JUDGMENT Hon’ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.—Heard Sri K.K. Tiwari, learned counsel for the landlady-petitioner and Sri Rajendra Prasad, learned counsel for the tenant-respondents and perused the record. 2. Present petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 22.7.2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jhansi in Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2008 whereby the appeal filed by the tenant-respondents was allowed by the lower appellate Court and the release application filed by the landlady-petitioner under Section 21(1)(a) of UP Act 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was rejected. 3. The release application was filed by the landlady Smt. Kalawati for release of the residential accommodation in possession of the tenant-respondents under Section 21(1)(a) of UP Act 13 of 1972 on the ground that her family includes 18 members and therefore, there is a need of the premises in question. While describing the dependents, names of Ashok, Deepak and Raj Kumar were also included. The release application was allowed by the prescribed authority. 4. Appeal was filed by the tenant-respondents. While challenging the judgment and order of the prescribed authority, new grounds was taken by the tenants that the husband of the landlady late Sri Mangal Prasad solemnZed second marriage with Smt. Babboo @ Bhagwati who became his second wife and Ashok, Deepak and Raj Kumar were born out of the wedlock from his second wife and hence, they are not the members of the family of landlady as defined under Section 3(g) of the Act and alleged need of the said three sons cannot be legally made the basis of release application. Only one daughter Anno was born out of the wedlock of Mangal Prasad and the landlady and she is married and had been residing at her matrimonial home and thus she is also not the member of landlady’s family. Two other daughters were born from the second wife of Mangal Prasad and they are also married and do not come within the definition of family. In substance, it was submitted that the sons born out from the wedlock of the second wife were not included in the definition of family as provided under Section 3(g) of the Act and as such, the release application has wrongly been allowed. In substance, it was submitted that the sons born out from the wedlock of the second wife were not included in the definition of family as provided under Section 3(g) of the Act and as such, the release application has wrongly been allowed. Various rulings were cited by both the sides before the lower appellate Court, however, upholding the objections raised by the tenants it was held by the lower appellate Court that the need of the step sons of the landlady cannot be considered under Section 21 (a) of the Act and that the landlady is not bound to keep her steps with her and she may ask them to find out another suitable accommodation by observing that the step sons may be as near as real son but the law does not support the same. Consequently, the appeal filed by the tenant-respondents was allowed and the release application was rejected. The aforesaid findings are under challenge. 5. Challenging the impugned order, submission of the learned counsel for the landlady-petitioner is that there is no doubt about the fact that Ashok, Deepak and Raj Kumar were born out from the wedlock of second wife, however, placing reliance on a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, (1997) 2 SCC 53 , it was submitted that once the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the “foster son” would also be a member of the family than the “step son” would be even on a better footing. He has placed reliance on paragraphs 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 25 of the said decision in support of his argument. It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid judgment, the need of the above noted three sons was also liable to be included in the need of the family as there is no dispute about the fact that they were living with the landlady and admittedly, are sons of Mangal Prasad may be from his second marriage with Smt. Babboo @ Bhagwati. 6. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the tenant-respondents has supported the impugned order and submits that no interference is warranted in the order impugned herein as the sons born out from the wedlock of second marriage are not clearly included in the definition of family under Section 3(g) of the Act, therefore, the lower appellate Court has rightly allowed the appeal and rightly rejected the release application filed by the landlady-petitioner. 7. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. For ready reference, Section 3(g) of UP Act No. 13 of 1972 is quoted as under : “3. Definition.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— (a) .................... (b) .................... ......................... (g) “Family”, in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building, means, his or her- (i) spouse; (ii) male lineal descendants; (iii) such parents, grandparents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building; 8. On perusal of the record, I find that in the release application need of as many as 18 members was shown by the landlady and the lower appellate Court has confined itself to the need of three sons born out from of the wedlock with the second wife. There is a complete ignorance of the need of the entire family even if the three sons are treated to be not part of the family. 9. Even otherwise, perusal of the judgment in the case of K.V. Muthu (supra), which is a case arising out of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Contral) Act, 1960, clearly indicates that Hon’ble Apex Court has extensively considered the word ‘family’ in context of bona fide need of family and found that there is a consensus among the High Courts in India that the word “Family” is a word of great flexibility and is capable of different meanings. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court was considering the question whether a “foster son” would be “member of family” in relation to a landlady. Whether the meaning of Section 2 (6A) of the Act, 1960. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court was considering the question whether a “foster son” would be “member of family” in relation to a landlady. Whether the meaning of Section 2 (6A) of the Act, 1960. Even in this ruling, not only “adopted son” but even the “foster son”, who is “one brought up as a son though not a son by birth” as defined in Shorter Oxford Dictionary, has also been considered. Ultimately, it was held that it is not in every case that a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a member of family of that person but would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 10. Section 2(6-A) of Tamil Nadu Buildings ( Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is quoted as under: “2.(6-A) ‘member of his family’ in relation to a landlord means his spouse, son, daughter, grandchild or dependant parent.” Relevant paragraphs 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 24 of K.V. Muthu (supra) are also quoted as under: “14. In its ordinary and primary sense, the term “Family” signifies the collective body of persons living in one house or under one head or manager or one domestic government. In its restricted sense, “Family” would include only parents and their children. It may include even grandchildren and all the persons of the same blood living together. In its broader sense, it may include persons who are not connected by blood depending upon the context in which the word is used. 15. There is a consensus among the High Courts in India that the word “Family” is a word of great flexibility and is capable of different meanings. 18. It is in the background of the above discussion relating to the cases decided by various High Courts and this Court that it is to be seen whether a “Foster Son” would be covered by the word “Family” as defined in the Act. 19. “Son” as understood in common parlance means as natural son born to a person after marriage. It is the direct blood relationship which is the essence of the term in which “Son” is usually understood, emphasis being on legitimacy. In legal parlance, however, “Son” has a little wider connotation. 19. “Son” as understood in common parlance means as natural son born to a person after marriage. It is the direct blood relationship which is the essence of the term in which “Son” is usually understood, emphasis being on legitimacy. In legal parlance, however, “Son” has a little wider connotation. It may include not only the natural son but also son’s son, namely, the grand child, and where the personal law permits adoption, it also include an adopted son. 20. Section 3 (57)of the General Clauses Act defines “Son” as under: ‘son’ in the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption, shall include an adopted son. 21. Relying upon this definition, the Lahore High Court in In re Divi Dita , held that where the personal law of the parties permits adoption, the word “Son” will include an adopted son. In Adit Narayan Singh v. Mahabir Prasad Tiwari, 48 Indian Appeals 86, the Privy Council held that ‘Sons’ in Mitakshara Chapter II 6(1) include a grand son. In the ancient Hindu Law, twelve sons are mentioned by the truth-seeing Sages all of whom need not be mentioned here. The attempt only is to indicates that the terms “Son” itself is a flexible term and may not be limited to the direct descendant. Its true meaning, like the term “Family” discussed above, will depend upon the context in which it is used. Even illegitimate son may be treated as legitimate, as for example, the ‘Son’ referred to in Section16 of Hindu Marriage Act, as originally enacted. 24. “Foster Brother” is a male child nursed at the same breast as, or reared with, another of different parentage. “Foster Father” is described as one who performs the duty of a father to another’s child. “Foster pother” is indicated to mean a woman who nurses and brings up another’s child, either as an adoptive mother or as a nurse, while “Foster Sister” means a female child nursed at the same breast as, or reared with, another of different parentage.” 11. Thus, on the same analogy, a conclusion can safely be drawn that ‘step son’ would be a member of “family” of landlady/landlord as defined under Section 3(g) of the Act. It may be noticed that the above ruling was given on the question as to whether the “foster son” would be “member of family” in relation to landlady. Thus, on the same analogy, a conclusion can safely be drawn that ‘step son’ would be a member of “family” of landlady/landlord as defined under Section 3(g) of the Act. It may be noticed that the above ruling was given on the question as to whether the “foster son” would be “member of family” in relation to landlady. In my view, the present case stands on a better footing wherein it is not in dispute that three sons named above were born out of the wedlock of late Mangal Prasad with his second wife Smt. Babboo @ Bhagwati. It is not in dispute that late Mangal Prasad, late husband of the landlady, is the natural father of all three sons and they are also living with the landlady with other family members. 12. It is also not in dispute that 18 persons including above noted three sons are living in one accommodation and therefore, it cannot be said that the need of the landlady was not bona fide. The release application was filed in the year 2004 and by now the family must have grown up further. In the totality of circumstances, I find that the impugned judgment and order suffers from material irregularity and is based on incorrect interpretation of law produced before the Court below and warrants interference by this Court. 13. Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 22.7.2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jhansi in Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2008 is quashed. The judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority dated 17.9.2008 is restored. Consequently, the release application filed by the landlady-petitioner under Section 21(1)(a) of UP Act 13 of 1972 stands allowed. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, subject to filing of an undertaking by the tenant-respondents before the Court below, it is provided that: (1) The tenant-respondents shall handover the peaceful possession of the premises in question to the landlord-petitioner on or before 31.1.2019. (2) The tenant-respondents shall file the undertaking before the Court below to the said effect within two weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order; (3) The tenant-respondents shall pay entire decretal amount within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order; (4) The tenant-respondents shall pay damages @ Rs. 1,000/- per month by 07th day of every succeeding month and continue to deposit the same in the Court below till 31.1.2019 or till the date he vacates the premises, whichever is earlier and the landlord is at liberty to withdraw the said amount; (5) In the undertaking the tenant-respondents shall also state that he will not create any interest in favour of the third party in the premises in dispute; (6) Subject to filing of the said undertaking, the tenant-respondents shall not be evicted from the premises in question till the aforesaid period; (7) It is made clear that in case of default of any of the conditions mentioned herein-above, the protection granted by this Court shall stand vacated automatically. (8) In case the premises is not vacated as per the undertaking given by the petitioner, he shall also be liable for contempt. There shall be no order as to costs.