JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioners in Crl.M.C. No.4139/2017 are A2 to A8, petitioners in Crl.M.C. No.5383/2017 are A16 to A19, petitioners in Crl.M.C. No.5352/2017 are A34 to A37 and petitioners in Crl.M.C. No.6185/2017 are A49 to A52 in ST.3/2017 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Thiruvananthapuram, based on Annexure-A private complaint annexed in Crl.M.C. No. 4139/2017, alleging the offence punishable under Section 500 read with Section 34 IPC. 2. It is alleged that the 1st accused, a practising lawyer, has made some statements in a speech, which were duly published by almost all the print and electronic media in the State, including these petitioners. It is alleged that these petitioners, along with the other media persons, who are accused, had printed and published and also caused the telecasting of the said speech as a news item. The complainant is a practising lawyer, who is allegedly representing a group of advocates, who are agitating and protesting against the atrocities allegedly committed by the media persons. 3. The portion of the speech, which according to the complainant, constitute defamatory statements has been reproduced in Malayalam in paragraph 1 of Annexure-A complaint. The statement precisely compares 'street dogs' on the one side with 'lawyers' on the other side. He has allegedly further stated that the menace from street dogs could be checked by adequate treatment. He went on to say that he did not mean whether such a treatment should be given to “them”. 4. According to the learned counsel for the 1st respondent complainant, by the term “them”, the 1st respondent had meant an identifiable class and determinate group of lawyers, who are staging the protest/agitation against some atrocities caused by the media. 5. The learned Senior Counsel and the other learned counsel for the petitioners have advanced an argument that the proceedings in the case before the court below based on Annexure-A private complaint are not legally sustainable in view of Section 199 Cr.P.C. read with Explanation 2 to Section 499 IPC. It has been argued that even from the complaint itself, it is discernible that the statements were allegedly made as against the general community of lawyers, and not against an identifiable or determinate class of individuals. It has been pointed out that such a group of lawyers, who are allegedly staging an agitation or protest in the matter, is not identifiable. It has been pointed out that such a group of lawyers, who are allegedly staging an agitation or protest in the matter, is not identifiable. There is no case that any separate association of such persons were formed. Had there been any such association, it could have been said that the said body of individuals as an association could be identifiable and they could be brought within the purview of Explanation 2 to Section 499 IPC. 6. Section 499 IPC says:- “499. Defamation - Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.” Therefore, what is contained in the main body of Section 499 IPC is regarding the harm to the reputation of any person, which necessarily mean that, the said provision deals with individuals. In the case of particular individuals, they can be identified. 7. Explanation 2 to Section 499 IPC says:- “It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.” The question to be considered is whether the complainant represents or forms part of a 'collection of persons' within the meaning of Explanation 2 to Section 499 IPC. 8. On a mere reading of the statement reproduced by the complainant in paragraph 1 of Annexure-A complaint, it clearly gives an indication that the 1st respondent was referring the lawyers as a general class in the middle portion of the said statement. There, he had made a comparison of street dogs on the one side with advocates on the other side. It has to be borne in mind that the 1st respondent himself is a practising lawyer. When the last portion of the statement refers the term “them”, necessarily, it has to be interpreted in such a way that he was referring the general community of lawyers and not any particular individuals or a separate category of lawyers. 9. It has to be borne in mind that the 1st respondent himself is a practising lawyer. When the last portion of the statement refers the term “them”, necessarily, it has to be interpreted in such a way that he was referring the general community of lawyers and not any particular individuals or a separate category of lawyers. 9. Even though the learned counsel for the complainant has strenuously contended that the 1st respondent was referring the particular group of lawyers, who were agitating and protesting against the media, the statements reproduced by the complainant in paragraph 1 of Annexure-A complaint do not give any indication that the 1st respondent was referring to a particular group of lawyers or a group or a collection of individual lawyers, who form a separate class from a general community of lawyers. 10. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in G.Narasimhan v. T.V. Chokkappa [ (1972) 2 SCC 680 ], wherein it was held in paragraph 15 that- “Section 499 of the Penal Code, which defines defamation, lays down that whoever by words, either spoken or intended to be read or by signs etc. makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that the imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person. This part of the section makes defamation in respect of an individual an offence. But, Explanation (2) to the section lays down the rule that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. A defamatory imputation against a collection of persons thus falls within the definition of defamation. The language of the Explanation is wide, and therefore, besides a company or an association, any collection of persons would be covered by it. But such a collection of persons must be an identifiable body so that it is possible to say with definiteness that a group of particular persons, as distinguished from the rest of the community, was defamed. Therefore, in a case where explanation (2) is resorted to, the identity of the company or the association or the collection of persons must be established so as to be relatable to the defamatory words or imputations. Therefore, in a case where explanation (2) is resorted to, the identity of the company or the association or the collection of persons must be established so as to be relatable to the defamatory words or imputations. Where a writing inveighs against mankind in a general, or against a particular order of men, e.g., men of gown, it is no libel. It must descend to particulars and individuals to make it a libel.” 11. In S.Khushboo v. Kanniammal and another [ (2010) 5 SCC 600 ], it was held that- “In respect of the offence of defamation, Section 199 Cr.P.C. mandates that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence only upon receiving a complaint by a person who is aggrieved. This limitation on the power to take cognizance of defamation serves the rational purpose of discouraging the filing of frivolous complaints which would otherwise clog the Magistrate's Courts. In the given facts of the present case, the complainants cannot be properly described as 'persons aggrieved' within the meaning of Section 199(1) Cr.P.C. as there was no specific legal injury caused to any of them.” 12. In paragraph 38 of S.Khushboo (supra), by relying on M.S. Jayaraj v. Commissioner of Excise [ (2000) 7 SCC 552 ], it was held that- "The 'person aggrieved' means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. 'Person aggrieved' means a person who is injured or one who is adversely affected in a legal sense." 13. The learned Senior Counsel has further invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Asha Parekh and others v. State of Bihar and others [1977 Crl.L.J. 21], wherein the question as to whether there could be a defamation of the lawyers as a whole by giving a picturisation of a lawyer in a film. It was held that advocates as a class are incapable of being defamed. 14. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent has relied on the decision in Sahib Singh Mehra v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1965 SC 1451 ] and argued that when imputation was made against the prosecuting staff of Aligarh or the prosecuting staff in the State of U.P., it was held that it was an identifiable group or collection of persons and there was nothing indefinite about it. The discussions in Sahib Singh (supra) shows that the Apex Court had considered the question for identifying it as a class of persons by holding that the Assistant Public Prosecutors and Public Prosecutors, who were manning the prosecuting agency in Aligarh or U.P., as the case may be, constitute an identifiable class of persons. 15. At any stretch of imagination, the findings entered in Sahib Singh (supra) cannot be extended to the case in hand. On going through Annexure-A complaint as such, it seems that the complainant wanted to represent “a sector of lawyers in Kerala” as is evident from paragraph 3. Can such a sector of lawyers in Kerala be considered as a collection of persons which is definite or identifiable? The answer is an emphatic 'no'. 16. Further, in paragraph 5 of the complaint also, the complainant has averred that the speech refers to a determinate and identifiable section/group of lawyers, who were agitating against media personnel. Such an association has never formed. Persons, who had allegedly staged such agitation, cannot form a collection of persons within the meaning of Explanation 2 to Section 499 IPC. In paragraph 6, the complainant has referred to “agitating lawyers” for whom he is representing. Such a group also cannot be a collection of persons within the meaning of Explanation 2 to Section 499 IPC. Even though in paragraph 7, the complainant has averred that the offending publication, though does not refer to the complainant personally or to any other individuals, defames a determinate class of lawyers in Kerala. By merely stating that such lawyers form a collection of persons or forms a determinate group of lawyers, it cannot be said that they form a collection of persons within the meaning of Explanation 2 to Section 499 IPC. 17. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent has invited the attention of this Court to the following passage from (1699) 3 Balk 224, cited in Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes (22nd ed.) 1317: “Section 499 of the Penal Code, which defines defamation, lays down that whoever by words, either spoken or intended to be read or by signs etc. makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that the imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person. makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that the imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person. This part of the section makes defamation in respect of an individual an offence. But Explanation (2) to the section lays down the rule that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. A defamatory imputation against a collection of persons thus falls within the definition of defamation. The language of the Explanation is wide, and therefore, besides a company or an association, any collection of persons would be covered by it. But such a collection of persons must be an identifiable body so that it is possible to say with definiteness that a group of particular persons, as distinguished from the rest of the community, was defamed. Therefore, in a case where explanation (2) is resorted to, the identity of the company or the association or the collection of persons must be established so as to be relatable to the defamatory words or imputations. Where a writing inveighs against mankind in a general, or against a particular order of men, e.g., men of gown, it is no libel. It must descend to particulars and individuals to make it a libel.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. The decisions in G.Narasimhan (supra) and S.Khushboo (supra) are squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Matters being so, the complainant cannot be treated as a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 199(1) Cr.P.C., when the group which he is allegedly representing, cannot be brought within the category of 'class of persons' within the meaning of Explanation 2 to Section 499 IPC. Therefore, all further proceedings as against the petitioners in ST.3/2017 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Thiruvananthapuram are liable to be quashed. In the result, these Crl.M.Cs. are allowed and all further proceedings as against these petitioners in ST.3/2017 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Thiruvananthapuram are quashed.