JUDGMENT : SANJAY KAROL, J. 1. Interpretation of Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) arises for consideration in the present petition. What is the meaning of the words “an act is a reason of anything done” and “consequence” “which has ensued” contained in the said Section needs to be examined. To put it shortly if an act which is offence by reason of anything done in a place 'A’ and the “consequence” which has ensued at a place 'B’, then whether place 'B’ would have jurisdiction to conduct the trial or not. 2. Chapter-XIII of the Code stipulates the jurisdiction of the Courts where inquiry or trial can take place. For the purposes of ready reference, relevant provisions are reproduced as under:- 179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.—When an act is an offence by “reason of anything which has been done” and of a “consequence which has ensued”, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 3. At the threshold, it sands clarified that remaining provisions from Sections 181 to 189 of the said Chapter are not relevant, in view of undisputed facts borne out from the record of the present petition. 4. On facts, record reveals that in relation to an offence falling under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, an FIR No.132, dated 25.05.2016 was registered at Police Station, Shimla (West), District Shimla, H.P. As per averments made in the FIR, in the night intervening 24-25.05.2016, allegedly, petitioners herein, namely, Brij Lal, Ranveer Sankyan, Sanjeev Kumar @ Sanju and Mohinder Singh, gave beatings to deceased Ankush and Madan at Brahmpukhar-Ghaghas – a place falling within the territorial jurisdiction of Sessions Judge, Bilaspur - outside the territorial jurisdiction of Sessions Judge, Shimla. Thinking deceased Ankush to have died on the spot, the assailants went away. But however, it was not so and both the injured came to Shimla. For treatment of injuries, Ankush was admitted for medical treatment at the Government Hospital, IGMC, Shimla, where, he was declared dead. The postmortem was conducted in the said hospital and on the basis of complaint lodged by his relatives, aforesaid FIR came to be registered at Shimla. But however, it was not so and both the injured came to Shimla. For treatment of injuries, Ankush was admitted for medical treatment at the Government Hospital, IGMC, Shimla, where, he was declared dead. The postmortem was conducted in the said hospital and on the basis of complaint lodged by his relatives, aforesaid FIR came to be registered at Shimla. Brahmphukhar- Ghagas do not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of Police Station (West) District Shimla, H.P. Nor does the Sessions Judge has the same. 5. Since FIR was registered at Police Station (West), Shimla, falling within the jurisdiction of Sessions Judge, Shimla and investigation was carried out by the officers thereof, challan was presented for trial in the Court having competent jurisdiction at Shimla. 6. The jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioners stands rejected by the trial Court, vide order dated 27.11.2017, passed in Case No.2-S/7 of 17, titled as State of H.P. vs. Brij Lal, etc. and they stand charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 302, 382 and 323 read with Section 34 of IPC, to which they plead not guilty and claim trial. This was vide separate order of the very same date i.e. 27.11.2017. 7. This petition under Section 407 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Code’) preferred by the petitioners is with a prayer to transfer the Sessions Trial No.2-S/7 of 2017, pending before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge- II, Shimla, H.P., to the Court of Learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. 8. Before this Court, it could not be disputed that the deceased travelled all the way from Brahmpukhar-Ghagas to Shimla where he succumbed to the injuries. It is in this factual backdrop, one appreciates the relevant provisions of the Statute. 9. Section 177 of the Code postulates that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired and tried by a Court in whose local jurisdiction the offence stands committed. 10. The Apex Court in Naresh Kavarchand Khatri vs. State of Gujarat & another, (2008) 8 SCC 300 , has clarified that whether an Officer Incharge of a Police Station has the requisite jurisdiction to make investigation or not would depend upon large number of factors, including those contained in Sections 177, 178 and 181 of the Code. 11. 10. The Apex Court in Naresh Kavarchand Khatri vs. State of Gujarat & another, (2008) 8 SCC 300 , has clarified that whether an Officer Incharge of a Police Station has the requisite jurisdiction to make investigation or not would depend upon large number of factors, including those contained in Sections 177, 178 and 181 of the Code. 11. As per the provisions of Section 178 of the Code, when an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more than one local area, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over anyone of such local area (s). Undisputedly, it is nobody’s case that the assailants followed the victims from Ghagas to Shimla or travelled outside the territorial limits of Bilaspur. Hence this Section is not applicable. 12. However, what needs to be considered is as to whether the case would fall under Section 179 of the Code or not. From the bare reading of the Section it is clear that for its invocation following ingredients must exist: (a) where an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done; (b) and of a consequence which has ensued. With the fulfillment of these two essential ingredients, the offence may be tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such act stands committed or consequence ensued. 13. Thus, what needs to be considered is, as to what is the meaning of the word “consequence” which has “ensued” for there is no dispute about the act being an offence. Only whether consequences have ensued or not needs to be examined. 14. Oxford English Dictionary Indian Edition, defines the word “consequence” as:- '1 a result or effect. 2 importance or relevance. 3 (Consequences) a game in which a narrative is made up by the players in turn, each ignorant of what has already been contributed. — Phrases in consequence as a result. take (or bear) the consequences accept responsibility for negative results or effects. — Origin Me: via OFr. From L. consequential, from consequent-, consequi'follow closely’.’ and word “ensue” as:- '— happen or occur afterwards or as a result. — Origin Me: from Offr. Ensivre, from L. insequi, based on sequi'follow’. ' 15. Further, Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, defines the word “Consequence” as:- 'Consequence. (14c) A result that follows as an effect of something that came before. From L. consequential, from consequent-, consequi'follow closely’.’ and word “ensue” as:- '— happen or occur afterwards or as a result. — Origin Me: from Offr. Ensivre, from L. insequi, based on sequi'follow’. ' 15. Further, Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, defines the word “Consequence” as:- 'Consequence. (14c) A result that follows as an effect of something that came before. See Effect.’ And word “ensue” as:- 'Ensue—Term that means to come later or to follow.’ 16. The book Words and phrases (Permanent Edition 8A) defines the word “Consequence” as:- 'Consequence means that which follows something on which it depends; that which is produced by a cause or ensues from any form of necessary connection or from any set of condition; a natural or necessary result (Board of Fireman’s Relief & Retirement Fund Trustees of Houston vs. Marks, Tax. Civ. App., 237 S.W.2d 420, 423.’ and Permanent Edition 14A Book defines word “ensue” as:- 'Ensue—the word “ensue” means to follow, to come afterwards, to follow as a consequence or in chronological succession, to result as an ensuing conclusion or effect or the year ensuing.’ 17. Thus, grammatical expression and meaning is plain and simple. Consequence is a result or effect and ensue is what happens or occurs afterwards or as a result. 18. In Lee KunHee, President, Samsung Corporation, South Korea & others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others, (2012) 3 SCC 132 , the Apex Court observed that in Section 179 aforesaid, two phrases need to be noticed: Firstly, "anything which has been done", with reference to the offence; and secondly, "consequence which has ensued", also with reference to the offence. Both the aforesaid phrases substantially enlarge and magnify the scope of jurisdiction contemplated under Section 179 aforesaid, so as to extend the same over areas contemplated by the two phrases. The Court was dealing with a case where pursuant to agreement dated 01.12.2001 executed outside the jurisdiction of the Courts at Ghaziabad, but goods were dispatched from there to a place outside its territorial limits and also payments were received in Ghaziabad, the Court observed that the words "anything which has been done", for the present controversy, would extend to anything which has been done in furtherance of the execution of the agreement dated 1.12.2001. The facts constituting the performance of obligations by the complainant, actually constitute the foundational basis for the criminal accusation levelled against the accused (in refusing to honour the corresponding obligation). The instant foundational basis for establishing the commission of the offence, in my view, would fall within the ambit of the words "anything which has been done" sufficient to vest jurisdiction under Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with a competent Court at Ghaziabad. It categorically held that: “35. Besides the aforesaid, under Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even the place (s) wherein the consequence (of the criminal act) "ensues", would be relevant to determine the court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, even the courts within whose local jurisdiction, the repercussion/effect of the criminal act occurs, would have jurisdiction in the matter.” 19. Noticeably in the very same decision, the Court reiterated its earlier view taken in Mobarik Ali Ahmad vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 , wherein it was observed that:- “24. … …But as is seen above, the principles recognised in International Law in this behalf are virtually based on the recognition of those principles in the municipal law of various countries and is really part of the general jurisprudence relating to criminal responsibility under municipal law. No doubt some of the above dicta have reference to offences actually committed outside the State by foreigners and treated as offences committed within the State by specific legislation. But the principle emerging therefrom is clear that once it is treated as committed within the State the fact that he is a foreigner corporeally present outside at the time of such commission is no objection to the exercise of municipal jurisdiction under the municipal law. This emphasises the principle that exercise of criminal jurisdiction depends on the locality of the offence and not on the nationality of the alleged offender (except in a few specified cases such as ambassadors, Princes etc.)” 20. This emphasises the principle that exercise of criminal jurisdiction depends on the locality of the offence and not on the nationality of the alleged offender (except in a few specified cases such as ambassadors, Princes etc.)” 20. In Banwari Lal Jhunjhunwala& others vs. Union of India & another, AIR 1963 SC 1620 , the Apex Court reiterated its earlier view, rendered in Purushottam Das Dalmia vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 SC 1589 and L.N.Mukherjee vs. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1601 , that a Court trying an accused for an offence of conspiracy is competent to try him for all the offences committed in pursuance of that conspiracy, irrespective of the fact that any or other all other offences were not committed within its territorial jurisdiction. 21. In a case where the product stood manufactured at a place other than the place where it was sold, in a prosecution launched under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Apex Court in State of Punjab vs. Nohar Chand, (1984) 3 SCC 512 , held that the manufacturer could be sued alongwith the seller at the place where such product stood sold. [State of U.P. vs. Mandleshwar Singh, 1988 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 58]. 22. In Vishwanath Gupta vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 11 SCC 633 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with a case where the victim was kidnapped from a place 'A’, taken to a place 'B’, from where demand for ransom was made and thereafter taken to yet another place 'C’, where he was murdered. The Court observed that territorial jurisdiction to deal with the crime in its entirety would be at any one of the three places. 23. In a case of an offence arising out of matrimonial dispute, the Apex Court in Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs. State of Bihar & another, (2011) 11 SCC 301 , observed that the place where the 'consequence’ of the dowry “ensued”, which was other than the place where the marriage took place, being parental house of the lady, would have jurisdiction to conduct the trial. [State of M.P. vs. Suresh Kaushal & another, (2003) 11 SCC 126]. 24. [State of M.P. vs. Suresh Kaushal & another, (2003) 11 SCC 126]. 24. The Apex Court in Babita Lila and another vs. Union of India, (2016) 9 SCC 647 , while dealing with a case where the premises of the assessee were searched at Bhopal and Aurangabad, observed that confining the jurisdiction within the territorial limits only to one Court, the principal place where the returns were filed by the assessee, would amount to impermissible and illogical truncation of the ambit and scope of Sections 178 & 179 of the Code. The Court further observed as under:- “75. Though the concept of “cause of action” identifiable with a civil action is not routinely relevant for the determination of territoriality of criminal courts as had been ruled by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129 , their Lordships however were cognizant of the word “ordinarily” used in Section 177 of the Code to acknowledge the exceptions contained in Section 178 thereof. Section 179 also did not elude notice.” 25. Section 179 Cr.P.C. elucidates the meaning of the language used. The section is only applicable where the act and its consequence, both of which have to be proved to constitute the offence, have taken place in two different local areas. In such an event, the alleged offence may be tried either where the act took place or where its consequence ensued. It is also clear that the "consequence" here is part of the offence to be established. It is by virtue of the consequence that the act becomes a complete offence is also the issue taken by the Allahabad High Court in M.N. Bhatia vs. State of U.P., 1968 Cri. L.J. 555. 26. In a case relating to an offence of defamation, it stands settled that both the Courts, from where the letter is written, posted and/or received and read, would have jurisdiction to try the offence. [Rekhabai vs. Dattatraya& another, 1986 Cri. L.J. 1797 (Bombay High Court); S. Bangarappa vs. Ganesh Narayan Hegde & another, 1984 Cri. L.J. 1618 (Karnataka High Court) &Shaukatali Ibrahim Rangrez& others vs. Mohommad Siraj & another, 1997 Cri. L.J. 1352 (Bombay High Court)]. 27. Applying the aforesaid procedures to the given case, here the beatings given at Bilaspur, resulted into death at Shimla. L.J. 1797 (Bombay High Court); S. Bangarappa vs. Ganesh Narayan Hegde & another, 1984 Cri. L.J. 1618 (Karnataka High Court) &Shaukatali Ibrahim Rangrez& others vs. Mohommad Siraj & another, 1997 Cri. L.J. 1352 (Bombay High Court)]. 27. Applying the aforesaid procedures to the given case, here the beatings given at Bilaspur, resulted into death at Shimla. Accepting the averments made in the FIR to be true, it cannot be disputed that the act of assault committed at Bilaspur is one of the ingredients of the Section and that the other ingredient stands fulfilled with a consequence which has ensued at Shimla. 28. In support of his contentions, Mr.N.S. Chandel, learned counsel, referred to and relied upon the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Manoj Kumar Sharma & others vs. State of Chhattisgarh & another, (2016) 9 SCC 1 (Para.16); Naresh Kavarchand Khatri vs. State of Gujarat & another, (2008) 8 SCC 300 (Para.1); &Satvinder Kaur vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & another, (1999) 8 SCC 728 (Para.8). 29. These decisions do not deal with the issues at all, for the issue in the said case (s) was transfer of investigation to an officer having competent jurisdiction. The Court cautioned that the jurisdictional fact, would emerge only during the course of investigation and it would not be prudent for the Court to transfer the investigation from one Police Station to another. 30. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the Court of Sessions Judge, Shimla, has no jurisdiction to conduct the trial in Sessions Trial No.2-S/7 of 2017, titled as State of H.P. vs. Brij Lal & others. As such, present petition, devoid of any merit, is dismissed. Records be immediately sent back. Pending application (s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.