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2018 DIGILAW 1665 (RAJ)

Madan Lal Tak v. Rent Control Appellate Tribunal

2018-08-07

INDERJEET SINGH

body2018
JUDGMENT Inderjeet Singh, J. - This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners-tenants (hereinafter referred to as 'Tenants') against the order passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Tonk dated 11.01.2011 whereby the appeal filed by the Tenants against the order dated 03.09.2009 passed by the Rent Tribunal Tonk was dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the disputed premises was originally belongs to Damodarji @ Laddu Gopalji. The father of the Tenants Chunnilal taken the disputed premises on rent from said Damodarji @ Laddu Gopalji on 15.09.1954 and the rent deed was also executed in this regard. After the death of original Landlord Damodarji @ Laddu Gopalji his wife Chhota Devi and her daughter Munni Devi became absolute owner of the disputed premises by operation of law as per section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, later on wife of the original Landlord i.e. Chhota Devi relinquished her share in favour of her daughter Munni Devi by a registered relinquish dated 07.10.1998. Therefore, Munni Devi became absolute owner of disputed premises. 3. The respondent no.3 Mohan Lal (hereinafter referred to as 'Landlord') purchased the disputed premises from Smt. Munni Devi on 28.06.2004 through a registered sale deed, thereafter Munni Devi served a notice upon the father of the petitioners Chunnilal with regard to sale of the dispute premises and directed to give rent of this disputed premises to Sh. Mohan Lal. The Landlord also served a notice upon father of the petitioners for giving the rent to him, the Landlord after purchasing the disputed premises filed eviction application in the year 2006 on the grounds of denial of title, default in making payment of rent and bona-fide and personal need etc. 4. The father of the Tenants filed reply to the eviction application wherein he has admitted the rent note dated 15.09.1954 and also admitted that the shop in dispute was taken by him of rent from the original Landlord i.e. Damodarji @ Laddu Gopalji. It was further stated in the reply that he is not paying the rent to anybody since last 45 years and therefore, the claimed the ownership on the ground of adverse possession, lastly, submitted that there is no relationship of Landlord and Tenant between the parties and lastly prayed for dismissal of the eviction application. 5. Learned trial court framed as many as eight issued. 5. Learned trial court framed as many as eight issued. The Landlord in support of his case produced the evidence of PW1 Mohan Lal, PW2 Shiv Lal, PW3 Munni Devi, PW4 Chota Bai & PW5 Ram Babu and also produced the documents Ex.1 to Ex.20 and got the same exhibited. The Tenants in support of their case produced the evidence of Madan Lalm, OM Prakash & Suresh and also produced the documents Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-5 and got same exhibited. The learned trial court allowed the eviction petition vide order dated 03.09.2009. 6. Being aggrieved by the order dated 03.09.2009 the Tenants preferred an appeal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal only qua issue no.8 only with regard to jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal to here the dispute. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Tenants vide order dated 03.09.2009, hence the present writ petition filed by the Tenants under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no relationship of Landlord and Tenant between the parties as the Tenants have never paid the rent to the Landlord. Counsel further submits that the Rent Tribunal as well as Appellate Rent Tribunal has no jurisdiction to here and decide the dispute between the parties as the relationship of Landlord and Tenant was denied by the Tenants. Counsel further submits that the Tenants become owners of the disputed premises on the ground of adverse possession and they are in possession of the disputed premises for a long time. Counsel further submits that they never paid the rent to the present Landlord since no fresh rent deed was executed. 8. Learned senior counsel relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tribhuvanshankar vs. Amrutal, reported in (2014) 2 Supreme Court Cases 788 wherein paras no. 4, 13,24,25,26,27, 34 & 44 it has been held as under:- "4. In the written statement, the Defendant disputed the right, title and interest of the Plaintiff, and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. That apart, a further stand was taken that the Appellant had no right under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity "the Act") to file the suit for eviction. In the written statement, the Defendant disputed the right, title and interest of the Plaintiff, and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. That apart, a further stand was taken that the Appellant had no right under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity "the Act") to file the suit for eviction. It was set forth by the Respondent-Defendant that he was never a tenant under Kishorilal and, in fact, the accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and a 'banjar' land and the Respondent was in possession for 18 to 19 years and it was to the knowledge of Kishorilal and his elder brother. For the purpose of business he had constructed a Gumti, got the gate fixed and when the business relating to sale of furniture commenced there was no objection from Kishorilal or his brother or any family member. The possession, as put forth by the Respondent, was uninterrupted, peaceful and to the knowledge of Kishorilal who was the actual owner. It was also set forth that when Kishorilal desired to sell the premises, he was put to notice about the ownership of the defendant but he sold the property without obtaining sale consideration with the sole intention to obtain possession by colluding with the appellant-Plaintiff. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the premises is situate in the Cantonment area and the Cantonment Board has the control over the land and neither Kishorilal nor the Appellant had any title to the same. 13. At the very outset, we may straight away proceed to state that the finding returned by the courts below that has been concurred by the High Court to the effect that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is absolutely impeccable and, in fact, the legality and propriety of the said finding has not been assailed by the learned senior Counsel for the Appellant. As far as right, title and interest is concerned, the learned trial Judge had not believed the sale deed executed by the vendor of the Appellant-Plaintiff in his favour for lack of consideration and also returned an affirmative finding that the Defendant was in possession for long and hence, had acquired title by prescription. As far as right, title and interest is concerned, the learned trial Judge had not believed the sale deed executed by the vendor of the Appellant-Plaintiff in his favour for lack of consideration and also returned an affirmative finding that the Defendant was in possession for long and hence, had acquired title by prescription. The learned appellate Judge on reappreciation of the evidence brought on record had unsettled the findings with regard to the title of the Plaintiff as well as the acquisition of title by the Defendant by way of adverse possession. He had granted relief to the Plaintiff on the ground that in a suit for eviction when the title was proven and assertion of adverse possession was negatived by the court, there could be a direction for delivery of possession. As has been stated earlier the High Court has reversed the same by distinguishing the law laid down in Bhagwati Prasad (supra) and restored the verdict of the learned trial Judge. 24. It was contended before this Court in Rajendra Tiwary that as the trial court was exercising limited jurisdiction under the Rent Act, the question of title to the suit premises could not be decided inasmuch as that had to be done by a civil court in its ordinary jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court erred in law in remanding the case to the first appellate court for deciding the question of title of the Plaintiff and passing an equitable decree for eviction of the Defendant. 25. The Court in Rajendra Tiwari case posed a question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the High Court was right in law holding that an equitable decree for eviction of the Defendant could be passed under Order 7, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and remanding the case to the first appellate court for recording its finding on the question of title of the parties to the suit premises and for passing an equitable decree for eviction against the Defendant if the Plaintiffs were found to have title thereto. Answering the question the learned Judges proceeded to state thus:- (SCC p.94, para 7) "7. Answering the question the learned Judges proceeded to state thus:- (SCC p.94, para 7) "7. It is evident that while dealing with the suit of the Plaintiffs for eviction of the Defendant from the suit premises under Clauses (c) and (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, courts including the High Court were exercising jurisdiction under the Act which is a special enactment. The sine qua non for granting the relief in the suit, under the Act, is that between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant the relationship of "landlord and tenant" should exist. The scope of the enquiry before the courts was limited to the question: as to whether the grounds for eviction of the Defendant have been made out under the Act. The question of title of the parties to the suit premises is not relevant having regard to the width of the definition of the terms "landlord" and "tenant" in Clauses (f) and (h), respectively, of Section 2 of the Act." 26. In course of deliberation, the two-Judge Bench distinguished the authorities in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar vs. Mahabir Prasad AIR 1951 SC 177 and Bhagwati Prasad (supra) by observing thus: (Rajendra Tiwary Case: (2002) 1 SCCp. 96, para 15) "15. These are cases where the courts which tried the suits were ordinary civil courts having jurisdiction to grant alternative relief and pass decree under Order 7, Rule 7. A Court of Rent Controller having limited jurisdiction to try suits on grounds specified in the special Act obviously does not have jurisdiction of the ordinary civil court and therefore cannot pass a decree for eviction of the Defendant on a ground other than the one specified in the Act. If, however, the alternative relief is permissible within the ambit of the Act, the position would be different." (Emphasis supplied) 27. Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to express thus: (Rajendra Tiwary case, SCCp.96, para 16) "16. In this case the reason for denial of the relief to the Plaintiffs by the trial court and the appellate court is that the very foundation of the suit, namely, the Plaintiffs are the landlords and the Defendant is the tenant, has been concurrently found to be not established. In any event inquiry into title of the Plaintiffs is beyond the scope of the court exercising jurisdiction under the Act. In any event inquiry into title of the Plaintiffs is beyond the scope of the court exercising jurisdiction under the Act. That being the position the impugned order of the High Court remanding the case to the first appellate court for recording finding on the question of title of the parties, is unwarranted and unsustainable. Further, as pointed out above, in such a case the provisions of Order 7, Rule 7 are not attracted." (emphasis supplied) 34. The conception of adverse possession fundamentally contemplates a hostile possession by which there is a denial of title of the true owner. By virtue of remaining in possession the possessor takes an adverse stance to the title of the true owner. In fact, he disputes the same. A mere possession or user or permissive possession does not remotely come near the spectrum of adverse possession. Possession to be adverse has to be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for the requisite frame of time as provided in law so that the possessor perfects his title by adverse possession. It has been held in Secy. of State for India In Council vs. Debendra Lal Khan (1933-34) 61 IA 78: AIR 1934 PC 23 that the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. 44. Coming to the case at hand the Appellant had filed the suit for eviction. The relief sought in the plaint was for delivery of possession. It was not a forum that lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree for delivery of possession. It showed the intention of the Plaintiff to act and to take back the possession. Under these circumstances, after the institution of the suit, the time for acquiring title by adverse possession has been arrested or remained in a state of suspension till the entire proceedings arising out of suit are terminated. Be it ingeminated that if by the date of present suit the Defendant had already perfected title by adverse possession that would stand on a different footing." 9. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by Patna High Court in the matter of Sheogobind Bhakat and others vs. Sujan Mahto and others, reported in AIR 1960 Patna 156 (V 47 C 49) , wherein para no. 12 it has been held as under:- "12. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by Patna High Court in the matter of Sheogobind Bhakat and others vs. Sujan Mahto and others, reported in AIR 1960 Patna 156 (V 47 C 49) , wherein para no. 12 it has been held as under:- "12. There is, of course, one case reported in Gangadhar Hari Karkare vs. Morbhat Purohit ILR 18 Bom 525 , one of the earliest cases of that court. That case no doubt, is in favour of the appellants but the subsequent Bombay cases, which I have referred to above show that this 18 Bom 525 case was held to have been overruled and no longer a good law. It is noticeable that in the case of AIR 1930 Allahabad 177, the two earlier Allahabad cases referred to above have not been at all considered. In my opinion, the authorities overwhelmingly favour the view that in the absence of any positive proof of the fact that the landlord has consented to the continuance of the tenant, who had held over, the tenant becomes a tenant by sufferance and as such his possession would be a sufficient bar to the claim of the landlord for recovery of possession from him if he has not been sued for eviction within 12 years from the date on which the tenancy, which was for a fixed period, had expired. 13. This is the legal position governing the facts found in this case, which are that the plaintiffs had settled this land with the defendant for one year after the expiry of which the defendant had continued in possession without payment of rent and without any evidence of assent on behalf of the plaintiffs that he should remain in possession. That being the position, the possession of the defendant was that of a tenant by sufferance. That possession was wrongful as 12 years had elapsed from the date on which that tenancy expired and before the suit was filed by the plaintiffs, the defendant remaining in possession during this period, the plaintiffs' claim was barred by limitation. The Court below was, therefore, right in dismissing the suit." 10. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) in the matter of Karachi Wine Store & Ors. The Court below was, therefore, right in dismissing the suit." 10. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) in the matter of Karachi Wine Store & Ors. vs. Shri Mohammad Rafiq & Another (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.46/1987), decided on 09.02.1988, wherein paras no.10,13,24,25, &29 it has been held as under:- "10. Section 116 of the Evidence Act lays down that no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had at the beginning of the tenancy a title to such immovable property. In (1) Kumar Krishna Prosad Lal Singha Deo vs. Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd. And others, AIR 1937 PC 25 , the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has laid down that the principle of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not apply in disentitle a tenant to dispute the derivative title of one who claims to have since become entitled to the reversion, through in such cases there may be other grounds of estoppel, e.g., by attornment acceptance of rent etc. In view of the said decision it must be held that though the principle of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not apply to a case where a person claims to be a landlord on the basis of derivative title, but in such a case the principle of estoppel would be attracted if the tenant has attorned to the new owner of the premises. 13. I may now come to the second question as to whether the defendants can be said to have denied the title of the plaintiffs, In this regard it may be mentioned that in clause (g) of section 111 of Transfer of Property Act a provision is made for forfeiture of the lease in a case where the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. In the context of the aforesaid provision in the Transfer of Property Act, the question has arisen before the courts as to what are the requirements of a disclaimer which may entail forfeiture under section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act. 24. In the context of the aforesaid provision in the Transfer of Property Act, the question has arisen before the courts as to what are the requirements of a disclaimer which may entail forfeiture under section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act. 24. As regards the written statement in the present suit, the relevant paragraph on which reliance has been placed by Shri Mehta is Paragraph 3. In the said paragraph the defendants have denied the partition between Noor Mohammad and the children of Rahim Bux and have stated that from the children of Ibrahim the defendants have learnt that no partition deed had been executed and registered and that any partition effected by an unregistered partition deed is inadmissible in evidence and does not confer any rights on Noor Mohammad and since Noor Mohammad was not the sole owner of the property, he was not entitled to redeem the mortgage and that even if he was entitled to redeem the mortgage, the children of Rahim Bux were also the owners of the premises and Noor Mohammad alone did not have the right to sell the property. In the said paragraph the defendants stated that so long as plaintiffs do not give a clarification in this regard and establish that partition had taken place between Noor Mohammad and children of Rahim Bux, through a properly registered partition deed, no proprietary rights could be acquired on the entire premises by the plaintiffs on the basis of the sale deed executed by Noor Mohammad alone and the plaintiffs were, therefore, not entitled to maintain the suit. In the aforesaid paragraph the defendants have referred to the reply to the notice sent sent by the plaintiffs advocate dated 31st July, 1968 whereby they had sought clarification from the plaintiffs and have stated that inspite of the said reply no clarification had been made by the plaintiffs. In the said paragraph the defendants have also stated that if the clarification on those matters had been given to them, the defendants would not have raised an objection challenging the right of the plaintiffs to maintain the suit and that even now if the aforesaid matters are established, the defendants would not challenge the title of the plaintiffs over the property in dispute. It has also been stated in the said paragraph of the written statement that till the date of filing the written statement, the defendants had not received any notice from the heirs of Ibrahim that Noor Mohammad had become the sole owner of the property. In the said paragraph the defendants have also stated that they are not raising any objection with regard to the title of the plaintiffs nor they say that the title of the said property was of somebody else and that the objection that was being raised by them was in order to protect their tenancy rights because the defendants had been tenants from the very beginning of Shri Noor Mohhammad and Ibrahim and that if the plaintiffs establish that Noor Mohammad alone was entitled to sell the property and for that reason the plaintiffs are owners of the entire property, the defendants do not raise any objection that they were tenants of the plaintiffs. The defendants in the said paragraph have further asserted that the objections are being raised by them bona fide and not with a view to disclaim title of the plaintiffs. 25. It would thus be seen that the whole tenor of the aforesaid averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present suit is to make sure about the title of the plaintiffs with regard to the entire property and in the said averments the defendants have very clearly indicated that they do not dispute their character as tenants in respect of a property and they also do not wish to disclaim the title of the plaintiffs over the same or to deny their title in that regard. In my view neither the reply (Ex. A.14) nor the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present case can be held as a clear and unequivocal disclaimer or repudiation of the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property by the defendants. In this connection it may also be stated that the plaintiffs themselves did not treat the reply (Ex. A 14) and the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present suit and amounting to denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendants. In this connection it may also be stated that the plaintiffs themselves did not treat the reply (Ex. A 14) and the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present suit and amounting to denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendants. This would be apparent from the judgment of this Court dated 23rd February, 1979 wherein this court has set out the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiffs before this court to the effect the plaintiffs while referring to the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present suit, had urged that defendants had no courage to deny the title of the plaintiffs in the written statement and that they were tactly accepting the plaintiffs to be their landlord. This court has also observed that in the said judgment that half-hearted manner in which the defendants have challenged the title of the plaintiffs in the written statement leave no manner of doubt that the defendants had accepted the plaintiffs to be their landlords. In these circumstances, I am unable to accept the submission of Shri Mehta in their reply (Ex. A. 14) to the notice as well as in paragraph no. 3 of the written statement in the present suit, the defendants have denied the title of the plaintiffs. 29. I may now come to the cross-objections that have been raised by the plaintiff-respondents with regard to the findings recorded by both the courts below with regard to the plea that the premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the plaintiffs for their personal use, namely, for the purpose of carrying on the business in precious stones. In this connection it may be stated that the plaintiff-respondents, in support of the said plea, have relied upon certain vouchers which have been marked as Ex. 6 to Ex. 52 to show that they are carrying on the business in precious stones. In respect of the said documents the trial court has observed that they purport to refer to the period 1968-69, but they contain Pin Code No. 302003 of Jaipur City. The trial court has observed that Pin Code in Jaipur City was introduced for the first time on 15th August, 1972 and it was not in force in the year 1968-69 to which period these documents refer. The trial court has observed that Pin Code in Jaipur City was introduced for the first time on 15th August, 1972 and it was not in force in the year 1968-69 to which period these documents refer. The trial court has, therefore, observed that the said documents have been prepared subsequently after 15th August, 1972 and they have been ante dated to show as relating to the year 1968-69. in these circumstances the trial court has held that no reliance could be placed on the evidence, both oral and documentary, produced by the plaintiffs in support of their case that they are carrying on the business in precious stones. The trial court has also observed that if the plaintiffs were carrying on business in precious stones, as claimed by them, they would have mentioned the sales tax number on the documents, but no such sales tax number is mentioned on the documents. The trial court has also found that the plaintiffs own other property in Jaipur City and, therefore, it cannot be said that they require the premises reasonably and bona fide for the purpose of carrying on business. The Additional District Judge has agreed with the aforesaid finding recorded by the Addl. Munsiff. In my view no ground is made out for interfering with the said concurrent findings of fact recorded by both courts below and for taking a different view in second appeal. There is thus no merit in the cross objections filed by the plaintiff-respondents." 11. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by Lahore High Court in the matter of Umar Bakhsh vs. Baldeo Singh, reported in AIR 1916 Lahore 353 , it has been held as under:- "It may be noted here that the oral evidence of subsequent demand of rent and promises by the defendants to pay is of a very unsatisfactory and unconvincing nature. With two exceptions, the witnesses live at Amritsar, whilst the defendants live either at Wazirabad or at Jammu, and the gist of their evidence is that they carried oral messages of demand from Plaintiff's manger in Amritsar to the defendants at Jammu. The value of the evidence may be gathered from the statement of one of the witnesses, Mul Raj, who says : "Ganga Ram at Jammu asked me to Ali Muhammad to pay rent and execute a lease. The value of the evidence may be gathered from the statement of one of the witnesses, Mul Raj, who says : "Ganga Ram at Jammu asked me to Ali Muhammad to pay rent and execute a lease. I did so and Ali Muhammad admitted he was a tenant and promised to pay rent and execute a deed. This he said in Ganga Ram's presence." One wonders whether Ganga Ram was dumb. This evidence, if it is worth anything at all, shows that rent and an admission of the tenancy were demanded and that both demands were refused in effect. In conclusion we shall now refer to the authorities cited before us for the view that mere non-payment of rent by a tenant does not establish his adversity of possession. [of. Dadoba vs. Krishna (I), Prem Sukh Das vs. Bhupia (2)]. At this Abstract proposition we are not disposed to cavil, but we think that each case must be decided on its own particular features. In the case of Umar Bakhsh we find that rent was never paid at all for nearly 30 years, that no serious attempt was ever made to recover rent and over and above this we have defendant's denial on oath that he never intended to pay rent or regarded himself as a lessee. In the case of Ali Muhammad and Muhammad Bakshsh, we find a tenancy established for fixed period, and the defendant-appellant has referred us to Article I39 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiff-respondent has quoted Adimulam vs. Pir Ravuthan (3) and Pusa Mal vs. Makdum Bakhsh (4), but we approve of Kantheppa Raddi vs. Sheshappa (5), to the effect that a tenancy on the sufferance is not a tenancy contemplated by Article I39 of the Limitation Act, and that on the expiry of a tenancy for a fixed term, time begins to run against the landlord, unless there is evidence that there was a novation and that the tenancy for a fixed term was succeeded by a tenancy at will. As above remarked, we can find no reliable evidence of any such novation. For these reasons we accept the appeals and dismiss the suits, but as the defendants on their own pleas are shown to deserve no consideration, we direct parties to pay their own costs throughout." 12. As above remarked, we can find no reliable evidence of any such novation. For these reasons we accept the appeals and dismiss the suits, but as the defendants on their own pleas are shown to deserve no consideration, we direct parties to pay their own costs throughout." 12. Learned senior counsel for the Landlord submitted that the relationship of Landlord and tenant was established before the Rent Tribunal as the original tenant i.e. father of the petitioners Chunnilal has admitted in his reply to the eviction application that he has taken disputed premises on rent in the year 1954 from the original Landlord. Counsel further submits that the Rent Tribunal was very much having the jurisdiction to here and decide the dispute as the present Landlord has purchased the disputed premises from one Munni Devi who is daughter of original Landlord Damodarji @ Laddu Gopalji and she became the absolute owner of the disputed premises by operation of law. Counsel further submits that once a Tenant always a Tenant as the Tenants have never surrendered the tenancy and handed over the possession. Counsel further submits that the tenancy was for fixed term and if the Tenants have not paid the rent then it is a case of default in making the payment of rent and same is ground of eviction. Counsel further submits that the Rent Tribunal as well as Appellate Rent Tribunal has given a concurrent finding with regard to issue no.8 on the ground of jurisdiction therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Counsel further submits that the Rent Tribunal decide as many as five issues in favour of the present Landlord and passed the decree of eviction. However, before the Appellate Rent Tribunal only the issue of jurisdiction was pressed by the Tenants, lastly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 13. Learned senior counsel for the Landlord relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Majati Subbarao vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by Lrs, reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 2187 , wherein para no.5 it has been held as under:- "5. 13. Learned senior counsel for the Landlord relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Majati Subbarao vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by Lrs, reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 2187 , wherein para no.5 it has been held as under:- "5. It was argued by learned Counsel for the appellant that even accepting that there was a denial of title by the appellant and the result would be only that the respondent-landlord became entitled to forfeit the lease and in order to be a ground for eviction in a suit that forfeiture would have to precede the suit or petition for eviction. It was submitted by him that it was not open to a landlord to take advantage of a denial of title by the tenant in the very proceedings for eviction in the course of which the denial was made. The denial must be anterior to the eviction proceedings. In support of this argument learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision in Maharaja of Jeypore vs. Rukmani Pattamahdevi 46 Ind App 109 : AIR 1919 PC 1 . In our view, this argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V. Dhanupal Chettiar vs. Yesoda Ammal : [1980] ISCR 334 a Constitution Bench of this Court comprising seven-learned Judges held that in the matter of determination of tenancy the State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is the position under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord can recover possession of the property only on one or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord under the definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts remains a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means 'a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour'. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of a non obstante clause or by necessary implication these enactments have done away with the law contained in section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of a non obstante clause or by necessary implication these enactments have done away with the law contained in section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. The difference between the position obtaining under the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under the former Act in order to recover possession of the leased premises determination of the lease is necessary because during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot recover possession of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession merely by determining the tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. In the case before us, we find that the denial of landlord's title by the tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already set out earlier. In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A. P. Rent Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. We find, on the other hand, that a number of High Courts have taken the view that even a denial of the landlord's title by a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a written statement containing the denial has been filed (See : Sada Ram vs. Gajjan Shiama, AIR 1970 Punj And Har 511 . As observed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenant's denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement." 14. Learned senior counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bismillah Be (Dead) By Legal Representatives vs. Majeed Shah, reported in 2017 (2) Supreme Court Cases 274 , wherein para no.25 it has been held as under:- "25. However, once the Assignee/Vendee proves his title to the demised property, the original tenancy devolves on the Assignee/Vendee and tenant/lessee by operation of law on the same terms and conditions on which it was entered into with the original landlord/lessor and continues till either modified by the parties or is determined by the landlord in accordance with law. It enables the Assignee/Vendee to acquire the status of a "new landlord" in place of the original landlord of the demised premises qua tenant/lessee. (see Law of Evidence by Sarkar, 16th Edn., pp 2106-108)." 15. Learned senior counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Rajasthan High Court in the matter of Laxmi Narayan vs. Ram Kishan & others, reported in AIR 2015 Rajasthan 46 , wherein paras no.12 & 13 it has been held as under:- "12. This Court in the case of Ram Saran Sharma vs. Smt. Kamla Acharya: 2001 (2) RLR 136 : (AIR 2001 (NOC) 70 (Raj) ) held and observed as under:-"17. As regards the law of attornment, envisaged under Section 109 of the Act of 1882, it is held that Section 109 of the said Act does not require service of notice on the tenant, on alienation of property, to create relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee landlord and the existing tenant. The transferee of the lessor steps into the shoes and possess all the rights, which the transferor has and the attornment is not a condition precedent, to give validity to the transfer made in favour of the transferee. The transferee of the lessor steps into the shoes and possess all the rights, which the transferor has and the attornment is not a condition precedent, to give validity to the transfer made in favour of the transferee. Section 8 of the Act of 1882 specifically provides that a transfer of property passes forthwith, to the transferee, all the interests, which the transferor is capable of passing in the property, including the legal incidents thereof and such incidents include the rents and profits thereof. Once the title of the assignee is complete, the attornment is automatic not dependent on the tenant's attorning or agreeing to the attornment. An identical question came up for consideration in case of Mahendra Raghunath Das, ( AIR 1997 SC 2437 ) (supra), wherein, it is ruled by the Supreme Court, which reads thus: "It is well settled that a transferee of a landlord's rights steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The Section does not require that the transfer of the right of the landlord could take effect only if the tenant attorns to him. Attornment by tenant is not necessary to confer the validity of the transfer of the landlord." 18. The aforesaid question also came up for consideration, before me, in case of Mohd. Hussain vs. Uakoob, reported in 1997 (2) RCR 443 , wherein, it is ruled that tenant has not legal justification to question oral gift. Giving notice to tenant by landlords regarding change in ownership is a mere technicality. It was held in the aforesaid case that question of title is foreign, in a suit for eviction by landlord against tenant, but in abundant caution, where such issues are found to be necessary, it can be raised incidentally. It was held that because the transferee is clothed with right to recover rent and eject lessee, no payment of rent or attornment to lessor is necessary. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the landlord plaintiff respondent, mentioned hereinabove, indicates towards the aforesaid conclusion. Thus, the question of attornment by landlord, is no more res integra.". 13. It was held that because the transferee is clothed with right to recover rent and eject lessee, no payment of rent or attornment to lessor is necessary. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the landlord plaintiff respondent, mentioned hereinabove, indicates towards the aforesaid conclusion. Thus, the question of attornment by landlord, is no more res integra.". 13. As such, from the above, it is apparent that neither any attornment was necessary on part of the tenant for conferring the right to receive the rent, nor any notice in this regard was necessary for the purpose of alleged attornment." 16. Learned senior counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by Punjab & Haryana High Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh & Others vs. Mukhtiar Singh & Others, reported in 2010 (4) Civil Court Cases 302 (P&H) , wherein para no.11 it has been held as under:- "11. In view of the above order passed by the competent authorities having jurisdiction over the matter, I have no hesitation to hold that Buggar Singh was in possession of the property in dispute as a tenant thereof. If Buggar Singh was tenant of the property in dispute then he cannot set up title by adverse possession in view of section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, challenging the title of the owner/landlord of the property in dispute. The principle of "once a tenant always a tenant" would apply. Findings of the First Appellate Court that the order of the revenue authority was not legal and justify cannot hold water because of the fact that in a civil litigation order of the competent revenue authority was not in challenge. Secondly, Civil Court hearing civil suit shall not act as an Appellate Court over the decision of the competent revenue Court. Finding of the First Appellate Court that orders of the revenue authority was not justified and not legal cannot be accepted. Once Buggar Singh allowed the decision of the revenue authorities to attained finality, it was not open for the Civil Court (appellate Court) to disbelieve the order passed by the competent revenue authority saying orders are illegal. It is no body's case that revenue authorities were having no jurisdiction while directing to record name of Buggar Singh in the revenue record showing him in possession as tenant of the property in dispute. Hence revenue authority was having jurisdiction. It is no body's case that revenue authorities were having no jurisdiction while directing to record name of Buggar Singh in the revenue record showing him in possession as tenant of the property in dispute. Hence revenue authority was having jurisdiction. Therefore, order passed by the revenue authority cannot be said to be illegal in a subsequent civil suit. Plaintiffs cannot acquire title by way of adverse possession. Plaintiffs failed to prove title by way of adverse possession." 17. Learned senior counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Atyam Veerraju and others vs. Pechetti Venkanna and others, reported in AIR 1966 Supreme Court 629 (1) , wherein paras no.13,14 & 15 it has been held as under:- "13. Having regard to section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, during the continuance of the tenancy, a tenant will not be permitted to deny the title of the deity at the beginning of the tenancy. In Bilas Kunwar vs. Desraj Ranjit Singh:I.L.R 37 All 557 at p. 567: ( AIR 1915 PC 96 at p. 98) . the Privy Council observed: "A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord's title, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord." 14. It is also well settled that during the continuance of the tenancy, the tenant cannot acquire by prescription a permanent right of occupancy in derogation of the landlord's title by mere assertion of such a right to the knowledge of the landlord. See Mohammad Mumtaz Ali Khan vs. Mohan Singh, 50 Ind App 202: ( AIR 1923 PC 118 ), Madhavrao Waman Saundalgekar vs. Raghunath Venkatesh Deshpande, 50 Ind App 255: ( AIR 1923 PC 205 ), Naini Pillai Marakayar vs. Ramanathan Chettiar, 51 Ind App 83: ( AIR 1924 PC 65 ) . In the last case, Sir John Edge said: "No tenant of lands in India can obtain any right to a permanent tenancy by prescription in them against his landlord from whom he holds the lands." 15. These decisions received the approval of this Court in Patna Municipal Corporation vs. Ram Das, Civil Appeal No. 598 of 1963, dated 11-8-1965 (SC). In the last case, Sir John Edge said: "No tenant of lands in India can obtain any right to a permanent tenancy by prescription in them against his landlord from whom he holds the lands." 15. These decisions received the approval of this Court in Patna Municipal Corporation vs. Ram Das, Civil Appeal No. 598 of 1963, dated 11-8-1965 (SC). In the last cited case, this Court refrained from pronouncing upon the soundness of the following observation in Bastacolla Colliery Co Ltd. vs. Bandhu Beldar, AIR 1960 Pat 344 (FB): "There are, however, some cases in which a lessee can acquire the right of a permanent right by prescription in spite of payment and acceptance of rent. Those are cases where the lessee pays rent on the basis of a notorious claim of permanent tenancy to the knowledge of the owner. The acceptance of rent by the owner on the basis of the lessee claim as a permanent tenant will not prevent the acquisition of such a right by the lessee." As we did not hear any argument on that point, we do not also decide whether this passage lays down the correct law. This passage must be read with the following observation of the Patna High Court in the same case: "If once a tenancy of some kind comes into existence either under an express lease or under a lease implied by law, the tenant cannot convert his tenancy into a permanent one by doing any act adverse to the landlord." In the Instant case, on October 25, 1929 Nuli Subba Rao was a tenant and by an adverse notice during the continuance of his tenancy he could not acquire absolute title to the suit lands, nor could be convert his tenancy into a permanent one. Moreover, it is not shown that since 1929 Nuli Subba Rao held the suit lands under a notorious claim of either an absolute title or a permanent tenancy or that he supplied oil to the temple of the basis of such a claim." 18. Learned senior counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Joginder Singh & another vs. Smt. Jogindero and others, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1654 , wherein para no.6 it has been held as under:- "6. Learned senior counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Joginder Singh & another vs. Smt. Jogindero and others, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1654 , wherein para no.6 it has been held as under:- "6. Late Surain Singh and Respondent Bur Singh did not seriously dispute that they were not tenants under Smt. Soman in respect of the land in dispute and adduced no evidence in that behalf. On the contrary Khasra Girdwari Ext. P. 6 clearly indicated that the deceased Surain Singh (who is represented by his legal representatives in this appeal) and Bur Singh were tenants under Smt. Soman with regard to the land in suit. This being the position the tenants could not be permitted to deny or dispute the title of the owner. This is a settled view that having regard to the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny the title of the owner of such property. In this connection it would be relevant to make a reference to the decision of this Court in Veerraju vs. Venkanna : (1966) 1 SCR 831 (839), wherein this Court, with reference to the decision of Privy Council ( AIR 1915 PC 96 at p. 98) took the view as under: "A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord". 19. Learned senior counsel for the landlord further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shamshad Ahmad and others vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj and others, reported in 2008 (9) Supreme Court Cases 1 in which in para 36, 37 & 38 it has been held as under:- "36. A finding as to bona fide requirement for doing readymade garments business by Matloob Ahmad has been expressly recorded by the appellant authority. The said finding was a finding of fact. Neither could it have been interfered with, nor has it been set aside by the writ court. In view of the above position, the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition. 37. The said finding was a finding of fact. Neither could it have been interfered with, nor has it been set aside by the writ court. In view of the above position, the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition. 37. As observed earlier, statutory remedy has been provided under the Act against an order passed by the prescribed authority by filing an appeal before the District Judge (Section 22). There is no further remedy under the Act. The tenant, in the circumstances, approached the High Court by filing a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law." 20. The argument raised by the learned senior counsel for the Tenants regarding no relationship of Landlord and tenant between the parties is not acceptable in view of the admission of the original tenant Chunnilal i.e. father of Tenants before the Rent Tribunal. In reply to the eviction application he has admitted the Tenancy and also admitted that he has taken the disputed premises of rent on 15.09.1954 and a rent note was also executed and the Tenants have also adopted the same reply before the Rent Tribunal. The next argument raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners regarding no jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal to here and decide the dispute between the parties is also not acceptable in view of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 which provides that the dispute between the Landlord and Tenant can only be decided by the Rent Tribunal. Admittedly in the present matter, the original tenant Chunni Lal i.e. father of Tenants has admitted the tenancy, therefore in my considered view the Rent Tribunal was having the jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the parties. The next argument raised by the Tenants regarding ownership of the petitioners by way of adverse possession is also not acceptable in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bismillah Be (supra). 21. In view of the above discussion the writ petition field by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed for the reasons; firstly, Chunni Lal i.e. father of the Tenants has admitted the relationship of Landlord and Tenant in his reply before the Rent Tribunal and same reply was adopted by the present Tenants; secondly, Munni Devi and Chotta Bai both were produced in evidence and they have proved the sale deed as well as rent deed in favour of the present Landlord and therefore, the present Landlord was having the legal right to file the eviction application against Chunni Lal i.e. father of the Tenants before the Rent Tribunal; thirdly, the Rent Tribunal was having the jurisdiction to here and decide the dispute between the parties as the tenancy was permanent in nature and the tenancy continues on month to month basis; fourthly, the concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the courts below in favour of the Landlord is not liable to be disturbed under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India as this court does not act as a court of appeal in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shamshad Ahmed (supra). 22. In that view of the matter, the writ petition filed by the petitioner stands dismissed. Petition dismissed.