ORDER M.S. Sanklecha, J. - These three Appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act), challenge the common order dated 30th January, 2015 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal). The common impugned order dated 30th January, 2015 is in respect of Assessment Years 2004-05, 2005-06,and 2007-08. These three Appeals relates to Assessment Years 2004-05,and 2007-08. 2. In all these Appeals, Revenue urges the following questions of law, for our consideration: "(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that since interest on security deposits kept with banks is offered to tax as income under other heads, adding notional interest on security deposit in ALV will amount to double taxation without appreciating that interest on security was considered by AO only to work out fair market rent which property would have fetched. The Tribunal failed to appreciate that interest free security deposit distorted the fair market rent which the impugned property would have fetched if given to tenant having arm''s length relationship? (b) Whether on the facts and in circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in holding that society maintenance charges are to be excluded from ALV under section 23(1) (b) without appreciating the fact that the actual rent received/receivable is independent of such charges and that the only deduction allowable under the Act is per section 24?" 3. Re. Question (a): (i) As it is evident from the question, the issue relates to adding of notional interest on the interest free security deposit received by the Respondent-Assessee from its licensee to the rent received. This to determine the Annual Letting Value (ALV) of the property in terms of Section 23(1)(b) of the Act. (ii) It is an undisputed position before the authorities that the property being let out on leave and license, is not covered by the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1991. Thus, no occasion to invoke the concept of standard rent to determine the sum for which the property may be reasonably be expected to be let. (iii) It is the case of the Revenue that amounts received as a rent/licence fee in respect of similar/identical properties, should be taken as the ALV in terms of Section 23(1)(b) of the Act. Thus, no occasion to invoke the concept of standard rent to determine the sum for which the property may be reasonably be expected to be let. (iii) It is the case of the Revenue that amounts received as a rent/licence fee in respect of similar/identical properties, should be taken as the ALV in terms of Section 23(1)(b) of the Act. It is on aforesaid basis that the Assessing Officer included the interest which was earned on the interest free security deposit received from the licencee. The interest obtained by the Respondent on the security deposit kept in the bank, is added to the licence fee in determining the rent received by the Respondent-Assessee. (iv) The impugned order of the Tribunal allowed the Assessee''s appeal on the above issue by holding that, this issue is being covered by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Tip Top Typography 368 ITR 330. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has held that for application of Section 23(1)(b) of the Act, the Assessing Officer has to first determine the fair rent which would be received in respect of the said property. In the absence of standard rent, the fair rent of the property should be determined by adopting Municipal Rateable Value. However, where the Assessing Officer finds that fixing of the rent by parties is doubtful then he would be entitled to disregard the same after hearing the parties in respect thereof. Only in such cases, the Municipal Rateable Value can be ignored. (v) In the present facts, it is not the case of the Revenue that fixing of the rent was inflated/deflated on extraneous consideration. Parties to the Agreement are at Arms Length. Therefore, the Municipal Rateable Value can be taken as a safe guide to determine the fair rent of the property. (vi) In the present facts, the Assessing Officer has not carried out necessary exercise to determine the Municipal Rateable Value of the said property. Thus, he could not have come to the conclusion that the amount received/receivable by the Assessee under Section 23(1)(b) of the Act is in excess of fair rent. (vi) In the present facts, the Assessing Officer has not carried out necessary exercise to determine the Municipal Rateable Value of the said property. Thus, he could not have come to the conclusion that the amount received/receivable by the Assessee under Section 23(1)(b) of the Act is in excess of fair rent. (vii) In the Tip Top Typography (supra), our Court, while dealing with Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, held that in the absence of Assessing Officer in carrying out the exercise to determine the fair rent in terms of the Municipal Rateable Value, the Revenue would not be justified in concluding that the amounts received are in excess of the rent which the property may be reasonably fetch on application of the fair rent by invoking the Municipal Rateable Value. It was in the aforesaid circumstances that, the impugned order of the Tribunal, allowed the Respondent-Assessee''s appeal by following the decision of this Court in Tip Top Typography (supra). Thus, no fault can be found with the impugned order of the Tribunal, holding that once interest on fixed deposit of interest free security deposit is subjected to tax as income from other sources, no occasion to tax it again as a part of the rent can arise. (viii) In the above view, we find that as the issue stands concluded in favour of the Respondent-Assessee by the decision of this Court in Tip Top Typography (supra), the question as framed do not give rise to any substantial questions of law. Thus, not entertained. 4. Re. Question (b): Appeal admitted on the substantial question of law at (b). 5. Registry is directed to communicate copy of this order to the Tribunal. This would enable the Tribunal to keep papers and proceedings relating to the present appeal available, to be produced when sought for by the Court.