United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Babul Sarkar S/o Late Buddheswar Sarkar
2018-12-11
SUMAN SHYAM
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Ms. I. Das, learned counsel for the appellant. I have also heard Mr. H. Das, learned counsel representing the respondent No. 1. None has appeared for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 2. This appeal is directed against the award dated 20-02-2010 passed by the learned Member, MACT, Goalpara in MAC Case No. 281/2004 awarding a sum of Rs. 3,69,186/- to the claimant/ respondent No. 1 on account of loss of earning capacity suffered by him due to the injury suffered in the motor accident. 3. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the claimant was working as cleaner (handyman) in the truck bearing number AS-01D-4271 which had met with an accident on 09-02-2004 near the Fatasil Glass Factory at Guwahati. In the aforesaid accident, the claimant has sustained fracture in his leg and there was displacement of bony fragment involving the mid third of left femur, head injury and other associated injuries leading to permanent disablement. Taking note of the nature of injuries suffered by the claimant and on appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned Tribunal had awarded compensation by taking the monthly income of the claimant as Rs. 3000/- and his age at the time of accident to be between 20-25 years. The impugned award has been assailed primarily on the ground that the claimant being a workman, the proceeding ought to have been registered and conducted under the provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 instead of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 4. Ms. Das submits that due to registration of the proceeding before the learned MACT, Goalpara by following the wrong legal provision, the award stood vitiated and is liable to be set aside. 5. Mr. H. Das, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, has resisted the said argument by submitting that the claim petition would be maintainable both under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and therefore, the plea raised by the appellant cannot be a ground to set aside the impugned award. In support is his aforesaid argument Mr. Das has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Purnima Singha & Ors. reported in 2016 (2) GLT 862. 6.
In support is his aforesaid argument Mr. Das has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Purnima Singha & Ors. reported in 2016 (2) GLT 862. 6. I have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the materials available on record. The core controversy in this appeal pertains to the correct legal provision under which a claim of this nature would be maintainable when the deceased is a workman coming within the fold of the Workmens’ Compensation Act, 1923. A question of similar nature had arisen for consideration by this Court in the case of Purnima Singha (respondent). That was a case where the deceased was working as a driver in the truck which was used as public carrier. The driver was attacked by some unknown persons under mysterious circumstances which had lead to his death. The dependent family members of the driver had filed a claim petition under Section 163A of the MV Act, 1988 praying for compensation, which was awarded by the learned Tribunal. Assailing the award passed therein, the Insurance Company had raised the same plea which was rejected by this Court. The decision in the case of Purnima Singha (Supra) was rendered following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Kumar Samrat Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in (2014) 14 SCC 243 . The observations made by this Court in Purnima Singha (Supra) are extracted herein below:- “18. Coming to the next question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant suggesting a limited jurisdiction of the Tribunal to grant compensation under Section 163-A of the Act of 1988, it would be relevant to mention herein that although the claimant s case was covered under the provisions of the W.C. Act, 1923, yet the claimants had chosen to institute the claim petition under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act, 1988. Section 163-A of the Act, 1988 reads as follows:- "163A.
Section 163-A of the Act, 1988 reads as follows:- "163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule." 19. A perusal of Section 167 of the M.V. Act goes to show that in cases which are covered under the W.C. Act, 1923 as well as the M.V. Act of 1988, the claimant would have the option to proceed under either of the two Acts but not under both. While dealing with the law on the aforesaid subject, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had had made the following observations in the case of Sanjeev Kumar Samrat Vs. National Insurance Company Limited reported in (2014) 14 SCC 243 , :- "20. At this stage, we may usefully refer to Section 167 of the Act which reads as follows:- "167.
While dealing with the law on the aforesaid subject, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had had made the following observations in the case of Sanjeev Kumar Samrat Vs. National Insurance Company Limited reported in (2014) 14 SCC 243 , :- "20. At this stage, we may usefully refer to Section 167 of the Act which reads as follows:- "167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen s Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both." From the aforesaid provision, it is quite vivid that where a death or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim under the Act as well as under the 1923 Act, the said person is entitled to compensation under either of the Acts, but not under both." From the above observation of the Apex Court, it is abundantly clear that in the facts of the present case, the claimants had the option either to lodge a claim petition under the W.C. Act 1923 or to prefer the instant claim petition under the M.V. Act of 1988.” 7. In view of what is noted hereinbefore, there can be no doubt about the fact that the ground urged by the appellant in this appeal is untenable in the eye of law. At this stage, Ms. Das has argued that the claimant had not examined the doctor in support of his claim of permanent disability and loss of earning capacity and as such, the award was not sustainable on such count as well. However, what needs to be note herein that no such ground has been taken up in the memo of appeal. That apart, a perusal of the impugned award goes to show that the claimant had produced sufficient documentary evidence including the certificate (Exhibit-13) issued by the District Standing Medical Board, Goalpara certifying the injury suffered by him. After examination of the physical condition of the claimant on 14-05-2008, the Medical Board had come to a conclusion that the permanent disability of the claimant was to the extent of 60%.
After examination of the physical condition of the claimant on 14-05-2008, the Medical Board had come to a conclusion that the permanent disability of the claimant was to the extent of 60%. Taking note of the same, the learned Tribunal had assessed the loss of earning capacity of the claimant and awarded the amount of compensation. As such, this is not a case where there was complete lack of medical evidence so as to enable the learned Tribunal to assess the loss of earning capacity. 8. It is no doubt correct that the learned Tribunal had not recorded any clear finding as regard loss of earning capacity suffered by the respondent No. 1. However, there is also no dispute in this case about the fact that the respondent No. 1 had suffered 60% permanent disability. Therefore, even if the loss of earning capacity is taken to be less than 60% even than, the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal cannot be said to be unreasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Since the appellant has not pressed any other ground, hence, I am of the view that the ground urged by the appellants counsel are not good enough to interfere with the impugned order. This appeal is, accordingly, held to be devoid of any merit and is hereby dismissed. Send back the LCR.