JUDGMENT : BHARATI H. DANGRE, J. 1. The Petitioner seeks his release by quashing and setting aside an order of detention passed by the Commissioner of Police, Pune on 6th April 2018, thereby detaining him under the provisions of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons engaged in Black Marketing of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 (for short “MPDA Act 1982”). The petitioner is presently detained at Yerwada Central Jail at Pune and has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, praying for quashing and setting aside the impugned order of detention on the ground that it suffers from total non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority and is illegal and bad in law. 2. The petitioner, a resident of Sridhar Nagar, Hill Point Society, Pune was served with an order of detention issued by the respondent No. 1 with a view to prevent him from acting, in any manner, prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and it is directed that it has necessary to detain him from the date of service of the order. The order of detention was accompanied with the grounds of detention which were also communicated to the petitioner in pursuance of section 8 of the MPDA Act, 1981. The grounds of detention which were communicated to the petitioner informed him that paragraph No. 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 is the basis on which the detention order has been passed under subsection (2) of section 3 of the MPDA Act, 1981. The detaining authority also stated that on the basis of the documents that were placed before him and on which he had placed reliance and formed subjective satisfaction were also supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention. 3. The grounds of detention, as communicated to the petitioner and placed on record at Exhibit-B, recites that the criminal record of the detenu reveals that he had committed offences enlisted in the grounds under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 such as selling illegal liquor which has not only endangered human lives but also ruined poor families. 3. The grounds of detention, as communicated to the petitioner and placed on record at Exhibit-B, recites that the criminal record of the detenu reveals that he had committed offences enlisted in the grounds under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 such as selling illegal liquor which has not only endangered human lives but also ruined poor families. It also states that the detenu is habitually committing the offences which are harmful to human life and are detrimental to the society and while he has engaged himself in bootlegging activities, he has also terrorized and threatened people of dire consequences. It is further stated in the grounds of detention that the detenu had created a virtual terror on account of the bootlegging activities. A categorical averment is made in the grounds to the following effect “you have made yourself a virtual terror on account of the above mentioned bootlegging activities”. You have been habitually committing offences under the Bombay Prohibition Act 1949 and Rules and Orders made thereunder and thus, you are ‘bootlegger’ as defined in section 2(b) of the said Act and your bootlegging activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 3-A. The grounds of detention then enlist the offences and the preventive action initiated against him which includes the offences registered at Bharati Vidya Peeth Police Station under section 65-E of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 in the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. For the purposes of passing of order of detention, the detaining authority had mentioned that she has considered the offences mentioned at Serial Nos. 4 and 5, enlisted in the chart, to be of the recent past suggestive of desperate tendencies and inclination of the detenu to perpetuate his bootlegging activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is further stated that the offences mentioned at Serial Nos. 2 to 5 of the chart were committed by the detenu while he had executed the bond for keeping good behaviour till the inquiry was concluded by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Haveli Pune. Based on the activities of the detenu, the detaining authority has concluded that the normal laws of the land were insufficient to curb his bootlegging activities which was showing an ascending trend and are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Based on the activities of the detenu, the detaining authority has concluded that the normal laws of the land were insufficient to curb his bootlegging activities which was showing an ascending trend and are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The grounds of detention then enumerate the details of the two crimes registered at Bharati Vidya Peeth Police Sation, Pune against the detenu under section 65-E of the Bombay Prohibition Act. Perusal of the said crime details would reveal that the detenu was carrying out illegal distilling of country liquor and plastic cans containing country liquor came to be seized from the spot where it was being sold and forwarded for chemical analysis. A confidential inquiry was conducted into the bootlegging activities of the detenu by the Senior Police Inspector of Bharati Vidyapeeth Police Station and the said inquiry revealed that the detenu is a bootlegger and has created a reign of terror in the vicinity of Bharati Vidya Peeth where he resided, but since he was a bootlegger, nobody dared to complain against him openly, because of fear of retaliation and nobody was ready to come forward and depose in the Court of law or any open forum and disclose any details about his bootlegging activities and in this backdrop, in-camera statements came to be recorded during the confidential inquiry. The detaining authority has included eight such statements recorded in-camera of the residents of the locality where the detenu is carrying his business of selling illicitly distilled country liquor in the area. The in-camera witnesses have also narrated the adverse effects of the liquor trade in the locality which is inhibited by poor people who survive on meager wages, but spent their earnings in consuming illicit liquor by the detenu. The in-camera statements have further narrated the conduct of the detenu in harassing the said witnesses and threatening them with dire consequences by killing them or destroying their place of abode. 4. The detaining authority, based on the bootlegging record and by placing reliance on the in-camera statement of the witnesses recorded by the Senior Inspector of Police of Bharati Vidyapeeth police station arrived at a conclusion that the detenu is a habitual and dangerous bootlegger involved in crime of Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and Rules and Orders made thereunder. 4. The detaining authority, based on the bootlegging record and by placing reliance on the in-camera statement of the witnesses recorded by the Senior Inspector of Police of Bharati Vidyapeeth police station arrived at a conclusion that the detenu is a habitual and dangerous bootlegger involved in crime of Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and Rules and Orders made thereunder. The detaining authority has described the bootlegging activities of the detenu as a threat to the lives and properties of the public and also conclude in paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 to the following effect. “6. On going through your bootlegging record, and in-camera statements of the witnesses recorded by Senior Police Inspector of Bharati Vidyapeeth Police Station, it is evident that, you are a habitual and dangerous bootlegger involved in crime under Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the rules and orders made there. Your bootlegging activities are a threat to the lives and properties of the public. In order to curb your bootlegging activities, preventive action had been taken against you. On 15-1-2017 a proposal under section 93 of the Bomaby Prohibition Act, 1949 was sent against you by Bharati Vidyapeeth Police Sation, Pune to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Haveli Division, Pune. In this proceeding, on 3-1-2018, you had executed a bond of Rs.10,000/- for keeping good behaviour till the enquiry is completed with Sub Divisional Magistrate, Haveli, Pune. During the enquiry period, you have committed offences of selling illicit liquor in the jurisdiction of Bharati Vidyapeeth Police Station, Pune. These offences are shown at serial number 02 to 05 of the chart of offences. Hence, it is evident that the normal laws of the land are insufficient to curb your bootlegging activities. Your bootlegging activities are showing an ascending trend and are prejudicial to maintenance of public order. You were arrested in several bootlegging offences and you were released on bail from time to time by the Hon’ble Courts. But you continued to commit bootlegging offences after getting released on bail. 7. From the above facts, I am subjectively satisfied that you are a ‘bootlegger’ as defined in section 2(b) of the said Act. Thus, it is clearly evident that you have been regularly indulging the sale of illicit liquor. Your activities are causing and calculated to cause wide spread danger to the life and health of the people in the jurisdiction of Bharati Vidhyapeeth Police Station, Pune. Thus, it is clearly evident that you have been regularly indulging the sale of illicit liquor. Your activities are causing and calculated to cause wide spread danger to the life and health of the people in the jurisdiction of Bharati Vidhyapeeth Police Station, Pune. Many persons are addicted to drinking of illicit liquor sold by you. This has not only affected their health but have also rendered them paupers and ruined their families. The families in which the earning members are addicted are facing untold suffering of their families, financially, socially and otherwise. This indicates that your illegal business of illicit liquor is hazardous to the society. You have earned lot of money from this illegal business. You have also created a reign of terror in the minds of common people who are afraid of you and they are not coming forward to give intimation against you. 5. Learned counsel Mr. Udaynath Tripathi would rely on the said grounds of detention and would submit that the order of detention is based on the said grounds and he specifically invited our attention to paragraph Nos. 6 and 7, which we have reproduced above from the grounds of detention. Shri Tripathi would submit that the detaining authority was in a confused state of mind and was not clear as to whether she intended to pass an order of detention, detaining the petitioner as a ‘bootlegger’ or ‘a dangerous person’. Learned counsel would submit that the detaining authority has concluded that the petitioner is a habitual and dangerous bootlegger. Shri Tripathi would submit that perusal of the grounds of detention wherein the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has been recorded would refer to the petitioner’s activities which are causing and calculated to cause danger to the life and health of public. Shri Tripathi would further submit that it proceeds to state that many persons are addicted to drinking illicit liquor which has not only affected their health, but also rendered them paupers and ruined their families. Shri Tripathi would submit that these are mere vague statements and there is no material to support the said averment about suffering and this also reflects the non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. Shri Tripathi would submit that these are mere vague statements and there is no material to support the said averment about suffering and this also reflects the non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. He would also submit that there was no material placed before the detaining authority to come to a conclusion that the said seized illicit liquor is dangerous to public health and as such, no public order is disturbed and this reflects total non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. In response to the petition and its grounds on which the detention order is assailed, the detaining authority has tendered an affidavit on record. The detaining authority has reiterated that on the basis of the material placed before her and on perusal of the same, she was subjectively satisfied that the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that the detenu is a bootlegger and has committed three offences enlisted in paragraph No. 3 of the grounds of detention under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 such as selling illicit liquor, which has not only endangered human life but also ruined poor families. The detaining authority has made a categorical statement in response to ground No. (g) of the petition to the following effect : “It is respectfully submitted that, after considering the seriousness of the recent past offences committed by the detenu, the senior Police Inspector of Bharati Vidyapeeth Police Station, Pune i.e. sponsoring authority on his own capacity conducted a confidential inquiry into the bootlegging activities of detenu’s and his associates’. The enquiry revealed that the detenu has terrorized the residents of the area where he live as well as the residents of the adjoining areas. However, as the detenu is a ‘Dangerous Person’, nobody dares to complain against him openly, due to fear and retaliation.” Though Mr. Tripathi would place into service several grounds reflecting non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority, we would consider the pin pointed submission of Shri Tripathi as to whether the detaining authority had clubbed the purposes for detention and whether clubbing of the purposes display lack of certainty and precision on the part of the detaining authority. 6. Tripathi would place into service several grounds reflecting non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority, we would consider the pin pointed submission of Shri Tripathi as to whether the detaining authority had clubbed the purposes for detention and whether clubbing of the purposes display lack of certainty and precision on the part of the detaining authority. 6. The MPDA Act which is an enactment to provide for preventive detention of Slumlords, bootleggers, Drug offenders, dangerous persons, Video Pirates, Sand smugglers and persons engaged in black marketing, essential commodities and for preventing their dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The said enactment intend to prevent the activities of several persons categorized under the said Act to be Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers, etc. At the time when the said enactment was brought into force with effect from 23rd September 1981, it intended to cover three classes of persons i.e. Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons and the aim of the enactment was to have a special law in the State of Maharashtra to provide for preventive Detention of the three classes of persons. The term “Slumlords”, “bootleggers” and drug offenders and dangerous persons was defined in the enactment itself and a specific meaning was assigned to each term. It was by the Amending Act of 2009, the words “Drug Offenders” and “Dangerous Persons” were segregated. Subsequently, the category of Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers came to be inserted to curb the activities of the persons falling into this category which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The thrust of the enactment being to prevent commission of activities by the different classes of persons categorized under the enactment from being acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In sub-section (a) of section 2, the activities of different classes of persons are enlisted and it is defined as to when such activities would amount to “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. Categories of persons and their activities which would be termed to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order are distinct and the legislature intended to identify and keep them distinct. Categories of persons and their activities which would be termed to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order are distinct and the legislature intended to identify and keep them distinct. Perusal of the definition of the term “bootlegger” as defined in section 2(b) would reveal that bootlegger is a person who distills, manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drugs or other intoxicant in contravention to the provisions of Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and Rules and Orders made thereunder or of any other law for the time being in force or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any other material in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the above mentioned things by or through any other person or abates in any other manner, the doing of such thing. Whereas a dangerous person under the enactment means a person who either by himself or as a member of a leader of a gang habitually commits or abates the commission of any offence punishable under Chapter 16 or 17 of the Indian Penal Code, or any of the offences punishable under Chapter 5 of the Arms Act 1959. An activity of a bootlegger is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when he is engaged or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as a bootlegger, which affect adversely or likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. In case of a drug offender, he is said to act in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, when he is engaged or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as a drug offender. In context of the activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, each term and category is distinct in itself and when a person is sought to be detained by invoking the provisions of the MPDA Act, 1981, the detaining authority is expected to distinctly categorize the person and then pass an order of detention, if his activities in the respective capacity is found to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 7. 7. Preventive detention being a precautionary measure, it necessarily proceeds in all cases, to some extent on suspicion or anticipation as distinct proof and the exercise of the power to issue the detention order necessarily depends upon existence of a state of mind in the detaining authority i.e. “satisfaction” which is a purely subjective condition, so as to exclude a judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify the detention. The scope of judicial review in the matters of preventive detention is limited so as to only examine whether the order is based on the material placed on record and takes into consideration the relevant material and excludes the irrelevant and in no case, it is permissible to go into the adequacy of the material on which the order has been made. The laws authorizing preventive detention denies the detenu the right of trial before the Court of law and of consulting or being defended by a legal practitioner of his choice enumerating followance of certain procedural safeguards. Keeping this particular feature of preventive detention as distinct from punitive detention in mind, it is the duty of the Court to examine whether the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority has been reached on the basis of the relevant material. Article 22 prescribes the minimum procedural safeguards that must be included in any law/statute permitting preventive detention and as and when such requirements are not observed, the detention even if void ab initio, ceases to be “in accordance with the procedure established by law” and infringes the fundamental rights of the detenu guaranteed under Article 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution. The preventive detention, by its very nature is aimed at preventing the commission of an offence or preventing the detained person or achieving a certain end. The authority making the order therefore, cannot always be in possession of full detailed information when it passes the order and the information in its possession may at times, fall short of a proof of any specific offence although it may be indicative of strong probability of commission of an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 8. The authority making the order therefore, cannot always be in possession of full detailed information when it passes the order and the information in its possession may at times, fall short of a proof of any specific offence although it may be indicative of strong probability of commission of an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 8. Perusal of section 3 of MPDA Act, 1981 would reveal that the power to detain can be exercised by the State Government if it is satisfied with respect to any person with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, an order directing detention of the person can be passed. The District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police is authorized to pass an order of preventive detention if he is satisfied that it is necessary to do so, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to be prevailing in any area within the local limits of his jurisdiction. It is thus apparent that the exercise of the said powers is dependent on the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority and the said authority must be satisfied with respect to the individual person that his activities are prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that it was necessary to prevent him from acting in such a manner. It is the satisfaction of the authority on the point alone is necessary to be established. The satisfaction, however, must be based on some grounds. If there are no grounds, then there can be no satisfaction. There may be divergence of opinion as to the sufficiency of grounds and one person may feel that existence of certain grounds are sufficient whereas the other person may be of the opinion that there ought to have been some more grounds. However, the legislature in its wisdom has left the decision on the detaining authority and if the detaining authority is satisfied on the existence of the grounds and which, in his opinion, are sufficient to detain a person, then the question of satisfaction except on the grounds of mala fides is not open to challenge in the Court of law. However, the legislature in its wisdom has left the decision on the detaining authority and if the detaining authority is satisfied on the existence of the grounds and which, in his opinion, are sufficient to detain a person, then the question of satisfaction except on the grounds of mala fides is not open to challenge in the Court of law. Whether in a particular case, the grounds are sufficient or not, according to the opinion of any person, other than the authority passing the order of detention is completely ruled out by section 3 of the Enactment. The Court would not sit in the place of the detaining authority and determine if it would have come to the same conclusion as is reached by the detaining authority and the subjective satisfaction reached by that authority cannot be substituted by applying an objective test in a Court of law. The orders of detention are at times passed on the material which may not be strictly admissible as evidence in the Court of law, but taking into consideration the exigencies of administration and if in the opinion of the detaining authority, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in an area, are sufficient to preventively detain a person, then weightage has to be adhered to such a subjective satisfaction formed by a detaining authority. The subjective satisfaction reached by a detaining authority is discernible from the grounds of detention which are to be communicated to a detenu by the mandate of sub-clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution and whenever any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order is duty bound to communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made. The said grounds is thus, a reflection of the mind of the detaining authority and indication of the grounds has an obvious purpose i.e. to apprise the detenu of the material on the basis of which he has been detained and to find out whether the material is relevant and is related to the object sought to be achieved by passing an order of detention against him. 9. The parameters of judicial review in such matters are too well settled to require any reiteration. 9. The parameters of judicial review in such matters are too well settled to require any reiteration. Suffice it to note that in a judgment delivered in somewhat similar set up, in the sense, under a similar law in the case of Subramanian vs. State of Tamil Nadu and anr., (2012) 4 SCC 699 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Court’s interference in the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority is in exceptional and extremely limited grounds. The Court may not substitute its opinion for that of the detaining authority when the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant and that sufficiency of grounds is not for the Court, but for the detaining authority for the formation of subjective satisfaction that the detention of a person with a view to preventing from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order is required and that such satisfaction is subjective and not objective. In para 14, this is what the Hon’ble Supreme Court held :— “14. It is well settled that the Court does not interfere with the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority except in exceptional and extremely limited grounds. The Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the detaining authority when the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant, that sufficiency of grounds is not for the Court but for the detaining authority for the formation of subjective satisfaction that the detention of a person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order is required and that such satisfaction is subjective and not objective. The object of the law of preventive detention is not objective. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive and further that the action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, normally, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the conduct in an exhaustive manner. The satisfaction of the detaining authority, therefore, is considered to be of primary importance with certain latitude in the exercise of its discretion.” 10. Even in an earlier judgment, it is this very test, which has been evolved in the context of the Maharashtra Act. Thus, the Maharashtra Act is founded on prevention from dangerous activities of slumlords, bootleggers, drug offenders and dangerous persons. Even in an earlier judgment, it is this very test, which has been evolved in the context of the Maharashtra Act. Thus, the Maharashtra Act is founded on prevention from dangerous activities of slumlords, bootleggers, drug offenders and dangerous persons. Even if the long title of the Act is borne in mind, it is evident that a meaning is assigned to the terms “bootlegger” and “dangerous person”. Thus, activities of a bootlegger are dangerous and they ought to be prevented, but a bootlegger is not a dangerous person as defined in the Act. This subtle but very pertinent distinction will be overlooked if one only goes by the long title of the Act. Equally, the expression “activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” is not undefined and vague one. That is also defined with reference to activities of each of these persons. Thus, the acts and activities of these persons are dangerous activities. However, when the Act enables passing of a detention order based on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, for that to be arrived at, it postulates application of mind to these defined concepts. The activities in which a bootlegger is involved in or is allegedly involved are brought within the sweep of the Act by defining the term “bootlegger” and also defining each of the acts which he commits. Then, the Act proceeds to state that these could be brought within the purview of the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” and qua a bootlegger. Thus, who is a dangerous person has also been defined and what acts attributable to him would result in prejudicially affecting the maintenance of public order have also been defined. There cannot be any confusion then in the mind of the detaining authority and he cannot, in the garb of preventing the activities of a bootlegger, but finding them not to be proximate or otherwise enough to bring him within the sweep of the law, in the process of recording his subjective satisfaction, make a departure and seek to bring him in the net as a dangerous person. In that process, if the acts attributed to him are not possible to be brought within the sweep of the law by terming them as that of a bootlegger and prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, midway the detaining authority cannot change track and hold that in his/her opinion he is also a dangerous person. Without there being any material, the detaining authority cannot hold that such person’s activities as a bootlegger are sufficient and in any event they are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Thus, the subjective satisfaction has to be based on grounds, which are precise, pertinent and relevant. If one has to bring within the net of the law the activities of a bootlegger, then, a specific satisfaction has to be recorded and in terms of the law. The law demands that precise satisfaction to be recorded. There is a distinct requirement if one has to apply the law or invoke it so as to prevent activities of a dangerous person. The nature of the material that is required for holding that his activities are dangerous to the maintenance of public order is distinct and different from that of a bootlegger, a sand smuggler etc. 11. Once we are dealing with a law of preventive detention, then, there is no scope for upholding a detention order, when the subjective satisfaction, as is recorded in the instant case, is arrived at by a process, which, from its inception, is wholly vitiated. In this case, the detaining authority was proceeding against the detenu by labeling and terming him as a bootlegger. His activities of bootlegging were to form the basis of the subjective satisfaction and that is how the detaining authority proceeded. However, the detaining authority did not apply its mind to the fact that there has to be cogent and satisfactory material for such subjective satisfaction to be arrived at and that material must pinpoint to his activities as a bootlegger and further these activities have to be prejudicially affecting the maintenance of public order. One cannot commence the process by referring to his bootlegging activities but never intending to proceed against him as a bootlegger. One cannot commence the process by referring to his bootlegging activities but never intending to proceed against him as a bootlegger. Then, midway, the detaining authority, though referring to his bootlegging activities and materials in that regard, picks up some material and proceeds on the footing that the detenu is a dangerous person and in the very order, without any material in that behalf, holds that the detenu is a dangerous bootlegger or is a dangerous person and his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 12. Mr. Tripathi is right in his criticism that the detaining authority in this case did not apply its mind as to whether it intends to proceed against the detenu petitioner as a bootlegger or as a dangerous person but still made a detention order. The detaining authority is well aware that there is a distinct requirement in law. The detaining authority, while arriving at her subjective satisfaction, has, at more than one places, referred to the detenu’s violent acts and concluded that by the same, he spreads terror in the society and the public at large is adversely affected by the same. Thus, from inception, the detaining authority intended to proceed against the petitioner detenu in order to curb or prevent his acts as a dangerous person. However, an attempt is made to justify the subjective satisfaction by urging that the detenu is proceeded against as a bootlegger and in order to prevent his bootlegging activities, the order of detention has been passed against him. It is clear from the record that if this was the object and purpose in making the detention order, then, the detaining authority would have been careful enough and would have spelt out the satisfaction in clear and precise terms. This would have been with reference to relevant and proximate materials. Then, there was no occasion to refer to him as a dangerous person and bringing him within that expression. 13. The fact that the detaining authority proceeded against the petitioner detenu in this case as above is established and proved by the stand taken before us as well. This would have been with reference to relevant and proximate materials. Then, there was no occasion to refer to him as a dangerous person and bringing him within that expression. 13. The fact that the detaining authority proceeded against the petitioner detenu in this case as above is established and proved by the stand taken before us as well. In the affidavit in reply, while justifying the subjective satisfaction and supporting it, this is what the deponent/detaining authority has stated :— “It is respectfully submitted that, after considering the seriousness of the resent past offences committed by the detenu, the senior Police Inspector of Bharati Vidyapeth Police Station, Pune i.e. sponsoring authority on his own capacity conducted a confidential inquiry into the bootlegging activities of detenu’s and his associates. The enquiry revealed that the detenu has terrorized the residents of the area where he live as well the residents of the adjoining areas. However, as the detenu is a ‘Dangerous Person’, nobody dares to complain against him openly, due to fear of retaliation.” 14. While furnishing this explanation, the detaining authority is conspicuous by her silence with regard to the contents of paras 5 to 7 of the impugned detention order. There is no explanation furnished with regard to the opening paragraphs as well. These paras point towards a clear intent in making an order of detention against the detenu so as to curb his acts as a dangerous person. This is not a subjective satisfaction demanded by law so as to prevent the activities of a bootlegger and there is no application of mind at all. It is apparent that while defining the words and expressions (dangerous person and bootlegger) the law has outlined the activities in precise words. A dangerous person is the one who has committed certain offences, whereas a bootlegger is understood to mean a person engaged in the activities specified in the definition of the term bootlegger. In these definitions, specific acts attributable to them are brought within the definition of the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. The attempt of Mr. Yagnik to justify the subjective satisfaction on the footing that we must not ignore the explanation below this definition of the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” is futile and meaningless. The attempt of Mr. Yagnik to justify the subjective satisfaction on the footing that we must not ignore the explanation below this definition of the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” is futile and meaningless. The explanation cannot be read in the manner suggested by Mr. Yagnik, but qua each of the persons, the acts attributable to them, if committed, result in a adverse effect on the maintenance of public order. By the aid of the explanation, the acts engaged in by a bootlegger cannot be introduced in the definition of a “dangerous person” or vice versa. It is specific acts attributable to each of them, if committed, result in adversely affecting the maintenance of public order and the explanation, therefore, has to be read accordingly. Since this is a law enabling preventive detention, it demands awareness to the above crucial aspects. If the detenu in this case was to be detained for his bootlegging activities resulting in prejudicially affecting the maintenance of public order, then, the material in that behalf ought to be indicated with clarity. If throughout that was the intent in detaining him by relying on his activities as a bootlegger, then, a detention order against him by terming him as a dangerous person cannot be supported by relying on the explanation to section 2(a) of the MPDA Act. It is this vital aspect of the matter, which enables us to agree with Mr. Tripathi that extraneous materials have gone into arriving at the subjective satisfaction. It is the above, which enables us to agree with Mr. Tripathi that the impugned detention order is vitiated by total non-application of mind. 15. We ought to remind all concerned that a preventive detention order has to be made by complying with the provisions of the law enabling making of such an order. The distinction between preventive detention and punitive detention is too well settled to be reiterated. Preventive detention is different from punitive detention/sentence. A person is preventively detained without a trial, but punitive detention is after a regular trial and when he is found guilty of committing an offence. The basis of preventive detention is suspicion and its justification is the necessity. The basis of sentence is the verdict of a Court after a regular trial. Preventive detention is different from punitive detention/sentence. A person is preventively detained without a trial, but punitive detention is after a regular trial and when he is found guilty of committing an offence. The basis of preventive detention is suspicion and its justification is the necessity. The basis of sentence is the verdict of a Court after a regular trial. When a person is preventively detained, his detention is justified only so long as it is necessary. Such is not the position in punitive detention. In the case of Sunil Fulchand Shah vs. Union of India and ors., AIR 2000 SC 1023 . A Five Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court succinctly pointed out this distinction and we can make a useful reference to the following paragraph :— “31. It was contended by the learned Attorney General that section 10 and particularly the words “may be detained” have to be read in the context of Article 22(7)(b) of the Constitution and if they are so read, also keeping in mind the object and purpose of the Act, then correctly interpreted they would mean “may be actually detained”. He submitted that Article 22(7)(b) is permissive, it being not obligatory on Parliament to prescribe the maximum period of detention. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned Solicitor General appearing for the State of Gujarat, also submitted that the Constitution thus contemplates longer period of detention in the sense that in absence of any limit prescribed by the Parliament detention can be for a period longer than one or two years. It is true that Article 22(7)(b) has been held permissive and, therefore, there can be a preventive detention legislation which does not provide for the maximum period of detention and a person can be detained thereunder for a period longer than one or two years. That, however, cannot justify the view that the provision prescribing maximum period of detention should be construed liberally. When the Parliament has chosen to fix the maximum period, the question as to how the said period is to be computed will have to be decided by considering the object of the legislation and the relevant provision, the words used in that provision and without being influenced by the nature of power conferred by Article 22(7)(b). When the Parliament has chosen to fix the maximum period, the question as to how the said period is to be computed will have to be decided by considering the object of the legislation and the relevant provision, the words used in that provision and without being influenced by the nature of power conferred by Article 22(7)(b). COFEPOSA, like all other preventive detention laws, has been regarded as a Draconian Law as it takes away the freedom and liberty of the citizen without a trial and on mere suspicion. It is tolerated in a democracy governed by the rule of law only as a necessary evil. Though the object of such legislation is to protect the nation and the society against anti national and anti social activities, the nature of action permitted is preventive and not punitive. The distinction between preventive detention and punitive detention has now been well recognized. Preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention/sentence. A person is preventively detained without a trial but punitive detention is after a regular trial and when he is found guilty of having committed an offence. The basis of preventive detention is suspicion and its justification is necessity. The basis of sentence is the verdict of the Court after a regular trial. When a person is preventively detained his detention can be justified only so long as it is found necessary. When a person is sentenced to suffer imprisonment it is intended that the person so sentenced shall remain in prison for the period stated in the order imposing sentence. The term specified in the order of sentence is intended to be actual period of imprisonment. On the other hand, preventive detention being an action of immediate necessity has to be immediate and continuous if it is to be effective and the purpose of detention is to be achieved. The safeguards available to a person against whom an order of detention has been passed are limited and, therefore, the Courts have always held that all the procedural safeguards provided by the law should be strictly complied with. The justification for preventive detention being necessity a person can be detained only so long as it is found necessary to detain him. If his detention is found unnecessary, even during the maximum period permissible under the law then he has to be released from detention forthwith. The justification for preventive detention being necessity a person can be detained only so long as it is found necessary to detain him. If his detention is found unnecessary, even during the maximum period permissible under the law then he has to be released from detention forthwith. It is really in this context that section 10 and particularly the words “may be detained” shall have to be interpreted.” 16. We are, therefore, very clear in our mind that when this basic and fundamental distinction has not been adhered to, then, the detention order cannot be sustained. The very concept of preventive detention is not to punish for the acts done, but to prevent a person in anticipation of doing activities prejudicial to security of State. It is in these circumstances that we must proceed to quash and set aside the impugned detention order. 17. As a result of the above discussion, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (b). The order of detention dated 6th April 2018 is quashed and set aside. Detenu Anil Preetam Kumbhar is set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 18. Since we have allowed the writ petition on the basis of grounds (b) and (c) at pages 5 and 6 of the writ petition, we did not deem it fit to hear Mr. Tripathi on the other grounds in the writ petition, though he says, they are of equal substance. Petition allowed.