JUDGMENT : Mir Alfaz Ali, J. This jail appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 19.11.2016, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bongaigaon, in Sessions Case No.107(BGN)/2014. By the said judgment, the appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5,000/- with default stipulation. 2. We have heard Ms. B Sarma, learned Amicus Curiae and Ms. S Jahan, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam for the State respondent, who have also taken us through the evidence and materials available on record. 3. The deceased in the present case was the brother of the appellant. 4. As per the prosecution case, on 02.07.2014 at about 5’ o clock, in the morning, the appellant Purna Ch. Sarania inflicted injuries on his elder brother (victim) with an axe. Immediately he was taken to Lower Assam Hospital for treatment, and then shifted to GNRC, Hospital, Guwahati, where he succumbed to the injuries at about 6 pm, on the same day. Dhaneswar Sarania, (PW-1), lodged the FIR, (Exhibit-1), on the basis of which, Bongaigaon PS Case No.391/2014 under Section 302 IPC was registered and investigation commenced. During investigation, inquest report was prepared by the Investigating Officer and post-mortem examination was conducted by (PW-9) Dr. Arpan Mazumdar. 5. Dr. Arpan Mazumdar, who conducted the post-mortem examination found the following injuries on the body of the victim: (1) Stitched wound of length 7 cm present over right parietal area, 8 cm away from midline and 10 cm above the mastoid repaired with 6 stitches. On removal of the stitches, a laceration of size 7 cm × 5 cm × scalp deep is found. (2) Stitched wound of length 5 cm present over right occipital area, 9 cm away from midline and 10 cm above the mastoid repaired with 5 stitches. On removal of the stitches a laceration of size 6 cm × 5 cm × scalp deep is found. (3) Stitched wound of length 4 cm present over occipital area, 5 cm away from midline and 4 cm below the injury number (2). On removal of the stitches a laceration of size 4 cm × 5 cm × scalp deep is found. (4) Abrasion of size 2 cm × 2 cm is present over left maxillary area. Scalp : contusion present over the right fronto, parieto, occipital areas. On removal of the stitches a laceration of size 4 cm × 5 cm × scalp deep is found. (4) Abrasion of size 2 cm × 2 cm is present over left maxillary area. Scalp : contusion present over the right fronto, parieto, occipital areas. Skull : Fissured fracture of length 7 cm is present over right parietal area, running horizontally, 10 cm above the mastoid. Membrane : Subdural haemorrhage present over both cerebral hemisphere. In the opinion of the doctor, death was due to coma as a result of injury sustained over the head and all the injuries were ante-mortem and caused by blunt force impact. Approximate time of death is 12-22 hours before the post-mortem examination. 6. On conclusion of investigation, charge-sheet was laid against the accused/appellant under Section 302 IPC and eventually he stood trial for the offence of murder. 7. In Course of trial, prosecution examined 9 (nine) witnesses to establish the charge. The defence did not adduce any evidence. On appreciation of evidence, learned trial Court convicted the accused/appellant under Section 302 IPC and awarded sentence as indicated above. 8. The factum of homicidal death of the victim has not been disputed. Evidently, there was no direct evidence or eye witness, having seen the accused inflicting injuries. However, learned trial Court essentially relying on certain circumstances and the extra judicial confession made by the accused as well as the confession made during the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., recorded conviction and imposed sentence. 9. PW-4 Kanan Sarania, wife of the victim deposed, that while she woke up in the morning, she found her husband sitting in the verandah, the accused was also present there. She went to have bath. While coming out from the bathroom, she found her husband (victim) lying on the verandah with injuries. She also noticed the accused standing there, with an axe in his hand and having seen her (PW-4), the accused left the place. She raised alarm and the other members of the family arrived there. The oral testimony of the PW-4, that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence, she had seen him with axe in his hand and he (accused) left the place seeing PW-4, remained unshaken during cross-examination. 10. The PW-2 Suren Sarania, is the father of the deceased and the accused. The oral testimony of the PW-4, that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence, she had seen him with axe in his hand and he (accused) left the place seeing PW-4, remained unshaken during cross-examination. 10. The PW-2 Suren Sarania, is the father of the deceased and the accused. PW-2 deposed, that hearing commotion raised by PW-4, he came to the place of occurrence and found the victim lying on the courtyard with injuries on his head. Immediately, the victim was taken to hospital. He further stated that the accused/appellant later on, confessed to have assaulted the victim with an axe, which was produced by him before police and seized vide Exhibit-2, seizure list. During cross-examination of this witness, it was elicited that the appellant was suffering from mental ailment, which was aggravated, as he regularly did not take medicines, prescribed by doctors. 11. PW-3 Pratima Sarania, sister of the appellant and the victim deposed, that hearing commotion, she arrived at the place of occurrence and found the victim lying in the courtyard with injuries on his head and wife of the victim told her, that the appellant assaulted the victim with axe. This PW-3 also stated that the appellant had been suffering from mental ailment, which was aggravated, for not taking medicines properly. 12. According to PW-1, having come to know about the occurrence, he came and took the victim to Lower Assam Hospital, wherefrom, the victim was taken to GNRC, Hospital and the victim died at the GNRC Hospital, Guwahati. 13. PW-6 was the witness of the inquest-report. During cross-examination of PW6 also, it was elicited that the victim was suffering from mental ailment and he was undergoing treatment. 14. A dispassionate scrutiny of the oral testimony, more particularly, PW-4 the wife of the victim, shows that the accused/appellant was present at the place of occurrence. Though PW-4 did not see the accused inflicting injury, while coming out of the bathroom, she noticed the accused armed with an axe and left the place, on seeing the PW-4. PW-2, who is none but the father of the victim and the appellant, testified, that the accused confessed before him of having assaulted the victim with an axe. Though PW-4 did not see the accused inflicting injury, while coming out of the bathroom, she noticed the accused armed with an axe and left the place, on seeing the PW-4. PW-2, who is none but the father of the victim and the appellant, testified, that the accused confessed before him of having assaulted the victim with an axe. This extra judicial confession made by the appellant before PW-2, who happens to be the father of both the accused and the victim, remained totally unshaken and therefore, we find nothing to disbelieve the oral testimony of PW-2 as regards the extra judicial confession, made by the victim before him. 15. During examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant confessed in unequivocal term, that he had killed his brother, the victim, with an axe. However, he also stated, that the victim was consistently causing disturbance to him and also killed his cow. So out of anger he hit his brother with an axe. Following were the relevant questions and answers given by the appellant during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., Q4. PW-2 further deposed that later on you confessed before him that you inflicted blow to your elder brother Prabhat Sarania with an axe. What do you have to say on this? Ans : It is true that I had assaulted him. Q8. PW-3 further stated that, then Kanon Saharia told her that you inflicted blow upon Prabhat Sarania with an axe who later on died at GNRC hospital. What do you have to say on this? Ans : It is true that i assaulted my elder brother Prabhat Sarania with an axe. Since he used to create disturbance, i assaulted him out of anger. Q9. PW-3 further deposed that you and the deceased had dispute regarding land. What do you have to say on this? Ans : It is true that there had petty land dispute between us. Q11. PW-4 further stated that at that time she notice you standing in the courtyard with an axe and after seeing her, you fled away from there. What do you have to say on this? Ans : My sister-in-law did not see me. I went out of the house after the incident. Q13. PW-4 further stated that her husband was a railway employee and you did not have any job and regarding this, you had grudge upon the deceased. What do you have to say on this? Ans : My sister-in-law did not see me. I went out of the house after the incident. Q13. PW-4 further stated that her husband was a railway employee and you did not have any job and regarding this, you had grudge upon the deceased. What do you have to say on this? Ans : I did not envy him, but he was causing inconveniences to me. Prabhat Sarania even killed my cow. Q14. PW-5 Someswar Sarania in his evidence stated that on 02/07/14 at about 5.30/6.00 AM Kanon Sarania and Suren Sarania the wife and father respectively of the deceased Prabhat Sarania coming to his house reported that you inflicted blow upon Prabhat Sarania with an axe over his scalp. What do you have to say on this? Ans: It is true that I had assaulted him. 16. Law as regards the use of confession made by the accused during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is no longer res-integra. This Court had the occasion to deal with the question in the case of Sri Mintu Kalita @ Mitu Kalita Vs. State of Assam reported in 2006 (1) GLT 393 and subsequently also in a not her decision in Baiju Baby and Ors. Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in 2009(1) GLT 405. In Mintu Kalita (supra) relying on a decision of the Apex Court in State of Maharastra Vs. Sukhdev Singh reported in 1992 CrLJ 3454 observed as under : “From what has been observed and laid down in Sukhdev Singh (supra), it also becomes transparent that if an accused person, in his examination under Section 313, Cr.P.C., confesses to the commission of the offence(s) charged with, the court may, relying upon such confession, proceed to convict the accused and that it is only if the accused does not confess and/or chooses to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him or set up his own version of the occurrence claiming to the effect that he had committed no offence, the statement of the accused, made during the course of examination under Section 313 CrPC, can be considered in its entirety along with other prices of evidence on record. To put it differently, there is no impediment in law for a court for found conviction of an accused on his confession made by him during his examination under Section 313, Cr.P.C.” 17. The Apex Court in the case of Sukhdev Singh (supra) clearly held that such statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC can be used for proving the guilt of the accused and held as under:- “51. That brings us to the question whether such a statement recorded under section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he givens false answers. Then comes sub- section (4) which reads:- "313. (4). The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed." Thus the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under section 313 can be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharasthra v. R.B. Chowdhari, [1967] 3 SCR 708. This court in the case of Hate Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1953 CrLJ 1933 held that an answer given by an accused under section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab, [1963] 3 SCR 678 this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab, [1963] 3 SCR 678 this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge Bench answered the question it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685 : "Under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under section 342 is primarily to be directed to those mattes on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation - if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may "be taken into consideration" at the enquiry of the trial. If the accused person in his examination under section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charges against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety. Sub-section (1) of section 313 corresponds to sub- section (1) of section 342 of the old Code except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of section 313reproduces the old sub-section (4) and the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 18. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 18. The medical evidence of PW-9, the post-mortem report Exhibit-5 and also the nature of injury, apparently lent support to the confession made by the appellant during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and also to the extra judicial confession made before PW-2. The evidence of PW-4, that the accused/appellant was present with the victim with an axe in his hand at the place of occurrence and he left the place seeing PW-4, is a strong incriminating circumstances against the appellant to connect him with the commission of offence. Therefore, the confessional statement made during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and the circumstances as revealed from the oral testimony of PW-4, left no room for doubt, that it was none but the accused/appellant himself, who inflicted the fatal injury to the victim with an axe, which caused his death. In fact, learned Amicus Curiae has also not assailed the above evidence, which clearly established, that appellant was the perpetrator of the offence. Therefore, we concur with the findings of the learned Sessions Judge, that the accused was the perpetrator of the offence in the instant case. 19. While accepting, that the appellant was the perpetrator of the offence, learned Amicus Curiae submits, that the appellant was suffering from mental ailment at the time of occurrence, and as such, he was entitled to the benefit of the exception, under Section 84 of the IPC. In the alternative, learned amicus curiae further submits, that there was ill feeling between the accused/appellant and the victim, inasmuch as, the victim killed one cow of the appellant and he was also causing disturbance to the appellant, and as such, there was provocation, which promoted the appellant to inflict the injuries. Therefore, conviction of the appellant ought to have been under Section 304 Part-II and not under Section 302 IPC, submits learned amicus curiae. 20. Section 84 IPC provides that “nothing is an offence which is done by a person, who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of act, or that he is doing which is either wrong of contrary to law”. 20. Section 84 IPC provides that “nothing is an offence which is done by a person, who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of act, or that he is doing which is either wrong of contrary to law”. The provision is amply clear that in order to get the benefit of exception under Section 84 IPC, mere insanity or mental ailment is not sufficient. For being entitled to the benefit of section 84 IPC, the accused needs to prove, that at the time of commission of the offence, he was suffering from such mental ailment or unsoundness of mind, that because of unsoundness of mind, he was incapable of understanding the nature of the act, he committed or that he was doing a wrongful act. The burden necessarily lies upon the accused to prove the plea of unsoundness of mind. However, there is no gain saying, that burden of the accused to prove such plea is not as strict, as the burden of the prosecution, to prove the guilt. Obviously the standard of proof to establish the plea of insanity is not higher, than that of preponderance of probability. It is also always not necessary for the accused, to adduce defence evidence. Even if it is discernible from the prosecution evidence, that the accused was suffering from unsoundness of mind at the time of occurrence, which impaired his cognitive faculties, rendering him incapable of judging the consequence of, what he was doing, the burden of the accused stands discharged. 21. In the present case, accused did not adduce any evidence in support of the plea of insanity, and in fact, abjured such plea during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. However, during cross-examination of the prosecution witness, more particularly of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-6, it was elicited that the accused was suffering from mental ailment and that the disease was aggravated, for not taking medicine properly. However, PW-5 deposed that he did not notice any abnormality in the behaviour of the accused at the time of the occurrence. PW-4 also did not support the plea of unsoundness of mind. Even the appellant himself, during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., as indicated above abjured the plea of insanity. However, PW-5 deposed that he did not notice any abnormality in the behaviour of the accused at the time of the occurrence. PW-4 also did not support the plea of unsoundness of mind. Even the appellant himself, during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., as indicated above abjured the plea of insanity. It is pertinent to mention, that the conduct of the accused immediately before and after the occurrence is relevant in respect of the plea of insanity. The evidence of PW-5 clearly demonstrated that he did not notice any abnormal behaviour of the accused at the time of occurrence. That apart, conduct of the accused that he left the place of occurrence seeing the PW-4, also suggested, that he was aware of the consequence of his act. Therefore, even if it is accepted for the sake of argument, that the accused/appellant was suffering from some kind of mental ailment, the same was not sufficient to give him the benefit of Section 84 IPC, unless it could be shown, that mental ailment was of such magnitude, that it impaired his cognitive faculty, rendering him incapable of judging the nature of his act, which is totally absent in the instant case. The only material elicited during cross-examination of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-6 was that accused had some mental ailment, which was also not supported by PW-2 & PW-5. More particularly, the accused/appellant himself has abjured the plea of insanity. In view of all these evidence and materials, we have no hesitation in our mind to hold, that the accused/appellant was not suffering from any unsoundness of mind, as contemplated in Section 84 IPC and as such, in our considered opinion, on the facts of the case, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of section 84 IPC in the present case. 22. Coming to the alternative submission of the learned amicus curiae, as to provocation, learned Amicus Curiae seeks to impress us referring to exception No.1 to section 300 IPC, that the accused/appellant inflicted injury to the victim, being deprived of the power of self control, by grave and sudden provocation. Learned amicus curiae, referring to the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., submits, that the victim was causing disturbances to the appellant and he also killed his cow, which provoked the appellant to inflict the injuries. Learned amicus curiae, referring to the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., submits, that the victim was causing disturbances to the appellant and he also killed his cow, which provoked the appellant to inflict the injuries. The exception 1 to Section 300 reads as follows:- “Exception 1.- When culpable homicide is not murder.- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos:- (First) - That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. (Secondly) - That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant. (Thirdly) - That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.” 23. In order to invoke the exception-1, it needs to be established, that the act constituting the offence was done by the accused, while deprived of self control, due to grave and sudden provocation. There is no gain saying that the expression ‘grave and sudden provocation’ cannot be given any rigid or inflexible construction, inasmuch as, the explanation to the exceptions itself, makes it clear, that whether the provocation is grave or sudden is a question of fact, and would therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In B.D. Khunte Vs. Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC 286 , the Apex court observed that the expression ‘grave’ indicates that the provocation be of such a nature, so as to give cause for alarm to the accused. ‘Sudden’ means an action, which must be quick and unexpected, so as to provoke the accused. Therefore, the word ‘sudden’ necessarily indicates, that the provocation must be in close proximity to the act constituting offence, so as to create a cause and effect relation, between the provocation and the ‘act’ done. If there is long time gap between the provocation and act done, which is sufficient to cool down or neutralise the effect of provocation, the doctrine of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation cannot be invoked. If there is long time gap between the provocation and act done, which is sufficient to cool down or neutralise the effect of provocation, the doctrine of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation cannot be invoked. It is no doubt true, that the provocation may be a single provocative act or accumulated effect of series of act culminating in the last or ultimate provocative act and in such case, it may not be necessary, that the entire set of provocative act must immediately preceeds the offence. A division bench of this Court in Manju Lakra Vs. State of Assam, 2013 (4) GLT 333, discussed this aspect in detail in para 79 to 88, 90 & 91 and let me quote the relevant portion as below: 79. In a quest for an answer to the query, so posed, it would be necessary to visit some of the decided cases on this issue. 80. In R v Duffy, [1949] 1 All ER 932, the appellant attacked and killed her husband with a hammer and a hatchet, whilst he was sleeping on bed. Her husband had subjected her to violence throughout their marital life. Devlin J, while delivering the judgment, gave the definition of provocation as follows: "Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done (or words spoken)... which would cause in any reasonable person and actually causes, in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her, for the moment, not master of his or her mind." 81. In the light of what stand observed in Duffy's case (supra), provocation may be an act or series of acts, which, by their very nature, would induce sudden and temporary 'loss of self-control in a reasonable man so that it can be said that he is no longer master of his own mind. The span of series of acts may differ from case to case; but the law does recognize the series of acts as cumulative circumstances sufficient to constitute provocation. 82. The span of series of acts may differ from case to case; but the law does recognize the series of acts as cumulative circumstances sufficient to constitute provocation. 82. In Boya Munigadu v. The Queen, reported in ILR (1881) 3 Mad 33, the Court upheld the plea of 'grave and sudden' provocation in the following circumstances: The accused saw the deceased, when she had cohabitation with his bitter enemy; that night he had no meals; next morning, he went to the rayots to get his wages from them and, at that time, he saw his wife eating food along with her paramour; he killed the paramour with a bill-hook. 83. The learned Judges, in the circumstances indicated above, held, in Boya Munigadu (supra), that the accused had sufficient provocation to bring the case within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. 84. The relevant observations, appearing in Boya Munigadu (supra), read: "............If having witnessed the act of adultery, he connected this subsequent conduct as he could not fail to connect it, with that act, it would be conduct of a character highly exasperating to him, implying as it must, that all concealment of their criminal relations and all regard for his feelings were abandoned and that they purposely continued their course of misconduct in his house. This, we think, amounted to provocation, grave enough and sudden enough to deprive him of his self- control and reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder." 85. The case of Boya Munigadu (supra) illustrates that the state of mind of the accused, having regard to the earlier conduct of the deceased, may be taken into consideration in determining whether the subsequent act of the deceased would be sufficient provocation to bring the case within the First Exception to Section 300 IPC. 86. The decisions, in Duffy (supra) and Boya Munigadu (supra), were considered in K.M Nanavati vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR1962 SC 605), and, on an analysis of the ratio, the Supreme Court evolved the following illustrative parameters: 1. The test of "'grave and sudden'" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. 2. The test of "'grave and sudden'" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. 2. In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause 'grave and sudden' provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The mental background, created by the previous act of the victim, may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused 'grave and sudden' provocation for committing the offence. 4. The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise, giving room and scope for pre-meditation and calculation. (Emphasis supplied) 87. The principles, enumerated at Serial Nos. 3 and 4, are relevant for our decision in the present appeal and one of the logical deductions of principle no. 3 would be that in a case, where the circumstance, immediately preceding the fatal strike, may not be, independent of the previous acts, treated so provocative as to make a man lose his power of self-control, yet when the series of provocative circumstances, preceding the fatal strike, were sufficient to deprive an ordinary man of his power of self-control, it may, perhaps, not be a proper appreciation of plea of provocation if the immediate provocative conduct, preceding the causing of death, is taken into account excluding altogether the previous series of acts, which were, apart from being provocative, inextricably connected with the ultimate act of provocation leading to the causing of death. 88. The principle No. 3, as reproduced above, enables the Court to take into account a those acts, which started building potential rage in the mind of an accused, culminating into the last provocative act immediately preceding the causing of death, though the provocative act, immediately preceding the causing of death, may not, by itself, be 'grave and sudden' within the meaning of the expression 'grave and sudden' occurring in First Exception to Section 300 IPC. In such cases, the sentence, 'whilst deprived of the power of self-control by 'grave and sudden' provocation' may have to be read as 'whilst deprived of the power of self-control by series of acts constituting 'grave and sudden' provocation'. 90. The discussion on principle No. 3, laid down in Nanavati's case (supra), would be incomplete without discussing the principle No. 4, which lays down that the fatal blow should be clearly traceable to the influence of passion arising out of the previous provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise, giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. This principle was the answer to the question, which the Supreme Court posed unto itself regarding the time lag and as to what is the effect of the time lag between the act of provocation and the commission of offence. 91. Thus, what the principle No. 4 lays down is an extension of the principle No. 3. In other words, it would be necessary for the Courts to ascertain the proximity between the first act, in the entire series of acts, along with the immediate act, which preceded the act of causing of death. If the Court is able to connect even an innocuous provocative act preceding the causing of death with a series of acts, which, when taken together, constitute, in its entirety, 'grave and sudden' provocation', the Court would be justified in extending the benefit of First Exception to Section 300 IPC. The series of acts, which together constitute 'grave and sudden' provocation, must be such acts of provocation, which never really a owed the accused to calm down and the act, immediately preceding the killing, was the culmination of the previous provocative acts as mentioned hereinbefore. 24. In the present case, the appellant stated during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., that the victim “used to create disturbance” and he even killed his cow “Prabhat Sarania even killed my cow.” Besides, the above statement of the accused, no other evidence or material could be brought on record to establish the fact of grave and sudden provocation, which deprived the accused/appellant of the power of self control. Even if it is accepted that victim used to create disturbance to the appellant or he had killed his cow, there is nothing on record, when the cow was killed or when the disturbances were created or what kind of disturbances were created. There was also no material on record, as to what was the provocative act immediately preceeding the occurrence, for which accused lost his self control. When it is alleged that there were series of provocative act, building potential rage in the mind of the accused culminating into ultimate provocative act immediately preceeding the occurrence, besides proving the earlier provocative act, it is also most essential to prove the ultimate or the last provocative act, which works as triggering factor to render the accused deprived of his power of self control. Therefore, unless the ultimate or last provocative act immediately preceding the occurrence is proved, it may not be possible for the Court to come to a finding, that the earlier series of provocative act culminated into the last provocative act immediately preceeding the occurrence, rendering the accused deprived of self control. As already indicated above, there was no evidence as to when the cow of the appellant was killed by the victim, or when the disturbances were created? Some provocative act, if done long before the occurrence, giving time to the accused for cooling down, doctrine of grave and sudden provocation cannot be invoked. In the present case, not only there was no material to prove any provocative act immediately preceeding the occurrence to link with the alleged previous provocative act, there was even no evidence or material, as to when the alleged previous provocative acts were done. Having considered all these facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion, that the materials brought on record was grossly inadequate to suggest, even remotely, that there was grave and sudden provocation, because of which, the accused might have lost self control and inflicted injuries. 25. In view of foregoing discussions and reasons, we are in full agreement with the findings of the learned trial Court convicting the appellant. Accordingly, we upheld and confirmed the conviction recorded and sentence imposed on the appellant by the learned trial Court. 26. Consequently, the appeal fails. 27. Appreciating the assistance rendered by Ms. 25. In view of foregoing discussions and reasons, we are in full agreement with the findings of the learned trial Court convicting the appellant. Accordingly, we upheld and confirmed the conviction recorded and sentence imposed on the appellant by the learned trial Court. 26. Consequently, the appeal fails. 27. Appreciating the assistance rendered by Ms. B Sarma, learned Amicus Curiae, we hereby provide that she will be entitled to fees as Legal Aid Counsel, as per the norms fixed by the Legal Services Authority Regulation. Upon production of a copy of this judgment, Guwahati High Court Legal Services Committee shall pay the fee to Ms. Sarma. 28. Send down the LCR along with a copy of this judgment.