JUDGMENT : PRAKASH GUPTA, J. 1. The present second appeal has been filed by the defendants-appellants against the judgment and decree dt. 23.02.2011 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No. 4, Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as 'the appellate Court') in civil regular appeal No. 222/2009 (119/1998) whereby the learned appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants-appellants and confirmed the judgment and decree dt. 29.05.1998 passed by the Civil Judge (J.D.) & Judicial Magistrate, South, Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial Court') in Civil Suit No. 30/90. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that a suit for eviction was filed by the plaintiff-respondent Smt. Kausalya Devi (since deceased) wherein it is stated that the disputed shop comprising three 'Khand', was let out to the defendant. The appellant made default in payment of the rent. Additionally, the plaintiff is in bona fide need of the disputed shop for expanding her husband's and son’s business. It is further contended that the plaintiff has no other alternate vacant premises to store the whole-sale goods of the business of her husband and son. It is also alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff would suffer greater comparative hardship if the disputed shop is not vacated. The ground of subletting was also taken in the plaint. It was prayed that the suit be decreed on the aforesaid grounds of eviction. 3. The defendant-appellant Mirchumal (since deceased) resisted the suit by filing a written statement wherein he admitted the tenancy. However, it was stated that the terrace as well as the Chabutra outside the shop in dispute also fall within 'tenanted premises' of the defendant. It was averred that the defendant had offered to pay the rent but the same was refused by the plaintiff and in view of this, the defendant deposited the rent on regular basis in the Court. Plaintiff had renovated the adjoining shop in her possession according to her needs and requirements and therefore, her requirement was satisfied. Hence, the question of hardship does not arise. It was averred that the disputed shop is the only source of livelihood of the defendant's family. It was prayed that the suit be accordingly dismissed. 4. On the basis of pleading of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as 11 issues. Plaintiff examined only one witness, while six witnesses were examined by the defendant. It was averred that the disputed shop is the only source of livelihood of the defendant's family. It was prayed that the suit be accordingly dismissed. 4. On the basis of pleading of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as 11 issues. Plaintiff examined only one witness, while six witnesses were examined by the defendant. Having analysed and appreciated the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff required the suit shop reasonably and bona fidely and she will suffer greater hardship if the shop is not vacated by the defendant. The trial Court further ruled that the requirement of the plaintiff shall not be duly met even if part of the tenanted premises is vacated. 5. Dissatisfied, the defendant preferred an appeal. The first appellate Court after re-appreciating the entire evidence, dismissed the appeal. Thus, there are two findings of fact against the defendants-appellants. 6. Hence, this second appeal. 7. This second appeal was admitted vide order dt. 21.03.2012 and following substantial questions of law were framed:- "(i) Whether the Courts below have committed gross illegality and perversity in coming to a conclusion that the plaintiff respondent is in bona fide necessity of the shop to expand her business even when it was admitted that there are 23 to 24 rooms behind the plaintiff's shop? (ii) Whether the Court below acted illegally and contrary to the evidence on record in deciding the issue of comparative hardship and partial eviction against the defendant-appellants and thus rendering the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below vitiated and liable to be quashed and set aside by this Court? (iii) Whether the Courts below acted illegally and unreasonably in making out a case that the plaintiff respondent has no other premises to extend its business to whole sale even though she had renovated her shop and increased its size to satisfy her needs and requirement?" 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 9. It is submitted by learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that it was an admitted fact that the shop was already in possession of the plaintiff and was renovated according to the needs and requirements of the plaintiff, therefore, her alleged needs of bigger shop stood satisfied. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 9. It is submitted by learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that it was an admitted fact that the shop was already in possession of the plaintiff and was renovated according to the needs and requirements of the plaintiff, therefore, her alleged needs of bigger shop stood satisfied. Both the Courts below have failed to consider this fact and therefore, the judgments of both the Courts below are unsustainable. It is submitted that both the Courts below have failed to consider this fact that plaintiff did not appear in the witness box to prove her necessity. Her son without producing any power of attorney examined himself as only witness. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has proved her personal bona fide necessity. It is also submitted that the plaintiff has suppressed the material facts from the Courts below which disentitles her to any relief against the defendants appellants from the Court. It is also submitted that indisputedly, 23 to 24 rooms are available behind the plaintiff's shop and plaintiff can expand her business through using the said rooms. It is also submitted that during the pendency of the appeal, husband of the plaintiff has been expired and this subsequent development should be looked into by the Court. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel for the appellants relies on the following judgments:- 1. Sheshambal (D) Thr. L.Rs. vs. M/s. Chelur Corporation Chelur Buildings & Ors., 2010 SAR (Civil) 283; 2. Adil Jamshed Frenchman (D) by LRs. vs. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust & Ors., 2005 (1) RCR 284; 3. Sri Kempaiah vs. Lingaiah & Ors., 2001 (2) RLR 612 . 10. On the other hand, Shri M.M. Ranjan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that there is a concurrent findings of fact of both the Court below that the plaintiff required the said shop reasonably and bona fidely. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement and the tenant cannot dictate him as to how and in what manner the requirement would be fulfilled. Both the Courts below have considered the evidence available on record in right perspective. There is no illegality or perversity in the judgments of both the Courts below. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel for the respondents relies on the following judgments:- 1. Both the Courts below have considered the evidence available on record in right perspective. There is no illegality or perversity in the judgments of both the Courts below. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel for the respondents relies on the following judgments:- 1. Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 1999 (1) All India Rent Control Journal 158; 2. Mst. Bega Begum & Ors. vs. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 272; 3. Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors., (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 252. 11. Before dealing with the contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to discuss the rulings cited by learned counsel for both the parties. In Sheshambal (D) (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that subsequent events and development may also be taken into account. Relevant para of the said judgment reads as under:- "10. Confronted with the above position Mr. Vishwanathan made in generous submission. He contended that the rights and obligations of the parties get crystallized at the time of institution of the suit so that any subsequent development is not only inconsequential but wholly irrelevant for determination of the case before this Court. Learned counsel sought to extend that principle to the case at hand in an attempt persuade us to shut out the subsequent event of the death of the original petitioners from consideration. We regret to say that we do not see any basis for the submission so vehemently urged before us by Mr. Vishwanathan. While it is true that the right to relief must be judged by reference to the date suit or the legal proceedings were instituted, it is equally true that if subsequent to the filing of the suit, certain developments take place that have a bearing on the right to relief claimed by a party, such subsequent events cannot be shut out from consideration. What the Court in such a situation is expected to do is to examine the impact of the said subsequent development on the right to relief claimed by a party and, if necessary, mould the relief suitably so that the same is tailored to the situation that obtains on the date the relief is actually granted. That proposition of law is, in our view, fairly settled by the decisions of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu case (supra). That proposition of law is, in our view, fairly settled by the decisions of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu case (supra). Krishna Iyer J. (as His Lordship then was) has in his concurring judgment lucidly summed up legal position in the following words: "............If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed............." In Adil Jamshed Frenchman (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the requirement should be natural, real, sincere and honest. Relevant paras of the said judgment read as under:- "8. The decree of the trial Court is based on the landlords' bona fide requirement of the accommodation. In appeal, the question before the Court for adjudication is whether the trial Court was justified in passing the decree in favour of the landlords on the ground of bona fide need and the tenants obviously are within their rights to show that the need of the landlords is not genuine. The evidence produced in that direction would be relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the question of need of landlords. In Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. The evidence produced in that direction would be relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the question of need of landlords. In Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 , this Court has held that a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contra-distinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a Judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. In Deena Nath vs. Pooran Lal (2001) 5 SCC 705 , this Court reiterated that bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 9. It cannot be denied that the documents sought to be produced by the tenants are material and if substantiated, would have a material effect on the case of the landlords of their bona fide need of the suit premises. If, in fact, the landlord has entered into negotiations with M/s. Godrej Boyce Co. Ltd. for selling or use by them of the property, the need cannot be said to be genuine. Similarly, a change in the construction plan may show that the alleged need of the landlord for the construction may not be genuine. The third document proposes to demolish the case of availability of the funds for construction with the landlord. Two of the documents came into existence after the passing of the decree by the trial Court. Similarly, the correspondence entered into by the landlord with a third party could not have been within the knowledge of the tenant and therefore, the tenants' statement that the documents could not have been produced before the trial Court, in spite of the exercise of due diligence, was highly probable. Similarly, the correspondence entered into by the landlord with a third party could not have been within the knowledge of the tenant and therefore, the tenants' statement that the documents could not have been produced before the trial Court, in spite of the exercise of due diligence, was highly probable. In such circumstances, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the first appellate Court permitting additional evidence." In Sri Kempaiah vs. Lingaiah (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that mere wish or desire is not sufficient to prove necessity. Relevant para of the said judgment reads asunder:- "9. Though it was pleaded that the appellant was under compulsion to vacate the premises under his occupation as his landlord was insisting to vacate the same, yet no evidence was led in that behalf. It may have been a wish or desire of the appellant to occupy the leased premises but he failed to prove the reasonable bona fide requirement as contemplated under Sec. 21(1)(h) of the Act. The word "require" used in clause (h) of sub-clause (1) of Section 21 of the Act implies something more than a mere wish or impulse or desire on the part of the landlord. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between "desire" and "require" lies in the insistence of the need. There is an element of "must have" in the case of "require" which is not present in the case of mere "desire". The ground mentioned in clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act emphasizes to the genuineness of the requirement of the landlord. The term "reasonable and bona fide requirement" are complementary and supplementary to each other in the context. Dealing with a similar provision under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court in Dattatraya Laxman Kamble vs. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr., 1999 (4) SCC 1 held that when the Legislature employed the two terms together the message to be gathered is that requirement must be really genuine from any reasonable standard. Where eviction is sought on the aforesaid ground, a duty is cast upon the Court to satisfy itself with the alleged requirement of the landlord. Where eviction is sought on the aforesaid ground, a duty is cast upon the Court to satisfy itself with the alleged requirement of the landlord. Even in a case where the tenant does not contest or dispute the claim of the landlord and the tenancy is governed by the Rent Control legislation, the Court is obliged to look into the claim independently and give a specific finding in that regard." In Sarla Ahuja (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is not permissible for the High Court to come to a different fact finding unless finding arrived at by the lower Court on facts is unreasonable. Relevant paras of the said judgment read as under:- "6. The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the case must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of the Rent Controller is "according to the law." In other works, the High Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing the order under Sec. 25B. It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such a finding on the materials available. 7. Although, the work "revision" is not employed in the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act it is evident from the language used therein that the power conferred is revisional power. In legal parlance distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction is well understood. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction is wide enough to afford a re-hearing of the whole case for enabling the appellate forum to arrive at fresh conclusions untrammeled by the conclusions reached in the order challenged before it. Of course, the statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe or limit the width of such appellate powers. Revisional power on the contrary, is ordinarily a power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction of such revisional power would depend upon how the statute has couched such power therein. Of course, the statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe or limit the width of such appellate powers. Revisional power on the contrary, is ordinarily a power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction of such revisional power would depend upon how the statute has couched such power therein. In some legislations revisional jurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity, legality or propriety of proceedings or decisions of the subordinate Court. In Sri Raj Lakshmi Dyeing Works vs. Rangaswamy this Court considered the scope of the words ("the High Court may call for and examine the records .... to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, illegality or propriety of any decision or order...") by which power of revision has been conferred by a particular statute. Dealing with the contention that the above words indicated conferment of a very wide power on the revisional authority, this Court has observed thus in the said decision: "The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words to satisfy 'itself under the Section appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court under the Section is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in the Section the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority." In Mst. Bega Begum (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the requirement only signifies an element of genuine need. The Hon'ble Court also considered the scope and ambit of the expression, 'reasonable requirement'. In relevant para 13 & 17, the Hon'ble Court observed as under:- "(13) Moreover section 11(h) of the Act uses the words 'reasonable requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term 'need' or 'requirement should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for one landlord to get a decree for eviction. It seems to us that the connotation of the term 'need' or 'requirement should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for one landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other State in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word requirement and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need. (17) This brings us to the next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents regarding the interpretation of section 11(1)(h) of the Act. Section 11(1)(h) of the Act runs thus:- 11(1)(h).....................where the house or shop is reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or re-building, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house or shop is held; Explanation. The Court in determining the reasonableness of requirement for purposes of building or rebuilding shall have regard to the comparative public benefit or disadvantage by extending or diminishing accommodation, and in determining reasonableness of requirement for occupation shall have regard to the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the landlord or the person for whose benefit the house or shop is held and of the tenant. It was submitted by Mr. Andley learned counsel for the respondents that the words used' in section 11(1)(h) are "that the house should be required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of and person for whose benefit the house or shop is held." It was argued that the words "own occupation clearly postulate that the landlord must require it for his personal residence and not for starting any business in the house. We are, however, unable to agree with this argument. The provision is meant for the benefit of the landlord and, therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object of the Act. The word 'occupation' does not exclude the possibility of the landlord starting a business or running a hotel in the shop which also would amount to personal occupation by the landlord. The provision is meant for the benefit of the landlord and, therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object of the Act. The word 'occupation' does not exclude the possibility of the landlord starting a business or running a hotel in the shop which also would amount to personal occupation by the landlord. In our opinion, the section contemplates the actual possession of the landlord, whether for his own residence or for his business. It is manifest that even if the landlord is running a hotel in the house, he is undoubtedly in possession or occupation of the house in the legal sense of the term. Furthermore, the section is wide enough to include the necessity of not only the landlord but also of the persons who are living with him as members or the same family." In Sait Nagjee Purushotham (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it cannot be said that a person is already having a business at one place cannot expand his business. It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires a premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of his business, this is no ground to say that a landlord is already having their business. Relevant para of the said judgment reads as under- "4. First of all we shall take up the question of bona fide need of the landlords. So far as the partition of the property and the present premises coming to the share of the landlords are concerned, there is no dispute that the portion of the building has come to the share of the landlords and they are the owners as a result of the partition of the family properties. But the question is whether the landlords who are the owners of the portion of the building have substantiated the allegation with regard to the bona fide need or not. We have gone through the findings of the trial Court as well as that of the appellate authority and the High Court and after closely scrutinizing the same, we do not think that the finding recorded by appellate Court and the High Court can be interfered by this Court on the ground of being perverse or without any basis. We have gone through the findings of the trial Court as well as that of the appellate authority and the High Court and after closely scrutinizing the same, we do not think that the finding recorded by appellate Court and the High Court can be interfered by this Court on the ground of being perverse or without any basis. The landlords have led evidence to show that one of their sons who had requisite qualification for starting a computer institute wants to establish the same at Calicut and others for extension of their business.. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court and the High Court examined the statements of P.Ws. 2 & 3 and after considering their evidence, the appellate Court reversed the finding of the trial Court and held that the need of the respondent-landlords to start business at Calicut, is bona fide & genuine. It was held that it cannot be said that a person who is already having business at one place cannot expand his business at any other place in the country. It is true that the landlords have their business spreading over Chennai and Hyderabad and if they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it cannot be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of the tenant from the premises in question. It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlords and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. However, the trial Court held in favour of tenant-appellant. But the appellate Court as well as the High Court after scrutinizing the evidence on record, reversed the finding of the trial Court and held that the need of establishing the business at Calicut by the landlords cannot be said to be lacking in bona fide." 12. Indisputably, the measurement of the shop, which is in possession of the plaintiff, is 9 x 30 feet. Indisputably, the measurement of the shop, which is in possession of the plaintiff, is 9 x 30 feet. Further, the existence of a way leading to the house is also not in dispute. Moreover, it is also admitted that behind the said shop, the plaintiff has her house, which has about 23-24 rooms. All these facts have been admitted by Jagdish (P.W.1) in his cross-examination. In my considered opinion, mere existence of a house with 23-24 rooms right behind the shop does not mean that the plaintiff has no bona fide and reasonable need of the shop. The defendant-tenant has accepted in his cross-examination that the said house behind the shop has been occupied by the plaintiff along with her family and other tenants for residential purposes. There is nothing on record to suggest that any of the 23 rooms in the house behind the shop is vacant and the same can be used by the plaintiff to fulfill her bona fide needs. Further, in the considered view of this Court, the tenant cannot direct or suggest the landlord the manner in which the landlord should fulfill his/her needs as the landlord is the best judge of his own needs and requirements. 13. In the instant case, as far as the question of the plaintiff's failure to appear in the witness box is concerned, in this regard, it is a settled law that the person for whose bona fide and reasonable need the suit has been filed should appear and give his/her testimony so that the other side can be given an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the said witness. Apart from this, it is a suit solely between the tenant and the landlord and the basis of the suit is the bona fide and reasonable need of the son and that of the husband of the plaintiff. The son, Jagdish had presented himself for examination after having told that the plaintiff is an old and uneducated lady of 60-65 years and he has been collecting the monthly rent from the defendant and doing all the other work on behalf of the plaintiff. It is thus, clear that he is aware of all the necessary details as regards the disputed shop. It is thus, clear that he is aware of all the necessary details as regards the disputed shop. Therefore, no benefit of the mere absence of the plaintiff to appear for examination can be given to the defendants, as Jagdish (P.W.1) was a competent witness as far as the bona fide requirement is concerned. 14. As far as the bona fide and reasonable need of the plaintiff-landlord is concerned, it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that during the pendency of the appeal, the husband of the plaintiff passed away and hence, the bona fide requirement does not subsist any longer. 15. In the suit, the plaintiff had averred the bona fide and reasonable need of her husband and that of her son and the shop of the plaintiff wherefrom husband and son of the plaintiff had been carrying on business is a commercial establishment. The mere factum of death of the plaintiff's husband does not mean that bona fide and reasonable need of that of her son also came to an end. Plaintiff's son Jagdish has still been carrying on the business in the same premises with full competence and ability. Thus, the death of Ram Narayan i.e., the husband of the plaintiff during the pendency of the appeal, does not adversely affect the necessity of the plaintiff and that of her son and also does not have any bearing on her claim. 16. The defendant himself affirmed that the plaintiff resides in the house which is behind the shop. Apart from this, there is no other substantial evidence which even remotely suggests that the plaintiff owns and is in possession of any other vacant room which can be used by her as a warehouse. Thus, as regards factum of the availability of other vacant premises which can be used by the plaintiff to fulfill her bona fide requirements is concerned, no document has been produced and proved in evidence by the defendant to establish the existence of such alternate premises. Thus, a mere averment is not enough to prove that the plaintiff has enough vacant space in her possession to fulfill the reasonable needs and requirements of her son. 17. As far as the question of expanding the shop is concerned, the defendant has stated that the size of the shop has been increased from 9 x 32 feet to 12 x 40 feet. 17. As far as the question of expanding the shop is concerned, the defendant has stated that the size of the shop has been increased from 9 x 32 feet to 12 x 40 feet. However, the plaintiff has not been cross-examined on this aspect which can even remotely suggest that the size of the shop was indeed increased to 12 x 40 feet. Though, during the course of arguments, it was accepted by the plaintiffs counsel that the size of the shop was increased by 2-3 feet and certain renovations were also done. But even if it is accepted that the shop now measures 11 x 32 feet, the area of the shop is still almost the same, as alleged in the plaint. Moreover, if any area is still left vacant, such area would be utilized for further expansion of the business, which is a reasonable and bona fide need too. The need to carry out and expand one's business cannot be termed as an unreasonable one. Thus, it cannot be assumed that merely because Jagdish is carrying on his business in the adjacent shop, he does not need the disputed shop for expanding his business. When a person wants to expand his business and improve his income thereby increasing his standard of living, such a need is a bona fide and reasonable need. 18. Further, the bona fides of the plaintiff are also evident from the fact that she has herself got the shop renovated and also got the area of the shop increased, which is affirmed by the defendant too. This makes it clear that the conduct of the plaintiff has always been to expand her business and her need does not seem to be artificial or bogus. 19. From the very beginning, the case of the plaintiff has been that she wants to remove the wall in between the two shops and then use the entire area for stocking and storing goods for wholesale. It is also an admitted fact that the shop has been used to carry on business of both retail and wholesale and one sack of grain measures 3 feet in height and 2 feet in width. It is also an admitted fact that the shop has been used to carry on business of both retail and wholesale and one sack of grain measures 3 feet in height and 2 feet in width. It is also the case of the plaintiff that at any point of time they need to store at least 250-350 such sacks and it is for the stocking and storage of these sacks along with gunny bags and cartons, that the plaintiff needs the disputed shops. Thus, in the considered view of this Court, the need of the plaintiff is reasonable and bona fide. 20. Learned trial Court's observations, as regards the bona fide need of the plaintiff's son to carry on his business and expand, considering his experience, amount invested and the availability of alternate premises, is based on a proper appreciation of evidence. The plaintiff has been able to prove her bona fide and reasonable need successfully. 21. As far as the questions of comparative hardship and partial eviction are concerned, both the Courts below have appreciated the evidence in consonance with law. There is no case of misreading and non reading of material evidence. These concurrent findings of facts are correct and no interference of this Court is required. None of the three substantial questions of law pertain to any legal infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgments & decrees. What is reflected from the three questions framed above is regarding perversity of the impugned judgment and do not involve any question of law. Therefore, this Court has examined the evidence in detail and a discussion of the same given above reveals that the judgments of both the Courts below are not perverse. 22. Thus, the substantial questions of law framed by this Court are decided against the appellants. 23. In view of the above discussions, this appeal is devoid of any merits is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.