ORDER : R. Suresh Kumar, J. 1. This Criminal Revision Case was filed against the order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai in Crl.M.P. No. 13279 of 2017 in Crime No. 220 of 2016, on the file of the Sub Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch Team-III, Vepery, Chennai, by order dated 06.09.2017. The revision petitioners against whom, the case was registered by the respondent police for the alleged offences punishable under Section 65 & 66 of Information Technology Act and under Sections 408, 420, 465, 468, 471 and 477(A) of IPC, had moved petitions for anticipatory bail before this Court in Crl.O.P. Nos. 3611 and 4176 of 2017. The said petitions were dismissed by a learned Judge of this Court by order dated 05.07.2017 where, the learned Judge has traced the facts of the case, which are re-produced hereunder for easy reference: "The defacto complainant in this case is one Soundarrajan, Company Secretary & Compliance Officer of Sundaram Asset Management Company Limited (hereinafter called as the Company). It is the business of the Company to manage the financial portfolio of their clients, for which the company had appointed four named persons, as authorised signatories, who were empowered to enter into individual agreements with clients for managing their finances. Since the clients are not conversant with the nitty gritty of share transaction they would make available their finance with the company and would rely upon the wisdom of the company in making investments. The four authorised signatories were permitted to have Demat account on behalf of the clients for the purpose of share transactions. Decisions will be taken on behalf of the clients by the company and the money that is kept in trust belonging to the client will be used "or purchase of shares and debentures. While so, Priya, Petitioner in Crl.O.P. No. 3611 of 2017 was appointed as Manager-Customer Relations some time in the year 2006 and she knew the business activities of the company. One Balaji Vaidyanathan, a colleague of Priya abruptly left the company some time in the year 2014 and the Company suspected that Priaya has shared some confidential information with the said Balaji Vaidyanathan, as he had joined their competitor. Therefore, the services of Priya was terminated. One Balaji Vaidyanathan, a colleague of Priya abruptly left the company some time in the year 2014 and the Company suspected that Priaya has shared some confidential information with the said Balaji Vaidyanathan, as he had joined their competitor. Therefore, the services of Priya was terminated. Thereafter, when the laptop provided to her by the company was scrutinised, it revealed startling information, it was found that Priya had opened two accounts in the name of S.V. Consultants and Sun Shine Associates and those two companies were started in the name of her brother, namely, Vincent and her mother, Juliet, Petitioner in Crl.O.P. No. 4176 of 2017. Further, enquiry conducted by the company revealed that Priya had issued instructions in the name of the four authorised signatories to transfer monies of the clients amounting to Rs. 1,29,00,000/- to the said account over a period of time and thus, siphoned off the amount. Hence, the FIR." "From the records produced by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it is seen that the complaint in this case has been submitted by Sundaram Asset Management Company to the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 09.03.2016, as could be seen from the date seal of the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Police and the matter was referred to Commissioner of Police on the same day for enquiry. As usual, the police were dragging their feet without registering the FIR and ultimately they registered FIR only on 01.09.2016. Perhaps they would have made preliminary enquiry before registration of the same. If viewed in this background, Priya has given the complaint before National Commission for Women only on 11.03.2016 and the allegation made in her complaint that she had left her company's laptop in her desktop, which was misused by the company, does not cut ice with this Court. The Police have filed a detailed counter, wherein it is shown that out of a sum of Rs. 6,24,00,000/- Priya has purchased immovable properties in various places in Anna nagar etc., and also purchased one Fortuner car and two Polo cars. She also seems to have several accounts in various banks. Apart from that, Juliet Bernard, her mother has also purchased properties in Egmore and in other places. 6,24,00,000/- Priya has purchased immovable properties in various places in Anna nagar etc., and also purchased one Fortuner car and two Polo cars. She also seems to have several accounts in various banks. Apart from that, Juliet Bernard, her mother has also purchased properties in Egmore and in other places. Taking into consideration the serious nature of allegation in the FIR, this Court is of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail to both the petitioners and hence, these petitions are dismissed. However, this Court directs the Assistant Commissioner of Police to take up the investigation to be closely monitored by the Deputy Commissioner of Police." 2. Aggrieved over the said dismissal of anticipatory bail petitions of this Court, the petitioners preferred Special Leave Petition before the Honourable Supreme Court in SLP. No. 5805 & 5806 of 2017 where, the Honourable Supreme Court by order dated 17.08.2017, has passed the following order: "Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and perused the record. We are not inclined to entertain these special leave petitions. Accordingly, they are dismissed. However, there shall be stay of arrest qua the petitioners for a period of four weeks from today during which time, the petitioners may apply for regular bail." 3. Pursuant to the said order passed by the Honourable Apex Court, the petitioners filed a Crl.M.P. No. 2742 of 2017 in Crime No. 220 of 2016, on the file of the Central Crime Branch Police, Chennai, before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court for exclusive Trial of CCB Cases, [relating to cheating case in Chennai] and CBCID, Metro Cases, Chennai. 4. The said applications were filed invoking the provision of Section 437 and 439 of Cr.P.C, for the release of the petitioners on bail. 5. 4. The said applications were filed invoking the provision of Section 437 and 439 of Cr.P.C, for the release of the petitioners on bail. 5. The learned Magistrate, after having taken into account the facts of the case and after taking into consideration the powers vest with the Magistrate Court under Section 437 of the Code, has come to the conclusion that, since the petitioners not have been arrested by the respondent police and had been in custody nor they appeared/brought before the Magistrate Court, either at the time of filing the application for bail, or at the time of hearing of the application, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that, there was no necessity to consider for grant of bail invoking Section 437 of the Code and the learned Magistrate has also held that Section 439 of the Code, cannot be invoked by the learned Magistrate and therefore, on this ground these said application filed by the petitioners in Crl.M.P. No. 2742 of 2017 was dismissed, by Order dated 30.08.2017. 6. Against the said order of the learned Magistrate made in Crl.M.P. No. 2742 of 2017, dated 30.08.2017, the petitioners preferred Crl.M.P. No. 13279 of 2017 in Crime No. 220 of 2016, before the Principal Sessions Court at Chennai. The said petition was heard and decided by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai, by order dated 06.09.2017, where also the learned Sessions Judge, has dismissed the said petition as the said petition was not maintainable under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. As against the said dismissal order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge dated 06.09.2017, the present revision case was filed. 7. At the time of scrutinising the revision case, the Registry, had raised an objection that, since the order impugned was the dismissal of the bail petition as against which, the revision would not lie, therefore, the Registry has raised the following objection: "Impugned order in Crl.M.P. No. 13279 for 2017 in Cr. No. 220 of 2016 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge at Chennai is interlocutory in nature. In view of Section 379(2) of Cr.P.C. It may be stated that how this Crl.R.C.is maintainable. Hence, returned." 8. No. 220 of 2016 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge at Chennai is interlocutory in nature. In view of Section 379(2) of Cr.P.C. It may be stated that how this Crl.R.C.is maintainable. Hence, returned." 8. However, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner while re-presenting the said revision case has made the following endorsements: "This petition is maintainable as there is an illegality in the order passed by the learned Magistrate and learned Sessions Judge, who had decided the bail application finally by dismissing it as non-maintainable. Hence, it is not an interim order and it is a final order. Hence, the bar under Section 397(2) will not lie as it is maintainable. Moreover, as per the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 , even in revision the Hon'ble High Court has got powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Whose inherent is to secure the ends of justice. Further as held in Supreme Court Judgment in the case of K.K. Patel & another v. State of Gujarat & another 2000(6) SCC 195 ) in para-11- discussed that it is now well-high settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage. We mentioned before the Hon'ble Justice, the Hon'ble Justice was ordered to file and number and post it for maintainability tomorrow (i.e.) 15.09.2017. Hence, we representing after compliance and mentioned before court." 9. In view of the said objection raised by the Registry and the endorsement made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in re-presenting the revision case papers, the Registry has placed this case in the SR. stage for maintainability before this Court. That is how, this case has come up for maintainability. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has made elaborate submissions supporting his contention that, the revision case would be maintainable in the present form and for the present relief, as against the order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, dated 06.09.2017. He has also made submissions on merits of the case also underlining the need of the indulgence of this Court for grant of bail to the petitioners. 11. He has also made submissions on merits of the case also underlining the need of the indulgence of this Court for grant of bail to the petitioners. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in support of his contention has submitted that, only pursuant to the order passed by this Court in the earlier round of litigation where, the anticipatory bail petition filed by the petitioners were dismissed on merits and when the petitioners approached the Honourable Apex Court, it was directed, though declined to entertain the SLP as against the said order of dismissal made by this Court, that the petitioners to approach the Court below, for regular bail and only pursuant to such order of the Honourable Apex Court, bail petition was filed by these petitioners before the Magistrate Court, who instead of entertaining the same on merits, by invoking the provisions of Section 437 as well as 439 of the Code, had declined to entertain the same by citing the reason that, the said petition for bail filed by the petitioners was not maintainable under Section 437 or 439 of the Code. This decision made by the learned Magistrate was erroneous, therefore, as against which, when further petition was filed before the learned Principal Sessions Court, where also, the learned Principal Sessions Judge, in the order impugned dated 06.09.2017, had taken the very same view taken by the learned Magistrate at the first instance, and had declined to accept the plea raised by the petitioners for consideration of grant of bail to the petitioners. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the learned Magistrate had erroneously decided that, since the petitioners had not appeared in person before the Magistrate either at the time of filing the petition or at the time of hearing, the question of invoking Section 437 of the Code, does not arise. The learned Magistrate also decided that since the power to grant bail under Section 439 would vest only with either to the Sessions Court or to the High Court, such provision has not empowered the Magistrate to invoke or grant bail and therefore, invocation of Section 439 of the Code, for consideration of grant of bail would not arise in this case. For these two reasons, learned Magistrate, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, have erroneously decided the issue. 13. For these two reasons, learned Magistrate, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, have erroneously decided the issue. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that, when the said issue was reported before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, where the decisions of the Honourable Apex Court as well as this Court were quoted to state that there was no requirement of surrender of the accused before the Court below for grant of bail, the said position was not accepted by the learned Principal Judge. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners would further submit that, when the said two erroneous decisions made by the learned Magistrate as well as the learned Principal Sessions Judge were assailed before this Court in the present revision case, the Registry has raised the aforesaid objection to state that the said decisions made by the Court below are interlocutory in nature therefore, as against which, no revision would lie before this Court, under Section 397 of the Code in view of the statutory bar in sub section 2 of Section 397 of the Code. 15. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would further submit in this regard that, though there is a bar under Sub Section 2 of Section 397 of the Code to state that, the revisional power of this Court as well as the Sessions Court shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, in order to decide, as to whether a particular order was an interlocutory order or not, the test as envisaged by the Courts of law in a number of judgments, to decide the nature of the order as to whether it was interlocutory or final, it shall not be on the basis of the time at which the order was passed and it must be tested whether based on such order, the rights of the party is affected finally or not. 16. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would very much rely upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court made in 2000 (6) SCC 1985 in the matter of K.K. Patel and another v. State of Gujarat and another. 17. 16. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would very much rely upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court made in 2000 (6) SCC 1985 in the matter of K.K. Patel and another v. State of Gujarat and another. 17. Learned counsel would rely upon paragraph 11 of the said judgment which reads thus: "That apart, the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that no revision was maintainable on account of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Code, is clearly erroneous. It is now well neigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage. (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ( 1977 4 SCC 137 ); Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra ( 1977 4 SCC 551 ); V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI ( 1980 2 SCR 380 ); and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam ( 1999 3 SCC 134 )}. The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, would it result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable." 18. Learned counsel would further submit that the language used in Section 437 that, 'appears or is brought before a Court, was not to be construed or meant that such an appearance must be a physical appearance of the accused and it should be construed that the appearance must be through his or her counsel. Learned counsel would further submit that the language used in Section 437 that, 'appears or is brought before a Court, was not to be construed or meant that such an appearance must be a physical appearance of the accused and it should be construed that the appearance must be through his or her counsel. Therefore, in this context, the learned counsel would further submit that, since the accused was represented by counsel before the Court below it should be taken into account that the appearance through the counsel satisfying the ingredients as mentioned under Section 437(i) of the Code, that the accused appeared or brought before the Court and therefore, the requirement of physical presence or personal appearance of the accused ought not to have been insisted upon by the Court below, especially in the Court of Magistrate for consideration of grant of bail invoking Section 437 of the Code. 19. I have considered the said submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the materials placed before this Court. 20. In so far as the merits of the case is concerned, on the other side, as to whether the petitioners were entitled to seek for a bail, the issue had been widely discussed by the learned Judge of this Court, while refusing the anticipatory bail in the first round of litigation made in Crl.O.P. No. 3611 and Crl.O.P. No. 4176 of 2017, by order dated 05.07.2017. 21. Very wild allegation has been made against the petitioners. According to the prosecution, the amount involved is more than six crores rupees and therefore, in that context, whether the custodial interrogation was necessitated or not is a matter between the prosecution and the Court and based on which, bail can be granted or even refused by the Courts concerned, depending upon the situation of the case and quality of the allegation made against the accused. Therefore, as far as the decision to be made by this Court with regard to the question posed before this Court as to the maintainability of this revision case is concerned, this Court does not want to go into the merits of the case of the petitioners projecting before the Court below for the purpose of consideration of grant of bail to the accused/petitioners. 22. 22. Since the prime question raised before this Court for consideration is as to the maintainability of the case, this Court is confined only to the arguments to that effect and the legal position in that regard before deciding the issue raised herein. 23. In this context, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of K.K. Patel's case to state that, merely because of the statutory bar under Section 397(2) of the Code precluding the High Court as well as the Sessions Court from exercising any revisional power in case, if the order against which, such revision is filed, is only an interlocutory in nature, the maintainability of the revision cannot be decided. The test to consider the nature of the order is not on the basis of the time on which it was passed. Courts have also taken the view that there is lot of difference between the interlocutory order and intermediate order. 24. Interlocutory order or otherwise for the purpose of Section 397 of the Code must be construed as an order rejecting the rights of the parties which are finally or conclusively decided or and it shall be construed as a final order even though was passed on intermediate stage. 25. In this regard, the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in 1980 SC Suppl. 92 in the matter of V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, can be relied, where, the Honourable Apex Court, after having analysed the issue has given the following decision: "Applying this test, it would appear that the substantive provision of s. 11(1) while providing for an appeal against any judgment, sentence or order made by a Special Court, circumscribed the right to appeal against the orders by excluding therefrom orders which are interlocutory orders. If this is the substantive provision in s. 11(1), the question is whether the non-obstante clause enlarges the provision or restricts it with reference to the substantive provision of appeals in the Code itself. It is necessary to bear in mind at this stage a fundamental fact. Unlike the provision contained in Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, either the present or the earlier one which ever provided for any appeal against any interlocutory order. The very concept of an appeal against an interlocutory order was wholly foreign to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the provision contained in Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, either the present or the earlier one which ever provided for any appeal against any interlocutory order. The very concept of an appeal against an interlocutory order was wholly foreign to the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is an understandable difference between an appeal and a revision. Till the prohibition contained in s. 397(4) of the Code was enacted for the first time, interlocutory orders were amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court or the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the notion or idea of an appeal against an interlocutory order in any Criminal Procedure Code was foreign to the Criminal Jurisprudence. If this was the statutory position at the time of enactment of the Act, it would be interesting to find out whether the Parliament wanted to make a radical departure by providing an appeal against every interlocutory order-a term which is wider than even an intermediate order as spelt out in the cases of Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye, by incorporating the non-obstante clause with a view to widening the substantive provision contained in s. 11(1). If such was the object of the Parliament there was no necessity of cutting down the operation of the word 'order' by excluding therefrom interlocutory orders. Again, when the non-obstante clause provides for 'notwithstanding anything in the Code' the expression as per grammatical construction would mean that something contained in the Code is to be excluded while examining the scope and content of the substantive provision of s. 11(1). However, there is nothing in the Code providing for an appeal against an interlocutory order. While enacting the Act, the Parliament was conscious of appeals and revisions under the Code and that is manifest from the language incorporated in sub-section 2 of Sec. 11 of the Act. Now, if there was no provision in the Code providing for an appeal against any interlocutory order in any proceeding under the Code, it is inconceivable that excluding that non-existent provision a wider jurisdiction of appeal was sought to be enacted under the substantive provision of s. 11(1)." 26. Now, if there was no provision in the Code providing for an appeal against any interlocutory order in any proceeding under the Code, it is inconceivable that excluding that non-existent provision a wider jurisdiction of appeal was sought to be enacted under the substantive provision of s. 11(1)." 26. So, according to the aforesaid judgment, the right to prefer an appeal against the interlocutory order alone was negated and if it is an interlocutory order against which, revision is filed, there had been no bar in preferring revision merely because the order impugned therein, is an interlocutory order. Even though it is an interlocutory order, the nature and effect of the said order shall be taken into account to justify that against the said order, a revision would lie under Section 397 of the Code or revision would not lie in view of the bar under Section 397(2) of the Code. 27. Here in the case in hand, as against the FIR registered against the petitioners they filed anticipatory bail petition, which was dismissed after taking into account the merits of the case by the learned Judge, by a detailed order, which has already been extracted herein above. As against which, when petitioners preferred Special Leave Petition before the Honourable Apex Court, it has categorically stated that the Apex Court was not inclined to entertain the Special Leave Petitions and accordingly, they were dismissed. However, a four weeks stay was granted from arresting the petitioners and in the meanwhile, it was the liberty given to the petitioners to seek for a regular bail. 28. Only in that context, the petitioners moved bail applications before the Magistrate Court invoking both the provisions of Section 437 and 439 of the Code. When the said bail petition was considered by the learned Magistrate, he has taken into account the import of Section 437(1) of the Code. The language used in Section 437(1) of the Code is very clear and unambiguous, which, for the purpose of easy reference, is extracted hereunder: "437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. When the said bail petition was considered by the learned Magistrate, he has taken into account the import of Section 437(1) of the Code. The language used in Section 437(1) of the Code is very clear and unambiguous, which, for the purpose of easy reference, is extracted hereunder: "437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. (1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non- bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but- (i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; (ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence: Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm: ........ ........." 29. Under Section 437(1) of the Code, the language used therein clearly demonstrates that, if any person on the commission of non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant or appeared or is brought before the Court other than High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail. 30. Therefore, the necessary ingredients which are required for invoking Section 437 is that, a person must be an accused and on commission of non-bailable offence, he should have been arrested or should have been detained without warrant or should have appeared or should have been brought before the said Court. 31. In the present case in hand, admittedly the petitioners were not arrested as they originally moved anticipatory bail before this Court, on dismissal of the same they preferred SLP before the Honourable Apex Court where also the same was dismissed however, liberty was given to them to move for a regular bail. 31. In the present case in hand, admittedly the petitioners were not arrested as they originally moved anticipatory bail before this Court, on dismissal of the same they preferred SLP before the Honourable Apex Court where also the same was dismissed however, liberty was given to them to move for a regular bail. When such a liberty was given to them to move for a regular bail, accordingly, when they moved before the Magistrate Court invoking Section 437 of the Code seeking for a regular bail, the necessary ingredients should have been satisfied by the accused persons to the satisfaction of the Magistrate for consideration of grant of bail. 32. In this context, it may be relevant to note that the accused persons were not ready to be arrested or to be surrendered before the learned Magistrate or not even ready to appear before the learned Magistrate for consideration of grant of bail. The words 'arrested' or 'detained without warrant' and the words, 'appears or brought before a Court', found in Section 437(1) of the Code are to be strictly interpreted and necessarily to be followed or such a situation should have emerged before the Court for consideration of grant of bail in that circumstances only. However, it was the stand of the petitioners/accused before the Court below that, they were not surrendered before the Court nor even appeared before the lower Court either at the time of filing the petition or at the time of hearing the petition. Only in that context, the learned Magistrate has refused to entertain the said petition invoking Section 437 of the Code and therefore, the said decision cannot be said to be incorrect or illegal or without propriety. 33. Like that, the learned Judge has also stated that Section 439 of the Code cannot be invoked by the Court of the Magistrate as it is a special power vested with the High Court or Sessions Courts regarding bail. In this regard, for easy reference Section 439 of the Code is extracted hereunder: "439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. In this regard, for easy reference Section 439 of the Code is extracted hereunder: "439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct- (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in subsection (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub- section; (b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing an person on bail be set aside or modified: Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. (2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody." 34. Since Section 439 is a special power other than the Magistrate Court, i.e., especially on the High Court or Sessions Court, such a power cannot be invoked by the Magistrate and therefore, the learned Magistrate, has taken a right decision. Moreover, Section 439 of the Code cannot be invoked by a Magistrate and therefore, that cannot be said to be an incorrect or illegal order. 35. As against the said order of the learned Magistrate, when the petitioners moved before the learned Principal Sessions Judge in Crl.M.P. No. 13279 of 2017, the learned Principal Sessions Judge also, after taking into account all the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners/accused, had dismissed the said petition as not maintainable within the meaning of Section 439 of the Code. The learned Principal Sessions Judge has given reasons for dismissing the said petition as not maintainable under Section 439 of the Code in the following manner. "Against which, these petitioners have come forward with this bail application before this Court under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. The learned counsel for petitioner argued that the lower court has not considered the provision of 437(1). "Against which, these petitioners have come forward with this bail application before this Court under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. The learned counsel for petitioner argued that the lower court has not considered the provision of 437(1). Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. That 'when any person accused of, or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable is arrested or detained without warrant by the office in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before the trial court, he may be released on bail". The petitioners have not appeared before the court below either at the time of filling the petition or at the time of hearing. The learned Magistrate has also observed that the petitioners have not been appeared before this Court either at the time of filing this petition or at the time of hearing and the petitioners/accused have also not been brought before this Court. Further, the respondent police neither arrested nor detained the petitioners/accused in connection with this case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's order is that "there shall be stay of arrest qua the petitioners for a period of four weeks from today during which time, the petitioners may apply for regular bail". Under Section 439(1)(a) of Cr.P.C. any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail and if the offence is of the nature specified in subsection(3) of Section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purpose in the sub-section. (2) A High Court or Court of Sessions may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody. In Sunil Fulchand shah v Union of India and other, it was held, "Bail is well understood in criminal jurisprudence and Chapter XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains elaborate provision relating to grant of bail. Bail is granted to a persons who has been arrested in a non-bailable offence or has been convicted of an offence after trial. In Niranjan Singh and Another v Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Others (1980) 2 SCC 550 - Para 7 - held that 'Custody' meaning of -held, includes Physical surrender by the accused before the court and submission to its directions. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the petitioners appearance is nor required for moving bail petition and appearance involves through a counsel before the court is sufficient. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the petitioners appearance is nor required for moving bail petition and appearance involves through a counsel before the court is sufficient. 12. Sec. 439 of Cr.P.C. as well as the above decisions are clear that under Sec. 439 Cr.P.C. Bail may be granted to a person who is in custody in a non bailable offence or who has been surrendered before the court or submissions to its directions. In the present petition, the petitioners have filed bail petition u/s. 439 Cr.P.C. and they have not surrendered before this Court or appeared before this Court at the time of filing the petition or at the time of hearing the case. Hence, this court is of the view that this petition u/s. 439 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed." 36. The learned Judge has also given the reason by quoting the decision of the Honourable Apex Court to the meaning of the word "custody", to state that, custody includes physical surrender of the accused before the Court and submission to his terms. 37. In that context, the learned Sessions Judge has held that since the accused/petitioners were not ready even to surrender before the court below and submits to its directions it cannot be considered that the petitioners have satisfied or fulfilled the ingredients of Section 437(1) of the Code and therefore, their plea to consider for grant of bail cannot be entertained. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioners had advanced an argument stating that the said ingredients under Section 437(1) of the Code may not be required to be followed in case if the person seeking bail is under the age of 16 years or is a women or is sick or infant. 38. Learned counsel would take aid of the first proviso under Section 437(1) of the Code to strengthen his contention. The said Proviso has already been extracted herein above where, it clearly states that the Court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on bail, if such person is under the age of 16 years or is a women or sick or infant. So, a person, mean, the person referred to in sub clause (i) and (ii) of Section 437(i) of the Code. So, a person, mean, the person referred to in sub clause (i) and (ii) of Section 437(i) of the Code. The sub clause (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1) gives exemption for two category of accused persons for consideration of grant of bail. One is that, the person, who has been guilty of offence punishable with death, and another category is that the persons who had been guilty of the offence punishable with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or more be released on bail. 39. Only in that context, which precludes the Magistrate for consideration of grant of bail, the said two clauses mentioned in sub section (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1) of the Code and the further explanation by way of proviso, as referred to above, has been given. Here in the case in hand, the petitioners' bail application was rejected not on the ground of sub clause (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1) of the Code but on the ground of Sub Section (1) of Section 437 of the Code to state that the accused/petitioners were not arrested or detained or not had been brought before the Court or appeared before the Court. Therefore, invocation of the provision on the ground of women or a sick or an infant, as has been claimed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in so far as the two petitioners/accused are concerned, would not be available to the petitioners in this case. 40. Further, the power vested with this Court under the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 and 401 of the Code and the power vested with this Court to meet the ends of justice under Section 482 of the Code are entirely different from each other. The present revision has been filed invoking Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code and not under Section 482 of the Code. 41. In this context, while considering the power of the High Court under revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 and 401 of the code vis-à-vis the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to meet the ends of justice, the Honourable Apex Court in a judgment reported in 2012 (9) SCC 460 in the matter of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another has held as follows: "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the Cr.P.C. 17. ...... 18. .... 19. ... 20. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case may be. Though the section does not specifically use the expression 'prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice', the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited one. Though the section does not specifically use the expression 'prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice', the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited one. The legality, proprietary or correctness of an order passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction could be exercised where there is palpable error, non-compliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily. On the other hand, Section 482 is based upon the maxim quando lex liquid alicuiconcedit, conceder videtur id quo res ipsa esse non protest, i.e., when the law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which the thing itself would be unavoidable. The Section confers very wide power on the Court to do justice and to ensure that the process of the Court is not permitted to be abused. 21. It may be somewhat necessary to have a comparative examination of the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. There may be some overlapping between these two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to matters which are specifically provided for under other provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the court may not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a party could have availed of the remedy available under Section 397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as the power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [ AIR 1980 SC 258 : (1980) 1 SCC 43 ]}. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [ AIR 1980 SC 258 : (1980) 1 SCC 43 ]}. In this very case, this Court has observed that inherent power under Section 482 may not be exercised if the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This itself shows the fine distinction between the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. In this very case, the Court also considered as to whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other extraordinary situation invites the court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time, are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which do determine some right and still are not finally rendering the Court functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of restriction." 42. Applying the said principle as has been enunciated in the aforesaid judgment, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that this Court now can usurp the power under Section 482 of the Code and entertain any petition and pass any order by molding the petition to any extent, cannot be accepted. Applying the said principle as has been enunciated in the aforesaid judgment, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that this Court now can usurp the power under Section 482 of the Code and entertain any petition and pass any order by molding the petition to any extent, cannot be accepted. This case was not filed under Section 482 of the Code but under Section 397 r/w 401 of the Code seeking to exercise the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, which specifically empowered this Court under Section 397 and 401 of the Code. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel is liable to be rejected accordingly, the same is rejected. 43. On the side of the merits of the case also, though it may not be required to dwell into detail in this case, for the sake of completion of the task, this Court wants to rely upon the decision of the Honourable Apex court reported in 2014(6) SCC 508 in the matter of Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another. In the said decision, the Honourable Apex Court, having considered the liberty of the individual and the well being of the society at large, has held that, society expects responsibility and accountability from its members and it desires that the citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social norm. In this regard, paragraph 16 of the judgment is extracted herein: "16. The issue that is presented before us is whether this Court can annul the order passed by the High Court and curtail the liberty of the 2nd respondent. We are not oblivious of the fact that the liberty is a priceless treasure for a human being. It is founded on the bed rock of constitutional right and accentuated further on human rights principle. It is basically a natural right. In fact, some regard it as the grammar of life. No one would like to lose his liberty or barter it for all the wealth of the world. People from centuries have fought for liberty, for absence of liberty causes sense of emptiness. The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. It is a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. It is a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A democratic body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously guards liberty. But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of an individual is not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to a society. A society expects responsibility and accountability from the member, and it desires that the citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social norm. No individual can make an attempt to create a concavity in the stem of social stream. It is impermissible. Therefore, when an individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the Court has a duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the established parameters of law. " 44. Here in the case in hand, since the allegation made against the petitioners is very serious in nature and in that context, even if the petitioners were not inclined to appear before the Court or surrender before the Court for consideration of the bail petition and in the context of invocation of Section 437(1) of the Code, the conduct of the parties, to the mind of this Court, cannot be considered to be a responsible and accountable act of a citizen or a member of the society. Therefore, in that context also, the petitioners are undeserved to claim any liberty by filing the bail petitions without complying with the mandatory provisions of law and therefore, in that context also, the plea raised by the petitioners are not worthy to be considered and their hue and cry are undeserved to be considered for grant of bail. 45. Therefore, in that context also, the petitioners are undeserved to claim any liberty by filing the bail petitions without complying with the mandatory provisions of law and therefore, in that context also, the plea raised by the petitioners are not worthy to be considered and their hue and cry are undeserved to be considered for grant of bail. 45. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the legal position, this Court is of the firm view that the orders of the Magistrate as well as the Principal Sessions Judge, which are assailed herein do not suffer with any infirmity or illegality or any impropriety. Therefore, these orders do not warrant any interference from this Court invoking Section 397 and 401 of the Code. That apart, since the petitions before the Lower Court, which were dismissed as not maintainable, is of bail applications, the very same petitioners can invoke the provisions of Section 439 and also the Provisions of Section 482, which, even though was pointed out to the learned counsel for the petitioner, he had been sticky in his point urged before this Court in the present revision and therefore, on that ground also, as the possibility of invocation of alternative provisions are very much available with the petitioners, which, for the reason best known to them, they refused to undertake, this revision petition fails at the SR. stage itself as it is not maintainable, within the meaning of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 397 and 401 of the Code. Accordingly, it is deserved to be rejected at this stage itself. In the result, the Registry is directed to return the case papers to the learned counsel for the petitioner after getting due acknowledgement.