ORDER : 1. The instant criminal miscellaneous application has been preferred by the four petitioners being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 04.03.2016 passed in Criminal Revision No. 246 of 2014, passed by the learned Session Judge, Deoghar, whereby and whererunder the order dated 10.10.2014 rejecting the petition of the petitioners filed under section 239 Cr.P.C, passed by learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Deoghar passed in connection with petition filed by the petitioners under section 239 Cr.P.C (arising out of Deoghar P.S. Case No. 394 of 2006 dated 02.12.2006 under sections 420, 467, 427 of the Indian Penal Code, corresponding to G.R. No. 1069 of 2006 has been affirmed. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is that the instant case has arisen on the basis of a petition filed by the complainant being Complaint Case No. 826 of 2006 which was referred to the police station under section 156(3) Cr.P.C and subsequently, Deoghar P.S. Case No. 394 of 2006 dated 02.12.2006, under sections 420, 467, 427, has been registered alleging inter alia that one M/s Dhandhaniya Brothers Pvt. Ltd, Company acquired two storied building No. 170, Ward No. 2, Plot No. 698 at Jasidih, Deoghar in the year, 1957 through a registered sale deed from its rightful legal owners. The said properly known as ‘Dhandhaniya Kothi’. It is further alleged that complainant/informant, an authorized agent of the company came to know from local people and newspapers that some miscreants in collusion with local influential persons and administrative officers are making attempt to fraudulently dispose of the above property and a representation was submitted to the Government authorities and notices were also published in the local newspapers. Later on the informant/O.P. No. 2 came to know that a portion of property has been sold to ten purchasers through registered sale deeds on the basis of no objection certificate issued by Circle Officer, Jasidih, Deoghar and on enquiry, it was further revealed that the vendors and vendee conspired amongst themselves and with some unknown persons to chit and dishonestly induce delivery of property of informant, committed mischief by causing damage to the property by making false and forged document. On the basis of these allegations the instant case has been lodged. 3. It appears that police after investigation submitted final form being Final Form No. 90 of 2011 under section 407, 427 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners herein on 02.03.2011. On the basis of these allegations the instant case has been lodged. 3. It appears that police after investigation submitted final form being Final Form No. 90 of 2011 under section 407, 427 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners herein on 02.03.2011. Thereafter, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Deoghar under order dated 21.04.2011 took cognizance under section 420, 467, 427 of the Indian Penal Code and the case was transferred to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Deoghar for trial and disposal. 4. It appears that during trial a petition has been filed under section 239 of the Cr.P.C on behalf of the petitioners in the Court of learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Deoghar who under order dated 10.10.2014 has rejected the petition preferred under sections 239 of the Cr.P.C thereafter the aforesaid order dated 10.10.2014 was challenged in Criminal Revision No. 246 of 2014 before the court of learned Sessions Judge, Deoghar who by a detailed order rejected the criminal revision application and affirmed the order dated 10.10.2014 passed by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Deoghar. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners referring to criminal miscellaneous application has submitted : “11. That the petitioners humbly submit that the petitioners are purchasers of land by power of Attorney Holder, namely, Raj Kishore Chodhary, who got the said power of attorney from the adopted son of late Hemedra Sekhar Rai and Usha Rani Rai namely, Sandeep Kumar Rai. 12, That the petitioners humbly submit that for the same cause of action one Title Suit vide Title Suit No. 150 of 2006 for cancellation of sale deeds is also pending in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Deoghar between the petitioners and the informant and as such for the same cause of action two different proceedings of different nature cannot be initiated against the petitioners and that too without finding from a Competent Civil Court, continuing criminal prosecution is an abuse of the process of the Court. 13. That the petitioners humbly submit that the petitioners are bona fide purchaser of the property and have purchased the said property vide different sale deeds entered between he petitioners and Raj Kishore Chaudhary and hence petitioners cannot be held liable of cheating or preparing any false documents in connection with the said property. 14. 13. That the petitioners humbly submit that the petitioners are bona fide purchaser of the property and have purchased the said property vide different sale deeds entered between he petitioners and Raj Kishore Chaudhary and hence petitioners cannot be held liable of cheating or preparing any false documents in connection with the said property. 14. That the petitioners humbly submit that the Investigating Officer has also not found any material against the petitioners during investigation and has clearly stated that the petitioners are themselves victim of circumstances, as if any cheating or deceit has been done then the same has been done by Raj Kishore Chodhary and not by the petitioners as the petitioners have purchased the said property in bona fide manner. 15. That the learned courts below have completely overlooked the judgment as reported in 2009 8 SCC 751 “ Mohammad Ibrahim & Others Vs. State of Bihar & Another” where the Apex Court has held that mere execution of Sale deed by claiming that property being sold was executants property did not amount to commission of offences under sections 467, 471 I.P.C even if title of property did not vested in the executants. Further, in the same judgment it has been held by the Apex Court that if seller defrauds the purchaser, purchaser is entitled to prosecute seller under section 415 I.P.C. 16. That the petitioners humbly submit that the learned courts below have failed to consider that there is no ingredient of Section 420/467/427 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners as the investigating officer has failed to establish during investigation that the petitioners who are bona fide purchasers have made any false documents or there was any intention to deceit the informant on the part of the petitioners. 17. That under the aforesaid facts and circumstances no case as alleged in the complaint petition is made out against the petitioners and the impugned orders are liable to set aside”. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relying on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of “Mohammed Ibrahim & Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another” reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “16. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relying on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of “Mohammed Ibrahim & Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another” reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorized or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner’s behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are tow possibility. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of “false documents”, it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority, he knows that it was not made or executed. 17. When a document is executed by a persons claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorized by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted.” has submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has not considered the aforesaid facts and dismissed the criminal revision. 7. On the other hand learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 has submitted that petitioners have preferred revision application before the learned Sessions Court which was dismissed and thereafter this Misc. 7. On the other hand learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 has submitted that petitioners have preferred revision application before the learned Sessions Court which was dismissed and thereafter this Misc. application has been filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C before this Court which is not maintainable and the order dated 04.03.2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Deoghar in Criminal Revision No. 246 of 2014 is in accordance with law and there is no illegality in the order accordingly, this Cr. Misc petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. Learned A.P.P drawn the attention of this Court to the impugned order dated 04.03.2016 passed in Criminal Revision No. 246 of 2014 and has submitted that revisional court has considered all the method and rightly dismissed the criminal revision and referred the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi” reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568 in which it was held that at the time of framing of the charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right of hearing at the time of framing of charge but the hearing by accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police and the learned Sessions Judge has found that there is prima facie material for framing charge against the accused persons and dismissed the revision application and the petitioners again invoking the jurisdiction of 482 Cr.P.C came to this Court for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 04.03.2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Deoghar. Learned A.P.P relied on a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of “Amit Kappor Vs. Ramesh Chander & Another” reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 which squarely covers the case of the petitioners in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well settled law laid down by this court in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh: “4 Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter, comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judger has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor ;proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weight in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under section 227 or section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial, but at the initial stage if there is s strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the laws governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under section 227 or Section 228 then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under section 227. 27. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under section 227 or Section 228 then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under section 227. 27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provision i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the court should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercise in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercise very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basis ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the court may interfere. 27.3 The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.3 The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4 Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate court se even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of igts inherent powers. 27.5 Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6 The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7 The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8 Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “Civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, gthe court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constituted an offence and, if so, is it abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Whether allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. 27.11. Whether allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reacting the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13 Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.12. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, the otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae ie. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. 9. Admittedly, in view of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment and also the fact that the petitioners have earlier invoked jurisdiction of 482 Cr.P.C after their Criminal Revision Application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge with reasoned order, the instant application has been filed to delay the trial, there is no illegality in the impugned order dated 04.03.2016 in Criminal Revision No. 246 of 2014 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Deopghar. 10. I find no merit in the instant criminal miscellaneous application, accordingly, this criminal miscellaneous application is hereby dismissed. Order dated 04.03.2016 in Criminal Revision No. 246 of 2014 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Deoghar is hereby affirmed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 11. Let a copy of this order along with L.C.R be transmitted to the concerned court forthwith. Appeal dismissed