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2018 DIGILAW 1674 (GAU)

Vardhini Bhattacharjee v. Vice-Chancellor, Indira Gandhi National Open University

2018-11-30

ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA

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JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. H. Rahman, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.P Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Indira Gandhi National Open University (in short IGNOU). The respondent No.4 Sri G.P. Bhatia is stated to be the Enquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceeding involved in this writ petition and in the absence of there being any allegation of mala-fide, the Court deems it appropriate that the said respondent need be heard for the purpose of this writ petition. 2. The petitioner worked as the Regional Director of IGNOU and was posted at Guwahati as on 01.05.2006 and continued in the said post up to 11.09.2011 at Guwahati. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted as the Deputy Director of the Research Unit of the IGNOU at New Delhi from which post she superannuated on 30.06.2014. 3. On the day the petitioner superannuated from service, an order bearing F.No.IG/TA/1/561/06/8068 dated 30.06.2014 was issued under the signature of the Registrar (Administration). By the said order, it was stated that a disciplinary proceeding was contemplated against the petitioner and accordingly in exercise of the powers under Rule 10(1)(a) of Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965 as adopted by IGNOU, as per notification dated 05.10.2012, the petitioner was placed under suspension. Thereafter, a memorandum bearing F.No.IG/TA/1/860/684 dated 31.03.2015 was served on the petitioner, by which certain charges were framed against her. In the present writ petition, the resultant disciplinary proceeding has been assailed. 4. Mr. H. Rahman, learned senior counsel for the petitioner contends that the service condition of the petitioner being governed by the Central Civil Services (Classification, control and appeal) Rules, 1965, the provision of the Central Civil Services (Pension Rules) 1972 (in short Pension Rules of 1972) would also be applicable upon the superannuation of the petitioner. Accordingly, by relying upon the Rule-9 of the Pension Rules of 1972, it is the submission of Mr. Rahman that the events in respect of which the memorandum of charge dated 31.03.2015 was issued being related to a period of more than four years prior to such memorandum of charge, the same is not sustainable as per the provisions of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Pension Rules of 1972. Mr. Rahman that the events in respect of which the memorandum of charge dated 31.03.2015 was issued being related to a period of more than four years prior to such memorandum of charge, the same is not sustainable as per the provisions of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Pension Rules of 1972. Mr. Rahman, learned senior counsel by referring to the articles of charges accompanying the memorandum of charge, points out that the Charge No.1 pertains to a period in the year 2006, whereas the Charges Nos. 2 and 3 pertain to a period during the years 2007 and 2008 and the Charge No.4 does not indicate any period therein. Accordingly, it is to be construed that all the events upon which charges have been framed on the petitioner, were of a period prior to 31.03.2015 i.e. the date on which date the charges were framed or as a matter of fact, even prior to a period of four years from the date of superannuation of the petitioner, which was on 30.06.2014. 5. On a bare reading of the memorandum of charge of 31.03.2015, it appears that the said submission of Mr. H. Rahman, learned senior counsel for the petitioner is acceptable inasmuch as, Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Pension Rules of 1972 clearly provides that if a departmental proceeding is not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, the same shall not be in respect of any event, which took place more than four years before such institution and therefore, from the point of view of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii), there is a statutory bar in sustaining the memorandum dated 31.03.2015. 6. But, Mr. P.P Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent IGNOU refers to the provisions of Rule 9(6)(a) of the Pension Rules of 1972. Rule-9(6)(a) of the Pension Rules 1972 is as follows:- “Departmental proceedings shabe deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date.” 7. Rule-9(6)(a) of the Pension Rules 1972 is as follows:- “Departmental proceedings shabe deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date.” 7. Rule-9(6)(a) clearly provides that for the purpose of Pension Rules of 1972, a departmental proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date. Rule 9(6)(a) clearly postulates two situations i.e. a departmental proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges or as a matter of fact, the memorandum of charges was issued or if the Government servant was placed under suspension from an earlier date, it would be deemed that the departmental proceeding was instituted on and from the date of the order of suspension. The second part of Rule 9(6)(a) is clearly a deeming provision, which constitutes a legal fiction to the extent that even if the memorandum of charge was submitted at a subsequent date, but in the event the employee concerned was placed under suspension during the period in which he or she was in employment, in such event, it is to be construed under the law that the departmental proceeding was instituted on and from the date of the suspension irrespective of the fact that the memorandum of charges was submitted subsequently. 8. In the instant case, it is taken note of that by the order dated 30.06.2014, the petitioner was placed under suspension whereas by the memorandum dated 31.03.2015, the statement of charges was served on her. In the circumstance, by operation of law, as provided in the second part of Rule 9(6)(a) of the Pension Rules of 1972, it is to be deemed that although the memorandum of charge was issued on 31.03.2015, but by operation of law, disciplinary proceeding was instituted on and from 30.06.2014, that is when the petitioner was placed under suspension. 9. Mr. 9. Mr. H. Rahman, learned senior counsel for the petitioner raises a further contention that in view of the provisions of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Pension Rules of 1972, no proceeding is maintainable if the proceedings are based upon events which had occurred four years prior to the institution of the proceeding. 10. Ordinarily, the said submission would have been acceptable had the proceeding against the petitioner been initiated after her retirement. It is so because Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) clearly postulates a situation for its applicability where the departmental proceeding is not instituted while the Government servant was in service. But in the instant case, it is already taken note of that by operation of law under the provisions of second part of rule 9(6)(a) of the Pension Rules, 1972, it is deemed that the proceeding against the petitioner was instituted on and from 30.06.2014 when she was placed under suspension. In other words, it would have to be construed that the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner was initiated while the petitioner was still in service. 11. As the provision of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) is applicable only in a situation where a proceeding is not initiated while the employee was in service, therefore, in the instant case, as the proceeding against the petitioner was initiated while she was still in service, the provisions of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) would be inapplicable. As the provisions of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) are inapplicable, the requirement that a proceeding shall not be initiated in respect of any event which took place more than four years before the institution, would also be inapplicable. 12. Mr. H. Rahman, learned senior counsel for the petitioner raises a further contention that there were no materials before the authorities to arrive at a satisfaction for initiating the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. 13. In order to appreciate the said contention, the Court deems it appropriate to peruse the record relating to the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. The records reveal that there was an enquiry against the petitioner against the same charges by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). In the said investigation by the CBI, there is a recommendation that certain anomalies were detected against the petitioner and therefore, a disciplinary proceeding be initiated. The records reveal that there was an enquiry against the petitioner against the same charges by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). In the said investigation by the CBI, there is a recommendation that certain anomalies were detected against the petitioner and therefore, a disciplinary proceeding be initiated. On the aforesaid premises, the respondent authorities in the IGNOU were required to provide the information as to whether the said recommendation alone was the basis for initiating the disciplinary proceeding or the authorities in the IGNOU had some further materials from which a satisfaction was arrived that a proceeding is required to be initiated against the petitioner. 14. As an answer to such query, the relevant note sheets pertaining to the period prior to the initiation of the proceeding has been produced. The note sheets reveal that upon the recommendation of the CBI for a departmental proceeding against the petitioner, the authorities in the IGNOU had before it certain documents, which are as follows:- “a. Superintendent of Police’s Report; b. Draft Articles of Charges (Draft charges) c. Draft Statement of Imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of the Articles of Charges (Draft Statement of allegations); d. List of Witnesses e. List of Documents f. Copies of Statements relied upon g. Copies of Documents relied upon, h. Copy of statement of delinquent and comments of the Investigating Officer thereon.” 15. The very provision in the note sheet that the aforesaid documents were available before the authorities and such documents were made the basis to arrive at a satisfaction that there is a requirement of initiating a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, prima-facie, the Court is satisfied that the proceeding was initiated against the petitioner not merely because of the recommendation of the CBI, but as because certain further materials were also available, which may lead to a satisfaction that a proceeding against the petitioner is justified. A further perusal of the note sheets indicates that the said documents were placed before the disciplinary authority being the Board of Management of the University for its approval as regards the disciplinary proceeding to be initiated and the Board of Management in its resolution dated 21.06.2014 had approved the proposal for initiating a disciplinary proceeding. 16. A further perusal of the note sheets indicates that the said documents were placed before the disciplinary authority being the Board of Management of the University for its approval as regards the disciplinary proceeding to be initiated and the Board of Management in its resolution dated 21.06.2014 had approved the proposal for initiating a disciplinary proceeding. 16. In view of the procedure adopted, where the materials were placed before the disciplinary authority for grant of an approval for initiating a disciplinary proceeding and based upon such materials, the disciplinary authority had granted the approval, no other conclusion can be arrived at other than that the disciplinary authority before initiating the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, had the materials before it and based upon such materials, had arrived at a satisfaction that the proceeding is required to be initiated. 17. In such view of the matter, the second contention of the petitioner that there was no material before the disciplinary authority to arrive at a satisfaction to initiate a disciplinary proceeding is also found unacceptable. 18. Mr. Rahman, learned senior counsel for the petitioner by referring to the affidavit of the respondents indicates that there is a recommendation of the CVC for initiating the disciplinary proceeding. But from the records pertaining to the period prior to the initiation of the proceeding as indicated above, the Court finds that apart from such recommendation, even if it existed, the disciplinary authority also had the materials before it, which were acted upon. 19. The Court also takes note that he petitioner had superannuated from service in the year 2014 and is required to face a disciplinary proceeding in respect of events, which had taken place much before her retirement i.e. sometime in 2006-2007 etc. From the said point of view, it is deemed appropriate that the proceeding initiated against the petitioner be brought to its logical conclusion within a specific period of time hence from. A prolonged disciplinary proceeding without bringing to a conclusion definitely violates the legal right of the petitioner for at least having an early conclusion of the proceeding against her. 20. Accordingly, it is ordered that the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner as per office memorandum dated 30.06.2014 be brought to its logical conclusion within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 20. Accordingly, it is ordered that the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner as per office memorandum dated 30.06.2014 be brought to its logical conclusion within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. In doing so, the petitioner shall co-operate with the disciplinary authority in any manner that is required. In terms of the above, the writ petition stands disposed of.