JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. S. Ali, the learned advocate for the appellants as well as Mr. D. Das, learned senior advocate, assisted by Mr. S. Deka, the learned advocate for the respondent. 2. While admitting this appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC, this Court by order dated 13.08.2018, had passed an order in the application filed by the appellants under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC, being I.A. (C) No. 2914/2018, thereby staying the operation of the impugned order dated 12.04.2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Kamrup (Rural), Amingaon in Misc. (J) Case No. 33/2017 in T.S. No. 39/2017 and it was further directed that the appellant No.2 shall file an undertaking before the learned trial Court that any construction that he would be doing would be at his own risk. In that respect, the respondent herein has filed I.A. (C) No. 3351/2018, thereby praying for recalling and/or vacation/alteration/modification of the said order dated 13.08.2018 passed by this Court. 3. The respondent herein is the plaintiff in T.S. No. 39/2017, which was instituted for cancellation of registered power of attorney bearing registered Deed No. 242 dated 22.06.2016, for cancellation of registered Sale Deed bearing Deed No. 557/2017 dated 22.03.2017 by declaring the said deeds being void ab-initio and not binding on the respondent, and for other reliefs. Along with the suit, the respondent/plaintiff had also filed a separate application seeking ad-interim injunction, which was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 33/2017. 4. The case projected in the plaint is that the respondent is the owner of a plot of land measuring 5B-18L, covered by Dag No. 1601 of K.P. Patta No. 716 of Village-Tezpur Part-I, under Mouza-Rampur, Dist. Kamrup (R), out of which the respondent had sold 3B-1K-18L land in favour of Pure & Cure Health Care Pvt. Ltd. (proforma defendant No.4). One Dilip Gupta (proforma defendant No.3) had expressed his interest in purchasing the remaining 2B land from the respondent and the said parties had entered into an Agreement for Sale on 16.04.2016. In the said deal, Lipak Das, the appellant No.1 had acted as mediator and he was appointed as a constituted attorney by the respondent vide Irrevocable General Power of Attorney dated 22.06.2016. However, when the respondent made enquiry, he came to know that on 29.12.2016, the appellant No.1 had applied for grant of sale permission of the suit land in favour of the appellant No.2. However, when the respondent made enquiry, he came to know that on 29.12.2016, the appellant No.1 had applied for grant of sale permission of the suit land in favour of the appellant No.2. Hence, on objection filed by the respondent, the Circle Officer, Palasbari Revenue Circle had stopped the sale permission. The respondent by his notice dated 31.12.2016 informed the appellant No.1 about his intention to revoke the Irrevocable General of Attorney and the appellant No.1 was called upon to appear before the Sub-Registry within 10 days, but the appellant No.1 did not appear. Thereafter, vide Sale Deed bearing Deed No. 79/2017 dated 11.01.2017, the respondent had executed a registered Agreement for Sale in favour of the proforma defendant No.3 on receipt of an advance of Rs.2.00 Lakh and possession of the suit land was handed over to the proforma defendant No.3, who is stated to have constructed permanent structure on the suit land to peacefully enjoy the suit land. The respondent had also issued notices dated 28.01.2017 and 09.02.2017 to the appellant No.1 expressing his intention to revoke the Irrevocable General Power of Attorney, but on getting no response, the respondent had issued notice in two Assamese newspapers published on 19.02.2017 and 20.02.2017 respectively. However, on 17.03.2017, the respondent got knowledge that NOC for sale of land was accorded vide File No. K.R.M.17/2017/33 dated 21.03.2017 and consequently the sale deed was registered on 22.03.2017 by the respondent No.1 in favour of respondent No.2 and the suit land was also mutated in favour of the respondent No.2 on 29.03.2017. The apprehension of the respondent was that the possession of the suit land was with the proforma defendant No.3 and, as such, the appellants may forcibly and illegally make attempt to take possession of the suit land, which will affect his interest. Hence, in Misc. (J) Case No. 33/17, the respondent had prayed for ad-interim injunction by restraining the appellants from taking forceful possession of the suit land or otherwise transferring the suit land. 5. The appellants i.e. the defendants No.1 and 2 had contested the suit by filing separate written statements. Upon the plaint being amended, the appellants had filed their respective additional statements. (J) Case No. 33/17, the respondent had prayed for ad-interim injunction by restraining the appellants from taking forceful possession of the suit land or otherwise transferring the suit land. 5. The appellants i.e. the defendants No.1 and 2 had contested the suit by filing separate written statements. Upon the plaint being amended, the appellants had filed their respective additional statements. The stand of the appellants before the learned trial Court was that the respondent had taken the full sale consideration of Rs.11,00,000/- for the suit land in terms of the agreement for sale (bainapatra) dated 28.03.2016 from the appellant No.1 and accordingly, by executing an irrevocable Power of Attorney on 22.06.2016, the respondent had appointed the appellant No.1 as his lawful attorney, inter-alia, with the power to sell, mortgage, lease or transfer the suit land and accordingly, the respondent had himself created encumbrance over the suit land. It is also projected that the agreement for sale dated 16.04.2016 was manufactured to frustrate the Power of Attorney dated 22.06.2016. All other averments made in the plaint was denied by giving reasons. It is projected that the possession of the suit land is with the appellant No.2. The appellants had prayed for dismissing the suit. 6. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court, by the impugned order dated 12.04.2018, was of the view that the status of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney and the Sale Deed can only be determined in trial, but if ad-interim injunction is refused, the respondent shall suffer irreparable loss and injury which cannot be adequately compensated in terms of money. Thus, by finding all the three golden principles for grant of ad-interim injunction in favour of grant of injunction, and upon considering that both the sides are claiming to be in possession, the learned trial Court directed both the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit land. The said order is assailed in the present appeal. 7. Thus, by finding all the three golden principles for grant of ad-interim injunction in favour of grant of injunction, and upon considering that both the sides are claiming to be in possession, the learned trial Court directed both the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit land. The said order is assailed in the present appeal. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants submit that the appellant No.1 and the respondent had entered into a deed of agreement for sale on 28.03.2016 in respect of suit land measuring 2 bigha out of 5B-1K-18L at a total agreed consideration of Rs.11 lakhs and the said agreement clearly reflects that entire sale consideration of Rs.11 lakhs was paid by the appellant No.1 and duly received by the respondent and thereafter, by executing a duly registered irrevocable power of attorney dated 22.06.2016 bearing deed No. 242 dated 22.06.2016, the respondent had appointed the appellant No.1 as his attorney , thereby conferring upon him several powers including the power to sell the suit land and to receive sale consideration for the same. It is submitted that the said power of attorney had followed the agreement for sale dated 28.03.2016 by which full sale consideration of the land was already paid, the respondent by clause No.10 of the irrevocable power of attorney had declared that the said general power of attorney shall be irrevocable and cannot be cancelled or revoked under any circumstances or made invalid by the respondent. It is submitted that as per the agreement for sale (Bainapatra) dated 28.03.2016, it was specifically mentioned that the possession of the land had been handed over to the appellant No.1. 8. It is submitted that the aforesaid agreement for sale was concealed from the learned trial court for the purpose of projecting as if the possession of the suit land was not handed over to the appellant No.1. It is also submitted that initially along with the prayer made by the respondent before the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (R), Amingaon, for grant of sale permission in favour of appellant No.2, the respondent had also submitted a written statement before the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (R), Amingaon, admitting that the appellant No.1 was appointed as his attorney and he has no objection for sale of the suit land. Therefore, on second thought, the respondent had submitted a written objection for grant of land sale permission and thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (R), Amingaon after hearing both the parties, rejected the objection filed by the respondent and the land sale permission in favour of the appellant No. 2 was granted. It is submitted that on merit, the respondent had no prima-facie case for trial and his suit was barred under the provisions of Section 41(j) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 because the admitted case of the respondent is that he had decided to sell the suit land in favour of proforma defendant No.3, i.e. Sri Dilip Gupta, allegedly by executing a unregistered sale deed dated 16.04.2016 and, as such, it is submitted that the respondent had divested himself of any right he had in respect of the suit land, allegedly in favour of the said purported purchaser. Hence, if anyone had a genuine grievance in respect of the suit land it was the said purported purchaser, who would be entitled to agitate his grievance before the appropriate court. In the said context, it is submitted that the proforma defendant No. 3, despite having knowledge of the proceedings, did not support the respondent in the suit. It is also submitted that the respondent is aware and conscious of the fact that he had transferred his interest firstly to the appellant No.1 upon receipt of entire sale consideration and thereafter, he was attempting to sell the suit land to the proforma defendant No.3, but the respondent had not prayed for any declaration for his right, title and interest over the suit land. Therefore, the conduct of the respondent is not without any blemish, but the learned trial court had failed to appreciate that there was no prima-facie case in favour of the respondent. 9. Therefore, the conduct of the respondent is not without any blemish, but the learned trial court had failed to appreciate that there was no prima-facie case in favour of the respondent. 9. It is further submitted that the learned trial court had not appreciated the facts in its proper perspective because even if every other documents is rejected for the time being only for the sake of argument, but the fact remains that the respondent had executed a registered irrevocable general power of attorney bearing Deed No. 242 dated 20.06.2016 and had appointed appellant No.1 as his true and lawful attorney and, as such, the learned trial court had failed to appreciate that the purported agreement dated 16.04.2016 by the respondent in favour of proforma defendant No.3 could not have existed and this fact is sufficient to show that the purported agreement dated 16.04.2016 was a subsequently prepared and manufactured document. It is submitted that it was never the projected case of the respondent that he had not received the sale consideration in respect of the suit land from the appellant No.1 and, as such, the learned trial court had failed to appreciate that having paid the agreed sale consideration, the appellant No.1 had an infallible interested the suit property owing to which under the provisions of Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872, the power of attorney in favour of the appellant No.1 could not have been terminated. 10. Hence, on the grounds set forth in the memo of appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the respondent had no prima-facie case for trial and the balance of convenience was also not in favour of the respondent and, as such, the direction to maintain status quo in respect of the suit land was perverse and cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Hence, the present challenge. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the cases of (i) Bruce Vs. Silva Raj and Ors., 1987 (supp) SCC 161, (ii) Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland etc. and ors. Vs. Kenniyuo Solo (2012) 4 NEJ 669 and (i) Church of Christ etc. Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust etc., (2012) 8 SCC 706 . 11. Silva Raj and Ors., 1987 (supp) SCC 161, (ii) Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland etc. and ors. Vs. Kenniyuo Solo (2012) 4 NEJ 669 and (i) Church of Christ etc. Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust etc., (2012) 8 SCC 706 . 11. Per-contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has submitted that in paragraph 24 of the amended plaint, the respondent had taken a specific plea denying the existence of any agreement for sale (bainapatra), the receipt of any consideration was denied by the respondent, further denying that there was no delivery of possession of the suit land in favour of the appellant No.1. In this context by referring to the alleged agreement for sale (bainapatra), it is submitted that it contain a clause that the balance sale consideration would be paid after demarcation of the land and on processing the document for registering the sale deed and it is submitted that the projection made by the appellant No.1 that entire sale consideration was paid is false and cannot be sustained. It is also submitted that the application for sale permission which is annexed to the memo of appeal does not contain the name of the purchaser of the suit land and it is further submitted that as the respondent had made his intention clear to revoke the power of attorney, the grant of land sale permission in favour of the appellant No.2 would not create any right in favour of both the appellants. 12. It is submitted that not only the respondent has disputed that he has parted with the possession of the land in favour of the appellant No.1, but he has also denied the execution of any agreement for sale in favour of appellant No.1 and therefore, until and unless a formal sale deed is registered by him in favour of proforma defendant No.3, it is only the respondent who would have right, title and interest as well as possession in respect of the suit land and therefore, it was not necessary for the respondent to seek any further declaration of right title and interest of a recovery of possession in respect of the suit land, which was otherwise was with him already. Hence, it is submitted that the suit filed by the respondent was maintainable. Hence, it is submitted that the suit filed by the respondent was maintainable. It is submitted that the sale deed executed by the appellant No.1 in favour of appellant No.2 was illegal, void ab initio and non est in the eye of law and, as such, the same is liable to be cancelled, whereupon the right, title, interest as well as possession in favour of the respondent would stand fortified. 13. By referring to the case of Wander Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 (Supp) SCC 727, it is submitted that unless the order of injunction passed by the learned trial court can be demonstrated to be perverse, it was not open to the first appellate court to reverse the finding and to substitute its own view over the discretion exercised by the learned trial court. On the same point, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also referred to the case of Sree Jain Swetamber Terapanthi Vid (S) Vs. Phundan Singh and Ors., (1999) 2 SCC 377 and Fritco-Lay India Vs. Uncle Chipps Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 Del 366 . 14. It is also submitted that this Court by order dated 13.08.2018 passed in I.A.(C) 2914/2018 had not only stayed the operation of the impugned order dated 12.04.2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Kamrup (R), Amingaon in Misc.(J) Case No. 33/2017 in TS No. 29/2017, but had also required the appellant No.2 to file an undertaking before the learned trial court in form of an affidavit to the effect that any construction that he would be doing on the suit land would be its own risk. In the said context, it is submitted that the respondent had filed I.A.(C) 3351/2018 for recalling and or vacation/alteration/modification of the said ex-parte order, amongst others on the ground that the respondent was in possession of the suit land, but taking advantage of the said ex-parte order dated 13.08.2018, the appellant No.2 had trespassed into the suit land and had made an attempt to change the nature and character of the suit land by applying heavy machinery and equipment. By referring to the photographs annexed as Annexure-10 to I.A.(C) 3351/2018, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the land was a vacant land which had no sign of any development, but by engaging heavy equipment, the status quo of the land is now sought to be altered. Hence, he also prays for vacating or modification of the interim order. 15. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the Senior Counsel for the respondent, this Court had perused the materials on record including the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the appellants in I.A.(C) 3351/2018. It is seen that the learned trial court in paragraph 13 of the impugned order had taken note of the fact that the respondent herein had apprehension and a reasonable brief that the appellants herein may take forceful possession of the suit land and it was projected that the appellants are not prevented they would be multiplicity of proceedings. The learned trial court having perused the materials on record arrived at a finding that both sides had prima-facie case for trial and it was not possible, at the said stage, to determine the status of the alleged irrevocable power of attorney and the sale deed and the same can be determined only after full trial. The leaned trial court was of the view that the balance of convenience was also in favour of both sides and only after full trial, the actual status of the documents relied upon by both sides can be ascertain otherwise not. Hence, as both sides claimed to be in possession of the suit land, the learned trial court had directed both parties to maintain status quo so as to preserve the suit land on the same status where it was initiated at the time of institution of the suit. 16. It is seen that the pleadings of both sides before the learned trial court are as if both sides are in possession of the suit land. While the appellant No.1 claims to be put into possession of the suit land on execution of the agreement for sale (bainapatra) dated 28.03.2016, the respondent has denied the execution of the said agreement for sale. While the appellant No.1 claims to be put into possession of the suit land on execution of the agreement for sale (bainapatra) dated 28.03.2016, the respondent has denied the execution of the said agreement for sale. The stand taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the agreement for sale dated 28.03.2016 refers to payment of balance sale consideration by the appellant No.1 after demarcation of the land and on processing the documents for registering the sale deed, which is stated to be indicated towards non-payment of the sale consideration cannot be readily brushed aside. Under the circumstances, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are found to be not applicable in the present case in hand because in the present case in hand not only the respondent is projecting that he is in possession of the suit land but he also projecting that he had not executed that the agreement for sale and had not received any sale consideration to project that no interest over the suit land was created in favour of the appellant No.1 and that there was no impediment in the cancellation of the agency i.e. the Power of Attorney. Therefore, this Court has not convinced that there is any perversity in the order impugned herein and that the view taken by the learned trial court is a plausible view. Hence, by following the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd.(supra), this Court is not inclined to substitute its own view upon the view taken by the learned trial court. 17. In view of the discussion above, this appeal stands dismissed and as a result, the interim order dated 13.08.2018 passed by this Court in I.A.(C) 2914/2018 stands recalled and revoked. Hence, the I.A.(C) 3351/2018 stands allowed and resultantly, on the disposal of the main appeal, the I.A.(C) 2914/2018 has become infructuous. 18. As a consequences, the impugned order dated 12.04.2018 passed by learned Civil Judge, Kamrup (R), Amingaon, directing both sides to maintain status-quo with respect to the suit property till disposal of the main suit stands affirmed. Hence, the I.A.(C) 3351/2018 stands allowed and resultantly, on the disposal of the main appeal, the I.A.(C) 2914/2018 has become infructuous. 18. As a consequences, the impugned order dated 12.04.2018 passed by learned Civil Judge, Kamrup (R), Amingaon, directing both sides to maintain status-quo with respect to the suit property till disposal of the main suit stands affirmed. Any construction and land development work done by the appellant No.2 at his own risk shall not create any right in favour of the appellant No.2 and such construction and/or land development work shall not be treated as an evidence of possession in favour of the appellants on the date of the institution of the suit. 19. The parties are left to bear their own cost.