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2018 DIGILAW 1726 (RAJ)

Kanhaiya Lal Girraj Prasad v. Gomti Devi Ghodawat

2018-08-14

INDERJEET SINGH

body2018
JUDGMENT Inderjeet Singh, J. - This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners (hereinafter to be referred as 'Tenants') against the judgment dated 6-8-2015 passed by Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan whereby the appeal filed by the respondent (hereinafter to be referred as 'Landlady') was allowed and the order passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan dated 19- 11-2012 was set aside and the Landlady was held entitled to get vacant possession of the disputed shop from the Tenants within three months. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the Landlady filed an eviction application under section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act,2001 (hereinafter to be referred as the 'Act of 2001') before the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan for eviction of the Tenants mainly on the ground of reasonable & bonafide need. The Tenants filed reply to the application and denied the averments made in the application. 3. The Landlady in support of her case produced the evidence of herself as PW1 and also of her son Sanjay as PW2 in the form of affidavits and also produced the documents and got the same exhibited. The Tenants in support of their case produced evidence of Bharat Kumar as DW1, Rajesh Jhanwar as DW2 and Ramkishore Somani as DW3 in the form of affidavits and also produced the documents and got the same exhibited. 4. The learned Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed two issues for consideration, which are as under :- 1 - 3TFTT 3T#TR ciKiRd W ^ % ieR JjRrlftd ^ 3j|c|!mdl t? 2 - sr^r? 5. Counsel for the Tenants submitted that the finding given by the Appellate Rent Tribunal on issue no.1 is perverse. Counsel further submits that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has committed error in reversing the finding given by the Rent Tribunal on issue no.1 in favour of the Tenants. Counsel further submits that the need of the Landlady is neither bonafide nor reasonable and it is mere her wish/desire to get the disputed shop vacated. Counsel further submits that the Landlady has purchased the shop in dispute where Tenants' business was already going on and other vacant shops were also available in the nearby locality but such shops were not purchased by the Landlady which shows that the need of the Landlady was neither bonafide nor reasonable. Counsel further submits that the Landlady has purchased the shop in dispute where Tenants' business was already going on and other vacant shops were also available in the nearby locality but such shops were not purchased by the Landlady which shows that the need of the Landlady was neither bonafide nor reasonable. Counsel further submits that the eviction application has been filed by the Landlady for her own as well for her son's business. Counsel further submits that the need is not bonafide as the family hotel business of the Landlady is going on in the same locality in which her son Sanjay is also a partner from where he can start/do his business of bakery as stated in the eviction application. Counsel further submits that the Landlady prior to filing of the eviction application, on 18-6-1999 has given a notice Ex.A-5 to the Tenants for vacating the shop in dispute in which the need was shown for running of travel agency business for her son, therefore the personal need is not bonafide & reasonable. Counsel further submits that the finding given by the Appellate Rent Tribunal is contrary to the evidence available on record as son of the Landlady Sanjay has stated in his evidence before the Rent Tribunal that he is having family hotel business & also taking care of bakery counter, therefore, the need of the Landlady on this count also is not reasonable & bonafide. Counsel further submits that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has given hypothetical reasoning which is contrary to the pleadings available on record as the Landlady has not pleaded with regard to extension of their business. Counsel further submits that the eviction application has been filed after 16 years of purchasing the shop in dispute and the Landlady is having a number of properties in the city of Jaipur from where her son can start/do their family hotel business. 6. In support of the contentions, counsel for the Tenants relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rajasthan State TPT Corpn. & Anr. vs. Bajrang Lal, reported in 2014 SAR (Civil) 464 , in which it has been held in para no.12 as under :- "12. 6. In support of the contentions, counsel for the Tenants relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rajasthan State TPT Corpn. & Anr. vs. Bajrang Lal, reported in 2014 SAR (Civil) 464 , in which it has been held in para no.12 as under :- "12. It is settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the plaint and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. (Vide: Larsen and Toubro Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. : AIR 1998 SC 1608 ; National Building Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan and Ors. : AIR 1998 SC 2779 ; Ram Narain Arora vs. Asha Rani and Ors. : (1999) 1 SCC 141 ; Smt. Chitra Kumari vs. Union of India and Ors. : AIR 2001 SC 1237 ; and State of U.P. vw. Chandra Prakash Pandey: AIR 2001 SC 1298 .)" 7. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Indrasen Jain vs. Rameshwardas, reported in 2005(1) WLC (SC) Civil 424 , in which in para no.10, it has been held as under :- "10. Even on the question of bonafide requirement of the suit premises, the respondent in our view has no case. In this connection, first aspect worth noting is that the respondent retired from service on 30th November, 1994. He purchased the suit property on 7th December, 1999. More than one year after the alleged purchase of the suit property, he issued a notice of eviction on 1st February, 2001 and ultimately filed an eviction petition on the ground of personal requirement for doing business in the shop on 24th May, 2001. If at all the respondent for purposes of keeping himself occupied or by way of supplementing his income after his retirement, needed to do a business, he would have felt such a need soon after his retirement in the year 1994. The suit property was purchased on 7th December, 1999, i.e. about five years after retirement. Even after 1999, if the respondent thought of starting some business of his own and purchased a shop for that purpose, he would have purchased a vacant shop rather than going in for a tenanted premises. The suit property was purchased on 7th December, 1999, i.e. about five years after retirement. Even after 1999, if the respondent thought of starting some business of his own and purchased a shop for that purpose, he would have purchased a vacant shop rather than going in for a tenanted premises. This shows that even in 1999 he had no intention or desire to start a business. Then even after purchase of the property he waited for more than a year and issued a notice in February, 2001 and instituted eviction petition in the end of May, 2001, that is nearly 1 1 /2 years after the purchase of the property. This entire sequence of events does not show any bonafides on the part of the respondent in setting up a case of bonafide requirement of suit premises. There is nothing to show how suddenly a need for doing business arose for the respondent in the year 2001. The Rent Control Authority in view of these facts doubted the bonafides of the respondent-landlord regarding requirement of the suit property for doing the business therein. The entire discussion in the judgment of the Authority on the question of bonafide need seems to suggest that the Authority was not satisfied with the case of landlord regarding bonafide need. However, in the concluding line on this issue the Authority observed that "the applicant bonafide needs the suit shop for starting the business of books and stationery". This conclusion of the Authority does not fit in with the discussion or reasoning on the point contained in the judgment of the Authority. The Authority noted several reasons which showed that there was no bonafide requirement of respondent. The High Court simply endorsed the conclusion of the Authority on the point without going into the question on its own. In our view, the respondent has not been able to make out a case for bonafide need of the suit premises. His claim for the suit premises is malafide." 8. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Ram Prakash vs. Shashi Bala Bajitpuria & Ors., reported 2016 (2) WLC (Raj.) 155 , in which in para no.13 it has been held as under :- "13. His claim for the suit premises is malafide." 8. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Ram Prakash vs. Shashi Bala Bajitpuria & Ors., reported 2016 (2) WLC (Raj.) 155 , in which in para no.13 it has been held as under :- "13. It shall also be pertinent to mention that the requirements of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 for eviction of a tenant from rented premises are given under Section 9 and as per clause (i) a landlord is required to establish its reasonable and bonafide need for the premises. The reasonable and bonafide necessity is different than the choice of place to run business. The choice of place follows to reasonable and bonafide need, therefore, the first requirement that was to be considered by learned Single Bench was about reasonable and bonafide need of the applicant for the premises in question. As a matter of fact in the case in hand learned Single Bench has not examined findings arrived by the Tribunals below on basis of the evidence available about reasonable and bonafide need of the premises, but reversed the same on the count that the landlord is having a unbridled right to choose a place for business. At the cost of repetition we would like to state that the choice of place have to follow a reasonable and bonafide necessity and a landlord, if desires a premises, then he/she must set out his/her need for the premises and must establish that the need is bonafide one. Under Section 9(i) of the Act of 2001 in addition to bonafide need, a landlord is also required to establish reasonability of his claim. In the case in hand the Rent Tribunal with the aid of evidence concluded that the applicant failed to establish reasonability in making his claim and that came to be affirmed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunals for the purpose relied upon availability of a shop just adjacent to the rented premises and two other shops in Shankar Colony. The Tribunals also noticed that the applicant concealed the fact about starting of a business of same nature in earlier years and closure of that. The Tribunals for the purpose relied upon availability of a shop just adjacent to the rented premises and two other shops in Shankar Colony. The Tribunals also noticed that the applicant concealed the fact about starting of a business of same nature in earlier years and closure of that. Without examining correctness of these findings, no occasion was there for learned Single Bench to alter the same on basis of the concept that the landlord is the best chooser for place of his/her use. 9. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Deena Nath vs. Pooran Lal, reported in (2001) 5 SCC 705 , in which in para-17 it has been held as under :- "17. Coming to the case on hand, the judgment of the High Court clearly bears out the position that the lower courts had failed to consider the requirement of the section regarding availability of reasonable accommodation in occupation of the landlord-Appellant. As noted earlier, at the time of filing the suit, one vacant shoproom was in occupation of the landlord and in course of the proceedings one more shoproom, one being vacated by the tenant, came in his occupation. The High Court has found that the landlord could easily make arrangements for starting the shop which his son Pradeep Kumar Gupta intends to open in the vacant shoprooms. If any adjustment was necessary, then the Respondent-tenant could also have been offered an alternate shoproom for his occupation. No such step was taken by the landlord during all these years. During the hearing of this appeal, we made a suggestion to the learned Counsel appearing for the landlord-Appellant, whether he is willing to permit the tenant-Respondent to occupy the shoproom presently in his (landlord) occupation so that he may have a block of four shoprooms for the business of himself and his son. The learned Counsel stated that the landlord, who was present in the Court, declined to accept the suggestion." 10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Landlady submitted that the Tenants are enjoying the disputed property since 1942 which the Landlady has purchased in the year 1991 and when the shop in dispute was required for starting of new business then only eviction application was filed in the year 2007. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Landlady submitted that the Tenants are enjoying the disputed property since 1942 which the Landlady has purchased in the year 1991 and when the shop in dispute was required for starting of new business then only eviction application was filed in the year 2007. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that there is no bar to start new business by her son who is already a partner in the family hotel business. Counsel further submits that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has arrived at a finding of fact with regard to bonafide & reasonable need of the Landlady and the same is not required to be disturbed by this Court under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Counsel further submits that the Landlady in the eviction application as well as in the rejoinder submitted before the Rent Tribunal has specifically stated that the shop in dispute is very much needed for starting of bakery business for her son Sanjay and admittedly in the family hotel business other partners are also there including her son etc. Counsel further submits that from a bare reading of the reply to the eviction application as well as the evidence submitted by the Tenants, it is clear that the Tenants have nowhere stated that the Landlady is having other vacant shop from where her son can start the business of bakery. Counsel further submits that the Landlady & her son have a right to decide the nature & place of business and it is not for the Tenants to dictate the Landlord or to her son as to what type of business or the place he should start the same. 11. In support of the contentions, Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shamshad Ahmad and Ors. vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through Lrs. and Ors., reported in (2008) 9 SCC 1 , in which in para no.36 & 38 it has been held as under :- "36. A finding as to bona fide requirement for doing readymade business by Matloob Ahmad has been expressly recorded by the appellant authority. The said finding was a finding of fact. Neither it could have been interfered with, nor it has been set aside by the writ court. A finding as to bona fide requirement for doing readymade business by Matloob Ahmad has been expressly recorded by the appellant authority. The said finding was a finding of fact. Neither it could have been interfered with, nor it has been set aside by the writ court. In view of the above position, the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition. 38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal or a Court of Error. It can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate Court or inferior Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior Court or Tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts and inferior Tribunals within the limits of law." 12. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in the matter of Rajendra Kumar & Ors. vs. Parasram, reported in 2011 (3) WLC (Raj.) 165 , in which in para no.11, 12, it has been held as under :- "11. So far as the substantial question of law which has been framed in this appeal is concerned, it has been submitted on behalf of the Appellants that the requirement of the Respondent cannot be considered as bonafide because he purchased the shop which was under the tenancy of the father of the Appellants. If the Respondent genuinely required a shop for establishing his business, he should have purchased a vacant shop so that he could have started his business instantaneously. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent has submitted that both the learned Courts below after detailed discussion of the evidence concurrently held that the suit shop is a bonafide and reasonable requirement for personal use of the Respondent and he will face greater hardship if the shop is not vacated. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent has submitted that both the learned Courts below after detailed discussion of the evidence concurrently held that the suit shop is a bonafide and reasonable requirement for personal use of the Respondent and he will face greater hardship if the shop is not vacated. Suffice it to state that there is no dispute between the parties that the father of the Appellant was a tenant in the suit shop when the Respondent purchased the same. 13. I have carefully considered the above submissions. There is no provision of law laying down that if a person purchases any property which is under tenancy with a third party, it should be presumed that he does not need that property for his personal use. The aforesaid substantial question of law is not res Integra now as it was considered by this Court earlier in the case of Bastichand Bhansali vs. Dharamvir Kalia reported at AIR 1989 Raj 135 . It has been held in the aforesaid case as under: "A shelter with a roof on his head and pursuit of happiness, subject to his means, is the normal and ordinary desire of a human being. Apart from that it is legal and statutory right of a person to actually possess the property owned by him. It would be purely against all logic to ask a landlord owner to opt for rental premises instead of his own building. There is no rule of law that the landlord can never get the occupying tenant vacated from a demised premises which the landlord Plaintiff purchased with intention to live therein and more so when it is the only property of a Plaintiff-landlord. Just as a tenant can be ejected under Section 13(1) (i) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 on the ground that the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession or had been allotted a suitable residence, a landlord can also very well eject the tenant on the ground that he has purchased the property for his own use and he cannot be compelled to live in rented premises for ever. It was never the intention behind the enactment of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 that a landlord should be disentitled to occupy his own house and continue to live in a rented house merely because the premises at the time of his purchasing or acquiring the same had been rented out by its previous landlord". After considering earlier judgments, this Court concluded "where a landlord living in a rented house and also carrying on his profession in a rented room, purchases a house of his own and wants to leave the rented house and to shift with his family in his own house for residence or/and professional purpose, it would amount in law to reasonable and bona fide requirement of the demised premises by him unless the tenant proves mala fides." 14. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 397 , in which in para no.24 & 25, it has been held as under :- "24. We are of the opinion that the expression "for his own use" as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The expressions must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use. In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove we have found the pari materia provisions being interpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependents and kith and kin in the requirement of landlord as "his" or "his own" requirement and user. Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the Court shall with circumspection inquire : (i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close inter-relation or identify nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the overlaid tests to the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the landlord himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the user would be by landlord for his son's office. The case squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. 25. Ravinder Kumar Pujara's case (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the tenant-appellant which holds that setting up of independent business of the son of the landlord is not covered by Section 13(3)(a) (ii) of the Act takes too narrow a view of the provisions, it does not lay down the correct law and is overruled." 15. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Co. Ltd. vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal and Ors., reported in (2005) 8 SCC 252 , in which in para-4 it has been held as under :- "4. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Co. Ltd. vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal and Ors., reported in (2005) 8 SCC 252 , in which in para-4 it has been held as under :- "4. First of all we shall take up the question of bona fide need of the landlords. So far as the partition of the property and the present premises coming to the share of the landlords are concerned, there is no dispute that the portion of the building has come to the share of the landlords and they are the owners as a result of the partition of the family properties. But the question is whether the landlords who are the owners of the portion of the building have substantiated the allegation with regard to the bona fide need or not. We have gone through the findings of the trial court as well as that of the appellate authority and the High Court and after closely scrutinizing the same, we do not think that the finding recorded by appellate court and the High Court can be interfered by this Court on the ground of being perverse or without any basis. The landlords have led evidence to show that one of their sons who had requisite qualification for starting a computer institute wants to establish the same at Calicut and others for extension of their business. The trial court as well as the first appellate court and the High Court examined the statements of P.Ws.2 & 3 and after considering their evidence, the appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need of the respondent-landlords to start business at Calicut, is bona fide & genuine. It was held that it cannot be said that a person who is already having business at one place cannot expand his business at any other place in the country. It is true that the landlords have their business spreading over Chennai and Hyderabad and if they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it cannot be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of the tenant from the premises in question. It is true that the landlords have their business spreading over Chennai and Hyderabad and if they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it cannot be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of the tenant from the premises in question. It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlords and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. However, the trial court held in favour of tenant-appellant. But the appellate court as well as the High Court after scrutinizing the evidence on record, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need of establishing the business at Calicut by the landlords cannot be said to be lacking in bona fide." 16. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Faruk Ilahi Tamboli and Anr. vs. B.S. Shankarrao Kokate (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Ors., reported in (2016) 15 SCC 431 , in which in paras no.16 to 20 it has been held as under :- 16. Insofar as the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the rival parties are concerned, the first question that draws our attention is, whether or not the need of the Appellants was bona fide, when the civil suit was preferred by the Appellants on 10.09.1982. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid issue, we are satisfied, that the fact, that the instant premises was purchased by the Appellants on 06.09.1980 for a total consideration of Rs. 10,000/- even though the same was earning a meager rent of Rs. 36/- per month, is indicative of the fact, that the Appellants had not purchased the premises for earning rent therefrom, but for the purpose of running a business therein. The assertion made by the Appellants that they wished to sell betelleaves and related articles in the premises, has not been seriously contested at the hands of the Respondents. 36/- per month, is indicative of the fact, that the Appellants had not purchased the premises for earning rent therefrom, but for the purpose of running a business therein. The assertion made by the Appellants that they wished to sell betelleaves and related articles in the premises, has not been seriously contested at the hands of the Respondents. But then, were the Appellants engaged in some other alternative business, at the time when the civil suit was filed? 17. It was not the case of the Respondents, that any business activities were being carried out by the Appellants independently, from their father and uncle, when the civil suit was filed. It certainly cannot be the claim at the behest of a tenant, that the owner of a premises must continue in business with his parents or relations, assuming there was a joint business activity, to start with. That is usual, and happens all the time when children come of age. And thereafter, they must have the choice to run their own life, by earning their own livelihood. The property owner has the right to use his property as he chooses, and if the Appellants in the instant case had purchased the suit property, for running their own business, we find no irregularity therein, nor can there be any doubt about their bona fide desire to run the proposed business in the premises, independent of the other family members. The premises measuring a mere 9.7 square meters, we are satisfied would be most suitable for the business proposed by the Appellants, namely, for selling betel-nuts and betel-leaves. This is the usual size of the shops engaged in such business. 18. The aforesaid determination, however, would not render a final decision in favour of the Appellants, for the reason, that we would still have to determine whether the bona fide need of the Appellants was subsisting? It is therefore, that we will venture to deal with the affidavit placed on our record, by the learned Counsel for the Respondents, relevant extracts of which have been reproduced hereinabove. A perusal of the same reveals, that reference therein has been made to a property bearing CTS No. 3569/A admeasuring 114-2 square meters. This property was purchased during the pendency of the proceedings arising out of Regular Civil Suit No. 420 of 1982. A perusal of the same reveals, that reference therein has been made to a property bearing CTS No. 3569/A admeasuring 114-2 square meters. This property was purchased during the pendency of the proceedings arising out of Regular Civil Suit No. 420 of 1982. The affidavit itself indicates, that the aforesaid premises is being used by the Appellants to run a flour mill. Even if the aforesaid factual position is accepted, it cannot be the case of the Respondents, that the Appellants can run their betel-nuts and betel-leaves business, from the premises which has a running flour mill. Thus viewed, the purchase of property bearing CTS No. 3569/A is inconsequential insofar as the present controversy is concerned. 19. The above affidavit further indicates, the purchase of property bearing CTS No. 3568/A admeasuring 105-7 square meters by the Appellants. This property was also purchased during the pendency of the proceedings arising out of Regular Civil Suit No. 420 of 1982. It was also submitted, that the instant property bearing CTS No. 3568/A, is at a distance of merely 100 meters from the suit property. It is also the assertion of the learned Counsel for the Respondents, that the Appellants are running wholesale business of various goods including betelleaves, cigarettes and fire-work items, and as such, the instant premises could be put to use for the additional purpose, for which the suit premises is being claimed by the Appellants. Even though the instant contention appears to be attractive, it is not possible for us to accept the same, because a retail business of selling betel-nuts, bidi and tobacco etc. cannot be run from a premises as large as the one in CTS No. 3568/A which admittedly measures 105-7 square meters. It is unlikely for customers to visit such a large premises for buying betel-leaves, betel-nuts and bidis etc. 20. In our view, the suit premises which measures 9.7 square meters would attract retailers of the trade under reference, as shops selling betel-leaves and betel-nuts are usually of the size of the suit property. We therefore decline the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the Respondents in this regard. 17. 20. In our view, the suit premises which measures 9.7 square meters would attract retailers of the trade under reference, as shops selling betel-leaves and betel-nuts are usually of the size of the suit property. We therefore decline the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the Respondents in this regard. 17. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhupinder Singh Bawa vs. Asha Devi, reported in 2016 (10) Supreme Court Cases 209 in which in para 12 it has been held as under:- "12. In light of the above, Additional Rent Controller and the High Court rightly concluded that no alternative premises were lying vacant for running business of respondent's son. The High Court rightly relied on the ratio of Anil Bajaj vs. Vinod Ahuja to hold that it is perfectly open to the landlord to choose a more suitable premises for carrying on the business by her son and that the respondent cannot be dictated by the appellant as to which shop her son should start the business from." 18. I have considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. Admittedly the tenancy relates to the year 1942 and the present Landlady has purchased the shop in dispute on 8-7-1991 through registered sale deed, hence relationship of Landlady and the Tenants between the parties is not disputed. 19. The arguments raised by the counsel for the Tenants regarding perverse finding given by the Appellate Rent Tribunal on the issue no.1 is not acceptable for the reason that the Appellate Rent Tribunal considering the pleadings submitted by the parties as well as the evidence produced by both the parties arrived at finding of fact with regard to bonafide and reasonable need of the Landlady that the shop in dispute is needed for starting of new business of bakery for her son and in my considered view the finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Rent Tribunal is not liable to be disturbed by this Court in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shamshad Ahmad & Ors.'s case (supra). 20. 20. The next argument raised by counsel for the petitioner that Sanjay son of the Landlady for whom the shop in dispute is required is also a partner in the family hotel business and he is also running a bakery counter from the family hotel business, therefore the need pleaded by the Landlady is not reasonable and bonafide is not acceptable in view of the fact that there is no bar under the law or statute or under the Act of 2001 that a person who is partner in the family business cannot start a new business of his own and admittedly Sanjay for whom the shop in dispute is required is only a partner in the family hotel business, therefore the finding recorded by the Appellate Rent Tribunal regarding bonafide and reasonable need of the shop in dispute for starting of new business for son of the Landlady is a right finding in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Faruk Ilahi Tamboli & Anr. (supra). 21. The next argument raised by counsel for the petitioner that wrong finding has been given by the Appellate Rent Tribunal contrary to the pleadings of the parties is not acceptable for the reason that the Landlady in her eviction application as well as in the rejoinder filed before the Rent Tribunal has specifically stated that the shop in dispute is needed for starting of new business for her son who is already a partner & running their family hotel business and on the contrary the Tenants nowhere stated in their reply or in their evidence that the Landlady is having vacant shop from where her son can start his business and mere vague allegations have been levelled in the reply & evidence that the Landlord is having a number of properties in the city of Jaipur. 22. The last argument raised by counsel for the Tenants that the eviction application has been filed by the Landlady after 16 years of purchase of the disputed premises which shows that the need is neither reasonable nor bonafide is also not acceptable in view of the fact that the Landlady immediately after purchase of the shop in dispute has not filed the eviction application rather she has filed the eviction application when the shop in dispute was actually needed for starting of business for her son. 23. 23. In view of the entire discussion made hereinabove, the writ petition filed by the Tenants deserves to be dismissed for the reasons; firstly the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Rent Tribunal is based on sound appreciation of evidence produced by the parties and more particularly with regard to bonafide & reasonable need is not liable to be distrubed under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shamshad Ahmed & Ors's case (supra), secondly it is for the Landlady to choose & decide the nature and place of business for her son and not for the Tenants to dictate that which business or from which place the Landlord should start the business in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhupinder Singh Bawa (supra). 24. Thirdly the Tenants though have mentioned that the Landlady is having a number of properties in the city of Jaipur, however, the Tenants have not filed/submitted any details of the shop which is lying vacant from where son of the Landlady can start his business. 25. In that view of the matter, the writ petition filed by the petitioner lacks merit & is accordingly dismissed.