JUDGMENT 1. This second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the plaintiff/appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated12.12.2002 passed in Civil Appeal No.20A/2001 – Jagdish Singh and others v. Mahila Beti Bai and others by the Court of Additional District Judge Gohad, District Bhind, reversing the judgment and decree dated17.5.2001 passed in Civil Suit No.59/2000 Mahila Beti Bai v. Mahila Goura Bai by the Court of Civil Judge Class I, Gohad. 2. Brief facts leading to the present appeal are that the head of the family was Aparbal Singh, father of the plaintiff. He had two wives, first wife is mother of the plaintiff. During the lifetime of Aparbal Singh, mother of the plaintiff had died and therefore Aparbal Singh had married Mahila Goura Bai and from her there was a son Gabbar Singh, who happened to be the step brother of the plaintiff. 3. When the founder of the family Aparbal Singh died, the property of Aparbal Singh came in the name of three persons namely; plaintiff, defendant Goura Bai and her son Gabbar Singh. Thereafter Gabbar Singh died while he was a minor and on death of Gabbar Singh, Goura Bai sold the property vide sale deed dated 6.8.1986 in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. 4. Plaintiff filed a suit challenging the sale deed dated 6.8.1986 made by Goura Bai in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. This suit was filed on 25.4.1994. As per the plaint averments made by the plaintiff in para 12, plaintiff attained 21 yeas of age on 21.12.1993, therefore, as per the then plaint averments, her date of birth comes out to 21.12.1972. Thus, plaintiff had attained 18 years of age on 21.12.1990 and on such finding, first appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 5. This Second Appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law – “Whether the limitation of three years will be applicable in the suit filed by the minors for setting aside the transfer which is not executed by natural guardian or a limitation of 12 years will be applicable by applying Article 65 of the Limitation Act ?” 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that as per the provisions contained in section 4 (c) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the “Act of 1956”), “natural guardian” means any of the guardians mentioned in section 6. Learned counsel thereafter has drawn attention of this Court to section 6 of the Act of 1956, which defines ‘natural guardians’ of a Hindu minor and has drawn attention to the explanation below section 6, which says that in this section, the expressions ‘father’ and ‘mother’ do not include a ‘step-father’ and a ‘step-mother’. He has also drawn attention to section 11 of the Act of 1956 to submit that “De facto guardian” not to deal with minor’s property. It provides that after the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor. Thus, placing reliance on such provisions, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the first appellate Court has wrongly dismissed the suit. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of Orissa High Court in the case of Keluni Dei v.Kanhei Sahu and others as reported in AIR 1972 Orissa 28. He has drawn attention to para 10 of this judgment, which has summarized the legal position as under : “10. The sale in this case is by the de facto guardian of the plaintiff. It is well settled that to an alienation by the de jure guardian without legal necessity. Article 44 of the Limitation Act applied while, if the said alienation was by the de facto guardian the enlarged period of limitation of 12 years applied. After discussing a series of decisions of different Courts, his Lordship Mr. It is well settled that to an alienation by the de jure guardian without legal necessity. Article 44 of the Limitation Act applied while, if the said alienation was by the de facto guardian the enlarged period of limitation of 12 years applied. After discussing a series of decisions of different Courts, his Lordship Mr. Justice Misra (My Lord the present Chief Justice) in the case of Naravan Prasad Rath v. Su-kumari Dei, ILR (1964) Cut 298 stated : “The correct legal position of law may be summarised as follows : (i) The observations in many of the authorities that a de facto guardian has the same power as ade jure guardian must always be restricted to cases where the alienation is for legal necessity and benefit of the minor; (ii) While alienation by de jure guardian without a legal necessity is voidable in the sense used in the Contract Act, such alienation by a de facto guardian is void ab initio and is voidable hi the sense that the minor on attainment of majority may either ratify it or avoid it by treating it as a nullity; (iii) An alienation by de facto guardian under the Mohammedan law, whether for necessity or otherwise, is void ab initio. The principle in such cases should not be applied to alienations by de facto guardian under the Hindu law when it is for legal necessity; (iv) To alienations by de jure guardian without legal necessity. Article 44 of the Limitation Act applies, while to such alienations by de facto guardian, the enlarged period of limitation of 12 years applies.” 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Kali Charan Naskar v. Sudhir Chandra Naskar and another, as reported in AIR 1985 Kolkata 66, wherein it has been held that transfer of a minor’s property by his de fecto guardian without legal necessity is void ab initio and hence it is not required to be set aside by the minor within three years after his attaining majority. 9. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhegowda (dead) by LRs v. Ankegowda (dead) by LRs and others, as reported in (2002)2 SCC 178, wherein the ratio is that a de fecto guardian is prohibited from transfer any part of minor’s estate by such a person. A clear statutory mandate is that any transfer in violation of the prohibition incorporated in section 11 of the Act is ab initio void. Placing reliance on such judgment, learned counsel for the appellant prays for allowing this appeal and setting aside the judgment passed by the first appellate Court. 10. Learned trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that cause of action arose on 21.12.1993, 25.3.1994, 4.4.1994 and 18.4.1994 when plaintiff was threatened. It held that sale deeds executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 are void and the suit was within the period of limitation. 11. First appellate Court in para 17 has recorded a finding that as per the averments made by the plaintiff, after death of Aparbal Singh, plaintiff, Gabbar Singh and Goura Bai became successors to 1/3rd of the estate of Aparbal Singh. Therefore, the plaintiff is not the sole inheritor and owner of the suit land. In para 18, there is a finding that as per Schedule I under section 8 of Hindu Succession Act, property of the deceased’ son goes to mother and not to sister, inasmuch as name of the sister is mentioned in Schedule 2. Therefore, property of Gabbar Singh will be received by Goura Bai and not plaintiff Beti Bai. 12. Mere allegation of Goura Bai contracting marriage does not debar her right of guardianship as has been mentioned in Article 520 of the Hindu Law by Satyajeet A. Desai’s Mulla Hindu Law, 22nd Edition of LexisNexis. section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 makes it obligatory that the property of a female Hindu is to be her absolute property. In fact, in the case of Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike and others as reported in AIR 2006 SC 3282 , it has been held that widow inherits absolute estate even without calling an aid of section 14. In fact, in the case of Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike and others as reported in AIR 2006 SC 3282 , it has been held that widow inherits absolute estate even without calling an aid of section 14. Since the factum of remarriage has not been proved therefore there is no bar in succeeding to the estate of the husband, therefore, once a widow succeeds to the property of her husband and acquires absolute right over the same under this section, she would not have divested by that absolute right. 13. In the present case, total land which was recorded in the name of Aparbal Singh was 4.597 hectare at village Pali (Dirman), Pargana Gohad, District Bhind. After death of Aparbal Singh, it was recorded in the name of Gabbar Singh s/o Aparbal Singh, Beti @ Munni d/o Aparval Singh minor under guardianship of Mahila Goura Bai widow of Aparbal Singh. 14. The issue involved in this case is as regards to limitation for filing the suit by the plaintiff Beti Bai. 15. Admittedly, Goura Bai is not a natural guardian of the plaintiff. Further, there is a detailed finding recorded by the first appellate Court also that Goura Bai was proceeded ex parte and she did not enter the witness box to prove that the money, which was obtained as sale consideration namely Rs.66,000/- was applied for the benefit and marriage of the plaintiff. The first appellate Court has rightly recorded the finding that to that extent it cannot be disputed that the defendant No.1 applied money obtained from selling the suit land for the benefit of minor Beti Bai. It is also on record that no permission was obtained from the Court empowered under the Act in regard to sale/alienation of the share of the property of the minor. In view of such facts, the first appellate Court has recorded a finding that Beti Bai had 1/3rd share in the property as per her own admission. This aspect has not been challenged and no substantial question of law has been framed on this aspect. In view of such facts, the first appellate Court has recorded a finding that Beti Bai had 1/3rd share in the property as per her own admission. This aspect has not been challenged and no substantial question of law has been framed on this aspect. There is no application to frame any substantial question of law challenging this finding of the first appellate Court that the plaintiff was having 1/3rd share in the suit property and was not entitled to succeed to the share of her step-brother Gabbar Singh as mother of Gabbar Singh, as a first degree legal heir because the provision of Schedule 2 of section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act was available. Therefore, the trial Court and the first appellate Court both have dealt with the aspect of the limitation and have given different reasoning. Reasoning of the trial Court is that it has deduced the age of the plaintiff from the statement given by the plaintiff about her age at the time of death of her father Gabbar Singh, whereas the trial Court as overlooked the admission of the plaintiff in para 12 of the plaint that she had attained 21 years of age on 21.12.1993. Thus, calculating the age on the basis of some happenings and co-relating those happenings with the statement of the plaintiff trial Court held that the limitation to file the suit is three years and the suit was filed within the prescribed period of limitation. 16. The first appellate Court has held that since the plaintiff herself has claimed her age to be 21 years on 21.12.1993, therefore, the suit was barred by limitation. However, both the Courts below have overlooked the fact that once it has been settled that Beti Bai @ Munni was having 1/3rd share in the property of Aparbal Singh and that finding has become conclusive having been not put to test by the plaintiff then the Court below was required to apply itself to test the aspect of limitation on the basis of the provisions contained in section 4 (b), sections 6 and 8 of the Act of 1956. 17. Section 4 (b) of the Act of 1956 defines ‘guardian’. 17. Section 4 (b) of the Act of 1956 defines ‘guardian’. Admittedly, defendant No.1 was not a guardian appointed by the Will of the minor’s father or mother, nor she was a guardian appointed or declared by the Court, or a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment relating to any Court of Wards. clause (c) of section 4 defines ‘natural guardian’ to mean any of the guardians mentioned in section 6. There is an explanation below section 6, which says that the expression “father” and “mother” do not include “step father” and “step mother”. Admittedly, defendant No.1 Gaura Bai is the step-mother of plaintiff Beti Bai @ Munni. Since the defendant No.1 is not a natural guardian, therefore, in the light of the law laid down in the case of Keluni Dei (supra), according to which Goura Bai being a de fecto guardian having alienated the share of the property of the plaintiff, then enlarged period of limitation of 12 years will be applicable. Same is ratio of law laid down in the case Kali Charan (supra), wherein it has been held that alienation of property by de fecto guardian without legal necessity is void ab initio and Article 60 of Limitation Act will not apply. In fact in paras 14 of the aforesaid judgment the Court has categorically held that in view of clause (3) of Article 538 of Mulla’s Hindu Law, 18th Edition, alienation by de fecto guardian, which is neither for necessity nor for the benefit of the estate of the minor, is void ab initio in the sense that it confers no title on the alienee. This proposition of law gets its support in the decision in the case of Malkarjun Annarao Gambhire v. Sarubai Shivyogi as reported in AIR 1943 Bom 187 that under such facts and circumstances, the transaction being void and not voidable in its inception then Article 44 of the Limitation Act, which now corresponds to Article 60 of the Limitation Act 1963 has no application and accordingly the minor’s interest in the property sold by such guardian would not be affected at all and that it would not be required for the minor to avoid such sale within three years after attaining majority. Similarly, in the case of Madhegowda (supra), in para 18, Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically stated that section 11 prohibits a de fecto guardian dealing with the minor’s property. Therefore, section 11 was enacted to prohibit any such person from alienating the property of the minor. Even a natural guardian is required to seek permission of the Court before alienating any part of the estate of the minor and the Court is not to grant such permission to the natural guardian except in the case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. So far as de fecto guardian or de fecto manager is concerned, the statute has in no uncertain terms prohibited any transfer of any of minor’s estate by such a person. In view of the clear statutory mandate, there is little scope for doubt that any transfer in violation of the prohibition incorporated in section 11 of the Act is ab initio void. 18. Since Courts have consistently held that in case of transfer being void ab initio provisions of Article 60 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable but that of Article 65 of the Limitation Act will be applicable, which provides for a limitation of 12 years, this Court is of the opinion that the suit filed by the plaintiff for claiming her share in the suit property was within limitation as the transaction made by the defendant No.1 against 1/3rd interest of the plaintiff being void ab initio limitation of 12 years will be applicable and not that of three years as prescribed under Article 60 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, both the Courts below were at fault in applying limitation of three years overlooking the provisions contained in sections 4,6,8 and 11 of the Act of 1956. Thus the substantial question of law having been answered in favour of the plaintiff, this Court now further directs that a decree be prepared in favour of the plaintiff to the extent that out of the suit property she is entitled to 1/3rd of her share from the defendant, which she can obtain by applying for partition before the competent authority. Appeal is allowed in above terms.