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2018 DIGILAW 170 (GUJ)

BHARGAVBHAI GAYAPRASAD VERMA v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2018-01-18

SONIA GOKANI

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Learned APP waives service of Rule for Respondent No.1-State, whereas, learned Advocate, Mr. Raval, waives for Respondent No.2. 2. This is an application by the applicant-original complainant, who had lodged I-C.R. No. 40 of 2017 with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad, for the offence punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’) on the ground that the forged and fabricated solvency certificate, before the trial Court, had been furnished by the original accused-Respondent No.2, herein, pursuant to the order of this Court dated 02.09.2016, passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 19592 of 2016. 2.1 Respondent No.2 was granted bail in connection with I-C.R. No. 3 of 2016 registered with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad, for the offence punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. 2.2 Respondent No.2 preferred Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 8454 of 2017, seeking the quashment of the I-C.R. No. 40 of 2017. The aforesaid application came for hearing on 30.03.2017 and the it was disposed of on the same day. 2.3 This is an application under Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’), whereby, the applicant is attempting to bring to the light, the alleged commission of offence by Respondent No.2 by not only furnishing false information but also making of false statement on oath by him. It is alleged of not only furnishing of a false affidavit but also getting the same signed by a third person in the name of Respondent No.2 with the complete knowledge and belief that the same is false and fabricated. Further, Respondent No.2 also deliberately made an attempt to misguide the Court by not disclosing the true and correct facts as to the production of false and fabricated affidavit. 2.4 The applicant has given the brief factual details and also the narration of the proceedings faced by Respondent No.2 by stating inter alia that the present applicant had lodged an FIR being I-C.R. No.3 of 2016 with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad, which has been quashed by this Court, against which the applicant has approached the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of Diary No. 1127 of 2018. 2.5 During the pendency of the application, Respondent No.2 had been granted regular bail by the trial Court vide order dated 26.04.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. 2.5 During the pendency of the application, Respondent No.2 had been granted regular bail by the trial Court vide order dated 26.04.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. Application – Sessions No. 1613 of 2016. The three vital conditions of the said order read thus: (1) Not to leave India without the permission of the Court, pending trial; (2) Deposit passport; (3) Mark his presence before the concerned Police Station. 2.6 Respondent No.2, thereafter, preferred Criminal Misc. Application No. 13093 of 2016 for quashment of I-C.R. No. 3 of 2016, registered with Navrangpura Police Station. 2.7 Respondent No.2, since, was desirous of leaving India, he preferred an application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 1810 of 2016 for modification of the conditions of bail granted vide order dated 26.04.2016, which came to be rejected by the learned Presiding Officer vide order dated 06.05.2016. Respondent No.2 also had preferred an application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 19952 of 2016 in Criminal Revision Application No. 450 of 2016 for temporary modification of condition, which came to be allowed by this Court vide order dated 02.09.2016 and Respondent No.2 was permitted to leave India for a period of six months on certain conditions including the condition of providing solvent surety to the tune of Rs.2,50,000/- lakh. 2.8 Against the aforesaid order dated 02.09.2016, the applicant approached the Apex Court vide Appeal (Criminal) No. 7013 of 2016, which, of course, rejected the same. Respondent No.2 preferred Criminal Misc. Application No. 4831 of 2017 before this Court without impleading the present applicant as party respondent. This Court allowed the said application vide order dated 17.02.2017 and six months time was allowed to Respondent No.2 on the same terms and conditions, as mentioned in the order dated 02.09.2016. 2.9 It is alleged that the applicant furnished fake, false and fabricated solvency certificate before the trial Court with a view to take advantage and misuse the liberty granted by the Court. 2.10 Since, the complaint was not registered, the applicant preferred Special Criminal Application No. 1426 of 2017. This Court, however, did not entertain the said application and directed the applicant to approach the Court concerned. 2.11 The applicant, therefore, approached the trial Court with an application and pursuant to the said proceedings an FIR being I-C.R. No. 40 of 2017 with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad, came to be lodged against Respondent No.2. This Court, however, did not entertain the said application and directed the applicant to approach the Court concerned. 2.11 The applicant, therefore, approached the trial Court with an application and pursuant to the said proceedings an FIR being I-C.R. No. 40 of 2017 with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad, came to be lodged against Respondent No.2. 2.12 It is, further, the say of the applicant that with mala fide intentions and to take advantage of the liberty granted by this Court, another application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 4831 of 2016, which came to be allowed on 17.02.2017. 2.13 The applicant had also preferred Criminal Misc. Application No. 6647 of 2017, stating therein the foul play perpetrated by Respondent No.2, while seeking the further extension. It was alleged that the solvency certificate produced by Respondent No.2, pursuant to the order dated 02.09.2016, was noticed to be bogus by this Court. Therefore, the same was reflected in the order passed by this Court, Dated: 17.03.2017, in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6647 of 2017. After hearing the parties, said application came to be allowed vide order dated 01.05.2017, whereby, the order dated 17.03.2017 was recalled. 2.14 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 03.05.2017, Respondent No.2 preferred the SLP before the Apex Court, which subsequently came to be withdrawn. 2.15 The present applicant applied for the certified copy of the entire record of Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017 before the Registry on 18.04.2017, which was the application for quashing and setting aside the FIR being IC. R. No. 40 of 2017. 2.16 Following are the foul plays, alleged by the applicant: “... (A) The respondent no. 2 is residing at present in Bangkok and affirmation of Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017 is done at Bangkok on 28/03/2017. (B) The signature on page nos. 1 to 32 is same and on affidavit at Page no. 33 the signature is different. (C) On 29/03/2017, the respondent No.2 filed an application for quashing of FIR at Annexure-A which is numbered as Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017 before this Hon’ble Court. The respondent no. 2i residing at present in Bangkok and affirmation of application is shown at Bangkok before the Notary there on 28/03/2017. The date of 28/03/2017 is in printed form. Now said memo of application also suggests date of 28/03/2017 solemnly affirmed at Bangkok. Application No. 8454 of 2017 before this Hon’ble Court. The respondent no. 2i residing at present in Bangkok and affirmation of application is shown at Bangkok before the Notary there on 28/03/2017. The date of 28/03/2017 is in printed form. Now said memo of application also suggests date of 28/03/2017 solemnly affirmed at Bangkok. This cannot be possible at a time to affirm it at Bangkok on 28/03/2017 and it signed by his two advocates on the very same day, i.e. on 28.03.2017 at Ahmedabad and said application is filed on 29/03/2017. The copy of affirmed Memo of Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017 is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-J to this application. Now looking to the Vakalatnama filed in that application also shows that all have signed it on 28/03/2017. The copy of Vakalatnama filed in above stated application is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-K to this application. The copy of Status Report of Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017 is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-L to this application. The said status suggests date of filing is on 29/03/2017 and suggests date of hearing is on 30/03/2017 i.e. very next day to filing. (D) Looking to the page 1 to 32 of the above stated petition, it seems that signature of respondent no.2 is same on every page. Even vakalatnama also contains same signature of respondent no.2. Now looking to page no. 33 of affirmation, it contains different signature of respondent no.2 made on 28/03/2017 at Bangkok before the notary of Thailand. Therefore, this act itself says volume about genuineness of affirmation of respondent No.2 himself as earlier also he has played foul with the court by producing bogus solvency certificate pursuant to the order dated 02/09/2016 passed by this Hon’ble Court. And this act is his continuous inning for playing with the judicial system. (E) Now most glaring factor of the case is that respondent no.2 had also filed un-affirmed memo of above stated petition. The copy of un-affirmed memo of Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017 is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-M to this application. The said memo of application also suggests date of 28/03/2017. And the affidavit on page 33 also suggests date of 28/03/2017 by stating solemnly affirmed at Bangkok which is filed on 29/03/2017. The copy of un-affirmed memo of Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017 is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-M to this application. The said memo of application also suggests date of 28/03/2017. And the affidavit on page 33 also suggests date of 28/03/2017 by stating solemnly affirmed at Bangkok which is filed on 29/03/2017. Now looking to the fact that if affirmed memo dated 28/03/2017 was having to file on 29/03/2017 than there was no any need to file un-affirmed memo. This shows and says volumes about foul played with the court and judicial system. (F) Looking to the page 33, no any advocate has identified to deponent at the time of affirmation.” 2.17 It is urged that the averments / affidavit made in the said application are false and with the knowledge that they are false, that has been tendered before this Court. Therefore, the case of Respondent No.2 falls within the provisions of offence of perjury. 3. Hence, this application seeking following reliefs: “17. … (A) Be pleased to allow this application. (B) Be pleased to call for record and proceedings of Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017. (C) Be pleased to initiate preliminary inquiry in to the alleged offence as mentioned in the present application and further be pleased to direct the Registrar General of this Hon’ble Court to lodge FIR for the offences punishable under Section 177, 181, 182, 191, 193, 196, 199, 200, 209, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code in view of the provisions of Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (D) ...” 4. Affidavit-in-reply for and on behalf of Respondent No. 2 is tendered, denying all the allegations made in this application. It is, further, contended that none of the ingredients required for establishing a case under Section 340 of the Code is present. It is urged that there is not an iota of evidence to justify any foul play in regard to the commission of offence. It is also contended that the applicant has lost before this Court so also before the Apex Court, where, the application preferred by him came to be withdrawn subsequently. A serious challenge is raised to the furnishing of the false affidavit, affirmed and signed by someone else before this Court. It is urged that there is nothing, in fact, to substantiate the say of the present applicant. A serious challenge is raised to the furnishing of the false affidavit, affirmed and signed by someone else before this Court. It is urged that there is nothing, in fact, to substantiate the say of the present applicant. 5. An affidavit of Notary, who is also a practicing Attorney at law, having license No. 2238/2553 and who has been registered as a Notarial Services Attorney qualified to certify signatures and documents, is also tendered. 6. The affidavit of one Mr. Parikshit Chaugule is also brought on record to establish that he had boarded flight from Bangkok to Mumbai on 30.03.2017 and had delivered the documents to the person, who is residing at Mumbai. 7. This Court has heard the learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. R.R. Marshall, appearing with learned Advocate, Mr. Tulsi Savani, for the applicant. He fervently argued along the line of the memo of the application, more particularly, the five points, where, he has alleged foul play. The affidavit, it is emphasized that it is a false affidavit. It is also urged by the learned Sr. Counsel that this is a clear case for initiating proceedings against Respondent No.2 since his action has affected the administration of justice. It is urged that he all along misguided this Court and this Court also has taken note of his having produced the documents by way of surety, which is held to be a concocted document. The proceedings have been initiated against him, and therefore, while dealing with the application which has been moved by the present applicant, the Court shall have to refer to the past actions of Respondent No.2 and need to initiate actions against him to curb such tendency. It is, further, argued before this Court that what is being asked to the Court is to initiate inquiry, as it is virtually impossible to sign on the very same date a document at two different parts of the Globe. The affidavit produced along with the memo of the application dated 28.03.2017 also bears the signatures of two advocates, and therefore, the affidavit, page-33, which is solemnly affirmed at Bangkok could not be possible affirmed by two advocates on the very same day, i.e. on 28.03.2017. The affidavit produced along with the memo of the application dated 28.03.2017 also bears the signatures of two advocates, and therefore, the affidavit, page-33, which is solemnly affirmed at Bangkok could not be possible affirmed by two advocates on the very same day, i.e. on 28.03.2017. Said application had been filed on 29.03.2017, and therefore, he urged that this requires scrutiny and the Court, of course, needs to decided that the same is expedient in the interest of justice to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of the Code. All that is being question being in this application is falsehood, which is being perpetrated by Respondent No.2. Moreover, he has also questioned the genuineness of the signature made on the last page of the affidavit. The question is also raised with regard to the signing of the same by the Notary of the Republic of Bangkok. The different signature made by Respondent No.2 on 28.03.2017 is also a subject matter of inquiry, according to the learned Sr. Advocate, which speak volume. As the alleged foul play with the Court is perpetrated by producing bogus documents for taking a favourable order, it is, therefore, urged that this being a clear attempt on the part of the Respondent No.2 to furnish a false affidavit, which he knew to be false and the same has been done deliberately with an intent to get the favourable orders, deserves to be. 8. Learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. S.V. Raju, appearing with learned Advocate, Mr. Nikunt Raval, for Respondent No.2 urged this Court that not every inadvertent statement would give rise to initiation of proceedings under Section 340 of the Code. By narrating the entire factual scenario in detail, it is urged by the learned Sr. Counsel that it is a case of making mountain out of a mole, only with a deliberate intent to continue the litigations against the present Respondent No.2. He urged that the applicant is the party, who has lost not only before the foreign Court but right upto the Apex Court of Thailand. Further, he has also lost before this Court, whereby, this Court quashed and set aside the FIR being I-C.R. No. 3 of 2016 registered with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad vide its judgment and order dated 16.11.2017 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 13093 of 2016. Further, he has also lost before this Court, whereby, this Court quashed and set aside the FIR being I-C.R. No. 3 of 2016 registered with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad vide its judgment and order dated 16.11.2017 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 13093 of 2016. He has taken this Court through the various judgments to indicate that it is not the falsehood per se, which would give rise to initiation of separate proceedings, but, the Court has to reach to the subjective satisfaction that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made. He, further, argued that it is not necessary for a person to sign in a particular manner. The writing of the full name is also one of the modes of signature. It is urged that every question that is raised against present Respondent No.2 have been duly explained in the affidavit-in-reply , which has been furnished before this Court, and therefore, not only this application be rejected but for continuing the perverse and mala fide prosecution against Respondent No.2, the Court should compensate Respondent No.2. 8.1 In support of his submissions, learned Sr. Advocate has placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) ‘JOTISH CHANDRA CHAUDHURY VS. STATE OF BIHAR’, AIR 1969 SC 7 ; (2) ‘CHANDRAPAL SINGH AND OTHERS VS. MAHARJ SINGH AND ANOTHER’, (1982) 1 SCC 466 ; (3) ‘ASHOK KUMAR AGGARWAL VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS’, (2013) 15 SCC 539 ; (4) ‘AMARSANG NATHAJI AS HIMSELF AND AS KARTA AND MANAGER VS. HARDIK HARSHADBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS’, (2017) 1 SCC 113 ; (5) ‘DIVYESH @ DIPU GORDHANBHAI PATEL VS. STATE OF GUJARAT’, Criminal Misc. Application No. 13950 of 2012, Dated: 09.08.2012, High Court of Gujarat; 9. So far as the learned APP, Mr. Pujari, is concerned, he urged this Court that the document, which is tendered is an affidavit and on the last page of the same does not bear the signature and instead it has got full name, which has been done before a Notary. However, there is no seal of the notary is affixed, thereon. 10. Pujari, is concerned, he urged this Court that the document, which is tendered is an affidavit and on the last page of the same does not bear the signature and instead it has got full name, which has been done before a Notary. However, there is no seal of the notary is affixed, thereon. 10. On, thus, hearing both the sides and also carefully examining the material on record, this Court notices at the outset, profitably it would be to refer to Chapter-26 of the Code under the heading provisions as to offences affecting administration of justice, which deals with the offence committed in or in relation to the proceedings of the Court or in respect of the documents produced or given in evidence in the proceedings of the Court and if, the Court is of the view that it is expedient, in the interest of justice, that an inquiry should be made, the Court may, after conducting a preliminary inquiry, if it thinks necessary, it may (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. 10.1 Section 177 of Chpate-X under the heading ‘Contempts of the lawful Authority of Public Servants’ of the IPC, provides for punishing a person, who being legally bound to furnish information on any subject to any public servant, as such, furnishes, as true, information on the subject which he knows or has a reason to believe to be false, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Further, if the information which he is legally bound to give respects the commission of an offence, or is required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or in order to the apprehension of an offender, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Further, if the information which he is legally bound to give respects the commission of an offence, or is required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or in order to the apprehension of an offender, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 10.2 Further, Section 181 of the IPC provides that if a person, who is legally bound by an oath or affirmation to state the truth on any subject to any public servant or other person authorized by law to administer such oath or affirmation, makes, to such public servant or other person as aforesaid, touching the subject, any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. 10.3 Likewise, Section 182 of the IPC provides for the punishment, if, a person, who gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that it will thereby cause, such public servant either to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him or to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person. Then, such person Shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Then, such person Shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 10.4 Sections 191 and 193 falling under Chapter-XI under the heading ‘False Evidences and Offences Against Public Justice’ of the IPC, provides for punishment for those, whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence and or Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. It further, provides that whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. 10.5 Section 196 of the IPC pertains to the use of evidence, known to be false, whereas, Section 197 of the IPC deals with the offences pertaining to issuing or signing false certificates. 10.6 Section 198 of the IPC provides for punishment for using a certificate as a true, which is known to be false. 10.7 Section 198 of the IPC pertains to false statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence in a proceedings. 10.8 Section 200 of the IPC provides for punishment, for using as true such declaration, knowing it to be false. 10.9 Section 465 of the IPC deals with the punishment for forgery, whereas, Section 467 of the IPC provides for punishment for forgery of valuable security, will etc.. Section 468 of the IPC deals with the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating and Section 471 deals with using as a genuine, a forged document. 11. In the light of these provisions of law, if one looks at the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of ‘JOTISH CHANDRA CHAUDHURY VS. Section 468 of the IPC deals with the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating and Section 471 deals with using as a genuine, a forged document. 11. In the light of these provisions of law, if one looks at the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of ‘JOTISH CHANDRA CHAUDHURY VS. STATE OF BIHAR’ (Supra), in that case the Apex Court was considering a case, where, the appellant sworn an affidavit giving date of birth of his minor son on the basis of school record, fully knowing that it was wrong. In that case, the Apex Court, held that, since, giving of wrong date of birth was not touching any material point in appeal and that the appellant did not stand to gain anything therefrom and that the declaration not shown to be used corruptly, it was held that the filing of the complaint by Court under Section 199 and 200 of the IPC against the appellant is not justified. 11.1 In ‘CHANDRAPAL SINGH AND OTHERS VS. MAHARJ SINGH AND ANOTHER’ (Supra), the Apex Court held that when it is alleged that a false statement has been made in a declaration which is receivable as evidence in any Court of Justice or before any public servant or other person, the statement alleged to be false has to be set out and its alleged falsity with reference to the truth found in some document has to be referred to, to point out that the two situations cannot coexist, both being attributable to the same person and therefore, one of them to his knowledge must be false. The relevant observations read thus: “12. In the revision petition filed by the landlord against the order of allotment in favour of appellant 1, three contentions were raised. Firstly. he challenged the allotment order on merits, secondly, he urged that the Rent Control Officer had no jurisdiction to decide the area of the accommodation vacated by Jai Prakash Nagar; and thirdly, he contended that the Rent Control Officer had no jurisdiction to determine the rent. The Fourth Additional District Judge who heard the matter rejected the contention on the first point and accepted the second and third contentions. Ultimately he confirmed the order of allotment. While reaching this conclusion he held that there was no dispute between the parties in respect of the portion of premises bearing_ Nos. The Fourth Additional District Judge who heard the matter rejected the contention on the first point and accepted the second and third contentions. Ultimately he confirmed the order of allotment. While reaching this conclusion he held that there was no dispute between the parties in respect of the portion of premises bearing_ Nos. 385 and 385/1 being in possession and tenancy of Chandrapal Singh. He upheld the finding that Chandrapal Singh is entitled to the allotment of the premises No. 385/2. Then there is an observation that the claim of Chandrapal Singh was incorrect to the extent that he was already in possession of one room in the upper storey. At the later stage it was observed that there was no cogent and documentary or believable evidence on record to hold that Shri Chandrapal Singh was already in possession of one room in upper portion along with ground floor of house No. 385/1 in any manner, and it was concluded that the claim of the appellant 1 that he was in possession of one room in premises No. 385/2 was not correct. However, as stated earlier, he finally upheld the allotment order of premises No. 385/2 in favour of appellant 1 Chandrapal Singh. 13. We have now to examine whether in the background of these facts any criminal court would have entertained a complaint of the landlord under Ss. 199 and 201, I. P. C. In the whole complaint there is not the slightest whisper as to what evidence wag available which the appellants destroyed. Sec. 201, I. P. C. provides as under : "201. Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false, shall, if the ...................." We minutely read line by line the complaint and did not find a single word as to what existing evidence was destroyed by the appellants individually or conjointly in respect of an offence which was already committed with the intention of screening the offender. Unfortunately, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate appears not even to have read the complaint. Unfortunately, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate appears not even to have read the complaint. Otherwise there is not one word as to what offence which he found appeared to have been committed in respect of which the evidence was destroyed or in respect of which a false information was given. Therefore, on the averments of the complainant himself in the complaint no court could have taken cognizance of an offence under See. 201, I. P. C. The High Court did not examine the matter from this angle. The complaint, therefore, in respect of an offence under Section 201. I. P. C. is liable to be quashed on the ground that there is not even the slightest allegation to constitute an offence except mentioning number of the section of the Penal Code. 14. That leaves for our consideration the alleged offence under S. 199. Sec. 199 Provides Punishment for making a false statement in a declaration which is by law receivable in evidence. we will assume that the affidavits filed in a proceeding for allotment of premises before the Rent Control Officer are receivable as evidence. It is complained that certain averments in these affidavits are false though no specific averment is singled out .for this purpose in the complaint When It is alleged that a false statement has been made in a declaration which is receivable as evidence in any Court of Justice or before any public servant or other person, the statement alleged to be false has to be set out and its alleged falsity with reference to the truth found in some document has to be referred to pointing out that the two situations cannot co-exist, both being attributable to the same person and, therefore, one to his knowledge must be false. Rival contentions set out in affidavits accepted or rejected by courts with reference to onus probandi do not furnish foundation for a charge under S. 199, I. P. C. To illustrate the point, appellant 1 Chandrapal Singh alleged that he was in I possession of one room forming part of premises No. 385/2. The learned Additional District Judge after scrutinising all rival affidavits did not accept this contention. It thereby does not become false. The only inference is that the statement made by Chandrapal Singh did not inspire confidence looking to other relevant evidence in the case. The learned Additional District Judge after scrutinising all rival affidavits did not accept this contention. It thereby does not become false. The only inference is that the statement made by Chandrapal Singh did not inspire confidence looking to other relevant evidence in the case. Acceptance or rejection of evidence by itself is not a sufficient vardstick to dub the one rejected as false. Falsity can be alleged when truth stands out glaringly and to the knowledge of the person who is making the false statement. Day in and day out in courts averments made by one set of witnesses are accepted and the counter-averments are rejected. If in all such cases complaints under S. 199, I. P. C. are to be filed not only there will open up floodgates of litigation but. it would unquestionably be an abuse of the process of the Court. The learned counsel for the respondent told us that a tendency to perjure is very much on the increase and unless by firm action courts do not put their foot down heavily upon such persons the whole Judicial process would come to ridicule. We see some force in the submission but it is equally true that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court. Complainant herein is an Advocate. He lost in both courts in the rent control proceedings and has now rushed to the criminal court. This itself speaks volumes. Add to this the fact that another suit between the parties was pending. from 1975. The conclusion is inescapable that invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court in this background is an abuse of the process of law and the High Court rather glossed over this important fact while declining to exercise its power under S. 482, Cr.P.C.” 11.2 In ‘ASHOK KUMAR AGGARWAL VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS’ (Supra), it was the case of initiation of the proceedings by the Court under Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) of the Code, where, the Apex Court held that for initiation of such prosecution, the Court concerned must be satisfied that there has been a prima facie a deliberate and conscious effort to misguide the Court and interfere in the administration of justice and that the said prosecution is necessary in the interest of justice. The apex Court further observed and held as under at Paragraphs-6 to 10: “6. In Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421 : (1994 AIR SCW 4994), this Court held that nobody should be permitted to indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods in the judicial proceedings and if someone does so, it must be dealt with appropriately. In case recourse to a false plea is taken with an oblique motive, it would definitely hinder, hamper or impede the flow of justice and prevent the courts from performing their legal duties. 7. In this context, reference may be made of Section 340 under Chapter XXVI of the Cr.P.C., under the heading of "Provisions as to Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice". This Chapter deals with offences committed in or in relation to a proceeding in the court, or in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in the court and enables the court to make a complaint in respect of such offences if that court is of the view that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence. Clause (b) of Section 195 (1) Cr.P.C. authorises such court to examine prima facie as it thinks necessary and then make a complaint thereof in writing after having recorded a finding to that effect as contemplated under Section 340(1), Cr.P.C. In such a case, the question remains as to whether a prima facie case is made out which, if unrebutted, may have a reasonable likelihood to establish the specified offences and whether it is also expedient in the interest of justice to take any action. Thus, before lodging a complaint, the condition precedent for the court to be satisfied are that material so produced before the court makes out a prima facie case for a complaint and that it is expedient in the interest of justice to have prosecution under Section 193, IPC. (Vide: Karunakaran v. T.V. Eachara Warrier and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 290 ; and K.T.M.S. Mohd. and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1831 ) : (1992 AIR SCW 2062). 8. In the case of Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam and Anr., AIR 1971 SC 1367 , this Court held : "7. (Vide: Karunakaran v. T.V. Eachara Warrier and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 290 ; and K.T.M.S. Mohd. and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1831 ) : (1992 AIR SCW 2062). 8. In the case of Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam and Anr., AIR 1971 SC 1367 , this Court held : "7. The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge." (Emphasis added) 9. In Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr., AIR 2005 SC 2119 : (2005 AIR SCW 1929), this Court observed : "In view of the language used in Section 340, CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1) (b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice". This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice?.." 10. This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice?.." 10. In view of the above, law on the issue can be summarised that in order to initiate prosecution for perjury, the court must prima facie reach a conclusion after holding preliminary inquiry that there has been a deliberate and conscious effort to misguide the court and interfere in the administration of justice. Moreso, it has to be seen whether such a prosecution is necessary in the interest of justice. The case is required to be decided in light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition.” 11.3 In ‘AMARSANG NATHAJI AS HIMSELF AND AS KARTA AND MANAGER VS. HARDIK HARSHADBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS’, the respondent had filed a civil suit against the appellant accused, where, the trial Court declined to grant temporary injunction. In appeal, the High Court upheld the order of the High Court and even the SLP filed against the same also came to be dismissed by the Apex Court. However, in the judgment, the High Court noticed certain contradictions in the statement of the appellant-accused and therefore, it ordered initiation of the proceedings under Section 340 of the Code. When, its sustainability was challenged, the Apex Court observed and held that the preconditions for initiating proceedings under Section 340 of the Code are (I) materials produced before the Court must make out a prima facie case for inquiry about alleged offence and (ii) it should be expedient, in the interest of justice, to hold such inquiry about the alleged offence. It was, further, held that mere making of contradictory statement by itself is not sufficient to proceed under Section 340 of the Code and it must be shown that such a statement was intentionally made. 12. Thus, what is required under the law, as can be deduced from the authorities discussed herein above, is that the statement, which is alleged to be false or contradictory must have been intentional. 12. Thus, what is required under the law, as can be deduced from the authorities discussed herein above, is that the statement, which is alleged to be false or contradictory must have been intentional. Even that per se is not sufficient for the Court to order initiation of an inquiry and what is further more required is that the Court must form an opinion that it is expedient, in the interest of justice, to initiate the proceedings under Section 340 of the Code. In order to form an opinion, the Court must prima facie be satisfied that the offence appears to have been committed. Further, the Court may hold inquiry , though, it is not mandatory. If, the Court forms an opinion that an offence under Section 340 of the Code is made out, then, it may dispense with preliminary inquiry. Further, if, formation of such an opinion is possible without conducting a preliminary inquiry, then, such opinion can be formed and even after forming an opinion, the Court has to take a decision, whether it is required to file a complaint, considering the facts and circumstances of a case. Where, a Court feels that it was required to lodge a complaint, then, it can make complaint in writing to the magistrate, having jurisdiction in the matter and upon receipt of such a complaint, the Magistrate concerned shall proceed under Section 343 of the Code, treating the same as a warrant case against the person concerned. 12.1 In light of the clear law on the subject, if, one adverts to the facts of the case on hand, what has been alleged, firstly, against Respondent No.2 is that he is residing presently at Bangkok and the affirmation of Criminal Misc Application No. 8454 of 2017 was done at Bangkok on 28.03.2017. Further, the signatures made on Page Nos. 1 to 32 of the memo of the said application are the same, however, the signature made on Page-33 of the memo, which is the affidavit, the signature is different and instead, there appears to be full name of Respondent No.2 written as signature. 12.2 It can be noticed clearly that there is a peculiar pattern adopted of signing Page Nos. 1 to 32 of the document in question. However, Page No.33, which is the affidavit to the said application, is not signed in the same manner as Page Nos. 12.2 It can be noticed clearly that there is a peculiar pattern adopted of signing Page Nos. 1 to 32 of the document in question. However, Page No.33, which is the affidavit to the said application, is not signed in the same manner as Page Nos. 1 to 32 and there is full name is written / signed of Respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 has explained this at Para-X of his affidavit-in-reply that he had inadvertently written / signed his full name on Page No.33 of the said application. It is, further, stated that signatures on Page Nos. 1 to 32 and the name written / signed on Page No.33 of the said application are in his own hand writing. 12.3 Then, what is, further more, argued before this Court is that, though, it is purported to be signed before a Notary, the seal of the Notary is missing on the said document. 12.4 In regard to that aspect, this Court finds that in the document, itself, the seal of the Notary is present. It, however, is not as clear as it is on the document at Page No. 118, where, the certificate has been issued by the very one Mr. Pote Chiravutikul, Director, the Registry of Signature and Document Attestation, Lawyers Council of Thailand to the effect that Acting 2Lt., Mr. Ongkar Singh, is an Attorney at Law, having License No. 2238/2553, who has been registered as a Notarial Services Attorney and is qualified to certify signatures and documents. 12.5 Yet, another issue that has been raised is with regard to Respondent No.2 residing, at present, at Bangkok and his affirmation of the affidavit on 28.03.2017 so also the signing of the same by two advocates on the same date at Ahmedabad. Further, the Vakalatpatra is also signed on 28.03.2017. A copy of the status report of Criminal Misc. Application No. 8454 of 2017 also suggests that the same was filed on 29.03.2017 and it came-up for hearing on 30.03.2017, i.e. on the very next day of the filing. 12.6 Affidavit of One Mr. Parikshit Chaugule, who is a resident of Nasik is also filed. He stated that Respondent No.2 had handed over him the parcel of documents at Bangkok, Thailand, and he was informed to handover the same to one Yashwantsingh at Mumbai. 12.6 Affidavit of One Mr. Parikshit Chaugule, who is a resident of Nasik is also filed. He stated that Respondent No.2 had handed over him the parcel of documents at Bangkok, Thailand, and he was informed to handover the same to one Yashwantsingh at Mumbai. He also has produced a photocopy of his passport issued by the Republic of India, which indicates that he returned to India on 20.03.2017 from Bangkok, Kingdom of Thailand. 12.7 Affidavit filed by Respondent No.2 also confirms this aspect. It is alleged by him that this application is nothing, but, abuse of process of law and the same is made to harass him and to pressurize him in so as to extort money from him. It is, further, his say that this is nothing but a desperate attempt on the part of the applicant to recover money, after having lost several proceedings right upto the Apex Court of the Thailand so also in the FIR being I-C.R. No. 3 of 2017 registered with Navrangpura Police Station having been quashed by this Court. 12.8 This Court is conscious of the order dated 01.05.2017 passed by this Court, whereby, it recalled the order dated 17.03.2017, passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 6647 of 2017, wherein, a report was also made by the City Mamlatdar, Ahmedabad, which was addressed to the learned APP, intimating him that the Solvency Certificate bearing No. 326/2016, Dated: 30.09.2016, is not issued by his office. 12.9 As recorded in the order of this Court dated 01.05.2017, the solvency certificate produced, pursuant to the order of this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No. 19592 of 2016, Dated: 02.09.2016, was noticed to be bogus and that it is a matter of very serious concerned and where, by giving certain findings, this Court had permitted Respondent No.2 to go abroad for a period of six months. Respondent No.2 had also furnished an undertaking before this Court in respect of the properties owned by him in the State of Kerala, stating, particularly, that he would not sell, transfer or alienate such property. The title deeds of the properties in the State of Kerala, which were deposited with the trial Court, do not belong to Respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 had also furnished an undertaking before this Court in respect of the properties owned by him in the State of Kerala, stating, particularly, that he would not sell, transfer or alienate such property. The title deeds of the properties in the State of Kerala, which were deposited with the trial Court, do not belong to Respondent No.2. In that view of the same, subsequent FIR being I-C.R. No. 40 of 2017 came to be lodged with Navrangpura Police Station, and therefore, this Court had not gone into the matter any further. This Court had therefore allowed the time to Respondent No.2 to file affidavit in respect of the fake surety, since, this Court held and found that he had taken disadvantage of the Court’s order. This Court also noticed that he could not have been permitted to travel abroad, had he not produced such a fake certificate. Therefore, prima facie, it was not found acceptable for him to tinker himself from the act of providing fake surety. Thus, the document prima facie was found to be bogus and forged and in such a backdrop of facts, this application has been preferred by the applicant-original complainant. 12.10 As it is a matter of separate investigation, so far as the furnishing of forged document in the Court process is concerned, the findings of this Court cannot be clouded by the pending proceedings which will be determined on its own merit. The issues raised before this Court by the applicant-original complainant, in the opinion of this Court are non-issues. They have been hyped and highlighted and an attempt is made to emphasis and urge to this Court to initiate proceedings by forming an opinion that it is expedient to so do it, as the action on the part of the present Respondent No.2 is to pollute the stream of justice, which does not find favour with this Court. 12.11 As discussed, herein above, in his signing on Page-33, instead of his making signature he has written his full name of his before the Notary, which is though unusual is not prohibited nor illegal. Notary, also by way of affidavit has confirmed his having signed before him. 12.11 As discussed, herein above, in his signing on Page-33, instead of his making signature he has written his full name of his before the Notary, which is though unusual is not prohibited nor illegal. Notary, also by way of affidavit has confirmed his having signed before him. With regard to the signing of the documents by both Respondent No.2 and his advocates on the same day and singing of the Vakalatpatra also on the very day, i.e. on 28.03.2017, in the opinion of this Court is well explained through the affidavit of the person, who carried the document from Bangkok, Kingdom of Thailand to Mumbai, substantiating such version of his with his travel documents, and therefore, on none of the counts, the Court has found any falsity. 12.12 It is given to understand to this Court that at the time of affirmation before this Court, ordinarily, the date, which has been put by the party concerned is the date, which is mentioned in the document of the applicant by the Registry. Although, there is no reason for the same nor has anyone pointed out any rule to that effect. Be that as it may, even if, there are some irregularities in signing of documents, the law on the subject is extremely clear, where, initiation of prosecution for perjury or for polluting the stream of the administration of justice is only when the Court, prima facie, reaches to the conclusion that there was a deliberate and conscious attempt to misguide the Court and to interfere in the administration of the justice and it is also to see, whether, it is necessary in the interest of justice to prosecute the person concerned for the act of his having larger impact and such a commission of offence should not go unpunished. None of the ingredients, in the opinion of this Court, gets satisfied. Though, the Court to either direct the holding of a preliminary inquiry and even if the Court, while hearing the parties, is required to form such an opinion by believing prima facie opinion, none of the averments set out in the application deserve to be entertained applying the law to the facts of the case on hand. Though, the Court to either direct the holding of a preliminary inquiry and even if the Court, while hearing the parties, is required to form such an opinion by believing prima facie opinion, none of the averments set out in the application deserve to be entertained applying the law to the facts of the case on hand. 12.13 Further, with regard to the allegations of there being a desperate attempt on the part of the applicant, who has lost litigation before the Court at Thialand and also by way of the quashing petition, this Court would not like to enter into the details of this allegations in wake of the pendency of investigation of the FIR being the I-C.R. No. 40 of 2017, registered with Navrangpura Police Station. It could be unhesitantly concluded that no case is made out by the applicant to initiate any proceeding under Section 340 of the Code so far as the present application is concerned. 12.14 Thus, on giving a serious consideration to the material on record, this Court appears of the firm opinion that there is no deliberate act to misguide the Court, while giving the document and in such fact situation, entertaining the application under Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) of the Code is unwarranted. 13. Resultantly, this application fails and is DISMISSED. Rule is discharged.