JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard, Mr. A.K. Dutta, the learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. M. H. Rajbarbhuiyan, the learned counsel for the respondent. In the discussion here-in-below defendant-appellant shall mean the father of the appellants as the said father filed the written statement during his life time. 2. One Promod Chandra Das, the predecessor in interest of the present appellants was the defendant in Title Suit No. 113/2002 filed by the plaintiff-respondent. It is the case of the plaintiff-respondent that he is the occupancy tenant in respect of land measuring 38 Bs., 19 Ks. and 2 Chs. covered by second RS Patta No. 2, Dag No. 9 described fully in the Schedule I of the plaint and status of occupancy tenant in respect of the said land was declared in the decree passed in Title Suit No. 188/1993 by the learned Sadar Munsiff No. 2, Silchar and his possession over the said land was also confirmed. The said Title Suit No. 188/1993 was preferred against one Alim Miya and Ummer Nessa Wakf Estate represented by its Mutwali Abdul Haniff Choudhury and the Wakf Board of Assam. The said decree was upheld by the first Appellate Court in Title Appeal No. 12/96 and the plaintiff-respondent continued possessing the Scheduled I land without any interference from anyone. The defendant No. 1 (Promod Ch. Das), the predecessor in interest of the present appellants on the strength of a Registered Sale Deed dated 16.03.82 started creating disturbances in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-respondent over the land described in Schedule II of the plaint which is part of Schedule I land. The Schedule II land is the suit land. The said defendant No. 1 has no right, title and interest over the Schedule II land which he entered forcibly on 05.10.2002. On the basis of the said pleadings the plaintiff-respondent sought for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant-appellant his agents etc., from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-respondent over the Schedule II suit land which is about 4 bighas of land forming part of the land described in Schedule I of the plaint. 3. The defendant-appellant contested the suit by filing written statement raising the plea that the suit is not maintainable and the same is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties etc. 3. The defendant-appellant contested the suit by filing written statement raising the plea that the suit is not maintainable and the same is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties etc. It is the defence taken by the defendant-appellant that the plaintiff-respondent with malafide intention by giving a wrong description of the suit land tried to possess the land he purchased from the proforma defendant No. 1 (who is the brother of the plaintiff-respondent) by way of the Registered Sale Deed in two plots. In MR Case No. 207/96 under Section 145 Cr.P.C., against the plaintiff-respondent initiated by the defendant-appellant, the Executive Magistrate declared possession of the suit land in his favour and the subsequent revision petition filed before the learned Sessions Judge also upheld the same. So the defendant-appellant sought for dismissal of the suit. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:- 1. Is there any cause of action for the Suit? 2. Is the suit maintainable in law? 3. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 4. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule-II land? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decreeas prayed for? 4. The plaintiff-respondent examined himself as the sole witness and exhibited three documents, namely, the judgment passed in Title Suit No. 188/1993 (Ext.1), the decree drawn up in Title Suit No. 188/1993 (Ext. 2) and the Registered Sale Deed bearing No. 1351 dated 16.03.1982 (Ext.3) by way of which the defendant-appellant purchased land measuring 3 bighas from Abdul Subhan Choudhury the proforma defendant No. 2 who is incidentally the brother of the plaintiff-respondent. The defendant-appellant failed to adduce any evidence oral or documentary. The learned trial court vide judgment and decree dated 03.06.2006 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. Title appeal No. 32/06 was filed by the legal heirs of the defendant-appellant (since deceased) in the Court of learned Civil Judge No. 1, Cachar at Silchar which was dismissed vide judgment dated 21.08.2007. Being aggrieved this second appeal is filed which was admitted on 12.03.2008 by framing the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the suit for perpetual injunction can b decreed when the plaintiff admitted transfer of the suit land by registered deed of sale in favour of the defendant, without praying for cancellation of such sale deed?” 5. Mr. Being aggrieved this second appeal is filed which was admitted on 12.03.2008 by framing the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the suit for perpetual injunction can b decreed when the plaintiff admitted transfer of the suit land by registered deed of sale in favour of the defendant, without praying for cancellation of such sale deed?” 5. Mr. Dutta, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that Title Suit No. 188/1993 was filed by the plaintiff-respondent against the Wakf Board thereby claiming his right of occupancy tenant over the land measuring more or less 39 bighas. The predecessor of the appellants purchased his land by way of a Registered Sale Deed in the year 1982 from one of the brothers of the plaintiff-respondent. The said fact of purchase of land by way of a Registered Sale Deed is clearly and specifically pleaded by the plaintiff-respondent and in such a situation the plaintiff-respondent is required to seek the relief of cancellation of the sale deed in order to get the relief of permanent injunction. There is no dispute raised against the Sale Deed with regard to its genuiness which goes to show that the derivation of title from the vendor of the defendant-appellant is lawful. Such legally acquired right cannot be defeated by way of a decree of permanent injunction until and unless the sale deed is cancelled as such, the Courts below was wrong in granting the decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. 6. Countering the submission of Mr. Dutta, Mr. Rajborbhuiya submits that the plaintiff-respondent is endowed with the status of occupancy tenant which was declared by a competent Civil Court, subsequently affirmed by the first appellate Court and the second appellate Court and in such a situation there is no requirement for seeking the relief of cancellation of the Sale Deed by way of which the defendant-appellant purchased the land from his vendor. 7. Considered submissions of the learned counsel. Perused the record. On perusal of the plaint it is seen that the cause of action for the suit arose over purchased plot of land of the defendant-appellant. The defendant-appellant claimed the suit land described in Scheduled II of the plaint which forms part of the schedule I land that is the decreetal property in Title Suit No. 188/1993. The defendant-appellant though filed his written statement failed to grace the witness box. The defendant-appellant claimed the suit land described in Scheduled II of the plaint which forms part of the schedule I land that is the decreetal property in Title Suit No. 188/1993. The defendant-appellant though filed his written statement failed to grace the witness box. The substantial question of law is with respect to the relief claimed by the plaintiff-respondent. From the plaint it is seen that the claim of the plaintiff-respondent is specific to the Schedule II land which is the suit land. The plaintiff respondent claims the said suit land on the strength of the status of occupancy tenant declared by a competent Court. The defendant-appellant was not a party in the said suit. 8. It would be relevant to consider Sections 34, 35 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 under Chapter VI prescribes that the Court may in its discretion make a declaration with respect to any person entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property and such person may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title to such character or right. However, no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title to do so. Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 under Chapter VI stipulates that a declaration made under Chapter VI is binding only to the parties to the suit and persons claiming through them. Section 38 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 is reproduced here-in-below which stipulates when relief of permanent injunction can be granted:- “38. Perpetual injunction when granted.- (1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication. (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter-II. (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter-II. (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of, property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely:- (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; (b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion; (c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.” 9. From the plaint it is seen that no where the plaintiff-respondent pleaded that the defendant appellant is the trustee of the property for the plaintiff respondent or any of the requirements for granting the relief of permanent injunction. From the plaint it is clear that the defendant-appellant purchased a plot by way of Registered Sale Deed in the year 1982 and on the basis of the said sale deed the said defendant-appellant was trying to invade his right to enjoyment of the suit property. The plaintiff-respondent being declared to be the occupancy tenant with respect to Schedule I land as such, the defendant-appellant has no right to enter into the suit land (Schedule II) on the strength of the sale deed. In such a situation the plaintiff-respondent ought to have sought for a declaration that the Schedule II land is the land covered under the decree passed in Title Suit No. 188/1993 and as such, the defendant-appellant has no right to enter into the said suit land on the basis of the sale deed. The said declaration is missing from the relief portion of the plaint and as such, granting of the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant-appellant would amount to denial of enjoyment of the right he derived from his vendor with respect to the property he purchased. 10. The plaintiff-respondent examined himself as the PW-1 and in his cross-examination he specifically stated that he filed a suit in the year 1993-94 against the Mutuwali in respect of land leaving aside the suit land. Further it is stated that he could not say anything about the land sold by the vendor of the defendant-appellant. 10. The plaintiff-respondent examined himself as the PW-1 and in his cross-examination he specifically stated that he filed a suit in the year 1993-94 against the Mutuwali in respect of land leaving aside the suit land. Further it is stated that he could not say anything about the land sold by the vendor of the defendant-appellant. The said deposition itself is damaging on the part of the plaintiff-respondent inasmuch as, he admitted that the suit land described in Schedule II is not the subject matter of the decree passed in Title Suit No. 188/93. In the present context of facts pleaded in the plaint the relief of permanent injunction is of consequential nature flowing out of the declaration. This is so because of the fact that as per the plaint the defendant appellant wanted to invade his right of enjoyment over the decreetal property of T.S. No. 188/93 on the strength of a Sale Deed which is not disputed by the plaintiff respondent. So a declaration is required to shield the decreetal property in T.S. No. 188/93 from the force of the Sale Deed and then only the defendant appellant can be restrained by way of permanent injunction. The Courts below ought not granted the bald relief of permanent injunction restraining defendant-appellant from enjoying the suit property and that too without cancellation of the sale deed as mentioned hereinabove. There is no declaration sought for by the plaintiff-respondent that the suit land is the one covered by the decree passed in Title Suit No. 188/93 but not under the sale deed. The defendant-appellant was not a party to the suit as hereinabove mentioned nor he falls within the persons mentioned in Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 under such circumstances I am constrained to hold that the substantial question of law formulated is to be replied in the negative keeping in view the factual matrix of the suit of the plaintiff-respondent. 11. Accordingly, this second appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree dated 21.08.2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge No.1, Cachar at Silchar in Title Appeal No. 32/2006 is set aside. 12. No cost. Prepare a decree accordingly. 13. Send back the LCR.