ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner whose writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 4809 of 2014 has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge by judgment and order dated 4.12.2014. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the action initiated by the respondents-Bank under the Securitisation & Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (For the sake of brevity here-in-after referred to as the Act, 2002). 3. Notice has been given by the respondents-Bank under Section 13(2) of the Act, 2002 for the non-payment of the loan amount taken by this appellant under the cash credit facility. 4. It further appears from the facts of the case that this appellant is ready and willing to make the payment of Rs.4,86,342/-. Certificate case was also filed by the respondents-Bank in which order has been passed in favour of the Bank for Rs.4,86,342/- approximately. Be as it may, the facts remain that the respondents-Bank has also initiated action under Section 13(2) of the Act, 2002. The remedy is available with this appellant under the Act, 2002. Moreover, those who are defaulters are rushing to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in High Court they are making offer for payment of the amount. We are not accepting such type of offer at much belated stage. It is for the Bank to consider and it is a matter of contract between this appellant and the respondents-Bank. It is the fact that sizeable amount was given by the Bank which was not returned by this appellant under the Act, 2002. If the action is initiated by this appellant under Section 13(2), the remedy is available under the Act, 2002. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition. We see no reason to take any other view than what has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 5. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 11, in paragraph nos. 43 & 55, which read as under : "43. We see no reason to take any other view than what has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 5. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 11, in paragraph nos. 43 & 55, which read as under : "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage, constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the ORT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction, under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." (Emphasis supplied) 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 782 , in paragraph nos. 22, 23, 24 & 25, which read as under : "22. We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciation of law on the point. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 782 , in paragraph nos. 22, 23, 24 & 25, which read as under : "22. We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciation of law on the point. It is manifest that an action under Section 14 of the Act constitutes an action taken after the stage of Section 13(4), and therefore, the same would fall within the ambit of Section 17(1) of the Act. Thus, the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, by providing for an appeal before the DRT. 23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories). 24. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala this Court had observed that: (SCC p. 175, para 30) "30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether : (a) adjudication of the writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) the person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches, (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors." 25. In the instant case, apart from the, fact that admittedly certain disputed questions of fact viz. non-receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, non-communication of the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, etc. are involved, an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the Act was available to the appellants, who ultimately availed of the same. In the instant case, apart from the, fact that admittedly certain disputed questions of fact viz. non-receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, non-communication of the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, etc. are involved, an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the Act was available to the appellants, who ultimately availed of the same. Therefore, having regard to the facts obtaining in the case, the High Court was fully justified in declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied) 7. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Ikbal, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 83 , in paragraph nos. 23, 27 & 28, which read as under : "23. There is one more aspect in the matter which has troubled us. Against the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the borrower had a remedy of appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 17. The remedy provided under Section 17 is an efficacious remedy. The borrower did not avail of that remedy and further remedies from that order and instead directly approached the High Court in extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. 28. If the facts of the present case are seen, it is apparent that the borrower had been chronic defaulter in repayment of the loan amount. Before issuance of notice under Section 13(2) on 30.6.2005 a demand notice was given by the Bank to the borrower on 16.2.2005 calling upon him to pay the outstanding loan amount but he did not comply with that notice. Thereafter, Section 13(2) notice was given to him on 30.6.2005 but he did not bother to pay the outstanding dues. The secured interest which was immovable property was put up for auction more than six months after the notice under Section 13(2) was given to him by the Bank but still the outstanding payment was not made. Thereafter, Section 13(2) notice was given to him on 30.6.2005 but he did not bother to pay the outstanding dues. The secured interest which was immovable property was put up for auction more than six months after the notice under Section 13(2) was given to him by the Bank but still the outstanding payment was not made. The auction was held on 11.1.2006 in his presence and he did not raise any objection about time of the auction. When the auction-purchaser did not make the balance amount in time and took about 11 months in paying the balance amount, the borrower gave his written consent to the Bank that the balance purchase price may be accepted from the auction-purchaser and sale certificate may be issued to him. Moreover, the writ petition was filed by the borrower more than four years after the issuance of sale certificate. The above facts are eloquent and indicate that the observations made by the Single Judge that the borrower was victimised and a fraud was practised upon, have no basis. The finding by the Single Judge that the sale of secured interest had been in violation of the borrower's right to livelihood and the observation of the Division Bench that non-compliance with Rule 9 has violated the borrower's right to property are misconceived. In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 225 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge." (Emphasis supplied) 8. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and the same is, hereby, dismissed.