JUDGMENT P.K. Lohra, J. By the instant writ petition, petitioner has challenged order dated 09.08.2017 (Annex.9), whereby petitioner is suspended with retrospective effect, i.e., from 21.05.2002, by treating him the then Assistant Engineer, Municipal Council, Jaisalmer. 2. Scorning the facts in detail, the bare necessary facts for the purpose of this writ petition are that petitioner was sought to be prosecuted in Criminal Case No.21/95 for offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 420, 409, 468, 471, 477-A and 120-B IPC. 3. When the requisite sanction for prosecution was granted against petitioner, the same was assailed by him before the Jaipur Bench of this Court by preferring S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3464/2002. At the threshold, while admitting the writ petition, Court passed interim order staying the sanction for prosecution. The stay order granted by the Court continued for almost one and half decades and during the interregnum period, petitioner availed two promotions, i.e., on the post of Superintendent Engineer and Additional Chief Engineer. The writ petition finally came up for hearing on 12.05.2017 and was dismissed. Likewise, petitioner also assailed his order of suspension by filing yet another petition before the Jaipur Bench bearing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4605/2002 in which also interim order was passed staying the suspension order. The writ petition was finally dismissed on 12.05.2017 as having become infructuous. While dismissing the writ petition as infructuous, the Court also observed that respondents would be at liberty to proceed and pass appropriate orders. It is after the rejection of writ petition No.4605/2002, the competent authority has passed fresh order of suspension, which is impugned in the present writ petition. 4. During the course of arguments, learned counsel has raised only one question that any order of suspension cannot be passed with retrospective effect and even by invoking deeming clause under sub-rule (2) of Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, no incumbent can be placed under suspension with retrospective effect. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Samrath Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8249/2007, decided on 30.09.2009). In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Samrath Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8249/2007, decided on 30.09.2009). The learned Single Judge, while considering the true import of suspension order, found the order passed with retrospective effect laconic and further held that same has been passed without application of mind. Eventually while quashing the order, the Court made following observation:- "From the averments made in reply to the writ petition it also appears that the respondents simply acted upon the circular dated 11.10.2007 and placed the petitioner under suspension. It also appears that the order impugned was passed with retrospective effect by treating the petitioner under suspension from the date he was arrested by the Anti Corruption Bureau. As a matter of fact the deeming provision under Rule 13(2) of the Rules of 1958 is having no role in present case as the petitioner after getting released from judicial custody was permitted to resume the duties. The work done by the petitioner while holding the post could not be undone by giving retrospective effect to the suspension. Beside that, no order placing the petitioner under suspension was passed by the competent authority when the petitioner was in judicial custody or immediately after his release and before resuming the duties. In such circumstances, the deeming provision as relied upon by the respondents is having no consequence. In view of whatever discussed above, it appears that the order impugned has been passed without proper application of mind. Consequently, this petition for writ succeeds and further continuation of the petitioner under suspension in pursuant to the order dated 11.10.2007 is declared unwarranted. The respondents are directed to revoke suspension of the petitioner forthwith. It shall be open for the competent authority to examine all the existing circumstances and to place the petitioner under suspension by proper exercise of the powers as per Rule 13 of the Rules of 1958, if so is desirable and required in interest of service." 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that on the crucial date of suspension order petitioner was in service but later on he was superannuated w.e.f. 13.08.2017 and he is presently drawing provisional pension. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that on the crucial date of suspension order petitioner was in service but later on he was superannuated w.e.f. 13.08.2017 and he is presently drawing provisional pension. It is also argued by learned counsel for the respondents that now in the changed scenerio after superannuation of the petitioner, no fresh order of suspension can be passed. Learned counsel has, therefore, urged that the order of suspension may be treated as prospective from the date it was passed by the competent authority. I have bestowed my consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar. 6. Supreme Court, in matter of R. Jeevaratnam vs. The State of Madras, (1966) AIR SC 951, while considering legality and propriety of dismissal order with retrospective date, upheld the same with prospective effect by observing that two parts of the order are clearly severable. The Court held: "We may now notice the cases relied on by counsel for the appellant. In Hemanta Kumar v. S.N. Mukherjee, (1953) 58 CalWN 1 the Calcutta High Court had occasion to consider an order dated April 29, 1952 by which a civil servant had been placed under suspension with retrospective effect from January 16, 1951. While holding that the order of suspension for the period, January 16, 1951 up to April 28, 1952 was invalid and should be quashed, the Court held that the order of suspension was valid and effective as and from April 29, 1952 and this part of the order should be upheld. As a matter of fact, the validity of the suspension as from April 29, 1952 was not even questioned by counsel for the parties. Far from supporting the appellant, this decision is against him on the point under consideration. In Abdul Hamid v. The District School Board, 24-Parganas, (0) 61 CalWN 880 the Calcutta High Court had occasion to consider an order dated April 18, 1952 discharging a teacher employed by a District School Board from service with effect from July 15, 1951, the date on which he had been arrested in connection with a pending criminal case against him. While holding that the dismissal from the period from July 15, 1951 up to April 17, 1952 was invalid, the High Court also held that the order of dismissal was entirely bad and was not effective even from April 18, 1952. While holding that the dismissal from the period from July 15, 1951 up to April 17, 1952 was invalid, the High Court also held that the order of dismissal was entirely bad and was not effective even from April 18, 1952. The High Court observed: "It appears to me that when the real intention of the Board was to discharge the petitioner with effect from the date when he was put under arrest it is not within the jurisdiction of the Court to substitute a different intention and maintain the order of discharge in a modified form. The order must stand or fall in toto. In this view of the matter it appears to me that the order of discharge as passed by the Board cannot stand." 7. Our attention is drawn to similar observation in Sudhir Ranjan Haldar v. State of West Bengal, (1961) 2 LLJ 283 Cal. With respect, we are unable to agree with this line of reasoning. An order of dismissal with retrospective effect is, in substance, an order of dismissal as from the date of the order with the superadded direction that the order should operate retrospectively as from an anterior date. The two parts of the order are clearly severable. Assuming that the second part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the first part of the order should not be given the fullest effect. The Court cannot pass a new order of dismissal, but surely it can give effect to the valid and severable part of the order." 8. In view of settled position of law, the instant writ petition deserves to be allowed in part and, accordingly, same is allowed. The order impugned, to the extent it has given retrospective effect to the suspension of the petitioner, is quashed and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the same be treated as prospective from the date it was passed by the competent authority. The petitioner would be entitled to consequential benefits accruing to him as a consequence of treating the order of suspension prospective. 9. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed in part.