ORDER : 1. The matter came up for preliminary hearing ‘B’ Group on 05.01.2018 and Miss Varsha R. Iyengar, learned counsel for the petitioners was heard in full, none appears for the respondent. In order to give one more opportunity, Court has directed to post the matter next week. Again, when the matter was posted on 12.01.2018, Court directed to post the matter next week. Again, on 19.01.2018, though case called twice, none appears for the respondent. In order to give one more opportunity, finally, one week’s time was granted to the learned counsel for the respondent to address his arguments, failing which the matter would be heard on the next date of hearing on behalf of the petitioners. Even though, on two occasions, time was granted for the respondent’s counsel to appear and argue, none appears for the respondent. Therefore, this Court has no option except to proceed with the hearing of the counsel for the petitioners. 2. The legal representatives of the original plaintiff filed the present writ petition against the order dated 29.08.2015 on I.A. No.5 made in O.S. No.236/2009 rejecting the application filed by the legal representatives of the original plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The mother of the plaintiffs Smt. Susheelamma originally filed a suit in O.S. No.236/2009 against the defendant (son) for declaration of title and permanent injunction contending that the suit schedule property belongs to the plaintiff who purchased under the registered Sale Deed dated 26.07.1974 out of her own earnings and it is her self-acquired property. The defendant has no manner of right, title and interest in the suit schedule property. Hence, plaintiff filed a suit. During the pendency of the suit, the original plaintiff-Smt. Sushelamma died. Therefore present petitioners who are the legal representatives were brought on record. 4. The defendant has filed the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that it is not the self-acquired property of the plaintiff alone and the property was purchased by the plaintiff’s husband in her name by selling the joint family properties and from the earnings of the defendant’s father. The plaintiff is the only name lender to the transaction and sale deed. The plaintiff has not at all contributed any amount of money in any form or shape in purchasing the suit property. The plaintiff is the only name lender to the transaction and sale deed. The plaintiff has not at all contributed any amount of money in any form or shape in purchasing the suit property. Earlier plaintiff’s husband i.e., father of the defendant purchased the house and site property in her name. The property purchased was for family benefit. Plaintiff has not at all having any property/income source, therefore the question of self-acquired property does not arise. It is further contended that owing to responsibility of maintaining the entire affairs of the family consisted of plaintiff, her husband and three daughters, the defendant was forced to engage in business. Out of his complete earnings, the defendant has improved the suit property, house properties and has performed the marriage of all the sisters by investing his money by incurring debts. The defendant is the owner and in possession of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff (including the sisters of the defendant) are not at all having any sort of right, interest, possession or whatsoever over the suit schedule property. Therefore, sought for dismissal of the suit. 5. After death of the original plaintiff, the legal representatives-present petitioners were brought on record and they have filed application for amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure contending that the original plaintiff died on 06.07.2013 leaving behind petitioners (daughters) and defendant (son). The suit schedule property belongs to joint family property and they are entitled to equal share i.e., 1/4th share each. Therefore, they sought for partition by amending the plaint. 6. The said application was resisted by the defendant on the ground that the very application filed for amendment will change the nature of the suit and it will lead to multiplicity of the proceedings and sought for dismissal of the application. 7. The Trial Court after considering the application, objections, by the impugned order dated 29.08.2015 rejected the application mainly on the ground that, originally the suit was filed for declaration of title and permanent injunction. After the death of the original plaintiff, the application was filed for amendment. If the said application is allowed, it will change the entire nature of the suit. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. 8. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Learned counsel for the respondent is absent. 9. Ms. After the death of the original plaintiff, the application was filed for amendment. If the said application is allowed, it will change the entire nature of the suit. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. 8. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Learned counsel for the respondent is absent. 9. Ms. Varsha S. Iyengar, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the trial Court rejected the application for amendment of the plaint on the ground that the suit filed for declaration and permanent injunction cannot be substituted for partition and separate possession merely on the basis of the application ignoring the fact that the suit schedule property was self acquired property of Smt. Susheelamma. The petitioners and the respondent are the only legal representatives of said Smt. Susheelamma and each of them are entitled for 1/4th share in the suit schedule property. 10. She further contended that the Trial Court was not justified in rejecting the application, when the legal position is clear that in order to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, a suit for declaration can be converted into a suit for partition. Therefore, she contended that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is liable to be quashed by allowing the present writ petition. 11. In support of her contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners, relied upon the dictum of this Court in the case of Neelawwa Vs Shivawwa reported in AIR 1989 Kar 45 and Abdul Rehman and another Vs. Mohd. Ruldu and others reported in (2012) 11 SCC 341 . 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is not in dispute that the original plaintiff- Susheelamma filed suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction in respect of suit schedule property against the defendant contending that it is her self acquired property. The same was disputed by the defendant, contending that it is not exclusive property of the plaintiff. The property purchased in the name of plaintiff out of joint family funds and defendant has been in exclusive and absolute possession and enjoyment of the suit property. It is also not in dispute that the original plaintiff Susheelamma died on 06.07.2013. The present petitioners were brought on record. The property purchased in the name of plaintiff out of joint family funds and defendant has been in exclusive and absolute possession and enjoyment of the suit property. It is also not in dispute that the original plaintiff Susheelamma died on 06.07.2013. The present petitioners were brought on record. Thereafter, the application for amendment came to be filed under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure specifically contending that the original plaintiff died leaving behind the present petitioners (daughters) and respondent (son) and they are entitled for equal share. The said application came to be opposed by the defendant by filing objections. The Trial Court considering the application and objections rejected the application relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kenchegowda (since deceased) by legal representatives Vs Siddegowda alias Motegowda reported in (1994) 4 SCC 294 dealing with the Provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 22 Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court held that if amendment application is allowed the very nature of the suit will be changed. Therefore, application cannot be allowed. The Trial Court failed to notice that it was a specific case of the original plaintiff that the suit schedule property is her self-acquired property. It is the case of the defendant-son that out of the joint family nucleus the property was purchased in the name of the plaintiff and it is not exclusive property of the plaintiff. After the death of the plaintiff, except plaintiffs and defendant there are no other legal representatives. When, the defense in the written statement is that out of the joint family nucleus the property was purchased in the name of the plaintiff, it clearly indicates that suit schedule property becomes the joint family property of the plaintiffs and defendant. The application for amendment can be allowed at any stage unless prejudice is caused to the other side. When, the defense in the written statement is that out of the joint family nucleus the property was purchased in the name of the plaintiff, it clearly indicates that suit schedule property becomes the joint family property of the plaintiffs and defendant. The application for amendment can be allowed at any stage unless prejudice is caused to the other side. When the original plaintiff claims that the suit schedule property was her self acquired property and the same was disputed by the defendant claiming that the property is joint family property, mere allowing the amendment application in a suit for partition will not prejudice the case of the defendant, since it is the case of the defendant in the written statement that it is a joint family property purchased in the name of the plaintiff by his father out of the joint family nucleus. 13. This Court in the case of Neelawwa Vs. Shivawwa reported in AIR 1989 Kar 45 in the similar circumstances held that the amendment should not come in the way granting a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the share of the plaintiff. Once it is declared that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the suit land, the necessary consequence of it is to divide the suit land and give her half share. Further, at para No.10, it is held as under: 10. “It is contended by Sri. W.A. Patil, learned counsel for respondent/defendant that in the suit the plaintiff has only sought for a declaration and injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the suit property and there is no prayer for partition and separate possession, therefore, the prayer made by the appellant cannot at all be granted. No doubt in the plaint there is no specific prayer made by the plaintiff seeking partition and separate possession of her share in the suit land. In our opinion, this should not come in the way of granting a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the share3 of the plaintiff. Once it declared that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the suit land, the necessary consequence of it is to divide the suit land and give her half share. In our opinion, this should not come in the way of granting a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the share3 of the plaintiff. Once it declared that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the suit land, the necessary consequence of it is to divide the suit land and give her half share. As all the persons entitled to a share in the suit land are parties to the suit, in a suit of this nature the relief for partition must be deemed to have been prayed for in the suit. It is also relevant to notice that the relief of partition and separate possession flows from the same cause of action which forms the basis for the present suit. Denial of such a relief would only lead to another suit. Multiplicity of proceedings should normally be avoided as the same tends to delay justice. IN the facts and circumstances of the case the relief of partition and separate possession becomes a consequential relief. In First Appeal No.231 of 1987, Rangappa Vs Jayamma decided on 17-6-1987 under more or less similar circumstances, we have considered the scope of R.7 of O. VII of the Civil P.C. and held as follows:- “The words “and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for” are wide enough to empower the Court to grant such relief. The plaintiff is entitled to, on the facts established on the evidence on record, even if such relief has not been specifically prayed for.” 8.1. The provisions of O. VII, R. 7 of the C.P.C. are so widely worded that they do enable the Court to pass a decree for partition in a suit for declaration of title to immoveable property and possession thereof where it turns out that the plaintiff is not entitled to all the interest claimed by him in the 'Suit property. In such a situation there is nothing unusual in giving relief to the parties by directing partition of the suit property according to the share of the parties established in the suit. The normal rule that relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted is not without an exception. In such a situation there is nothing unusual in giving relief to the parties by directing partition of the suit property according to the share of the parties established in the suit. The normal rule that relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted is not without an exception. Where substantial matters constituting the title of all the parities are touched in the issues and have been fully put in evidence the case does not fall within the aforesaid rule. The Court has to look into the substance of the claim in determining the nature of the relief to be granted. Of course, the Court while moulding the relief most take care to see that relief it grants is not inconsistent with the plaintiffs claim, and is based on the same cause of action on which the relief claimed in the suit, that it occasions no prejudice or causes embarrassment to the other side; that it is not larger than the one claimed in the suit, even it the plaintiff is really entitled to it, unless he amends the plaint; that it had not been barred by time on the date of presentation of the plaint. 8.2. No doubt the plaintiff has sought for exclusive title and he has not been able to prove his exclusive title; but has been able to prove, that he is entitled to a half share in the suit properties. When a party claims exclusive title to the suit property and is liable to establish that he is entitled to half of the suit property, it will not be unusual for the Court to pass a decree for partition and possession of his half share. In fact such a relief flows from the relief prayed for in the plaint that he is the exclusive owner of the entire property ,When a larger relief is med and what is established, is not the entire relief claimed in the suit but a part of it, as whole includes a part, larger relief includes smaller relief, and it also arises out of the same cause of action. Therefore in the instant case, nothing prevented the Court to pass a decree for partition, in order to avoid another suit for partition and. Therefore in the instant case, nothing prevented the Court to pass a decree for partition, in order to avoid another suit for partition and. to give relief to the party in conformity with the right he had established." Therefore we are of the view that instead of driving the plaintiff to another suit for partition, in conformity in the right she has established, it is just and appropriate to pass a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of her half share. The plaintiff has not also lost her right in the suit property because the, suit is filed within 12 years from the date of the death of her father. In other words, within 12 years from the date the property developed upon her or the succession opened. Therefore, even if a separate suit has to be filed for partition, the defendant does not have any sustainable defence. Therefore no prejudice will be caused to the defendant/ respondent if a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession is passed in this suit itself. Accordingly Point No. 2 is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Abdul Rehman and another Vs. Mohd. Ruldu and others reported in (2012) 11 SCC 341 while considering the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 7 Rule 1 and 7 held at para 10, 11, 16, 17 and 18 are as under:- “10. Before considering the factual details and the materials placed by the appellants praying for amendment of their plaint, it is useful to refer Order VI Rule 17 which is as under:- “17. Before considering the factual details and the materials placed by the appellants praying for amendment of their plaint, it is useful to refer Order VI Rule 17 which is as under:- “17. Amendment of pleadings.— The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” It is clear that parties to the suit are permitted to bring forward amendment of their pleadings at any stage of the proceeding for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between them. The Courts have to be liberal in accepting the same, if the same is made prior to the commencement of the trial. If such application is made after the commencement of the trial, in that event, the Court has to arrive at a conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” 11. The original provision was deleted by Amendment Act 46 of 1999, however, it has again been restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 but with an added proviso to prevent application for amendment being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. The above proviso, to some extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. At present, if application is filed after commencement of trial, it has to be shown that in spite of due diligence, it could not have been sought earlier. The object of the rule is that Courts should try the merits of the case that come before them and should, a. consequently, allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. The object of the rule is that Courts should try the merits of the case that come before them and should, a. consequently, allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This Court, in a series of decisions has held that the power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceeding in the interest of justice. The main purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimize the litigation and the plea b. that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. The above principles have been reiterated by this Court in J. Samuel and Others vs. Gattu Mahesh and Others, (2012) 2 SCC 300 and Rameshkumar Agarwal vs. Rajmala Exports Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (2012) 5 SCC 337 . Keeping the above principles in mind, let us consider whether the appellants have made out a case for amendment. 16. In view of the stand taken by the respondent Nos. 1-3 herein/Defendant Nos. 1-3 in their written statement and the observation of the High Court in the application filed for injunction, we are of the view that the proposed amendment to include a relief of declaration of title, in addition to the permanent injunction, is to protect their interest and not to change the basic nature of the suit as alleged. 17. In Pankaja & Anr. vs. Yellapa (Dead) By Lrs. & Ors., this Court held that if the granting of an amendment really sub-serves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation, the same should be allowed. In the same decision, it was further held that an amendment seeking declaration of title shall not introduce a different relief when the necessary factual basis had already been laid down in the plaint in regard to the title. 18. We reiterate that all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties should be allowed if it does not change the basic nature of the suit. 18. We reiterate that all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties should be allowed if it does not change the basic nature of the suit. A change in the nature of relief claimed shall not be considered as a change in the nature of suit and the power of amendment should be exercised in the larger interests of doing full and complete justice between the parties. 15. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court cannot be sustained and the application filed by the plaintiff has to be allowed. 16. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Trial Court dated 29.08.2015 on I.A.No.5 made in O.S. No.236/2009 is quashed. I.A. No.5 filed under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure is allowed with liberty to the defendant to file additional written statement, if any. Amendment sought will not change the nature of the suit. Ultimately, it is for the petitioners to establish their respective case based on the oral and documentary evidence on record. The Trial Court shall decide the suit strictly in accordance with law.