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Allahabad High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1702 (ALL)

Waqil v. State of U. P.

2018-08-02

AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI, BACHCHOO LAL

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Sarvajeet Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, out of whom appellant no. 3 Furkan died during the pendency of the appeal that abated insofar as the said appellant is concerned vide order of this court dated 23.10.2017. Learned A.G.A. Sri Ajit Ray has been heard for the State. 2. The appeal arises out of case crime no. 150 of 2008 under Section 302/34 I.P.C. police station Mandi District Saharanpur giving rise to Sessions trial No. 454 of 2008 wherein the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 4, Saharanpur has convicted the appellants vide judgment dated 15.12.2010 under the aforesaid sections for which they were charged and has sentenced them with life imprisonment coupled with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each failing which the appellants have to undergo three months further imprisonment. 3. The description of the incident as brought on record depicts the occurrence of the incident on 16.4.2008 at about 12.30 p.m. in the afternoon. The first information report was lodged by Mukhtiyar at 2:30 p.m. on the same day, who has been examined as P.W.-1 and is the husband of the deceased. The first information report narrates that the informant along with his younger brother Waqil resides in the same premises, the upper portion whereof is occupied by appellant Waqil and his family, and a room on the ground floor is occupied by the informant and his family. It is further stated that since the house is small, therefore, there occurred a regular heated verbal exchange between his wife and the wife of the younger brother Waqil namely Khushnuma. On this Khushnuma used to make complaints to her parents namely the deceased appellant Furkan and the appellant Murshida as a result whereof they were not on good terms and on account of such animosity, Waqil appellant no. 1, Khushnuma, appellant no. 2 wife of Waqil, late Furkan appellant no. 3 father of Khushnuma as well as Murshida appellant no. 4 wife of Furkan and mother of Khushnuma all joined together and caught hold of the deceased Farhat wife of the informant, whereupon the appellant Murshida sprinkled kerosene oil on the deceased and Waqil set her on fire with a match stick. 2 wife of Waqil, late Furkan appellant no. 3 father of Khushnuma as well as Murshida appellant no. 4 wife of Furkan and mother of Khushnuma all joined together and caught hold of the deceased Farhat wife of the informant, whereupon the appellant Murshida sprinkled kerosene oil on the deceased and Waqil set her on fire with a match stick. The deceased rushed out of the house when the informant along with Sadab the husband of his wife's sister came to her rescue who had already received serious burn injuries that was witnessed by a large number of neighbours of the locality. Taking advantage of the confusion the accused appellants ran away whereafter the informant along with the help of the members of the locality took his wife, Farhat, to the hospital who was in a serious condition. From there he came to the police station leaving his wife in the company of his relatives and accordingly lodged the first information report for taking appropriate action. 4. The investigation swung into action and the first step that appears to have been taken is recording of the statement of the injured and witnesses with further information to the local Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) for recording the statement/dying declaration of the deceased who was lying in S.B.D. District hospital, Saharanpur. Accordingly, Mr. Sunil Kumar Singh, Naib Tehsildar Haroda, who has deposed as P.W. 10 during trial, recorded the dying declaration of the deceased after the status of fitness of her mind was recorded by the Emergency Medical Officer Dr. Mahesh Grover who has been examined as P.W.-12. After recording of this dying declaration between 4.55 p.m. to 5.15 p.m., the deceased keeping in view her serious burn injuries was shifted to the Post Graduate Institute at Chandigarh where she finally succumbed to her injuries at about 9.30 p.m. 5. The inquest was prepared on 17.4.2008 along with a death summary and has been witnessed by five persons namely Mukhtiyar P.W.-1, Sadab P.W.-2, Mohd. Tarik, Mohd. Nayab and Sher Singh. 6. Her postmortem was carried out at General Hospital Sector -16 Chandigarh on the next day at 11.30 a.m. on 18.4.2008. The death was reported on account of antemortem burn injuries. Tarik, Mohd. Nayab and Sher Singh. 6. Her postmortem was carried out at General Hospital Sector -16 Chandigarh on the next day at 11.30 a.m. on 18.4.2008. The death was reported on account of antemortem burn injuries. The bed head ticket at the time of admission indicates that the burns were about 85 % and the patient was conscious but on examination by the attending doctor the injury was diagnosed to be 90 % burns with an endorsement of sending information to police station Janakpuri, Saharanpur to arrange for the recording of dying declaration. It is thereafter that the deceased was shifted to Chandigarh and she succumbed to her injuries. 7. The charge sheet was filed against four appellants where after the trial court proceeded to record the deposition of the informant Mukhtiyar as P.W.-1 that of Sadab as P.W.-2 and Km. Fareen the daughter of the deceased aged about 7 years as P.W.-3. Scribe of the first information report Sahjad Ahmad who is the maternal uncle of the deceased was examined as P.W.-4, Dr. A.K. Varma who had examined the deceased at the time of her admission in the hospital at Saharanpur in the burn ward on female bed no. 1, was examined as P.W.-5, Devi Pal Singh Constable who has registered the first information report has been examined as P.W.-6 and Dr. Arvind Joshi the attending doctor at the Postgraduate Institute at Chandigarh has been examined as P.W.-7. 8. The first Investigating Officer Suresh Chandra Sharma who recorded the statement of the deceased under section 161 Cr.P.C. at the time of her being admitted in the hospital at Saharanpur and who made arrangements for getting the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate, and who also carried out the recovery and proved the same was examined as P.W. 8. Constable Charan Dtas who went to Chandigarh along with the Investigating Officer P.W.-8 and in whose presence the inquest report was prepared on 17.4.2008 was examined as P.W.-9. Naib Tehsildar Sunil Kumar Singh who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased was examined as P.W. 10 and Dr. Rajvinder Jeet Singh who carried out the postmortem at Chandigarh District Hospital deposed as P.W.-11. Dr. Mahesh Grover who certified the fitness of the state of mind of the deceased while her dying declaration was recorded by P.W.-10 has been examined as P.W.-12. Rajvinder Jeet Singh who carried out the postmortem at Chandigarh District Hospital deposed as P.W.-11. Dr. Mahesh Grover who certified the fitness of the state of mind of the deceased while her dying declaration was recorded by P.W.-10 has been examined as P.W.-12. The subsequent Investigating Officer Satyapal Singh who had prepared some police papers has been examined as P.W. -13. 9. The statement of all accused under section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded thereafter. The defence introduced three witnesses Aurengzeb, Afsana and Sannawar as D.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 10. After assessing the entire evidence the trial court has convicted all the appellants on the strength of the evidence on record particularly the dying declaration of the deceased holding that all of them had participated in the commission of the offence. The trial court has also taken the aid of Section 106 Evidence Act 1872 to arrive at the conclusion that all the appellants had failed to discharge the burden cast on them by virtue of the evidence already collected by the prosecution and consequently in the absence of any cogent explanation by the defence the prosecution has been able to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly by the impugned judgment dated 15th December, 2010 all the appellants have been convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine. 11. Assailing the findings of the trial court as well as impeaching the evidence on record Sri Sarvajeet Kumar has taken the court through the statement of the witnesses of fact P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 to contend that out of these 3 witnesses P.W. 1 was declared a hostile witness by the prosecution and P.W. 3 who is a child witness in her cross-examination categorically admitted having been tutored by her maternal uncle to narrate a parroted statement before the court. He therefore submits that the deposition of P.W. 1 and P.W. 3 was absolutely uncreditworthy and consequently the trial court committed a manifest error to treat the same as corroborating material. He further submits that P.W. 2 being an interested witness and further having not actually witnessed the commission of the offence could not have been relied upon for bringing about the conviction. 12. He further submits that P.W. 2 being an interested witness and further having not actually witnessed the commission of the offence could not have been relied upon for bringing about the conviction. 12. He further submits that the scribe of the FIR also made a false deposition which nowhere corroborated the evidence on record and consequently all the witnesses of fact have not been able to support the prosecution story. 13. He has then questioned the credibility of the dying declaration of the deceased urging that the same does not inspire confidence not only because it is deficient in form and content but because it also reflects that the deponent of that statement namely the deceased was not in a fit state of mind to narrate any such declaration. Even otherwise the declaration is incoherent and on the basis thereof no conviction could have been brought about as it does not clinchingly establish either the commission of the offence or the actual participation of any of the appellants. He therefore submits that in view of the settled legal position with regard to the veracity of a dying declaration the same not being in-conformity with the same the dying declaration could not have been made the basis for recording a finding of guilt against the appellants. 14. He then submits that the trial court has completely ignored the defence set up by the appellants including the defence version being substantiated by the witnesses produced by it and therefore the trial court erred in not arriving at a just conclusion after weighing the evidence on a level balance. The submission therefore is that the conclusions of the trial court is based on such evidence which is highly doubtful and on the basis whereof the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction and sentence therefore deserves to be reversed in view of the inconsistencies pointed out during the course of submissions. 15. The learned A.G.A. on the other hand contends that from a perusal of the material on record the date, time and place of incident remains unimpeached and the cause of death due to heavy burn injuries is clearly established. The place of occurrence remains intact. He submits that the participation of the appellants has been categorically narrated even by the hostile witnesses and which stands corroborated with the dying declaration of the deceased. The place of occurrence remains intact. He submits that the participation of the appellants has been categorically narrated even by the hostile witnesses and which stands corroborated with the dying declaration of the deceased. He further submits that the material that was brought forth during investigation as well is clearly in-consonance with the evidence that was led in court and the deposition of the Investigating Officer P.W. 8 corroborates and proves the fact of the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the offence. The participation therefore can not be doubted and therefore it can not be said that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He submits that the manner of the recording of the dying declaration does not suffer from any infirmity and even otherwise after the deposition of the Magistrate P.W. 10 and the doctor in whose presence the dying declaration was made namely P.W. 12 there is no doubt that the declaration of the deceased was in a fit and sound state of mind and it does not create any doubt about the correctness of the incident or the participation of the appellants. Consequently if the dying declaration is intact and it gets corroborated by the other ocular testimony on record then in that view of the matter there is no doubt much less a reasonable doubt so as to question the prosecution version. 16. He further submits that the defence version which sought to create an impression that it was an accidental death due to the bursting of a stove in the kitchen, and which was sought to be advanced on the strength of the statement of the unreliable witnesses as well, can-not be said to have been proved by the defence by any material on record so as to corroborate the plea set up by the defence. In the circumstances there is no other alternative hypothesis to be believed and in the above background with there being no valid explanation on behalf of the accused, their indictment remains unquestionable. He therefore submits that the trial court has after appreciating the entire evidence on record arrived at a correct conclusion and the judgment impugned herein does not call for any interference. 17. We have considered the submissions raised and we have perused the original records. He therefore submits that the trial court has after appreciating the entire evidence on record arrived at a correct conclusion and the judgment impugned herein does not call for any interference. 17. We have considered the submissions raised and we have perused the original records. The fact that the deceased met her death on account of excessive burn injuries is clearly established from the medical evidence as well as the postmortem report. The death was caused on account of an assault made on her is also established and there is no evidence available to assume or construe the case to be one of accidental death. It is therefore a clear case of homicide and there is nothing to even remotely consider any hypothesis of a suicide. The narration in the FIR indicates that there were differences between the two families, that of the informant and the accused on account of regular altercations between the wives of the two brothers, namely between the deceased Farhat and the appellant Khushnuma. It is also evident that on account of such differences there was an interference in the family affairs by the parents of the appellant Khushnuma. The evidence on record also discloses an allegation that these differences had occurred as the deceased was allegedly trying to pressurize the appellant Wakil to marry her sister. There is however no concrete evidence to establish the motive of any such differences but the fact remains that the families were not on good terms. 18. The description in the FIR is that all the appellants on the calling of the appellant Wakil joined together in the room on the ground floor where the deceased resided and they allegedly caught hold of her. Thereafter the appellant Mursheeda sprinkled kerosene oil and the appellant Wakil is alleged to have set her on fire by lighting a match. 19. To support this version the prosecution examined Mukhtiyar the informant himself as P.W. 1 who has unfortunately turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution story to that extent except that for the occurrence of the incident. 19. To support this version the prosecution examined Mukhtiyar the informant himself as P.W. 1 who has unfortunately turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution story to that extent except that for the occurrence of the incident. P.W. 3 is a child witness and is the daughter of the deceased who in her examination-in-chief did narrate the incident but in her cross-examination she admitted that she has narrated what was told to her by her maternal uncle and therefore she virtually admitted her statement to have been tutored which was produced in a parroted form before the court. We therefore are in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the statement of P.W. 1 and P.W. 3 can not be treated to be credit-worthy so as to rely even on that part of the statement relating to the participation of the appellants. 20. We then come to the statement of P.W. 2 Shadab. He has supported the prosecution story but he is not the ocular witness of the actual occurrence. He arrived later on when the actual offence is alleged to have already been committed. He describes that when he arrived Khushnuma the appellant was allegedly trying to push the deceased inside the house whereas the deceased appellant Furkan was trying to bolt the door from the outside. He has described his arrival along with Mukhtiyar P.W. 1 but while deposing he stated that he accompanied Mukhtiyar from his in laws place but he does not remember that Mukhtiyar was coming behind him or not as he was rushing towards the place of occurrence. P.W. 2 Shadab happens to be the husband of the sister of the deceased. He has therefore come to the aid of the prosecution in that capacity and may be in order to help the family members of the deceased. The deposition of P.W. 2 is to the effect that he saw the deceased forcing herself out of the room where she had been set on fire and arriving at an open place described as a plot where he took the aid of a quilt to disperse the fire and also to cover the body of the deceased as all her clothes being burnt. This part of the deposition of he having arrived at the scene and used a quilt for putting off the fire or covering the deceased has to be read keeping in view the dying declaration of the deceased. In her dying declaration the deceased has nowhere named P.W. 2 as one of the rescuers, inspite of the fact that P.W. 2 has described his role as one of the major contributors in rescuing her and wrapping her with a quilt. No quilt is said to have been recovered or it remains which may indicate a corroboration of the aforesaid deposition of P.W. 2. In the said circumstances the deposition of P.W. 2 appears to be a little over played and is embellished. It may be true that P.W. 2 after having heard the incident had arrived but does not appear to be present at the time of occurrence or else the deceased would have at least mentioned him specially he being her closest relative. He is indicated to have joined the company of P.W. 1 along with the deceased while traveling to Chandigarh at some distance away when the deceased was being transported to the Post Graduate Institute at Chandigarh. We therefore find that P.W. 2 has in order to substantiate the case of the prosecution deposed in a manner which casts a doubt about his presence at the time of the occurrence. 21. Apart from this P.W. 2 has nowhere stated about the participation of any of the appellants in the actual commission of the offence of either sprinkling kerosene oil or setting or alighting the deceased to fire. His deposition therefore can not be solely relied on being shaky in nature for the purposes of convicting the appellants with the aid of Section 34 I.P.C. 22. We now turn to examine the most important part of the evidence relied on by the prosecution namely the dying declaration of the deceased. The same has been exhibited and proved to have been recorded by P.W.-10. We now turn to examine the most important part of the evidence relied on by the prosecution namely the dying declaration of the deceased. The same has been exhibited and proved to have been recorded by P.W.-10. We are reproducing the same to usefully refer to the words used by the declarant and its meaning; “Pt name Farhat W/o Mukhtyar R/o Gali No. 16, peerwali gali P/s Mandi Distt Saharanpur is conscious and oriented to give the declaration on dated 16.4.08 at 4:55 p.m. Sd illegible 16.4.08 S.B.D. Distt Hospital, Saharanpur bDt d&18 Jherh Qjgr iRuh eq[;rkj fu0 ifjokyh xyh ua0 16 pkan dkyksuh Fkkuk e.Mh lgkjuiqj us c;ku fd vkt fnukad 16&4&2008 dks nksigj 12 cts esjk nsoj odhy ?kj esa vk;k vkSj dgk fd Åij ls vkvksa] lkl ds gkFk esa feV~Vh ds rsy dk fMCck Fkk lkl esjs nsoj dh gS ftldk uke eqf'kZnk gSA nsoj ds cqykus ij mldk 'olqj Qqjdku fu0 xzke pkS/kjh fcgkj Fkkuk dksrokyh nsgkr o mldh iRuh nsojkuh Jherh [kq'kuqek uhps vk;s Fks esjs Åij feV~Vh dk rsy eqf'kZnk us fNMdk ekfpl fdlus tykbZ eq>s /;ku ugha eS ?kcjkgV esa FkhA vLirky eq>s esjk ifr vkSj iMkslh vkfn yk;sA eSusa lc dqN lp lp c;ku fd;k gSA dksbZ Hkh ckr NqikbZ ugha gSA eSa eqfLye gwaSA vYykg esjh enn djsA fu0 v0 Qjgr ,y- Vh g0 viBuh; lquhy dqekj flag uk;c rglhynkj gjkSMk rglhy lgkjuiqj Pt remained conscious and oriented during and after statement. g0 viBuh; 16.4.08 5:15 P.M. E.M.O. S.D.B.Distt Hospital Saharanpur bDt&19 bDt&16 23. A perusal of the said declaration indicates that the Emergency Medical Officer P.W.-12 Dr. Mahesh Grover has certified that the deceased was conscious and oriented while giving her declaration which commenced at about 4.55 p.m. and concluded at 5.15 p.m. The doctor has also endorsed that the deceased remained conscious and oriented during and after the statement. This certification corroborates the fitness of the state of mind of the deceased. 24. Coming to the contents, the same is in the form of a narrative and is not in any question-answer form. The narrative however corroborates the allegations in the first information report about a call being made by the appellant Waqil and the arrival of Khushnuma and Furkan. Murshida is alleged to have sprinkled kerosene oil. 24. Coming to the contents, the same is in the form of a narrative and is not in any question-answer form. The narrative however corroborates the allegations in the first information report about a call being made by the appellant Waqil and the arrival of Khushnuma and Furkan. Murshida is alleged to have sprinkled kerosene oil. The deceased however deviates in her statement from nominating Waqil as the person to have lighted the match and set her on fire which was the original case of the prosecution in the first information report. In order to verify the same we also referred to the original records including the case diary, the contents whereof were proved by the Investigating Officer P.W.-8 during deposition including the statement of the deceased under section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded by the Investigating Officer. He has recorded that the deceased has categorically nominated all the four persons and has indicated that kerosene oil was sprinkled by Murshida and that she was set on fire by lighting a match stick by Waqil. We do not find this part of her statement of having been set on fire by a match stick lighted by Waqil to have been confirmed in the dying declaration. The dying declaration therefore, puts us in doubt about the actual lighting of the fire by a match stick inasmuch as the deceased states that she does not remember as to who had lighted the match stick. As noted above, P.Ws. 1 and 3 have not proved to be trustworthy. But at the same time P.W.-2 who is not a witness of the occurrence has also not been able to shed any light on the same. Thus there is no direct and clinching evidence to conclude that Waqil had actually lighted the match stick and set the deceased on fire. 25. There is no role assigned at all in the dying declaration to either Waqil or his wife Khushnuma. The allegation that she had caught hold of the deceased is nowhere substantiated by any other material on record or even the dying declaration. The only statement made is that on the call given by Waqil, Furkan and Khushnuma came down stairs. We therefore find that the nomination of Khushnuma of coming down stairs by itself would not establish her participation in the commission of the offence. The only statement made is that on the call given by Waqil, Furkan and Khushnuma came down stairs. We therefore find that the nomination of Khushnuma of coming down stairs by itself would not establish her participation in the commission of the offence. Even assuming for the sake of arguments that she was present, it has come in the evidence that she had a new born child in her lap as she had delivered a child just fifteen days ago. In the said circumstances it cannot be said that she was either pushing the deceased or had involved herself in the said commission of the offense. Consequently on the given evidence as on record and discussed herein above, we do not find any participation of Khushnuma to have been established. 26. The trial court has drawn a presumption against the appellants under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. In our considered opinion without there being any indication of an overt act having been attributed to Khushnuma she cannot be said to have either participated in the offence or having done something in aid thereof. She therefore, cannot be treated as an accessory to the crime. The prosecution had not discharged it's burden completely under section 101 of the Evidence Act. The trial court therefore committed an error in the absence of any evidence against her to convict her along with the other appellants with the aid of section 34 I.P.C. 27. We now come to the allegation of participation of Waqil. It is no doubt evident from the record that the deceased had nominated him as per the statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. but the role assigned in the F.I.R. vanishes in the dying declaration. He is only stated to have called on his wife Khushnuma and father-in-law Furkan to come down stairs. When we come to the ocular testimony of P.W-1, P.W.-2 and P.W.-3, we find it to be untrustworthy as observed above. 28. For this we may refer to the provision of Section 101 and Section 106 of the Evidence Act once again. The prosecution began with the participation of four accused. Furkan (since deceased), his wife Murshida appellant no. 4, Waqil appellant no. 1 and Khushnuma appellant no. 2 wife of Waqil. Furkan and Murshida are the parents of Khushnuma. 28. For this we may refer to the provision of Section 101 and Section 106 of the Evidence Act once again. The prosecution began with the participation of four accused. Furkan (since deceased), his wife Murshida appellant no. 4, Waqil appellant no. 1 and Khushnuma appellant no. 2 wife of Waqil. Furkan and Murshida are the parents of Khushnuma. Even though the names of all four accused are mentioned in the F.I.R. and in the statements during investigation, yet we have found as noted above, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses extremely doubtful. Left with the dying declaration we find that the deceased, in spite of clearly reciting about the role of Murshida, has not indicated her husband Waqil of either catching hold of her or performing any act to suggest his participation. The prosecution therefore, once again has not been able to discharge its burden completely. So as to shift the burden on Waqil to explain his actions. His conduct may be in some doubt but there is no further material to infer his participation. The testimony of Shadab, P.W.-2 who was a bit overzealous, also did not either see the appellant or nominate him so as to infer the commission of any offence as narrated in the F.I.R. Thus the prosecution has not been able to discharge it's burden in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act to lead evidence and prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. We find support from the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Joydeb Patra and others Vs. State of West Bengal, 2014 (12) SCC 444 (Pr 10, 11) and in that of Devinder alias Kala Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana [2012) 10 SCC 763]. 29. The dying declaration virtually exonerates Waqil and places him on the same footing as Khushnuma. We are therefore unable to find ourselves in agreement with the findings of the trial court on recording of the conviction of Waqil who deserves to be given the benefit of doubt. 30. We now come to the last but not the least about the participation of Murshida. We are therefore unable to find ourselves in agreement with the findings of the trial court on recording of the conviction of Waqil who deserves to be given the benefit of doubt. 30. We now come to the last but not the least about the participation of Murshida. The testimony with regard to her participation is categorical and which stands corroborated by the dying declaration and which was a consistent case during investigation as well, right from the inception of the F.I.R., that it is she who had sprinkled kerosene oil. The postmortem report and medical report both indicate the presence of kerosene oil and burn injuries. The cause of death has been directly connected with the said antemortem burn injuries. We have been unable to gather any evidence to give any benefit of doubt to Murshida whose participation has been narrated and established from the evidence on record. 31. Consequently the conclusion drawn by the trial court insofar as Murshida is concerned cannot be faulted with as the evidence against her is unimpeachable. Her participation in the manner indicated and also narrated in the dying declaration cannot be faulted with. At this juncture we may put on record that the manner of recording of the dying declaration may not have been in the exact proper form but the same by itself would not make the dying declaration entirely impeachable as it clearly inspires confidence about the occurrence and stands corroborated with the medical testimony as well as post mortem report. The death of the deceased was certainly a homicide and has taken place in unusual circumstances with a clear overt act having been attributed to the appellant Murshida. 32. For all the reasons recorded herein above, we find that the appellant Waqil and Khushnuma deserve to be acquitted giving them the benefit of doubt. We therefore, partly allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants Khushnuma and Waqil and dismiss the appeal insofar as appellant Murshida is concerned. Her conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court is confirmed. The appellant Khushnuma is on bail. Her bail bonds shall stand discharged. The appellant Waqil is still serving his sentence. He shall be released forthwith subject to the provisions of Section 437 (A) Cr.P.C. 33. Murshida is still in jail. She shall serve out her sentence accordingly. The appeal is partly allowed.