JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Ms. M. Deuri, learned counsel for the petitioner. None appears for the respondent when the matter is called upon. 2. The present revision petition is preferred under Section 19(4) of the Family Court’s Act, 1984 read with Section 482/401 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 27.04.2010 passed by the learned Family Court, Kamrup in Case No. F.C.(Crl) 318/2007. The Case No. F.C(Crl) 318/2007 was preferred by the present respondent being the wife against the petitioner for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. 1973. During the pendency of the proceeding under Section 125, the claimant wife filed a petition No.527/2010 with a prayer for an interim maintenance, on the ground that she was without any income and was required to live at the mercy of her father who also did not have sufficient income at that relevant point of time. 3. By the order dated 27.04.2010, the said petition of the respondent for an interim maintenance was given a consideration. The petitioner took the stand that his income was limited to Rs.1000/-per month from tuition and his other sources of income had in the meantime stopped. A stand was also taken by the petitioner husband that the respondent wife had some other source of income. 4. But in spite of such stand being taken, the learned Family Court, Guwahati by the order dated 27.04.2010 had granted an interim maintenance in favour of the respondent wife at an amount of Rs.1200/-per month. The interim maintenance is assailed in this revision petition and one of the grounds taken by the petitioner husband is that he is a daily wage earner. But such stand taken in the revision also appears to be contrary to the stand taken by the petitioner husband in the proceeding before the Family Court that he earns Rs.1,000/-per-month from tuition. 5. Be that as it may, without expressing any view on the merit of the aforesaid stand taken by the petitioner husband, we take note of that this revision petition has been preferred by the petitioner husband, amongst others, also under Section 94 of the Family Court Act, 1984. Section 19 of the Family Court Act is as follows:- “19. 5. Be that as it may, without expressing any view on the merit of the aforesaid stand taken by the petitioner husband, we take note of that this revision petition has been preferred by the petitioner husband, amongst others, also under Section 94 of the Family Court Act, 1984. Section 19 of the Family Court Act is as follows:- “19. Appeal-(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code or Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, nor being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. 2. No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties [or from an order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) Provided that nothing in this sub section shall apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) before the commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 1991] 3. Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order of a Family Court. 4. The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for an examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such proceeding. 5. Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. 6. An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more judges.” 6. Section 19(1) provides for an appeal against every judgment or order of a Family Court, not being an interlocutory order and such provision for appeal is notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 7. Section 19(1) provides for an appeal against every judgment or order of a Family Court, not being an interlocutory order and such provision for appeal is notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 7. Interlocutory order is defined in the Black Law’s Dictionary to be an order, which is interim or temporary in nature and does not constitute a final resolution of the whole controversy. In the instant case, the order dated 27.04.2010 is an order directing payment of interim maintenance and hence as no final adjudication has been made by the said order as regards the controversy in question, the order of 27.04.2010 has to be construed to be an interlocutory order. 8. As the order dated 27.04.2010 is admittedly an interlocutory order, the provision of appeal under Section 19(1) is apparently not applicable. Section 19(4) provides that High Court may on its own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceeding of any Family Court situated within its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of an order not being an interlocutory order. 9. The provision of 19(4) being also specific that it is applicable only in respect of any order not being an interlocutary, the Court is of the view that even the provision of Section 19(4) would be inapplicable in the present case, inasmuch as the order dated 27.04.2010 which apparently is an order for interim maintenance is an interlocutory order. 10. Further Section 19(5) provides that except for as aforesaid, which also means the provisions of section 19(1) and 19(4) amongst others, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. The expression any order appearing in section 19(5) apparently also includes an interlocutary order meaning thereby that even against an interlocutary order, except as provided in Sections 19(1) and 19(4), no appeal or revision shall lie. To that extent, it is taken note of that even the provisions of Sections 19(2) and 19(3) does not provide for any appeal or a revision against an interlocutory order by the Family Court. 11. To that extent, it is taken note of that even the provisions of Sections 19(2) and 19(3) does not provide for any appeal or a revision against an interlocutory order by the Family Court. 11. In such view of the matter, the Court is of the view that even if the petitioner seeks to invoke the provision of section 482/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but in view of the express bar under Section 19(5) of the Family Court’s of Act 1984, a revision shall also not lie under the aforesaid provisions. The said interpretation is further fortified from the provision of Section 19(1) of the Family Court’s Act 1984 which begins with the expression notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil procedure 1908 or in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 12. The provision of Section 19 having begun with a non obstante clause, the Court is of the further view that a revision against an order which may be an interlocutory order is not maintainable. 13. It is also taken note of that Section 7 of the Family Court Act of 1984 provides for the jurisdiction of a Family Court. Section 7(2)(a) provide that subject to the provisions of the Act, a Family Court shall also exercise the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the 1st Class under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. 1973 which relates to the maintenance of wives, children and parents. 14. Section 8 of the Family Court Act, 1984 provides for the exclusion of jurisdiction wherein, it is provided that where a Family Court has been established for any area, no Magistrate shall, in relation to such area, exercise any jurisdiction or powers under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. 1973. In the instant case, the dispute in question being related to a place where a Family Court had been constituted, the jurisdiction of the Court of Magistrate for exercising its power under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. 1973 had been excluded under provision of Section 8(b) of the Family Court Act, 1984. As the jurisdiction of the Magistrate had been excluded under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. 1973, no such jurisdiction is exercisable by a Magistrate under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 15. As the jurisdiction of the Magistrate had been excluded under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. 1973, no such jurisdiction is exercisable by a Magistrate under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 15. In such view of the matter also as the order of maintenance had been passed by the Family Court, and not by a Magistrate, the revisional power exercisable against any such order under Section 482/401 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 would not be applicable in the present case. 16. But as regards invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for maintaining a revision against the interlocutory order of the Family Court, we have to look to the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in its various pronouncements as regards the exercise of power under Article 227. 17. In Sadhana Lodh–vs-National Insurance Co. Ltd and Another reported in (2003) 3 SCC 524 in paragraph 7 it has been held as under:- “The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or Tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or the Tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or Tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision.” 18. In State Through Special Cell, New Delhi –vs- Navjot Sandhu Alias Afshan Guru and Others reported in (2003) 6 SCC 641 in paragraph-28 it has been held as under:- “Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction….. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order…….It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate Courts and Tribunal's within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise". 19. Again in Jagir Singh –vs- Ranbir Singh and Another reported in (1979) 1 SCC 560 in paragraph-6 it has been held as under:- “The power under Article, 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to the order of the High Court such source of power when the High Court itself did not, in terms, purport to exercise any such discretionary power. In the second place the power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 could only be exercised, sparingly, to keep subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Where the statute banned the exercise of revisional powers by the High Court, it would indeed require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, since the power of Superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law.” 20. From the aforesaid proposition laid down by the Supreme Court, the following can be culled out in respect of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an interlocutory order:- (a) The jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited to examine whether a inferior court or tribunal had proceeded within its prescribed parameters and such jurisdiction be not exercised even to correct an error apparent on the face of the record. (b) Although the power under Article 227 are wide enough and can be used to meet the ends of justice and can also be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order, but it must be exercised sparingly and only to keep the subordinate courts and tribunals within bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. (c) If the statute concerned bars the exercise of a revisional power, it would require a very exceptional circumstance to warrant an interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the power of superintendence is not meant to circumvent a statutory law nor it would be exercised as a cloak of an appeal in disguise. 21. In the instant case, the petitioner assails the interlcotuary order of the Family Court granting interim maintenance to the wife @ 1200/-per-month by taking a ground that he being a daily wage earner does not have the adequate financial resources to make payment and accordingly the Family Court had erred in passing an order of interim maintenance of Rs.1200/-and the facts and circumstance that were presented before the Court did not warrant such an order. The said ground on its own would not render it to be a ground that the learned Family Court had proceeded beyond its prescribed jurisdiction and authority. Further the petition under Article 227 being against an interlocutory order in a situation where the Family Court Act bars a revision against it, where an exceptional circumstance would have to be established by the petitioner in order to make the petition maintainable under Article 227, no such exceptional circumstance had been made out. 22. From the materials produced in the petition and the grounds taken therein, we find no such exceptional circumstance being made out. From the aforesaid point of view and keeping in mind the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court while interpreting the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, mainly as regards a revision against an interlocutory order, the Court is unable to convince itself that this revision petition is maintainable even under Article 227. 23. In such view of the matter, the revision petition is devoid of any merit and stands dismissed. 24. The Court appreciates the service of Ms. 23. In such view of the matter, the revision petition is devoid of any merit and stands dismissed. 24. The Court appreciates the service of Ms. M. Deuri, learned Amicus Curiae, and accordingly, as provided under the law the Assam State Legal Service Authority is directed to pay an amount of Rs.7500/-to the learned Amicus Curiae.