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2018 DIGILAW 1633 (GAU)

Atowar Rahman, S/o. Darog Ali v. State of Assam

2018-11-22

A.K.GOSWAMI, MANOJIT BHUYAN, MIR ALFAZ ALI

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JUDGMENT : MANOJIT BHUYAN, J. 1. Two questions of law have been referred by a Single Bench of this Court for a decision by a larger Bench. The matter is placed before this Full Bench, although the same could have been answered by a Division Bench of this Court. Be that as it may, the two questions are : (a) Whether registration of a Society by the Registrar of Firms & Societies, Assam under section 3 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 cannot be cancelled once registered ? (b) Whether the decision rendered in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha and another vs. State of Assam and another, reported in (2006) 1 GLR 395 to the above effect lays down the correct position in law? 2. To understand the circumstances under which reference has been made, only as an academic exercise, we may take notice of the following basic facts: (i) The writ petitioner i.e. Tapar Pathar Budhboria Saptahik Bazar Management Committee (in short the ‘Committee’) is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 ( in short the ‘Act’) bearing Certificate of Registration (CoR) No. RS/Kam(R)/264/L/173 of 2017-2018, dated 6.11.2017, issued by the Registrar of Firms & Societies, Assam. This was in terms of Section 3 of the Act. (ii) The respondent no.7 in the writ petition i.e. Atowar Rahman lodged complaint petition dated 1.12.2017 with the allegation that the CoR had been obtained by misrepresentation. (iii) A hearing was held with participation of Atowar Rahman and the Secretary of the writ petitioner Committee. An order dated 25.1.2008 came to be issued by the Registrar of Firms & Societies, Assam, cancelling the registration, after hearing the parties in dispute and on consideration of the documents indicated in the said order. (iv) The aforesaid order dated 25.1.2018 prompted institution of the related writ petition. Legal point, inter-alia, urged was that the Act does not empower the Registrar of Firms & Societies, Assam to cancel and/or to withdraw the registration certificate. Violation of the principles of natural justice in the process was also urged. (v) While issuing notice of Motion in the writ petition on 19.3.2018, an interim order was passed by keeping in abeyance the operation of the impugned order dated 25.1.2018 until further order. Violation of the principles of natural justice in the process was also urged. (v) While issuing notice of Motion in the writ petition on 19.3.2018, an interim order was passed by keeping in abeyance the operation of the impugned order dated 25.1.2018 until further order. While doing so, the Court took notice of the two-fold submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioner Committee – (i) that in the absence of any State amendment in the Act, no power vested on the Registrar to cancel the registration, (ii) that no power was also vested on the Registrar in view of the decision in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha(supra). (vi) On 2.5.2018 the respondent no.7 i.e. Atowar Rahman filed application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India with a prayer for vacating the aforesaid interim order dated 19.3.2018. The said application received consideration on 20.7.2018. A view at variance was expressed in respect of the case in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha (supra) by the learned Single Judge with the following observations : “On a perusal of the order dated 19.3.2018, it is seen that while passing the stay order, an earlier decision of this Court in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha and another vs. State of Assam and another, reported in (2006) 1 GLR 395 was considered. On going through the said decision, it is seen that it was a case where certificate of registration was withdrawn by the Registrar which was interfered with by a Single Bench of this Court on two grounds. The first ground was that before withdrawing the registration no opportunity of showing cause was given to the petitioner. The second ground, which is relevant for the present case, was that the Societies Registration Act, 1980 does not contain any provision for cancellation of registration certificate. Learned Single Judge observed that while some states had brought in amendments in the said Act to provide for cancellation of registration, State of Assam has not done so. Therefore, it was held that cancellation of registration by the Registrar was beyond jurisdiction since there is no such provision in the Act. A careful perusal of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1980 would go to show that Section 3 thereof vests the power of registration of a society on the Registrar. Therefore, it was held that cancellation of registration by the Registrar was beyond jurisdiction since there is no such provision in the Act. A careful perusal of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1980 would go to show that Section 3 thereof vests the power of registration of a society on the Registrar. But there is no such provision in the Societies Registration Act, 1980 for cancellation of registration of a society once registered under the said Act. Relevant portion of the judgment in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha(supra) reads as under :- “12. What is also important to note is that the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which embodies the provisions for registration of societies, is the enactment under which registration of the said Society took place. This Act does not contain any provision for cancellation of registration certificate. It may, however, be pointed out that some States have, in fact, made specific provisions for cancellation of registration of a society formed, constituted or registered under the Societies Registration Act,1860. 13. In Assam, the State Government has not admittedly, made any provision with regard to cancellation and/or withdrawal of the registration of a society registered under the said Act. In the face of these facts there can be no escape from the conclusion that the act of the Registrar in passing the impugned order, dated 27.09.2004, is ex facie beyond his jurisdiction and cannot be sustained.” While it is true that there is no specific provision under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 empowering the Registrar to cancel registration of a society after such registration, Sections 14, 16 and 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 may be looked into. As per Section 14, where any power is conferred, then unless a different intention appears, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Section 16 on the other hand says that power to appoint includes power to suspend or dismiss. The authority having the power to make appointment shall also have the power to suspend or dismiss any person so appointed in exercise of that power. On the other hand, as per Section 21, power to issue, would include power to add, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or by laws. In Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. Vs. The authority having the power to make appointment shall also have the power to suspend or dismiss any person so appointed in exercise of that power. On the other hand, as per Section 21, power to issue, would include power to add, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or by laws. In Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2001) 3 SCC 193, Supreme Court considered the scope and ambit of Section 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Supreme Court held that Section 21 is based on the principle that power to create includes the power to destroy and also the power to alter what is created. Section 21 embodies a rule of construction. An administrative decision is revocable. The principle laid down in Section 21 is of general application. The power to rescind is inherent in the power to issue which is without any limitation or condition. Therefore, to my mind, even though there is no specific provision in the Societies RegistrationAct,1860empowering the Registrar to cancel a registration once granted, by application of the provisions contained in Section 14, 16 and 21 of the General ClausesAct,1897, such a power is deducible. Rather it is implicit in the Registrar and has to be acknowledged, otherwise it will lead to a situation where registration of a society once obtained would be immune from interference by the registering authority under any circumstances, which cannot be the purport and object of any legislation. Considering the above, most respectfully I am of the opinion that the view take in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha(supra) may not reflect the correct position in law and requires a relook. Therefore, the following two questions of law may require a decision by a lager Bench.” 3. We have heard Mr. J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the applicant as well as Mr. D. Saikia, learned senior Additional Advocate General, Assam for the State respondents. Also heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel for the respondent no.7 i.e. Tapar Pathar Budhboria Saptahik Bazar Management Committee. 4. Before proceeding further, we take note of the statutory provisions placed for consideration and which assume utmost significance for deciding the reference : Section 3 and 13 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 “3. Also heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel for the respondent no.7 i.e. Tapar Pathar Budhboria Saptahik Bazar Management Committee. 4. Before proceeding further, we take note of the statutory provisions placed for consideration and which assume utmost significance for deciding the reference : Section 3 and 13 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 “3. Registration and fees – Upon such memorandum and certified copy being filed, the Registrar shall certify under his hand that the society is registered under this Act. There shall be paid to the Registrar for every such registration a fee of fifty rupees, or such smaller fee as the State Government may, from time to time, direct; and all fees so paid shall be accounted for the State Government. 13. Provision for dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs – Any number not less than three-fifth of the members of any society may determine that it shall be dissolved, and thereupon it shall be dissolved forthwith, or at the time then agreed upon, and all necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the property of the society, its claims and liabilities, according to the rules of the said society applicable thereto, if any, and if not, then as the governing body shall find expedient, provided that, in the event of any dispute arising among the said governing body or the members of the society, the adjustment of its affairs shall be referred to the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction of the district in which the chief building of the society is situate; and the Court shall make such order in the matter as it shall deem requisite: Provided that no society shall be dissolved unless three-fifths of the members shall have expressed a wish for such dissolution by their votes delivered in person, or by proxy, at a general meeting convened for the purpose: Provided that the State Government is a member of, or a contributor to, or otherwise interested in any society registered under this Act, such society shall not be dissolved without the consent of the Government of the State of registration. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 “21. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 “21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws – Where, by any Central Act or Regulations a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued. Section 23 of the Assam General Clauses Act, 1915 “23. Power to make to include power add to, to amend, vary or rescind orders, rules or bye-laws-Where, by any Act, a power to make or issue notifications, orders, schemes, rules, forms, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any) to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notification, orders, schemes, rules, forms or bye-laws so made. 5. We start with the submissions of Mr. K.N. Choudhury who fairly submits that the power of the Registrar under section 3 of the Act to certify under his hand that the society is registered, is an administrative act, not involving any lis. But the act of cancellation of registration by following a procedure involving a lis or contest between the contending parties before a statutory authority, undoubtedly partakes the character of a quasi-judicial act. According to Mr. Choudhury, the manner and the nature surrounding the passing of the impugned order of cancellation itself, sufficiently demonstrates existence of attributes of a quasi-judicial act. On this, reliance is placed in Indian National Congress (I) vs. Institute of Social Welfare & Others, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 685 for the proposition that if a statutory authority acts quasi-judicially and passes a quasi-judicial order, the provision of section 21 of the General Clauses Act would be without any application, as stated to be the case at hand. Further contention of Mr. Choudhury is that section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked in any situation if it has the potential to distort the very scheme of a statute or Act. To qualify on it, Mr. Choudhury submits that inarguably the Societies Registration Act does not vest power of cancellation on the Registrar. The legislature in its wisdom did not provide for it. To qualify on it, Mr. Choudhury submits that inarguably the Societies Registration Act does not vest power of cancellation on the Registrar. The legislature in its wisdom did not provide for it. What is provided is only the provision for dissolution of societies under section 13 thereof. Argument advanced is that having regard to the scheme, context and effect of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, which envisages express provision for dissolution of societies and not cancellation of registration, section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked. On this, reliance is placed in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ajay Singh and Others, reported in (1993) 1 SCC 302 . Reliance is also placed in the Constitution Bench judgment in Kamla Prasad Khetan and another vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1957 SC 676 to say that section 21 of the General Clauses Act embodies a rule of construction and that rule must have reference to the context and subject-matter of the particular statute to which it is being applied. It cannot have automatic application. These, in fact, are the primary legal arguments advanced by Mr. Choudhury to say that unless a society stands dissolved as per section 13 of the Act, the Registrar is without any power to cancel a CoR issued under section 3 of the said Act. Also, the act of cancellation being in the nature of a quasi-judicial act, there can be no applicability of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. To this extent, it is contended that the decision in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha (supra) lays down good law in denuding the Registrar of any power and jurisdiction to make cancellation of registration. 6. Per contra, Mr. D. Saikia opens his argument by showing that section 23 of the Assam General Clauses Act, 1915 is a pari-materia provision to section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Emphasis is laid on the word “orders” for the purpose of this reference and to say that power to make orders includes power to add, vary or rescind it. Mr. Saikia submits that, apparently, the Societies Registration Act does not envisage power on the Registrar to grant extension of registration. Emphasis is laid on the word “orders” for the purpose of this reference and to say that power to make orders includes power to add, vary or rescind it. Mr. Saikia submits that, apparently, the Societies Registration Act does not envisage power on the Registrar to grant extension of registration. However, it is by virtue of section 21 of the Central or the State Act that power is derived to add years or extend the period of the validity of a CoR. Referring to the case in hand, Mr. Saikia draws our attention to the writ petitioner society’s CoR, which is valid upto 05.11.2020. According to Mr. Saikia, as in the CoR at hand and numerous other instances, the power of the Registrar to certify extension of CoR never did give rise to any debate. Such power to grant extension is implicit and saved by virtue of the provisions under the General Clauses Act. Mr. Saikia further submits that the power of the Registrar to make cancellation of the CoR is, out and out, a pure administrative action without trace of quasi-judicial element, inasmuch as, no procedure is laid down under the Act to make cancellation. Mr. Saikia, however, submits that absence of a laid-down procedure in the Act cannot be construed to shut out the principles of natural justice as the same is inherent in any action touching upon the rights of an individual or a legal entity. Emphasising on the power of the Registrar as being in the realm of an administrative action, Mr. Saikia touches upon another aspect to say that the language employed in the CoR certifying registration of a society and given under the hand of the Registrar of Societies, Assam, makes it an “order” within the meaning and purview of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. This being the position, it is contended that application of said section 21 to add to, vary or rescind the order, which is in the form of a CoR, is clearly available. On the provision for dissolution envisaged in the Act, Mr. Saikia submits that dissolution cannot be an alternative to cancellation, inasmuch as, dissolution of a society under section 13 of the Act is a self-serving internal act of the society concerned, where the members of the society determine amongst themselves that the society shall be dissolved. 7. On the provision for dissolution envisaged in the Act, Mr. Saikia submits that dissolution cannot be an alternative to cancellation, inasmuch as, dissolution of a society under section 13 of the Act is a self-serving internal act of the society concerned, where the members of the society determine amongst themselves that the society shall be dissolved. 7. A handful of decisions are placed for consideration by Mr. Saikia in support of his argument. We have gone through the same and make reference to only those case-laws which, in our considered view, have bearing in the adjudication of this reference. Notice is had to (i) Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (Regd.) and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Others, reported in (1991) 2 SCC 604 , (ii) Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 193 , and (iii) Indian National Congress (I) vs. Institute of Social Welfare and Others, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 685 (also relied upon by Mr. K.N. Choudhury). 8. Mr. J. Ahmed, while adopting the arguments advanced by Mr. D. Saikia, also relies upon the case-law in Rasid Javed and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, reported in (2010) 7 SCC 781 for the proposition that it is fairly settled in law that under section 21 of the General Clauses Act an authority which has the power to issue a notification has the undoubted power to rescind or modify the notification in the like manner. 9. Broadly, the above are the contentions put forth, for and against the power of the Registrar to make cancellation and to the correctness or otherwise of the ratio and observation in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha (supra). 10. In support of their respective submissions the common judgment relied upon by both Mr. Choudhury and Mr. Saikia is the case in the Indian National Congress(I) (supra). We shall deal with it after noticing the other judgments cited by the counsels which we find to be relevant to answer the present reference. In Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (Regd.) (supra), the Supreme Court held that although it would be within the power of the Government to rescind a notification by virtue of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, such rescission would obligate affording of pre-decisional opportunity of hearing to the affected persons. In Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (Regd.) (supra), the Supreme Court held that although it would be within the power of the Government to rescind a notification by virtue of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, such rescission would obligate affording of pre-decisional opportunity of hearing to the affected persons. It was held that under section 21 a power to issue notification includes a power to rescind it subject to the qualification that such power should be “exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions if any”. When a notification is rescinded without hearing the affected party in exercise of the implied power of rescission, it cannot be said such power have been exercised subject to the like conditions within the scope of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. 11. In Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited (supra) the Supreme Court explained that section 21 of the General Clauses Act, which is of general application, is based on the principle that where there is power to create, it includes the power to destroy as well as the power to add to, amend, vary or rescind; where there is a power conferred on any authority to do a particular act, such power carries with it the power to withdraw, modify amend or cancel the act, which is exercisable in the like manner and subject to like conditions, if any, attached with the exercise of the power. 12. One of the primary questions in Indian National Congress (I) (supra) that fell for consideration and which is relevant to the case in hand was whether the Election Commission of India, which wields power to register a political party under section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is equally empowered to revoke or rescind the order of registration on application of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. To address this issue, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that another question that arose for consideration is whether the Election Commission of India in exercise of its powers under section 29A of the above Act, acts administratively or quasi-judicially. On consideration of the decisions referred to at paragraphs 20 to 24 of the reported case, the Supreme Court underlined the legal principles as to when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act. On consideration of the decisions referred to at paragraphs 20 to 24 of the reported case, the Supreme Court underlined the legal principles as to when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act. The Supreme Court noted the legal principle in the following words: “Where (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act (b) which would prejudicially affect the subject (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial”. Having said that, it was also held that mere presence of one or two attributes of quasi-judicial authority would not render an administrative act as a quasi-judicial act. As an illustration, it was held that an administrative authority may determine question of fact before arriving at a decision which may affect the right of an individual but such decision would not be quasi-judicial. Taking it further, it was held that what distinguishes an administrative act from a quasi-judicial act is that in the case of quasi-judicial functions under the relevant law the statutory authority is required to act judicially, in that, where law requires that an authority prior to arriving at a decision must make an enquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi-judicial authority. The Supreme Court took note of another test which distinguishes administrative function from quasi-judicial function. It was held that an authority who acts quasi-judicially is required to act according to the rules, whereas the authority which acts administratively is dictated by the policy and expediency. 13. Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, in the light of the above principles of law, was answered to be an order of the Election Commission which is neither a legislative nor an executive order but a quasi-judicial order. Such conclusion was drawn upon due examination of section 29A. 13. Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, in the light of the above principles of law, was answered to be an order of the Election Commission which is neither a legislative nor an executive order but a quasi-judicial order. Such conclusion was drawn upon due examination of section 29A. The Supreme Court made reference to the provisions under the various sub-sections of section 29A and explained that it provides as who can make an application for registration as a political party; the making of application to the Commission; what would be the contents of the application; provision obligating the Election Commission to consider all particulars in its possession and any other necessary and relevant factors and deciding either to register the association or body as a political party or not after giving the representatives of the association reasonable opportunity of being heard, and thereupon, the requirement to communicate its decision to the political party. The Supreme Court held that from the provisions under the various sub-sections of section 29A it is manifest that the Election Commission is required to act judicially and in this view of the matter the act of the Commission is quasi-judicial. 14. Unlike the rigour of procedure envisaged under section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, section 3 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 only obligates the Registrar to certify under his hand that the concerned society is registered under the Act. The requirement of payment of necessary fess to the Registrar for every such registration, which would be accounted for to the State Government, is also envisaged. A perusal of the provision under section 3 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the same does not involve any such procedure as under section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In other words, the function to be discharged by the Registrar under section 3 of the Act is administrative in nature and not a quasi-judicial one. Thus, unlike the power of the Election Commission under section 29A which is a quasi-judicial act, the power of the Registrar under section 3 of the Act is not a quasi-judicial but purely an administrative act. Thus, unlike the power of the Election Commission under section 29A which is a quasi-judicial act, the power of the Registrar under section 3 of the Act is not a quasi-judicial but purely an administrative act. Having held so, the very next issue for consideration would be whether the act of cancellation of the certificate of registration by the Registrar, involving a lis between parties, would amount to a quasi-judicial act. First and foremost, the Societies Registration Act does not prescribe any procedure requiring the statutory authority to act judicially under the statute for cancelling a certificate of registration. The presence of a lis or contest between the contending parties before a statutory authority will not alone clothe the proceeding as a quasi-judicial one. The determination of a question of fact and reaching a decision after affording opportunity of hearing to the person whose right is going to be affected, would not ipso-facto make it a quasi-judicial act. It would be a different thing if the concerned statute requires that an authority before arriving at a decision must make an enquiry. Such a requirement of law would make the authority a quasi-judicial authority. Taking a leaf out of the reported case in Indian National Congress (I) (supra), another test which distinguishes administrative function from quasi-judicial function is that the authority who acts quasi-judicially is required to act according to the rules, whereas the authority which acts administratively is dictated by policy and expediency. Without any doubt, the act of cancellation of CoR is not dictated by the Act. It is absolutely in the realm of expediency where, on a complaint that a CoR issued to a party had been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and/or on any sufficient reasons, the Registrar hears the parties and arrives at a decision. In the scheme of the Societies Registration Act, read with the Assam Act, no procedure is laid down as to the exercise of power of rescission or cancellation of a CoR. Notwithstanding such absence, the compliance of the principles of natural justice is inherently implicit and has to be read into in the exercise of the power of rescission or cancellation so as to sub-serve the very principles underlying section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The above decision of the Registrar is not the fall-out of any act which the statute specifically empowers the Registrar to do. The above decision of the Registrar is not the fall-out of any act which the statute specifically empowers the Registrar to do. It is an act of expediency on the part of the Registrar, which may involve a lis or contest between the contending parties. The presence of a lis or one or two attributes of a quasi-judicial act would not make an administrative act as quasi-judicial act, as in the instant case. 15. The certificate of registration under section 3 of the Act is issued in the form of an order whereby the Registrar certifies under his hand a society to be a registered society and authorises the validity of such registration to a time-bound period, with provision for extension. The form and contents of the certificate brings it within the meaning of “orders” under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, in the absence of provision for cancellation of certificate under the Societies Registration Act and such certificate being in the nature of an order issued by the statutory authority i.e. the Registrar of Societies, the application of section 21 of the General Clauses Act is clearly available to the Registrar to add to, vary or rescind the certificate. 16. To answer the argument advanced by Mr. Choudhury that the Societies Registration Act only envisages express provision for dissolution of societies and not cancellation of registration and if the latter is to be allowed by importing section 21 of the General Clauses Act the same would distort or nullify the very scheme of the Societies Registration Act, we say that the provision for dissolution of societies under section 13 of the Act is an internal act of the required number of members of any society to determine that it shall be dissolved. Such act is altogether a different legal concept from cancellation. Dissolution cannot be an alternative to cancellation. Whereas dissolution of a society is an act provided under the statute, cancellation of registration is an act dictated by expediency alone. To make cancellation of registration by the Registrar by virtue of section 21 of the General Clauses Act on ground of expediency, it cannot be said that the transaction would amount to eroding or distorting the very scheme under the Societies Registration Act. A contrary view cannot have legal sanction. 17. To make cancellation of registration by the Registrar by virtue of section 21 of the General Clauses Act on ground of expediency, it cannot be said that the transaction would amount to eroding or distorting the very scheme under the Societies Registration Act. A contrary view cannot have legal sanction. 17. To sum it up, we hold as follows : (i) an order of cancellation of certificate of registration (CoR) that had been granted under section 3 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, is an order within the meaning of “orders” under section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and that of section 23 of the Assam General Clauses Act, 1915. (ii) an order of cancellation of certificate of registration (CoR) by the Registrar of Societies is neither a legislative nor a quasi-judicial order but purely an administrative order. (iii) an order of the Registrar of Societies cancelling a certificate of registration on a complaint and after giving opportunity of hearing to the contending parties, is an act of expediency and not a quasi-judicial act dictated by rules. (iv) the provision of section 21 of the General Clauses Act and/or section 23 of the Assam General Clauses Act, in the absence of an express power of cancellation of certificate of registration (CoR) under the Societies Registration Act, is available empowering the Registrar to order cancellation, as above. 18. For all the foregoing reasons we answer the reference by holding that: (a) A society registered by the Registrar of Firms and Societies under section 3 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can be cancelled by such Registrar after registration and after affording opportunity of hearing to the party who may be affected. (b) The decision rendered in Sadou Asom Puthi Prakasak Aru Bikreta Sangtha and another vs. State of Assam and another, reported in (2006) 1 GLR 395 to the effect that in the absence of any provision with regard to cancellation and/or withdrawal of the registration of a society registered under the Act the act of the Registrar to cancel or withdraw is ex-facie beyond jurisdiction and cannot be sustained, in our considered view, does not lay down the correct position of law. 19. The Registry shall now list the writ petition and the Interlocutory Application before the appropriate Bench for consideration.