JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Dileep Kumar, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant and Sri Gyan Prakash, learned counsel for the CBI. 2. By means of the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicant has sought quashing of the order dated 3.7.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge, PC Act, C.B.I. Ghaziabad, in Criminal Case No. 13 of 2017 (Special Case No. 08 of 2017) CBI v. Yadav Singh and others, arising out of FIR No. RC-D.S.T.-2015-A-0003 under Section 109 r/w 120-B IPC alongwith Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (to be preferred from here onwards in short as ‘PC Act’) and direction for release of the applicant from custody and in the alternative, it is also prayed that the applicant be released on bail on such terms and condition as may be deemed proper by this Court. 3. The case of the applicant as narrated in the affidavit filed in support of the said application is that the applicant is the registered Chartered Accountant practicing since 1993 and had a firm of his own under the name and style “DSM & Associates”. Since the beginning of his career, he has unblemished career and has no criminal history. He has been regularly involved in work of auditing and has also been a tax consultant and financial adviser to reputed undertakings, including Government and non-Government undertakings, since the lodging of FIR No. RC-DST-2015-A-0003 which was registered against one Yadav Singh (former Chief Engineer), Noida under Section 109 IPC alongwith Section 13(2) r/w 13(1) (e) of PC Act, pursuant to the directions of this Court dated 16.7.2015 in M.B. No. 12396 of 2014, he has cooperated with the investigation on various dates mentioned in the affidavit. During investigation, the respondent (Investigating Agency) persuaded him to be an approver and promised to make him a prosecution witness against the main accused as the allegation of the prosecution was that he was the person who filed Income Tax Returns of the accused Yadav Singh and his family members for a number of years, being their Chartered Accountant. During investigation, the respondent (Investigating Agency) persuaded him to be an approver and promised to make him a prosecution witness against the main accused as the allegation of the prosecution was that he was the person who filed Income Tax Returns of the accused Yadav Singh and his family members for a number of years, being their Chartered Accountant. In pursuance to that he was produced on 29.11.2016 before the concerned Magistrate, New Delhi for recording his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. to make him an approver and he, accordingly, made a full, complete and truthful disclosure of the facts to the satisfaction of the Investigating Authority as was required for rendering a pardon under Section 306 IPC. Later on, the respondent filed a charge-sheet against the accused persons wherein the name of the present applicant appeared as one of the accused under Sections 120-B, 109 I.P.C. and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1) (e) of PC Act. Thereafter, the learned Court below took cognizance on the said charge-sheet vide order dated 13.10.2017 and issued summons to the applicant and other accused in the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 13 of 2017 and Special Case No. 8 of 2017. Thereafter the applicant filed an application under Section 306 Cr.P.C. before the trial Court praying for grant of pardon in the said case on 6.11.2017 on which, the respondent had no objection. Meanwhile, the applicant filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing No. 39204 of 2017 praying therein for direction to be issued that no coercive action be taken against him till disposal of the said application. The provision of Section 306 Cr.P.C. not being applicable in this case for grant of pardon, the prayer was required to be made to him under Section 307 Cr.P.C. for the same. This fact was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Court, as a result of which, the application which was erroneously filed by the applicant under Section 306 Cr.P.C. was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 27.11.2017 as Section 307 Cr.P.C. was applicable. This fact was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Court, as a result of which, the application which was erroneously filed by the applicant under Section 306 Cr.P.C. was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 27.11.2017 as Section 307 Cr.P.C. was applicable. Thereafter, the matter was listed before the trial Court on 12.12.2017 wherein the application was moved for treating the application for pardon moved by the applicant to have been moved under Section 307 but vide order dated 12.12.2017, the same was dismissed, against which an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing No. 42914 of 2017 was preferred praying to get the said order dated 12.12.2017, set-aside and for order to be issued to the trial Court to grant pardon in view of Section 307 Cr.P.C. The said petition, however, was dismissed vide order dated 22.12.2017, against which S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 808 of 2018 was preferred. In the meantime, the matter was listed before the trial Court on 11.1.2018, wherein the applicant could not appear on account of medical condition and sought exemption from personal appearance, but the trial Court issued N.B.W. against the applicant and adjourned the case till 20.2.2018. On 10.2.2018, his SLP (Cri.) No. 808/2018 came to be heard and the applicant was directed to appear before the trial Court on 20.2.2018 for getting his application decided under Section 306/307 Cr.P.C. Pursuant to the said order the trial Court dismissed the said application erroneously and took the applicant into custody and adjourned the matter till 14.3.2018. Thereafter, in February, 2018, the applicant filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing No. 7585 of 2018 before this Court challenging the order of trial Court dated 20.2.2018 dismissing the prayer of the applicant seeking tender of pardon, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 14.5.2018 and the impugned order dated 20.2.2018 of the trial Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial Court to decide afresh the application seeking tender of pardon within a span of one month. Thereafter, in pursuance of the above order, the applicant moved an application before the trial Court on 16.5.2018 alongwith the certified copy of the order of this Court dated 14.5.2018, expressing his willingness to make statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and again on 30.5.2018, his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded by the learned Special Judge, In-charge, in which the applicant made entire true and fair disclosure as per his knowledge in regard to the facts and circumstances of this case. Thereafter, on 25.6.2018, the learned trial Court allowed the application of the applicant granting him pardon after making observation that the applicant was not the main accused and that he had not committed any offence and that he was involved in the transactions only at the behest of the main accused, Yadav Singh. It was further observed that he had made full and true disclosure and therefore, in terms of various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, he deserved to be granted pardon. Thereafter, on 27.6.2018, an application was moved for his release from custody merely as a consequential relief, in view of order dated 25.6.2018, against which CBI/respondent filed no objection but even then the trial Court erroneously dismissed the said application on the ground that if the applicant was released from custody, he was likely to come under influence of other accused and might not make true, full and fair disclosure with regard to the facts of the case. Hence the present application has been moved for aforementioned directions. 4. The perusal of impugned order dated 3.7.2018 indicates that the learned trial Court has mentioned in the order that the accused-applicant is co-accused with Yadav Singh as he was a Chartered Accountant of Yadav Singh and his family members. According to the prosecution version, the accused-applicant had rendered help to main accused Yadav Singh and his family members in making investment in various companies formed by accused Yadav Singh and his family members with the purpose of investing illegally earned income misusing his position as a Government servant so that their black-money could be concealed. In this concealment of black-money, the accused-applicant had used his professional skill illegally. He has been tendered pardon with the hope and belief that he would disclose all the facts and circumstances relating to the offence committed by the other co-accused so that they could be punished adequately under appropriate sections. In this concealment of black-money, the accused-applicant had used his professional skill illegally. He has been tendered pardon with the hope and belief that he would disclose all the facts and circumstances relating to the offence committed by the other co-accused so that they could be punished adequately under appropriate sections. Till now even charges have not been framed against the accused persons and the prosecution has not started adducing evidence, therefore, in case he is released from prison there could be possibility of his collusion with co-accused and of coming under their influence, thus, it was recorded by the trial Court that it was not in the interest of justice to release the applicant from prison and hence, dismissed the application on the same date i.e. 27.6.2018. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant has vehemently argued that due to good sense prevailing upon the applicant and to make amends for the wrong he had committed, he has come forward to become an approver in the present case so that he could disclose all the true facts and circumstances of the case to ensure that all the guilty accused were brought to book. Now after having been granted pardon he is no longer an accused, his status of accused vanishes and therefore, he should be immediately set free on such terms and conditions which this Court may deem fit and proper, he would abide by all such terms and conditions which might be imposed with regard to his future conduct or recording his statements in future before trial Court etc. It has also been underlined during the course of arguments that in the present case the Provisions of Section 306 (4) (b), which provides that a person accepting a tender of pardon under sub-section (1) of Section 306 Cr.P.C. shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of trial, would not be applicable, because in the present case the Provisions of Section 307 Cr.P.C. would not be applicable as the statement of the applicant (approver) has been recorded by the learned Special Judge, under Section 307 Cr.P.C. and in this regard reliance has been placed by him on following cases, the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced herein below : (1) Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and another v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 ; “24. Referring to Sections 306 and 307 of the Cr.P.C. the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that as the statement of Raju PW2 was not recorded in terms of Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) of Section 306, his statement recorded by the Trial Court after tendering pardon was, illegal. According to the learned counsel the statement of every accomplice is required to be recorded firstly in the Court of the Magistrate and subsequently in the Trial Court. As the statement of PW2 Raju was recorded only in the Trial Court, the appellants are reported to have lost a legal opportunity of having his second statement enabling them to elaborately cross-examine him; 25. In order to appreciate the submissions of the learned counsel a reference to Sections 306 and 307 Cr.P.C. is necessary. Section 306 provides: Tender of pardon to accomplice : (1) with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, and the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. (2) This section applies to: (a) any offence triable exclusively by the Court of session or by the Court of a special judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952; (b) any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with a more severe sentence. (3) Every magistrate who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall record— (a) his reasons for so doing; (b) whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person to whom it was made; and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record free of cost. (4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) ... (4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) ... (a) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any; (b) shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. (5) Where a person has accepted a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) and has been examined under sub-section (4), the magistrate taking cognizance of the offence shall, without making any further inquiry in the case, — (a) commit it for trial— i) to the Court of session if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court or if the magistrate taking cognizance is the Chief Judicial Magistrate; ii) to a Court of special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court; (b) in any other case, make over the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate who shall try the case himself.” Section 307 provides: “Power to direct tender of pardon — At any time after commitment of a case but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is made may, with a view to obtaining at the trial the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any such offence, tender a pardon on the same condition to such person.” A perusal of both the Sections clearly indicates that Section 306 is applicable in a case where the order of commitment has not been passed and Section 307 would be applicable after commitment of the case but before the judgment is pronounced. The provisions of sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 would be attracted only at a stage when the case is not committed to the Court of Sessions. After the commitment, the pardon is to be granted by the Trial Court subject to the conditions specified in sub-section (1) of Section 306, i.e. approver making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. After the commitment, the pardon is to be granted by the Trial Court subject to the conditions specified in sub-section (1) of Section 306, i.e. approver making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. It may be noticed that under the old Code, only the District Magistrate had the power to tender pardon, at any stage of the investigation, enquiry or trial even though he himself might not be holding such enquiry or trial. Pardon could be granted by the District Magistrate even during the pendency of the trial in the Sessions Court. By Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, old Sections 337 to 339 were substituted by Sections 306 to 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure conferring the power to tender pardon only to Judicial Magistrates and the Trial Court. Section 307 - in its present form - does not contemplate the recording of the statement of the approver twice as argued. Accepting the submissions made on behalf of the appellant would amount to legislate something in Section 307 which the Legislature appears to have intentionally omitted. 26. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp. (1) SCC 80] this Court while dealing with the case where the Approver was granted pardon by the committal Court observed that every person accepting the tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) of Section 306 has to be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any. The examination of the accomplice in such a situation was held to be mandatory which could not be dispensed with. Referring to a Full Bench Judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Kalu Khoda v. State [ AIR 1962 Guj. 283 ] this Court observed that: “If the said defect of not examining the approver at the committal stage by the committing Magistrate is rectified later, no prejudice can be said to be caused to an accused person and therefore the trial cannot be said to be vitiated on that account.” 27. 283 ] this Court observed that: “If the said defect of not examining the approver at the committal stage by the committing Magistrate is rectified later, no prejudice can be said to be caused to an accused person and therefore the trial cannot be said to be vitiated on that account.” 27. There is no legal obligation on the Trial Court or a right in favour of the accused to insist for the compliance with the requirement of Section 306(4) of the Cr.P.C. Section 307 provides a complete procedure for recording the statement of an accomplice subject only to the compliance of conditions specified in Sub-Section (1) of Section 306. The law mandates the satisfaction of the Court granting pardon, that the accused would make a full and true disclosure of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. It is not necessary to comply with the requirement of Section 306(4) when the pardon is tendered by the Trial Court. The Trial Court, in this case has taken all precautions in complying with the provisions of Section 306(1) before tendering pardon to accused Raju, who later appeared as PW2. We do not find any violation of law or illegality in the procedure for tendering the pardon and recording the statement of PW2.” (2) Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyasr v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 ; “29. Section 306, thus, empowers the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First class inquiring into or trying the offence to tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. The said provision indisputably applies to the cases triable exclusively by a Court of Sessions. 30. The Magistrate tendering pardon is required to record his reasons for so doing and to further record whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person to whom it was made. Sub-section (4) of Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that such a person accepting tender of pardon must be examined as a witness in the trial. Sub-section (4) of Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that such a person accepting tender of pardon must be examined as a witness in the trial. Sub-section (5) of Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that where a person has accepted tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) and has been examined under sub-section (4), the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence shall commit it for trial, without making any further inquiry in the case. 31. Whether the terms “on the same condition” occurring in Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refer to sub-section (4) of Section 306 thereof and as in the instant case apart from the purported statement made by Kumar Gaurav (PW-1) under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which had been retracted, as no other statement had been taken from him by the learned Magistrate, the order granting pardon in his favour was illegal, is the question. 32. In our opinion, the submission of Mr. Sushil Kumar does not merit acceptance. 33. Sub-section (4) of Section 306 is procedural in nature. It is necessary to be followed only by a Magistrate as he would not have any jurisdiction to try the case himself. The learned Sessions Judge before whom the case is committed for trial must be informed as to on what basis pardon had been tendered. 34. Section 307 does not contain any such condition. The power of the learned Sessions Judge is independent of the provisions contained in Section 306 thereof. The condition mentioned in Section 307 refers to the condition laid down in sub-section (1) of Section 306, namely that the person in whose favour the pardon has been tendered, will make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge. The power of a Sessions Court is not hedged with any other condition.” (3) State through CBI, Chennai v. V. Arul Kumar, (2016) 11 SCC 733 ; “14. Sub-section (1) of Section 306 of the Code very categorically and unambiguously mentions Metropolitan Magistrate as one of the Judicial Officers who can exercise the power of tender of pardon to accomplice. Thus, Metropolitan Magistrate is specifically given such a power Under Section 306 of the Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 306 of the Code very categorically and unambiguously mentions Metropolitan Magistrate as one of the Judicial Officers who can exercise the power of tender of pardon to accomplice. Thus, Metropolitan Magistrate is specifically given such a power Under Section 306 of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 306 makes it clear that this Section applies even to those offences which are triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by the Court of a Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. Thus, even where the cases are triable by a Special Judge, the Metropolitan Magistrate is authorised to grant tender of pardon. Sub-section (3) and Sub-section (4) outline the procedure that is to be followed in discharging this function. Sub-section (5), which is material for our purpose, stipulates that after the person has accepted a tender of pardon made under Sub-section (1) and has been examined under Sub-section (4), the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence will not make any further inquiry in the case and commit it for trial to a Court of Special Judge, if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court. This Sub-section makes the position beyond any pale of doubt, that even when an offence is triable by a Session Judge, the Magistrate has the requisite power to take cognizance and grant tender of pardon and, thereafter, commit the case to the Special Judge for trial. Section 307 of the Code restricts the power to grant tender of pardon by conferring it in the hands of the Court to which the commitment is made, only after the commitment of a case. This provision, also lends support to the position taken by the Appellant, as it makes it clear that after the committal of the case, it is only that Court to which the commitment is made has the power to tender a pardon, thereby implying that before the commitment of case, Magistrate is duly empowered. Section 308 of the Code is of no consequence to decide the controversy before us as it deals with the trial of person not complying with conditions of pardon. 15. Section 308 of the Code is of no consequence to decide the controversy before us as it deals with the trial of person not complying with conditions of pardon. 15. On a plain reading of Section 306 in conjunction with Section 307 of the Code, it becomes manifest that Magistrate is duly empowered to grant tender of pardon even in respect of the cases which are triable by the Session Court or by the Special Judge. This legal position is eloquently accepted in P.C. Mishra’s case. That was also a case under P.C. Act in which P.C. Mishra (Appellant in the said appeal) and his Reader Ravi Bhatt were made accused persons. During investigation, CBI noticed that accused Ravi Bhatt was not a leading accused in the case and it was considered necessary to take him as an approver to prove the various missing links in the chain of circumstantial evidence, which were otherwise not available to the investigating agency. In this backdrop, the CB! filed an application Under Section 306 of the Code before the Special Judge, CBI, Delhi for grant of pardon to Ravi Bhatt. The Special Judge marked that application to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, who, in turn, referred the same to the Metropolitan Magistrate. The Metropolitan Magistrate examined the application of the CBI and passed the order, in exercise of powers conferred Under Section 306 of the Code, holding that it was a fit case where pardon should be granted to Ravi Bhatt to enable the prosecution to unveil all circumstances of the case and to unearth the truth. Other accused, namely, P.C. Mishra challenged the said order exactly on the grounds which are taken before us, i.e., the Magistrate had no power to grant the pardon as the case was triable by the Special Judge. This Court repelled the contention by reading such a power in the hands of Metropolitan Magistrate as well, before the committal of the case and found that power was rightly exercised as order of committal has not been passed when the order of grant of pardon was passed by the Magistrate. Following discussion from the said judgment is worth quoting: 11. Power to grant pardon enjoined Under Section 306 Code of Criminal Procedure. is a substantial power and the reasons for tendering pardon must be recorded. Following discussion from the said judgment is worth quoting: 11. Power to grant pardon enjoined Under Section 306 Code of Criminal Procedure. is a substantial power and the reasons for tendering pardon must be recorded. It is for the prosecution to ask that a particular accused, out of several, may be granted pardon, if it thinks that it is necessary in the interest of successful prosecution of other offenders or else the conviction of those offenders would not be easy. This Court in State of U.P. v. Kailash Nath Agarwal [State of U.P. v. Kailash Nath Agarwal, MANU/SC/0182/1973 : (1973) 1 SCC 751 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 698] recognised the power of the District Magistrate to grant pardon at the investigation stage. This Court in Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Admn. [Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Admn., MANU/SC/0043/1958 : AIR 1958 SC 350 : 1958 Cri.LJ 698] had the occasion to examine the scope of Sections and of the old Code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898) vis-a-vis the powers of a Special Court constituted under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. This Court held that, reading the proviso to Section 337 and provisions of Section 338 together, the District Magistrate is empowered to tender a pardon even after a commitment, if the Court so directs. It was also held that Under Section of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, the Special Judge has also been granted power to tender pardon. The conferment of this power on the Special Judge in no way deprives the District Magistrate of his power to grant a pardon Under Section 337 of the Code. It was held if at the time when the District Magistrate tenders the pardon, the case was not before the Special Judge, then there is no illegality committed by the District Magistrate. 12. It was held if at the time when the District Magistrate tenders the pardon, the case was not before the Special Judge, then there is no illegality committed by the District Magistrate. 12. The scope of abovementioned provisions again came up for consideration before this Court in Kailash Nath Agarwal [State of U.P. v. Kailash Nath Agarwal, MANU/SC/0182/1973 : (1973) 1 SCC 751 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 698], wherein this Court after referring to its earlier judgment in Kanta Prashad [Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Admn., MANU/SC/0043/1958 : AIR 1958 SC 350 : 1958 Cri.LJ 698] held as follows: (Kailash Nath Agarwal case [State of U.P. v. Kailash Nath Agarwal, MANU/SC/0182/1973 : (1973) 1 SCC 751 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 698], SCC p. 757, para 13) It will be noted from this decision that emphasis is laid on the fact that the proviso to Section 337 contemplates concurrent jurisdiction in the District Magistrate and in the Magistrate making an inquiry or holding the trial to tender pardon. It is also emphasized that the conferment of the power to grant pardon on the Special Judge does not deprive the District Magistrate of his power to grant pardon Under Section 337. 13. In Bangaru Laxman [Bangaru Laxman v. State, MANU/SC/1409/2011 : (2012) 1 SCC 500 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 487 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 422] this Court has stated that the power of Special Judge to grant pardon is an unfettered power and held that, while trying the offences, the Special Judge has dual power of a Special Judge as well as that of a Magistrate. This Court, while interpreting Section 5, then went on to say as follows: (SCC pp. 509-10, paras 40-42) 40. Thus, on a harmonious reading of Section 5(2) of the PC Act with the provisions of Section 306, specially Section 306(2)(a) of the Code and Section 26 of the PC Act, this Court is of the opinion that the Special Judge under the PC Act, while trying offences, has the dual power of the Sessions Judge as well as that of a Magistrate. Such a Special Judge conducts the proceedings under the Court both prior to the filing of charge-sheet as well as after the filing of charge-sheet, for holding the trial. Such a Special Judge conducts the proceedings under the Court both prior to the filing of charge-sheet as well as after the filing of charge-sheet, for holding the trial. 41....Since this Court has already held that the Special Court is clothed with the magisterial power of remand, thus in the absence of a contrary provision, this Court cannot hold that power to grant pardon at the stage of investigation can be denied to the Special Court. 42. In view of the discussion made above, this Court is of the opinion that the power of granting pardon, prior to the filing of the charge-sheet, is within the domain of judicial discretion of the Special Judge before whom such a prayer is made, as in the instant case by the prosecution. 14. Bangaru Laxman (supra), therefore, emphasizes the concurrent jurisdiction of the Special Judge as well as the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate to grant pardon during investigation, but does not say that the Metropolitan Magistrate has no power Under Section 306 Code of Criminal Procedure. to grant pardon during the investigation i.e. before filing of charge-sheet before the Special Judge. During investigation, in our view, both the Special Judge as well as the Magistrate acting Under Section 306 Code of Criminal Procedure. have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain application of pardon which facilitates proper investigation of the crime. But, as already indicated, after the committal of the case, the pardon granted by the Magistrate is not a curable irregularity. 16. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, we deal with the arguments of Mr. Basant, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent as to whether Section 306 of the Code has no application in the cases relating to offences under PC Act. No doubt, Section 4 of the PC Act states that the offences specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be tried by Special Judges only, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, or in any other law for the time being in force. Further, Section 5 gives power to the Special Judge to take cognizance of offences even without the accused being committed to him for trial and Sub-section (2) of Section 5 empowers the Special Judge to grant pardon as well. It was on the basis of these provisions Mr. Further, Section 5 gives power to the Special Judge to take cognizance of offences even without the accused being committed to him for trial and Sub-section (2) of Section 5 empowers the Special Judge to grant pardon as well. It was on the basis of these provisions Mr. Basant has advanced the argument that PC Act was a complete Code and power was specifically given to the Special Judge and, therefore, Section 306 of the Code had no application and Magistrate had no power to grant pardon in respect of offences triable under the PC Act. He submitted that these provisions were not taken note of by the Division Bench of this Court in P.C. Mishra’s case and, therefore, matter required consideration by a Larger Bench. We are, however, not impressed by the aforesaid submissions. 17. Sub-section (1) of Section 5, while empowering a Special Judge to take cognizance of offence without the accused being committed to him for trial, only has the effect of waiving the otherwise mandatory requirement of Section 193 of the Code. Section 193 of the Code stipulates that the Court of Session cannot take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. Thus, embargo of Section 193 of the Code has been lifted. It, however, nowhere provides that the cognizance cannot be taken by the Magistrate at all. There is, thus, an option given to the Special Judge to straightway take cognizance of the offences and not to have the committal route through a Magistrate. However, normal procedure prescribed Under Section 190 of the Code empowering the Magistrate to take cognizance of such offences, though triable by the Court of Session, is not given a go-bye. Both the alternatives are available. In those cases where charge-sheet is filed before the Magistrate, he will have to commit it to the Special Judge. In this situation, the provisions of Section 306 of the Code would be applicable and the Magistrate would be empowered to exercise the power under the said provision. Both the alternatives are available. In those cases where charge-sheet is filed before the Magistrate, he will have to commit it to the Special Judge. In this situation, the provisions of Section 306 of the Code would be applicable and the Magistrate would be empowered to exercise the power under the said provision. In contrast, in those cases where Special Judge takes cognizance of offence directly, as he is authorised to do so in view of Section 5(2) of PC Act, Section 306 of the Code would get bypassed and as the Special Judge has taken cognizance, it is Section 307 of the Code which would become applicable. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of PC Act makes this position clear by prescribing that it is the Special Judge who would exercise his powers to tender of pardon as can clearly be spelled out by the language employed in that provision. Section 5(2) is to be read in conjunction with Section 5(1) of the PC Act. The aforesaid legal position would also answer the argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondent based on the judgment of this Court in A. Devendran (supra). In that case, this Court held that once the proceedings are committed to the Court of Session, it is that Court only to which commitment is made can grant pardon to the approver. The view taken by us is, rather, in tune with the said judgment. 18. ....................................... 19. The Appellant would succeed even on the basis of Section 460 of the Code. Clause (g) of this Section which is relevant for us reads as under: 460. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.-If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely: xx xx xx (g) to tender a pardon Under Section 306; xx xx xx erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered. 20. This Section treats some of the acts of the Magistrate, specified in Clauses (a) to (i) as ‘irregularities’. These are treated as irregularities even when the Magistrate is not ‘empowered by law to do’ those acts. Tendering a pardon Under Section 306 of the Code is included in those acts of “irregularities”. 20. This Section treats some of the acts of the Magistrate, specified in Clauses (a) to (i) as ‘irregularities’. These are treated as irregularities even when the Magistrate is not ‘empowered by law to do’ those acts. Tendering a pardon Under Section 306 of the Code is included in those acts of “irregularities”. Therefore, even if we presume that the Magistrate was not empowered (though we have held otherwise), the order passed by the Magistrate is saved by Section 460(g) of the Code. This aspect also stands clinched in P.C. Mishra’s case where the legal position was stated in the following manner: 15. We may, in this regard, refer to Section 460 Code of Criminal Procedure. which refers to nine kinds of curable irregularities, provided they are caused erroneously and in good faith. Irregularity caused while granting pardon is dealt with in Section 460(g) Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant part of that Section reads as follows: 460. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.—If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely— *** (g) to tender a pardon Under Section 306; erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered. Section 461 Code of Criminal Procedure. speaks of irregularities which vitiate proceedings. 16. We have already held, both the Magistrate as well as the Special Judge has concurrent jurisdiction in granting pardon Under Section 306 Code of Criminal Procedure. while the investigation is going on. But, in a case, where the Magistrate has exercised his jurisdiction Under Section 306 Code of Criminal Procedure. even after the appointment of a Special Judge under the PC Act and has passed an order granting pardon, the same is only a curable irregularity, which will not vitiate the proceedings, provided the order is passed in good faith. In fact, in the instant case, the Special Judge himself has referred the application to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/Metropolitan Magistrate to deal with the same since the case was under investigation. In such circumstances, we find no error in the Special Judge directing the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate to pass appropriate orders on the application of CBI in granting pardon to the second Respondent so as to facilitate the investigation.” (3) A. Deivendran v. State of T.N., (1997) 11 SCC 720 ; “4. In such circumstances, we find no error in the Special Judge directing the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate to pass appropriate orders on the application of CBI in granting pardon to the second Respondent so as to facilitate the investigation.” (3) A. Deivendran v. State of T.N., (1997) 11 SCC 720 ; “4. Mr. Muralidhar, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants attacked the evidence of PW-1 on several grounds and submitted that the said evidence of the approver cannot at all be relied upon by the prosecution in support of the prosecution case. According to the learned Counsel under Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the power to grant pardon lies only with the Sessions Judge, once the case is committed to the Court of Sessions, as provided in Section 307 of the CrPC (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’). Since the Sessions Judge did not exercise his power and on the other hand forwarded the matter to be dealt with by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and ultimately Chief Judicial Magistrate granted pardon to the accused the said order is without jurisdiction and illegal and as such the accused Mr. Rafiq cannot be held to. be an approver in the eye of law. The learned Counsel further contended that even assuming the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate granting pardon to the accused can be sustained, but yet non-compliance of Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 of the Code vitiates the entire proceedings and consequently the evidence of the approver when he was examined as PW-1 has to be excluded from consideration. According to the learned Counsel the requirements of Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 is mandatory in nature and confers a valuable right on the accused and non-compliance thereof vitiates the entire proceeding relating to the examination of the approver as a witness in the case. He also urged that if the approver’s evidence is examined it would appear that the same is wholly exculpatory in nature and therefore no reliance can be placed on the same. The further contention of the learned Counsel is that the circumstances under which the accused agreed to become an approver indicates that it was under coercion and threat and not voluntary and on this score the evidence of the approver PW-1 cannot be relied upon. The last argument advanced by Mr. The further contention of the learned Counsel is that the circumstances under which the accused agreed to become an approver indicates that it was under coercion and threat and not voluntary and on this score the evidence of the approver PW-1 cannot be relied upon. The last argument advanced by Mr. Muralidhar, the learned Counsel relating to the reliability of the approver’s evidence is, that the said evidence does not get corroboration from any independent materials neither with regard to the identity of the accused persons nor with regard to the role played by them, and as such the approver’s evidence must be held to be untrustworthy and should not be acted upon. So far as the other items of evidence relied upon by the prosecution the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants urged that after the approver’s evidence is excluded from consideration, on the residuary evidence the charges against the appellants cannot be said to have been established by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubts and, therefore, the appellants are entitled to be acquitted. On the question of award of death sentence on accused Devendran the learned Counsel urged that no doubt in course of incident three persons have been alleged to have been killed by said Devendran but the circumstances leading to the death of those three persons as unfolded through the prosecution evidence, even if believed in toto do not make out the case to be one of the rarest of rare category justifying imposition of the extreme penalty of death and, therefore, the order of the High Court confirming the death sentence has to be set aside. 5. Mr. Mohan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent/State on the other hand contended that the very object of granting pardon to one of the accused who agrees to be a witness of the prosecution to unfold the entire incident engrafted under Sections 306 and 307 of the Code will be frustrated if a technical view of the provisions is taken and, therefore, no prejudice having been caused by the grant of pardon by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the said order cannot be held to be beyond jurisdiction. Mr. Mr. Mohan, the learned senior counsel further urged that a Sessions Judge has the power to delegate his functions under the Code to a subordinate officer by virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Code and therefore, the impugned direction of the Sessions Judge calling upon the Chief Judicial Magistrate to deal with the application for grant of pardon in accordance with law cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel also urged that on a plain reading of Section 306 of the Code it appears that the Chief Judicial Magistrate can exercise power to grant pardon even after the committal of the proceedings to the Court of Sessions which is apparent from the expression ‘at any stage of the trial’ used in Sub-section (1) of Section 306 and, therefore, a combined reading of Sections 306 and 307 would indicate that the Sessions Judge and the Chief Judicial Magistrate have concurrent jurisdiction to grant pardon. Judged from this stand point the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate granting pardon to accused PW-1 cannot be held to be illegal. So far as non-compliance of Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 of the Code is concerned, the learned senior counsel appearing for the State urged that after the case is committed to the Court of Sessions when pardon to an accused is granted under Section 307 the provisions of Section 306, and more particularly Sub-section (4)(a) thereof are not attracted. According to the learned Counsel the expression ‘tender a pardon on the same condition’ used in Section 307 is referable to condition engrafted in Sub-section (1) of Section 306 of the Code, namely, a Magistrate may tender pardon to a person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure. The procedural requirements of Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 cannot be held to be a condition and as such the said provision cannot be attracted to a case where pardon is granted under Section 307 after the case is committed to the Court of Sessions. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in : S. Naravanaswami v. Paneer Selvam, MANU/SC/0362/1972 : [1973]1SCR 172; Iqbal Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) and others, MANU/SC/0131/1977 : 1978CriLJ192; and a decision of Orissa High Court in State v. Bigyan Mallik and others, (1975) Crl. Law Journal 1937. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in : S. Naravanaswami v. Paneer Selvam, MANU/SC/0362/1972 : [1973]1SCR 172; Iqbal Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) and others, MANU/SC/0131/1977 : 1978CriLJ192; and a decision of Orissa High Court in State v. Bigyan Mallik and others, (1975) Crl. Law Journal 1937. The learned Counsel further urged that even if it is held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to grant pardon since the case had been committed to the Court of Sessions yet the said order of the Magistrate is curable under Section 460(g) of the Code inasmuch as at the most it would be a case of Magistrate not empowered by law to grant pardon has granted pardon. The learned Counsel also urged that no objection having been taken to the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge and then to the granting of pardon by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and there have been no failure of justice on that score, the provisions of Section 465 of the Code get attracted and the conviction and sentence of the accused appellants cannot be reversed. On the question of appreciation of the evidence the learned Counsel urged that when the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court have appraised the evidence and have accepted the same, it would not be appropriate for this Court to enter into the arena of appreciation unless it is established that there has been violation of principles of natural justice or a mis-reading of a vital part of the evidence or the Court have committed an error of law or of the forms of legal process or procedure by which justice itself has failed. Since none of these pre-conditions are satisfied, the learned Counsel urged that this Court should not re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Saravanabhavan and Govindaswamy v. State of Madras, MANU/SC/0399/1965 : 1966CriLJ949. The learned Counsel further urged that the evidence of the approver gets corroborated from other independent sources to the material particulars of the approver’s evidence and such corroboration makes the approver’s evidence trustworthy and reliable. The learned Counsel further urged that the evidence of the approver gets corroborated from other independent sources to the material particulars of the approver’s evidence and such corroboration makes the approver’s evidence trustworthy and reliable. According to the learned Counsel the medical evidence relating to the death of three persons and the injuries of PW-5, the statement of the investigating officer as to what he found immediately after the occurrence when he reached the place of occurrence, the recovery of Mahaja exhibit P-29, the evidence of PW-2 who was in the house at the time of occurrence and the lodging of FIR immediately after the occurrence as well as the recoveries made from different accused persons and further the evidence of the ballistic expert PW-25 fully corroborate the evidence of the approver PW-1 and as such the Courts below rightly relied upon the evidence of the said approver. The learned Counsel also urged that the murder of 3 persons and robbery committed by the accused constitute an integral part of same transaction and therefore the possession of stolen ornaments by the accused would establish that the accused committed both murder and robbery and the presumption would arise under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The learned Counsel also urged that even excluding the evidence of the approver the conviction of the appellants can well be sustained on the residuary evidence of PWs-2 and 5 and other recoveries made from the accused persons. Lastly on the question of death sentence on appellant Devendran the learned Counsel urged that the manner in which said accused mercilessly killed two ladies and then shot at the man who entered inside the house indicate the action to be of depraved mind and in the absence of any mitigating circumstances the case would be one coming within the category of rarest of rare case and as such imposition of death sentence is wholly justified. In support of this reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, MANU/SC/0338/1991 : 1991CriLJ1845 and Shankar @ Gaurishankar and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, MANU/SC/0737/1994 : 1994CriLJ3071. 6. In view of the rival submissions, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the approver’s evidence can at all be relied upon to bring home the charge against the accused persons? 6. In view of the rival submissions, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the approver’s evidence can at all be relied upon to bring home the charge against the accused persons? It is no doubt true that the very object of granting pardon to an accused is to unfold the truth in grave offence so that other accused persons involved in the offence could be brought home with the aid of the evidence of the approver. But all the same the legislative mandate as well as the safeguards enshrined in the provisions of the Code for the accused cannot be given a go by merely because of gravity of the offence. With this background in mind it would be necessary to examine the provisions of the Code for testing the correctness of the rival submissions. Coming now to the question as to whether the Chief Judicial Magistrate could have at all granted pardon to the accused even after the committal of the proceedings to the Court of Sessions, the same would depend upon the interpretation of Sections 306 and 307 of the Code. A combined reading of the aforesaid two provisions would indicate that under Section 306 power has been conferred upon the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate as well as the Magistrate of the First Class to tender pardon to a person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence. The only distinction between the two sets of Magistrates for exercise of their power lies at the stage when the power can be exercised. While a Magistrate of the First Class can exercise the power while enquiring into or trying the offence in question, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate can exercise the power at any stage of investigation or enquiry into or trial of the offence which they themselves may not be trying. But under Section 307 the power has been conferred upon the Court to which the commitment is made to grant pardon. In other words once a proceeding is committed to a Court of Sessions then only the said Court can exercise power to tender pardon to an accused. But under Section 307 the power has been conferred upon the Court to which the commitment is made to grant pardon. In other words once a proceeding is committed to a Court of Sessions then only the said Court can exercise power to tender pardon to an accused. Section 307 of the Code corresponds to Section 338 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, If the two provisions are examined in juxtaposition it would be clear that while under Section 338 of the old Code after commitment is made the Court to which the commitment was made could himself tender pardon to an accused or could order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender pardon, but under Section 307 of the Code of 1973 the Court to whom commitment is made, no longer retains the power to order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender pardon. In other words under Section 307 of the present Code after commitment of a case the only Court which can tender pardon is the Court to which the commitment has been made. It would be appropriate at this stage to extract Section 338 of the old Code and the corresponding provisions of Section 307 of the new Code: 338. Power to direct tender of pardon.—At any time after commitment, but before judgment is passed the Court to which the commitment is made may, with the view of obtaining on the trial the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy, to any, any such offence, tender, or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender, a pardon on the same condition to such person. 307. Power to direct tender of pardon—At any time after commitment of a case but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is made may, with a view to obtaining at the trial the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any such offence, tender a pardon on the same condition to such person. 7. In view of the aforesaid change in the provisions it is difficult for us to accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the State that even under Section 307 after commitment of a case a Chief Judicial Magistrate retains the power to grant pardon. 7. In view of the aforesaid change in the provisions it is difficult for us to accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the State that even under Section 307 after commitment of a case a Chief Judicial Magistrate retains the power to grant pardon. It may not be out of place to notice the recommendations of the Law Commission in its 41st Report in paragraph 24.23; 24.23. Under Section 338, the Court of Session may at any time after commitment of the case, but before passing judgment, either tender pardon itself, or may “order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate” to tender pardon. Though this power is rarely resorted to by a Court of Session, it will be useful to retain the Section. But in view of the abolition of the commitment proceedings the Court of Session need not be authorised to direct “the committing Magistrate” or any other Magistrate to tender pardon. The section may be revised to read as follows: 338. At any time after commitment of a case but before judgment is passed, the Court of Session may, with the view to obtaining at the trial the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to, any such offence, tender a pardon on the same condition to such person. 8. The aforesaid Section has now taken the place of Section 307 in the new Code. This indicates that in the changed circumstances the legislature thought it necessary to delete the expression “or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender a Pardon” from Section 307 of the present Code which was there in Section 338 of the previous Code. On a plain reading of the provisions contained in Sections 306 and 307 of the Code and on examining the changes that have been brought about by the legislature from the corresponding provisions of the old Code, the conclusion is irresistible that under the new Procedure Code of 1973 once a case is committed to the Court of Sessions then it is only that Court to which the proceedings have been committed can tender pardon to a person and the Chief Judicial Magistrate cannot be said to have concurrent jurisdiction for tendering pardon. 9. It would be necessary in this context to examine the contention raised by Mr. 9. It would be necessary in this context to examine the contention raised by Mr. Mohan, learned Counsel appearing for the State that the Court to whom commitment has been made could exercise power under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the CrPC and, therefore, could direct a Chief Judicial Magistrate to deal with the question of tender of pardon notwithstanding the deletion of the said power in Section 307 of the Code. The aforesaid contention though prima facie looks attractive but does not sustain a deeper scrutiny. Section 10(3) of the Code may be extracted for better appreciation of the point in question: The Sessions Judge may also make provision for the disposal of any urgent application, in the event of his absence or inability to act, by an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and every such Judge or Magistrate shall be deemed to have jurisdiction to deal with any such application. 10. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that a Sessions Judge has been empowered to make provision for disposal of any urgent application in certain contingencies by requiring an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge or in their absence the Chief Judicial Magistrate to deal with an application which otherwise would have been dealt with by the Sessions Judge. This power can be exercised when the Sessions Judge himself is absent or is unable to act. Then again Chief Judicial Magistrate can be required to act under this sub-section not merely when the Sessions Judge himself is absent or unable to act but also when there is no Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge. In the case in hand these is not an iota of material to indicate that the pre-conditions for exercise of power under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Code were satisfied or that in fact the Sessions Judge exercised his power under Sub-section (3) of Section 10. In this view of the matter the order of the Sessions Judge dated 27.10.1994 in forwarding the application for grant of pardon to the Chief Judicial Magistrate as well as order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 14.11.1994 granting pardon to the accused who was examined as P.W. 1 is not sustainable in law. It would also be appropriate to deal with submission of Mr. It would also be appropriate to deal with submission of Mr. Mohan appearing for the respondent that the expression ‘trial’ in Section 306(1) would mean trial of an offence triable by the Court of sessions and as such a Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate may tender a pardon to a person even after the commitment of the case to the Court of sessions during the course of trial by the sessions judge. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned Counsel as in our view the plain and unambiguous language of Section 307 of the Code makes it explicitly clear that after the commitment of a case the power to tender pardon lies, under the Code, with the Court to which the commitment is made and not with any other magistrate including the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Once a commitment is made the committing magistrate no longer retains jurisdiction over the proceedings and that apart the unambiguous language of Section 307 of the Code does not confer such power on a magistrate to tender pardon after a case is committed to the Court of sessions. The expression ‘trial’ used in Sub-section (1) of Section 306 would, therefore, convey the meaning those cases which are triable either by a magistrate or the chief judicial magistrate. In other words, in respect of those cases which are triable by a magistrate, while the magistrate of First Class inquiring into or trying the offence can tender pardon at any stage of inquiry or trial, the Chief Judicial Magistrate can tender pardon at any stage of investigation, or inquiring into or the trial. Further a magistrate First Class who is in session of the case can tender pardon in course of inquiry or trial of the said case while the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate can tender pardon even though the trial is pending before another First Class Magistrate, But by no stretch of imagination it can be construed that under Section 306(1) of the Code a Chief Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate has a power to grant pardon even after the commitment of the proceedings to the Court of sessions. 11. At this stage we think it appropriate to notice another submission of Mr. 11. At this stage we think it appropriate to notice another submission of Mr. Mohan appearing for the respondent that the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate tendering pardon can at the most be an irregularity curable under Section 460(g) of the Code and is not null and void. Section 460, no doubt cures the irregularity specified in the Section if it is committed by a Magistrate not empowered by the law provided he committed irregularity erroneously in good faith. Clause (g) relates to tender pardon under Section 306. It would, therefore, appear that a Magistrate who was not empowered under Section 306 to tender pardon but actually tenders pardon in good faith erroneously then such an irregularity would be curable. Section 460 can have no reference to an act of a Magistrate who is empowered under Section 306 but does not possess the jurisdiction after an order of commitment is passed. The Chief Judicial Magistrate no doubt was authorised under Section 306 of the Code to tender pardon in course of an investigation, inquiry or trial before the committal of the proceedings to the Court of sessions. But after commitment of the proceedings he does not have jurisdiction to grant pardon and in such a case if the said Chief Judicial Magistrate tenders pardon then that would not be a curable irregularity within the ambit of Clause (g) of Section 460 of the Code. This conclusion of ours is further strengthened from the fact that under the 1898 Code, the corresponding provision to Section 460(g) of the 1973 Code was Section 529(g). In the said provision it was specifically stated that if any Magistrate not empowered by law to tender pardon under Section 337 or 338 the same would not vitiate the proceedings. But under Section 460(g) of the new Code the legislatures have omitted Section 307 which is corresponding to Section 338, and therefore, such irregularity committed by the Magistrate cannot be said to be a curable irregularity under Clause (g) of Section 460. 12. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether non-examination of the approver as a witness after grant of pardon and thereby non-compliance of Sub-section 4(a) of Section 306 vitiates the entire proceeding. 12. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether non-examination of the approver as a witness after grant of pardon and thereby non-compliance of Sub-section 4(a) of Section 306 vitiates the entire proceeding. In the case in hand there is no dispute that after the Chief Judicial Magistrate granted pardon to the accused he was not examined immediately after the grant of pardon and was only examined once by the learned Sessions Judge in course of trial. The question that arises for consideration is : When an accused is granted pardon after the case is committed to Court of sessions would it be necessary to comply with Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 of the Code. The contention of Mr. Mohan, the learned Counsel appearing for the State in this connection is that Section 307 merely mandates that pardon should be tendered on the same condition and such condition obviously refers the condition indicated in Sub-section (1) of Section 306, namely, on the accused making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. According to the learned Counsel Sub-section (4) of Section 306 is not a condition for tendering pardon but is merely a procedure which has to be followed when a person is tendered pardon by a Magistrate in exercise of power under Section 306. Since after a case committed to the Court of sessions pardon is tendered by the Court to whom the commitment is made, it would not be necessary for such Court to comply with Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306. Mr. Muralidhar, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants on the other hand contended, that the object and purpose engrafted in Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) of Section 306 is to provide a safeguard to the accused who can cross-examine even at the preliminary stage on knowing the evidence of the approver against him and can impeach the said testimony when the approver is examined in Court during trial, if any contradictions or improvements are made by him. This right of the accused cannot be denied to him merely because pardon is tendered after the proceeding is committed to the Court of sessions. 13. This right of the accused cannot be denied to him merely because pardon is tendered after the proceeding is committed to the Court of sessions. 13. The correctness of the rival submissions again would depend upon true interpretation of Sections 306 and 307 of the Code. Under Section 307 when pardon is tendered after commitment of the proceedings by the Court to which the commitment has been made the legislative mandate is that the pardon would be tendered on the same condition. The expression “on the same condition” obviously refers to the condition of tendering a pardon engrafted in Sub-section (1) of Section 306, the said condition being the person concerned on making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence. Sub-section (4) of Section 306 cannot be held to be a condition for tendering pardon. A combined reading of Sub-section (4) of Section 306 and Section 307 would make it clear that in a case exclusively triable by the Sessions Court if an accused is tendered pardon and is taken as an approver before commitment then compliance of Sub-section (4) of Section 306 becomes mandatory and non-compliance of such mandatory requirements would vitiate the proceedings but if an accused is tendered pardon after the commitment by the Court to which the proceeding is committed in exercise of powers under Section 307 then in such a case the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 306 are not attracted. The procedural requirement under Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 to examine the accused after tendering pardon cannot be held to be a condition of grant of pardon. The case of Suresh Chandra Bahri etc. v. State of Bihar, (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 80, on which the learned Counsel for the appellants strongly relied upon deals with a case where pardon had been tendered to an accused before the commitment proceedings and the question was whether non-compliance of Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 would vitiate the trial. The Court held that the provision contained in Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) of Section 306 is of mandatory nature and, therefore, non-compliance of the same would render an order of commitment illegal. It is no doubt true, as contended by Mr. The Court held that the provision contained in Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) of Section 306 is of mandatory nature and, therefore, non-compliance of the same would render an order of commitment illegal. It is no doubt true, as contended by Mr. Muralidhar the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, that the procedure indicated in Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 is intended to provide a safeguard to an accused inasmuch as the approver has to make a statement disclosing his evidence at the preliminary stage before the committal order is made and thereby the accused becomes aware of the evidence against him and further such evidence of an approver can be ultimately shown as untrustworthy during the trial when the said approver makes any contradictions or improvements to his earlier version. But still when the legislature in Section 307 have made specific reference to only on “such conditions” and not to the other procedures in Section 306 it would not be a rule of interpretation to hold that even Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 would also be applicable in such a case. 14. The decision of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) and others, supports our conclusion, as aforesaid, to a great extent. In the said case under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 the question for consideration was that when pardon had been tendered to a person at the stage of investigation under Section 337(1) of the Code then a Special Judge who had the power to take cognizance of offence under Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance and, therefore, charge-sheet has to be filed before a Magistrate. This contention had been advanced because of sub-section (2)(B) of Section 337 of the CrPC 1898. A contention has been advanced in the said case that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence the approver will have to be examined as a witness twice, namely, once in the Court of the Magistrate and again in the Court of Special Judge to whom the Magistrate sends the case for trial but on the other hand if charge-sheet is filed in the Court of Special Judge itself then the approver is examined only once and this is discriminatory. This Court repelled the said contention advanced on behalf of the accused and held: It is clear from the scheme of Section 337 that what is required is that a person who accepts a tender of pardon must be examined as a witness at the different stages of the proceeding. Where, however, a Special Judge takes congnizance of the case, the occasion for examining the approver as a witness arises only once. It is true that in such a case there would be no previous evidence of the approver against which his evidence at the trial could be tested, which would have been available to the accused had the proceeding been initiated in the Court of a Magistrate who under Sub-section (2B) of Section 337 of the Code is required to send the case for trial to the special Judge after examining the approver. But we do not find anything in Sub-section (2B) of Section 337 to suggest that it affects in any way the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to take congnizance of an offence without the accused being committed to him for trial. Sub-section (2B) was inserted in Section 337 in 1955 by Amendment Act 26 of 1955. If by enacting Sub-section (2B) in 1955 the legislature sought to curb the power given to the Special Judge by Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, there is no reason why the legislature should not have expressed its intention clearly. Also, the fact that the approver’s evidence cannot be tested against any previous statement does not seem to us to make any material difference to the detriment of the accused transgressing Article 14 of the Constitution. The special Judge in any case will have to apply the well established tests for the appreciation of the accomplice’s evidence. 15. In this view of the matter in the case in hand, admittedly pardon having been tendered after the case was committed to the Court of Session question of compliance of Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 does not arise and on that score no invalidity is attached to the statement of the approver.” (4) Shammi Firoz v. The National Investigation Agency (Kerala High Court), 2011CriLJ1529; 13................ “If pardon was granted to the petitioner under Section 307 Cr.P.C. by the Special Court itself which is a Sessions Court competent to take cognizance of the offence without a committal, then the bar under Section 306(4)(b) does not apply. The said provision will be attracted only in the case of a person who has accepted a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) of Section 306 Cr.P.C. by a Magistrate. Here, the pardon was tendered by the Special Judge who is a Sessions-Judge and that too under Section 307 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, Section 306(4)(b) is not is not attracted. I am fortified in this conclusion by the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Lakshmamma v. State of Karnataka. Hence, in the absence of any statutory prohibition against the release of the petitioner on bail, I am inclined to grant bail to the petitioner, who has been in custody since 19.3.2010 onwards. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to be released on bail in each of the above crimes on his executing a bond for Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) with two solvent sureties each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Court for trial of N.I.A. Cases, Ernakulam in each of the above crimes and subject to the following conditions :......................................................” 7. It is apparent from the above citations that the law is very clear on the point that in case a co-accused is granted pardon by the trial Court under Sections 307 Cr.P.C., to make him an approver, the trial Court being a Court of the Special Judge, the provision under Section 306 (4) (b) will not be followed. Meaning thereby that such an accused who is being granted pardon under afore-mentioned Section, may be released on bail/set at liberty without waiting for the conclusion of the trial because in such a situation the status of the said accused does not remain that of an accused rather it becomes a status of a precious witness who is granted pardon solely keeping in view that he would reveal all such evidence in respect of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned to the offence in question, making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether principal or an abettor. But this does not mean that the Court would forget to take into consideration the other circumstances pertaining to the case on hand, its gravity etc. while granting bail to such a person or setting him free subject to certain conditions. In case it is found that the release of an approver might prove detrimental to his security because of the enormity of the offence committed by co-accused against whom he is supposed to reveal truth, the Court may consider postponing the release of such a person and then pass an order best suited under the circumstances. 8. In the case at hand it is crystal clear that according to the prosecution version the co-accused namely Yadav Singh, the then Chief Engineer, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and Yamuna Expressway Authority was involved in allotting to himself and to his family members and associates, the plots of lands of high-value. During the raid conducted by the Income Tax Authorities on 27/28. 11. 2014 at his premises and at the premises of his associates, huge assets in the form of leasehold land were seized apart from an amount of Rs. 10 crores from an Audi vehicle of an office associate, Rajinder Manocha. Also as per the income tax records of the last 5 years i.e. 2009 to 2014, Yadav Singh had acquired various movable and immovable assets in the form of residential and commercial properties including properties in Delhi as well as in the name of his wife Smt. Kusum Lata, his son Sunny Yadav and his daughter Garima Bhushan to the tune of Rs. 3.60 crores approximately in addition to benami cash recovered from the possession of his associate, Rajender Manocha. The prosecution also has a case that against the net saving of Rs. 1.70 crores approximately, during last 5 years, Yadav Singh is found in possession of assets to the tune of Rs. 13.60 crores approximately in the name of his family members and associates and that during the period 2009 to 2014 he was in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, to the tune of Rs. 11.90 crores approx. 13.60 crores approximately in the name of his family members and associates and that during the period 2009 to 2014 he was in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, to the tune of Rs. 11.90 crores approx. It may also be noticed that several accused have already obtained bail in the present case, therefore deposing before Court against such alleged notorious economic offenders by the accused applicant who has turned approver, who is likely to divulge all the details before Court as to how such a huge amount could be invested by Yadav Singh and his family members, may entail threat to his life, if we set him at liberty at this stage. 9. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that he has already made his statement on oath before the learned special Judge, hence there is no apprehension of his resiling from the earlier made statement and further that there is adequate provision made under Sections 308 Cr. P.C. that in case an approver resiles from the terms and conditions on which he has been granted pardon, it would be open to the Court to treat him again as an accused and hold his trial as an accused, does not appeal to this Court because there is no provision under Sections 307 Cr. P.C. for recording statement of an approver as has been provided under Sections 306 (4) (a), therefore any statement, if recorded by the learned special Judge under Sections 307 Cr. P.C. does not appear to have any sanctity for the purposes of its admissibility during trial, not even for the purposes of contradiction. Therefore in our view the safety and security of the applicant is of primary importance till his statement is recorded by the trial Court. It may also be not lost sight of that in the case at hand there are only few accused who are on bail, while some are in jail but some accused are yet to be arrested. Therefore in our view the safety and security of the applicant is of primary importance till his statement is recorded by the trial Court. It may also be not lost sight of that in the case at hand there are only few accused who are on bail, while some are in jail but some accused are yet to be arrested. In such a situation it would be difficult for the trial Court to proceed with the trial and conclude the statement of the applicant at an early date, but we hope and trust that by monitoring the proceedings of the trial Court as regards trial of this case by issuing direction that the case may be separated of such accused who are still absconding from the case of such accused who are either on bail or are lying in jail and thereby initiating trial of such accused who are available to face trial by immediately framing charges against them and by preferring to record the statement of the applicant as a first witness of the case, the ends of justice would be met. As soon as applicant’s statement is concluded, the trial Court may be granted liberty to release the applicant on bail/set him at liberty, on such terms and conditions which might be deemed proper by it. This would serve the purpose of justice. Accordingly we propose to decide the present application as follows. 10. The application under 482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed at this stage with the direction to the trial Court to separate the case of such accused who are absconding and start the trial of other accused available on date on day-to-day basis by framing charge against them within a period of 15 days from today and thereafter within one and a half months time statement of the applicant shall be recorded on priority as first witness, whereafter the applicant would be at liberty to move another application for getting himself released from custody. In case the statement of the applicant is not possible to be recorded within that time period due to some difficulty, by the trial Court, the applicant would be at liberty to move fresh application for getting himself released. In case the statement of the applicant is not possible to be recorded within that time period due to some difficulty, by the trial Court, the applicant would be at liberty to move fresh application for getting himself released. It is further directed that the trial Court shall send a weekly report to this Court about the status of trial and shall make all endeavour to proceed with the trial on day-to-day basis as trial has already been directed to be expedited vide order dated 30.5.2018 in Cri. Misc. Bail Application No. 12492 of 2018 (Garima Bhushan and 2 others v. C.B.I.), such briefly report shall be kept on record of the present case for the perusal. 11. List the matter after one month i.e. on 04th September, 2018.