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2018 DIGILAW 1630 (JHR)

Future General India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ashma Khatoon

2018-07-25

RAJESH KUMAR

body2018
ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. No notice is required to be issued to the other side. 3. The claim petition has been filed stating therein that the deceased Md. Shagir @ Shagir Ahmad went to Patratu Market to sell cloths and when he was returning to his home by Tata Magic No. Jh-02Z-5967 on 30.03.2014 due to rash and negligence the said Tata Magic turned turtle just corned of the road near Chaingada, as a result of which deceased received serious injury. The deceased was admitted in C.C.L. Hospital, later on referred to RIMS, Ranchi and ultimately he died on 01.04.2014. 4. The composite petition has been filed under Section 140 and 166 of M.V. Act. 5. The Claim Tribunal has awarded Rs.50,000/-as compensation under Section 140 of M.V. Act. against this, the present appeal has been filed. 6. The adjudication under Section 166 of M.V. Act is still continuing. Para-5 of the judgment is quoted hereunder: “5. The humble rejoinder cum written argument dated 24.08.2016 u/s 140 of the M.V. Act has been filed on behalf of the O.P. No.2 stating therein that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger. On perusal of record, it appears that the matter raised by the O.P. No.2 will be heard on the stage of final adjudication of the claim case.” 7. Thus, the point of gratuitous passenger raised by the learned counsel for the appellant has been left open and it has been stipulated in the order that the same will be decided at the stage of final adjudication of the claim case. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by Apex Court reported in AIR 2007 SC 2582 in the case of Yallwwa vs. Insurance Co. Ltd. Para-11 16 to 19 and 30 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder: 11. One of the defences available to the insurer is breach of conditions specified in the policy. When such a defence is raised, the Tribunal is required to go into the said question. Section 140 of the Act does not contemplate that an insurance company shall also be liable to deposit the amount while it has no fault whatsoever in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 147 of the Act. 16. When such a defence is raised, the Tribunal is required to go into the said question. Section 140 of the Act does not contemplate that an insurance company shall also be liable to deposit the amount while it has no fault whatsoever in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 147 of the Act. 16. The question which is required to be considered is what would be the meaning of the term award when such a contention is raised. Although in a given situation having regard to the liability of the owner of the vehicle, a Claim Tribunal need not go into the question as to whether the owner of the vehicle in question was at fault or not, but determination of the liability of the insurance company, in our opinion, stands on a different footing. When a statutory liability has been imposed upon the owner, in our opinion, the same cannot extend the liability of an insurer to indemnify the owner, although in terms of the insurance policy or under the Act, it would not be liable therefor. 17. In a given case, the statutory liability of an insurance company, therefore, either may be nil or a sum lower than the amount specified under Section 140 of the Act. Thus, when a separate application is filed in terms of Section 140 of the Act, in terms of Section 168 thereof, an insurer has to be given a notice in which event, it goes without saying, it would be open to the insurance company to plead and prove that it is not liable at all. 18. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that there can be more than one award particularly when a sum paid may have to be adjusted from the final award. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 168 of the Act, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that an award for enforcing the right under Section 140 of the Act is also required to be passed under Section 168 only after the parties concerned have filed their pleadings and have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A Claims Tribunal, thus, must be satisfied that the conditions precedent specified in Section 140 of the Act have been substantiated, which is the basis for making an award. 19. A Claims Tribunal, thus, must be satisfied that the conditions precedent specified in Section 140 of the Act have been substantiated, which is the basis for making an award. 19. Furthermore, evidently, the amount directed to be paid even in terms of Chapter X of the Act must as of necessity, in the event of non-compliance of directions has to be recovered in terms of Section 174 of the Act. There is no other provision in the Act which takes care of such a situation. We, therefore, are of the opinion that even when objections are raised by the insurance company in regard to its liability, the Tribunal is required to render a decision upon the issue, which would attain finality and, thus, the same would be an award within the meaning of Section 173 of the Act. 30. In our considered opinion, the said decision does not state the law correctly. In our opinion, an order of the Tribunal awarding compensation under Section 140 of the Act is appealable under Section 173 as it amounts to an award under Section173. 9. Thus learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appeal is maintainable against the order passed under Section 140 of M.V. Act. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court reported in 2006 (3) J C R 9 (SC) in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla vs. Tilak Singh & Ors. to the effect that gratuitous passengers are the liability of owner of the offending vehicle not the insurance company. 11. Be that as it may, since, matter has been left open and it has to be decided finally under Section 166 of M.V. Act. 12. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present misc. appeal; accordingly the same is hereby dismissed. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant is permitted to withdraw the statutory amount. 14. I.A. No.5324 of 2018 is also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.