ORDER : Arun Bhansali, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner aggrieved against the award dated 15.01.2005 passed by the Labour Court, Bhilwara, whereby the claim of the petitioner has been rejected by holding that the employer-the Forest Department is not an Industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act') and as the dispute was raised with delay, the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. 2. The dispute was referred by the appropriate Govt. to the Labour Court, Bhilwara by order dated 29.12.2000 as to whether termination of services of the petitioner was justified and if not, to what relief he was entitled. Before the Tribunal, an objection was raised by the respondent-State that the Forest Department (the employer) was not an Industry and that the claim has been raised belatedly, inasmuch as, the alleged termination took place as on 01.01.1993 and claim has been raised after 8 years. The Tribunal after hearing the parties, came to be conclusion that the respondent-department did not fall with the definition of 'Industry' as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act and as the dispute was raised belatedly, rejected the claim. 3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court committed an error in coming to the conclusion on both the aspects. It was submitted that this Court in the case of Shambhulal v. Deputy Forest Officer & Anr. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4249/2007, decided on 15.04.2015, in similar nature circumstance, where the Tribunal had rejected the claim holding the Forest Department as not an Industry and on account of the delay, has reversed the findings on both the issues and has remanded back the matter to the Tribunal for consideration on merits. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State submits that the petitioner has not indicated in his claim what was the nature of work being performed by him so as to hold the respondent-Forest Department as 'Industry' and that the delay in raising the claim has not been explained and, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim raised by the petitioner. 5. Reliance was placed on judgment in Management of Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Prahalad Singh, AIR 2001 SC 69 . 6.
5. Reliance was placed on judgment in Management of Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Prahalad Singh, AIR 2001 SC 69 . 6. I have considered the submissions made learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 7. The Tribunal while deciding the case, came to the conclusion based on judgment in the case of State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Pratham singh Narsingh Parmar, 2001(3) JT 326 that the respondent-Department was not an Industry and further by noticing that the termination took place on 01.01.1993 and reference has been received on 29.12.2000, came to the conclusion that the dispute has been raised after eight years, therefore the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. 8. This Court in the case of Shambhulal (supra) dealt with both the aspects and recorded the following findings:- "In the case of Partam Singh (supra), relied upon by the Tribunal, the employee therein was a clerk whereas the petitioners herein were all engaged as daily wage labourers in the forest department. Thus, on facts also, the case of Partam Singh (supra) does not apply to the case of the present petitioners. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in the case of Chief Conservator of Forests and another v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare reported in AIR 1996 SC 2898 that the scheme of social foresting undertaken by the forest department cannot be regarded as a part of sovereign function of the State and thus, the issue as to whether the Government department would be covered by the definition of Industry, would have to be decided in context of the nature of duties assigned to the workman concerned. It was held that there was no threshold bar upon the employees in knocking the door of the Industrial Courts for making a grievance about the unfair labour practice adopted by the department. 9. The controversy at hand is squarely covered by the following judgments :- (i) State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Ram Lal & Anr. (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 495/2004 decided on 19.9.2011 ; (ii) State of Rajasthan v. Ram Chandra & Anr. Reported in 2003(2) DNJ (Raj.) 897 ; and (iii) Babu Lal v. Labour Court (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9132/2005 decided on 25.1.2006.
v. Ram Lal & Anr. (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 495/2004 decided on 19.9.2011 ; (ii) State of Rajasthan v. Ram Chandra & Anr. Reported in 2003(2) DNJ (Raj.) 897 ; and (iii) Babu Lal v. Labour Court (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9132/2005 decided on 25.1.2006. In all these cases, it was held by the Division and Single Benches of this Court that the forest department is covered by the definition of Industry. 10. So far as the aspect of delay in raising the dispute is concerned, in the case of Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab. I.C. 4266, it was held by the Supreme Court that reference of industrial dispute for adjudication can be made by the Government at any time. It was further held that provisions of Limitation Act do not apply to such claims. 11. In view of the above discussion, the order dated 10.5.2006 passed by the Tribunal, whereby the claims of the petitioners were dismissed on the aforesaid two grounds viz., the respondent department not being an industry and the claims being belated, cannot be sustained as being grossly illegal and arbitrary. The Tribunal as a matter of fact preempted the claims filed on behalf of the petitioners without putting them on notice on the issue of the department not being the industry. They were required to be provided an opportunity to lead evidence on this issue. 12. The view taken by the Tribunal that the claims were liable to be thrown on the ground that the dispute was raised belatedly is also unsustainable in view of the Supreme Court judgment in Raghubir Singh's case (supra). 13. Resultantly, the instant writ petitions are allowed. The order dated 10.5.2006 is quashed and the matters are remanded back to the Labour Court, Bhilwara for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law. The Labour Court will proceed with the cases expeditiously and decide the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of copy of this order." 9.
The order dated 10.5.2006 is quashed and the matters are remanded back to the Labour Court, Bhilwara for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law. The Labour Court will proceed with the cases expeditiously and decide the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of copy of this order." 9. Both the aspects decided by the Tribunal pertaining to the Forest Department not being an industry and denial of claim on account of the delay has been exhaustively dealt with and a conclusion has been reached that the petitioner was required to be provided an opportunity to lead the evidence on the said aspects of delay and that the Forest Department is covered within the definition of Industry. 10. So far as the judgment in the case of Management of Indian Iron (supra) cited by learned counsel for respondent is concerned, the judgment though has laid down that stale claim cannot be considered by the Labour Court and the Labour Court in a given case is justified in dismissing the claim on the said count, however the aspect has to be decided in each case as the same does not bar the entertainment of the claim. 11. As noticed in the case of Shambhulal (supra) relying on the case of Raghuveer Singh that an adjudication can be made by Government at any time and further that provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to such claim. 12. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The award dated 15.01.2005 passed by Labour Court is quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Labour Court, Bhilwara for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law. The Labour Court will proceed with the case expeditiously and decide the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.