JUDGMENT 1. In these appeals common questions of law and facts are involved, hence, they are decided by this common judgment. 2. By way of these appeals, the appellants have challenged the judgment and order of the learned single Judge whereby the learned single Judge has dismissed the petitions and has upheld the action of the State Government in issuing notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. 3. Counsel who appeared for the appellants has merely contended that the acquisition which has been made by the State Government is for Loha Mandi Scheme where the total area was 3,91,000 square metre and necessity for Steel Merchant Association was only 50% i.e. 1,76,000 square metre and for which letter dated 22nd August, 1998 Annexure 15 was issued. The Section 4 notification for the first time was issued on 28th August, 2001 and thereafter Section 6 notification was issued on 27th July, 2002 whereas the Section 4 notification for Phase 2 was issued on 25th July, 2002 and Section 6 notification Phase 2 was issued on 12th February, 2003. He has also emphasized that before Section 6 notification of Phase 2, notification of Section 4 Phase 2 was issued. Similarly paper publication of Section 6 notification of Phase 2, Section 4 notification was issued for which purpose he has taken us to Annexure 22 note which is reproduced as under:- 4. This remark made by the JDA was not established and same was not approved by the State Government and therefore, he contended that the acquisition which has been made by the State Government is contrary to law. 5. Counsel for the appellant contended that JDA is one of the interested person in view of Section 15 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is reproduced as under:- "15. Matters to be considered and neglected. In determining the amount of compensation, the Collector shall be guided by the provisions contained in sections 23 and 24." 6. 5. Counsel for the appellant contended that JDA is one of the interested person in view of Section 15 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is reproduced as under:- "15. Matters to be considered and neglected. In determining the amount of compensation, the Collector shall be guided by the provisions contained in sections 23 and 24." 6. The interested person being interested in the acquisition should be considered in view of the Sections 4, 6 & 17 which reads as under:- "4 Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon: (1) Whenever it appears to the 15[appropriate Government] that land in any locality 16[is needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose 17[or for a company] a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette 17[and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language], and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality 17[(the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the notification)]. 6. 6 Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. 6. 6 Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, 25[when the] 26[appropriate Government] is satisfied after consider-ing the report, if any, made under section 5-A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Gov-ernment or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders 27[, and different declarations may be made from time-to-time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2)]: 28[29[Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1), (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification:] 30[Provided further that] no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. 31[Explanation 1. In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2. Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues]. Explanation 2. Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues]. (2) 32[Every declaration] shall be published in the Official Gazette, 33[and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the date of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall state] the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration the 34[appropriate Government] may acquire the land in a manner hereinafter appearing. 17. Special powers in cases of urgency (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the 47[appropriate Government] so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), 48[take possession of any land needed for a public purpose]. Such land shall thereupon 49[vest absolutely in the 50[Government]], free from all encumbrances. Such land shall thereupon 49[vest absolutely in the 50[Government]], free from all encumbrances. (2) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, 47[or the appropriate Government considers it necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or electricity,] the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and with the previous sanction of the 47[appropriate Government], enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon 49[vest absolutely in the 50[Government]] free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience. (3) In every case under either of the preceding sub-sections the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons interested, compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24; and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and the amount of such other damage shall be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained. 51[(3A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31, sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. (3B) The amount paid or deposited under sub-section (3A), shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of the Collector's award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue.] 52[(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the 53[appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the 53[appropriate Government] may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time 54[after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4, sub-section (1).] 7. He contended that no averment of the petitioner was dealt with by the competent officer. The reply was filed by incompetent person and no award was passed. An endeavour is made to rely on Section 3F (vi) (vii) which is reproduced as under:- "vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to cooperative societies for the time being in force in any State. (vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government or with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority." 8. He contended that there is no public purpose for acquisition. 9. Counsel for the appellants has relied upon following decisions:- "1. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and Ors , (2005) 7 SCC 627 : ( AIR 2005 SC 3520 ), it has been held as under :- 15. However, considerations of the objections by the owner of the land and the acceptance of the recommendations by the Government, it is trite must precede a proper application of mind on the part of the Government. As and when a person aggrieved questions the decision making process, the court in order to satisfy itself as to whether one or more grounds for judicial review exists, may call for the records whereupon such records must be produced. The writ petition was filed in the year 1989. As noticed hereinbefore, the said writ petition was allowed. This Court however, interfered with the said order of the High Court and remitted the matter back to it upon giving an opportunity to the parties to raise additional pleadings. 16. Contention of Mr. Chaudhari to the effect that for long the additional ground relating to non-application of mind on the part of the State had not been raised and, thus, it might not be necessary for the State to file a counter-affidavit does not appeal to us. When a rule nisi was issued the State was required to produce the records and file a counter-affidavit. If it did not file any counter-affidavit, it may, subject to just exceptions, be held to have admitted the allegations made in the writ petition. 17. In view of the fact that the action required to be taken by the State Government is distinct and different from the action required to be taken by the Collector; when the ultimate order is in question it was for the State to satisfy the court about the validity thereof and for the said purpose the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of a Collector cannot be held to be sufficient compliance of the requirements of law. The job of the Collector in terms of Section 5-A would be over once he submits his report. The job of the Collector in terms of Section 5-A would be over once he submits his report. The Land Acquisition Collector would not know the contents of the proceedings before the State and therefore, he would be incompetent to affirm an affidavit on its behalf. 18. Furthermore, the State is required to apply its mind not only on the objections filed by the owner of the land but also on the Report which is submitted by the Collector upon making other and further enquiries therefore as also the recommendations made by him in that behalf. The State Government may further inquire into the matter, if any case is made out therefore, for arriving at its own satisfaction that it is necessary to deprive a citizen of his right to property. It is in that situation production of records by the State is necessary. 19. In Gurdip Singh Uban, whereupon Mr. Ramamoorthy placed strong reliance, this Court observed: "50. No reasons or other facts need he mentioned in the Section 6 declaration on its face. If the satisfaction is challenged in the court, the Government can show the record upon which the Government acted and justify the satisfaction expressed in the Section 6 declaration." It was, thus, for the State to justify its action by production of record or otherwise. 2. In V.K.M. Kattha Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors. , (2013) 9 SCC 338 : ( AIR 2013 SC 3557 ), it has been held as under :- 17. Keeping the above principles in mind, let us consider the first submission made by learned senior counsel for the Appellant-Company viz., the notification was not in consonance with the requirements laid down under Section 4(1) of the Act. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant-Company argued before this Court that in the light of the language used under Section 4(1) of the Act, all the three modes of publication mentioned therein are mandatory. He further asserted that since the notification was not published at the conspicuous places of the locality concerned, neither the lessee of the Appellant-Company nor the Appellant-Company came to know about the same. It is also asserted that no individual notice was served. In view of the same, according to learned senior counsel, the Appellant-Company was deprived of its valuable right to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act. It is also asserted that no individual notice was served. In view of the same, according to learned senior counsel, the Appellant-Company was deprived of its valuable right to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act. He further contended that, it is an opportunity given to the land owners or person in possession of lands to make a representation under Section 5-A of the Act. To put it clear, the purpose of publication of the notification is two-fold, first, to ensure that adequate publicity is given so that landowners and persons interested will have an opportunity to file their objections under Section 5-A of the Act, and second, to give the landowners/occupants a notice that it shall be lawful for any officer authorized by the Government to carry out the activities enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act. This position has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court vide Khub Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors , (1967) 1 SCR 120 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1074 ); J and K Housing Board and Anr. v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul and Ors , (2011) 10 SCC 714 : (2011 AIR SCW 6709) and Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms P. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors , (2013) 4 SCC 210 : ( AIR 2013 SC 1282 ). 18. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for Respondent-State asserted that the authorities have complied with all the three modes of publication. To test the above statements, we verified the written statement of Shri L.B. Verma, District Revenue Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Sonipat filed on behalf of Respondent No. 2 herein before the High Court. Though in para 6, it is stated that the notification was published in two daily newspapers, namely, National Herald dated 02.01.2006 in English and Amar Ujala in Hindi dated 31.12.2005 but there is no whisper about the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality as provided under Section 4(1) of the Act. Except the abovesaid written statement dated 15.11.2007, no other material such as counter-affidavit or reply had been projected before the High Court as well as before this Court in support of their stand. Except the abovesaid written statement dated 15.11.2007, no other material such as counter-affidavit or reply had been projected before the High Court as well as before this Court in support of their stand. In fact, on 09.08.2010, when the matter was called for hearing, learned Counsel appearing for the State submitted that 'in view of the counter filed before the High Court, no separate counter is being filed here". In view of the above, it is clear that in spite of knowing the specific ground raised by the Appellant about the non-publication of the substance of the notification as prescribed under the Act in the locality concerned, neither the State nor the Land Acquisition Collector availed the opportunity of filing reply refuting the same. In such circumstances, we have no other option except to hold that there was no publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the locality which is held to be mandatory. It is also relevant to point out that by effecting such publication in the locality, it would be possible for the person in possession, namely, either the owner or lessee to make their representation/objection in the enquiry under Section 5-A. In addition to the same, such person 'owner or occupier' is entitled to file their objections within 30 days from the date of publication in the locality and by non-publication of the same in the locality as provided under the Act, the owner or occupier loses his valuable right. For these reasons also, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed. 3. In Laxman Lal (Dead) Through L.Rs. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. , (2013) 3 SCC 764 : ( AIR 2013 SC 1578 ), it has been held as under :- 21. Anand Singh , (2010) 11 SCC 242 has been referred to in later cases, one of such decisions is Radhy Shyam (Dead) Through LRs and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors , (2011) 5 SCC 553 wherein this Court in paragraph 77 (v) to (ix) of the Report stated as follows: 77(v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5-A, the authority concerned must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will, in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired. (vi) The satisfaction of the Government on the issue of urgency is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of power Under Section 17(1) and the same can be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the private property is sought to be acquired is not a public purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due to mala fides or that the authorities concerned did not apply their mind to the relevant factors and the records. (vii) The exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of Section 5-A of the Act in terms of which any person interested in land can file objection and is entitled to be heard in support of his objection. The use of word 'may' in sub-section (4) of Section 17 makes it clear that it merely enables the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5-A would not apply to the cases covered Under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17. In other words, invoking of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant of the exercise of power under Section 17(1). (viii) The acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4). The court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Sections 5-A(1) and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters. (ix) If land is acquired for the benefit of private persons, the court should view the invoking of Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4) with suspicion and carefully scrutinise the relevant record before adjudicating upon the legality of such acquisition. (ix) If land is acquired for the benefit of private persons, the court should view the invoking of Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4) with suspicion and carefully scrutinise the relevant record before adjudicating upon the legality of such acquisition. 27. In this case, as noted above, the preliminary notification under Section 4 was issued on 01.5.1980. After lapse of about 7 years on 19.03.1987, one fine morning the state Government issued declaration under Section 6 without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A and in that declaration it was stated that it has invoked its powers conferred under Section 17(1) read with Section 17 (4) of the 1953 Act and dispensed with the provisions of Section 5-A. Had the state Government intended to hold and complete the inquiry under Section 5-A, it could have been done in few months. However, no steps for commencement of the inquiry under Section 5-A were even taken by the State Government. We find that a very valuable right conferred on the land owner/person interested Under Section 5-A has been taken away without any justification. It is so because the bus stand construction would have taken some time. The exercise of the power by the State Government under Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) of the 1953 Act and dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A can not be legally sustained and has to be declared as such. 4. In Chandrakant Adinath Utture v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , (2016) 6 SCC 150 : ( AIR 2016 SC 893 ), it has been held as under :- 15. Passing of the award by itself does not mean that any illegality should not be addressed. In the instant case, the writ petitions were filed when the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published, and in any case, it is submitted by the Appellants that they have not been dispossessed so far and no compensation also has been paid. 5. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors , (2000) 7 SCC 296 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3737 ), it has been held as under :- 52. 5. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors , (2000) 7 SCC 296 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3737 ), it has been held as under :- 52. In Abhey Ram as well as in the judgment in the Civil Appeals, it has been clearly stated that those claimants who have not filed objections to the Section 4 notification cannot be permitted to contend before Court that the Section 5-A inquiry is vitiated so far as they are concerned. Nor can they be permitted to seek quashing of Section 6 declaration on that ground. We shall elaborate this aspect further. 53. Now objections under Section 5-A, if filed, can relate to the contention that (i) the purpose for which land is being acquired is not a public purpose (ii) that even if the purpose is a public purpose, the land of the objector is not necessary, in the sense that the public purpose could be served by other land already proposed or some other land to which the objector may refer or (iii) that in any event, even if this land is necessary for the public purpose, the special fact-situation in which the objector is placed, it is a fit case for omitting his land from the acquisition. Objection (ii) is personal to the land and objection (iii) is personal to the objector. 54. Now in the (ii) and (iii) type of objections, there is a personal element which has to be pleaded in the Section 5A inquiry and if objections have not been filed, the notification must be conclusive proof that the said person had 'waived' all objections which were personal and which he could have raised. However, so far as objection (i) is concerned, even in case objections are not filed, the affected party can challenge in Court that the purpose was not a public purpose. 55. Learned Solicitor General Sri Salve rightly argued that in respect of each land owner whose land is acquired, the Section 4 notification if it is sought to be avoided on personal grounds as stated in (ii) and (iii) above, it is necessary that objection be filed to avoid a voidable notification. Otherwise, the notification which is not avoided on any personal grounds, remains operative and personal objections are deemed to be waived. 56. Otherwise, the notification which is not avoided on any personal grounds, remains operative and personal objections are deemed to be waived. 56. In the extracts from the Division Bench judgment set out earlier, it will be seen that two different concepts are unfortunately mixed up. Satisfaction regarding public purpose, it was said must be expressed in respect of each 'particular land'. This view, as already stated, is not correct. If the entire land is needed for a public purpose, it is not necessary for the Government (or here the Lt. Governor) to say in the Section 6 declaration that each piece of land is required for the public purpose. The Division Bench then mixed up this question with individual objections in each writ petition. Obviously, these individual objections of the type (ii) and (iii) mentioned above can only be personal to each writ petitioner or peculiar in respect of each of the pieces of land owned. In that event, the rejection of the objections by the land acquisition officer and the 'satisfaction' of the Government/Lt. Governor can relate only to each of these pieces of land and not the whole. Therefore, there is no question of the Division Bench holding in its order dated 18.11.88 that the satisfaction of the Lt. Governor in respect of the entire land is vitiated. As already stated, the satisfaction regarding public purpose was never in issue. 6. In Narayan Govind Gavate and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors , (1977) 1 SCC 133 : ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ), it has been held as under :- 11. The High Court had put its point of view in the following words : When the formation of an opinion or the satisfaction of an authority is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of a power, the challenge to the formation of such opinion or to such satisfaction is limited, in law, to three points only. It can be challenged, firstly, on the ground of mala fides; secondly, on the ground that the authority which formed that opinion or which arrived at such satisfaction did not apply its mind to the material on which it formed the opinion or arrived at the satisfaction; and, thirdly, that the material on which it formed its opinion or reached the satisfaction was so insufficient that no man could reasonably reach that conclusion. So far as the third point is concerned, no Court of law can, as in an appeal, consider that, on the material placed before the authority, the authority was justified in reaching its conclusion. The Court can interfere only in such cases where there was no material at all or the material was so insufficient that no man could have reasonably reached that conclusion. It is not necessary to refer to the authorities which lay down these propositions because they have by now been well established in numerous judgments and they are not in dispute before us at the Bar. In this case, however, there is no challenge on any of these three grounds. The dispute in this case therefore narrows down to the point as to the burden of proof. In other words, the dispute is whether it is the petitioner who has to bring the material before the Court to support his contention that no urgency existed or whether, once the petitioner denied that any urgency existed, it was incumbent upon the respondent to satisfy the Court that there was material upon which the respondents could reach the opinion as mentioned in Section 17(4). 12. On the evidence before it, the High Court recorded its conclusions as follows : In the case before us the petitioner has stated in the petition more than once that the urgency clause had been applied without any valid reason. The urgency clause in respect of each of the said two notifications concerning the lands in groups Nos. 1 and 2 is contained in the relative Section 4 notification itself. The public purpose stated in the notification is for development and utilization of the said lands as an industrial and residential area. To start with, this statement itself vague, in the sense that it is not clear whether the development and utilization of the lands referred to in that statement was confined to the lands mentioned in the schedule to the Notification or it applied to a wider area of which such lands formed only a part. So far as the affidavit in reply is concerned, no facts whatever are stated. The affidavit only states that the authority, i.e., the Commissioner of the Bombay Division, was satisfied that the possession of the said lands was urgently required for the purpose of carrying out the said development. Even Mr. So far as the affidavit in reply is concerned, no facts whatever are stated. The affidavit only states that the authority, i.e., the Commissioner of the Bombay Division, was satisfied that the possession of the said lands was urgently required for the purpose of carrying out the said development. Even Mr. Setalvad conceded that the affidavit does not contain a statement of facts on which the authority was satisfied or on which it formed its opinion. It is, therefore, quite clear that the respondents have failed to bring on record any material whatever on which the respondents formed the opinion mentioned in the two notifications. The notifications themselves show that they concern many lands other than these falling in the said first and third groups. It is not possible to know what was the development for which the lands were being acquired, much less is it possible to know what were the circumstances which caused urgency in the taking of possession of such lands. We have held that the burden of proving such circumstances, at least prima facie is on the respondents. As the respondents have brought no relevant material on the record, the respondents have failed to discharge that burden. We must, in conclusion, hold that the urgency provision under Section 17(4) was not validly resorted to. 13. It has been submitted on behalf of the State that we need decide nothing more than a simple question of burden of proof in the cases before us. We do not think that a question relating to burden of proof is always free from difficulty or is quite so simple as it is sought to be made out here. Indeed, the apparent simplicity of a question relating to presumptions and burdens of proof, which have to be always viewed together, is often deceptive. Over simplification of such questions leads to erroneous statements and misapplications of the law. 24. Coming back to the cases before us, we find that the High Court had correctly stated the grounds in which even a subjective opinion as to the existence of the need to take action under Section 17(4) of the Act can be challenged on certain limited grounds. But, as soon as we speak of a challenge we have to bear in mind the general burdens laid down by Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. But, as soon as we speak of a challenge we have to bear in mind the general burdens laid down by Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. It is for the petitioner to substantiate the grounds of his challenge. This means that the petitioner has to either lead evidence or show that some evidence has come from the side of the respondents to indicate that his challenge to a notification or order is made good. If he does not succeed in discharging that duty his petition will fail. But, is that the position in the cases before us We find that, although the High Court had stated the question before it to be one which 'narrows down to the point as to the burden of proof', yet, it had analysed the evidence sufficiently before it to reach the conclusion that the urgency provision under Section 17(4) had not been validly resorted to. 28. The High Court opined that the presumption of regularity, attached to an order containing a technically correct recital, did not operate in cases in which Section 106 Evidence Act was applicable as it was to the cases before us. We do not think that we can lay down such a broad general proposition. An order or notification, containing a recital, technically correct on the face of it, raises a presumption of fact under Section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act. The well known maxim of law on which the presumption found is illustration (e) to Section 114 of Evidence Act is : 'Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta' (i.e. all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done). This presumption, however, is one of fact. It is an optional presumption. It can be displaced by circumstances indicating that the power lodged in an authority or official has not been exercised in accordance with the law. We think that the original or stable onus land down by Section 101 and Section 102 of the Evidence Act cannot be shifted by the use of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, although the particular onus of proving facts and circumstances lying especially within the knowledge of the official who formed the opinion which resulted in the notification under Section 17(4) of the Act rests upon that official. The recital, if it is not defective, may obviate the need to look further. The recital, if it is not defective, may obviate the need to look further. But, there may be circumstances in the case which impel the Court to look beyond it. And, at that stage, Section 106 Evidence Act can be invoked by the party assailing an order or notification. It is most unsafe in such cases for the official or authority concerned to rest content with non-disclosure of facts especially within his or its knowledge by relying on the sufficiency of a recital. Such an attitude may itself justify further judicial scrutiny. 30. In the cases before us, if the total evidence, from whichever side any of it may have come, was insufficient to enable the petitioners to discharge their general or stable onus, their petitions could not succeed. On the other hand, if, in addition to the bare assertions made by the petitioners, that the urgency contemplated by Section 17(4) did not exist, there were other facts and circumstances, including the failure of the State to indicate facts and circumstances which it could have easily disclosed if they existed, the petitioners could be held to have discharged their general onus. 32. It is also clear) that, even a, technically correct recital in an order or notification stating that the conditions precedent to the exercise of a power have been fulfilled may not debar the Court in a given case from considering their question whether, in fact, those conditions have been fulfilled. And, a fortiori, the Court may consider and decide whether the authority concerned has applied its mind to really relevant facts of a case with a view to determining that a condition precedent to the exercise of a power has been fulfilled. If it appears, upon an examination of the totality of facts in the case, that the power conferred has been exercised for an extraneous or irrelevant purpose or that the mind has not been applied at all to the real object or purpose of a power, so that the result is that the exercise of power could only serve some other or collateral object, the Court will interfere. 42. All schemes relating to development of industrial and residential areas must be urgent in the context of the country's need for increased production and more residential accommodation. 42. All schemes relating to development of industrial and residential areas must be urgent in the context of the country's need for increased production and more residential accommodation. Yet, the very nature of such schemes of development does not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquires under Section 5-A of the Act. There is no indication whatsoever in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State that the mind of the Commissioner was applied at all to the question whether it was a case necessitating the elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The recitals in the notifications, on the other hand, indicate that elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was treated as an automatic consequence of the opinion formed on other matters. The recital does not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It is certainly a case in which the recital was at least defective. The burden, therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if possible, by evidence to show that some exceptional circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and that the mind of the Commissioner was applied to this essential question. It seems to us that the High Court correctly applied the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to place the burden upon the State to prove those special circumstances, although it also appears to us that the High Court was not quite correct in stating its view! in such a manner as to make it appear that some part of the initial burden of the petitioners under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act had been displaced by the failure of the State to discharge its duty under Section 106 of the Act. The correct way of putting it would have been, to say that the failure of the State to produce the evidence of facts especially within the knowledge of its officials, which rested upon it under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, taken together with the attendant facts and circumstances, including the contents of recitals, had enabled the petitioners to discharge their burdens under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. 10. 10. For the purpose of Section 17(1) & 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, he has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of State of Punjab & Another. v. Gurdial Singh & Ors , (1980) 2 SCC 471 : ( AIR 1980 SC 319 ) wherein it has been held as under:- "First, what are the facts? A grain market was the public purpose for which Government wanted land to be acquired. Perfectly valid. Which land was to be taken This power to select is left to the responsible discretion of Government under the Act, subject to Articles 14, 19 and 31, (then). The Court is handcuffed in this jurisdiction and cannot raise its hand against what it thinks is a foolish choice. Wisdom in administrative action is the property of the Executive and judicial circumspection keeps the court lock-jawed save where power has been polluted by oblique ends or is otherwise void on well-established grounds. The constitutional balance cannot be upset." 10.1 He has also relied on the decision of Supreme Court in Shyam Nandan Prasad and Others. v. State of Bihar & Ors , (1993) 4 SCC 255 : (1993 AIR SCW 3013) wherein it has been held as under:- "10. At the pre-Section 6 stage, besides the mode of publications at various places where the land is situated, personal service of the copy of the notification is prominently required to be made oil the person interested so that he can make objections in writing to the Collector, and on objections being made, the Collector is obliged to give to the objector opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader. The Collector is further obliged to hear all such individual objection, make such further enquiries as necessary and then required to make an appropriate decision reporting the same to the Government, The decision of the Collector is supposedly final unless the appropriate Government chooses to interfere therein and cause affectation, suo motu or on the application of any person interested in the land. These requirements obviously lead to the positive conclusion that the proceeding before the Collector is a blend of public and individual enquiry. The person interested, or known to be interested, in the land is to be served personally of the notification, giving him the opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and awakening him to such right. These requirements obviously lead to the positive conclusion that the proceeding before the Collector is a blend of public and individual enquiry. The person interested, or known to be interested, in the land is to be served personally of the notification, giving him the opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and awakening him to such right. That the objection is to be in writing, is indicative of the fact that the enquiry into the objection is to focus his individual cause as well as public cause. That at the time of the enquiry, for which prior notice shall be essential, the objector has the right to appear in person or through pleader and substantiate his objection by evidence and argument. And lastly, since the decision of the Collector may turnout to be final, unless interfered with by the Government, suo motu or on application, the Collector's decision is that of a quasi-judicial authority, arrived at by quasi-judicial methods. 11. That the compliance of provisions of Section 5-A is mandatory, is beyond dispute. See in this connection : [1975] 1 SCR 597 - Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors , (1974) AIR SC 1868 and MANU /SC/0370/1976 : (1977) 1 SCR 71 : ( AIR 1976 SC 2095 ) - Shri Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Anr. v. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Anr , (1977) 1 SCR 71 . Affording of opportunity of being heard to the objector is a must. The provision embodies a just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being, or is intended to be, acquired should have the occasion to persuade the authorities concerned that his property be not touched for acquisition. This right is not absolute, however, if the appropriate Government, in its discretion, choses to dispense with its applicability by invoking urgency provisions of 17 of the Act. But once Section 5-A is kept applicable, there is no cause to treat its provisions lightly or casually." 11. Regarding prior approval of Government, counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader and Ors , (1995) 2 SCC 677 : ( AIR 1995 SC 2244 ) wherein it has been held as under:- "14. Regarding prior approval of Government, counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader and Ors , (1995) 2 SCC 677 : ( AIR 1995 SC 2244 ) wherein it has been held as under:- "14. In view of the substituted definition of the expression "public purpose", in Section 3(f)(vi), the provision for carrying out any housing scheme sponsored by the Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme shall be deemed to be a "public purpose". It further says that the provision of land for carrying out any housing scheme with prior approval of the State Government by a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State, shall be deemed to be a "public purpose". As such for any housing co-operative society lands can be acquired by the appropriate Government, treating the same as acquisition for the public purpose. But, in that event, there has to be a prior approval of such scheme by the appropriate Government. When the lands are acquired for any co-operative society with prior approval of the scheme by the State Government, there is no question of application of the provisions of Part-VII of the Act. Such acquisition shall be on the mode of acquisition by the appropriate Government for any public purpose. 15. If lands are acquired for any co-operative society treating it to be a company within the meaning of Section 3(e), then in view of Section 39 of the Act the provisions of Sections 6 to 16 and Sections 18 to 37 shall not be put in force unless there is previous consent of the appropriate Government, and the co-operative society has executed an agreement. The consent required under Section 39 of the Act has to be given by the appropriate Government only after the conditions mentioned in Section 40 are fulfilled. Sub-section (1) of Section 40, of the Act prescribes the conditions : 40. The consent required under Section 39 of the Act has to be given by the appropriate Government only after the conditions mentioned in Section 40 are fulfilled. Sub-section (1) of Section 40, of the Act prescribes the conditions : 40. Previous enquiry.- (1) Such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate Government be satisfied, either on the report of the Collector under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided,- (a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or (aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some building or work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, or (b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. 18. Now the question which is to be answered is as to whether in view of the definition of "public purpose" introduced by the aforesaid amending Act 68 of 1984 in Section 3(f)(vi), is it open to the appropriate Government to acquire land for co-operative society for housing scheme without making proper enquiry about the members of the Society and without putting such housing co-operative society to term in respect of nature of construction, the area to be allotted to the members and restrictions on transfer thereof? 19. According to us, in Section 3(f)(vi) the expression "housing" has been used along with educational and health schemes. As such the housing scheme contemplated by Section 3(f)(vi) shall be such housing scheme which shall serve the maximum number of members of the society. Such housing scheme should prove to be useful to the public. That is why the Parliament while introducing a new definition of "public purpose", said that any scheme submitted by any co-operative society relating to housing, must receive prior approval of the appropriate Government and then only the acquisition of the land for such scheme can be held to be for public purpose. That is why the Parliament while introducing a new definition of "public purpose", said that any scheme submitted by any co-operative society relating to housing, must receive prior approval of the appropriate Government and then only the acquisition of the land for such scheme can be held to be for public purpose. If requirement of Section 3(f)(vi) is not strictly enforced, every housing co-operative society shall approach the appropriate Government for acquisition by applying Section 3(f)(vi) instead of pursuing the acquisition under Part VII of the Act which has become more rigorous and restrictive. In this background, it has to be held that the prior approval, required by Section 3(f)(vi), of the appropriate Government is not just a formality; it is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of acquisition by the appropriate Government for a housing scheme of a co-operative society. 11.1 He further relied upon the judgment in Banglore City Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Ors , (2012) 3 SCC 727 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1395 ) wherein it has been held as under:- "123. The Appellant's challenge to the finding recorded by the Division Bench that Respondent No. 3 had not been given opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A is well-founded. We have carefully gone through the proceedings of the Special Land Acquisition Officer and find that Shri Sandip Shah (son of Respondent No. 3), had appeared along with his Advocate and after hearing him along with other objectors, the concerned officers submitted report to the State Government. However, this error in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench is not sufficient for nullifying the conclusion that the acquisition of land was not for a public purpose and that the exercise undertaken by the State Government was vitiated due to the influence of the extraneous considerations." 12. Regarding power of State in acquisition proceedings, he has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Devinder Singh and Others. v. State of Punjab & Ors , (2008) 1 SCC 728 : ( AIR 2008 SC 261 ) wherein it has been held that strict construction is required with regard to existence of public purpose and that too on payment of reasonable compensation in terms of provisions of the Act. 13. v. State of Punjab & Ors , (2008) 1 SCC 728 : ( AIR 2008 SC 261 ) wherein it has been held that strict construction is required with regard to existence of public purpose and that too on payment of reasonable compensation in terms of provisions of the Act. 13. In rejoinder, the counsel for the appellant has relied upon in paras 24 & 25 of judgment, reported in 2011 (5) SCC 553 in paras 24 & 25 wherein it has been held as under:- "24. We may now advert to the ancillary question whether the High Court was justified in non suiting the Appellants on the ground that they failed to discharge the primary burden of proving that the State Government had invoked Section 17(1) and 17(4) without application of mind to the relevant considerations. In this context, it is apposite to observe that while dealing with challenge to the acquisition of land belonging to those who suffer from handicaps of poverty, illiteracy and ignorance and do not have the resources to access the material relied upon by the functionaries of the State and its agencies for forming an opinion or recording a satisfaction that the urgency provisions contained in Section 17(1) should be resorted to and/or the enquiry envisaged under Section 5-A should be dispensed with, the High Court should not literally apply the abstract rules of burden of proof enshrined in the Evidence Act. It is too much to expect from the rustic villagers, who are not conversant with the intricacies of law and functioning of the judicial system in our country to first obtain relevant information and records from the concerned State authorities and then present skillfully drafted petition for enforcement of his legal and/or constitutional rights. 25. The Court should also bear in mind that the relevant records are always in the exclusive possession/domain of the authorities of the State and/or its agencies. therefore, an assertion by the Appellants that there was no urgency in the acquisition of land; that the concerned authorities did not apply mind to the relevant factors and records and arbitrarily invoked the urgency provisions and thereby denied him the minimum opportunity of hearing in terms of Section 5-A(1) and (2), should be treated as sufficient for calling upon the Respondents to file their response and produce the relevant records to justify the invoking of urgency provisions." 14. He contended that in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court any illiterate persons who may not have knowledge of proceedings under Sections 4 & 6 on that ground merely because objections were not filed, they ought not be thrown out of the Court. 15. Counsel for the appellants in Appeal No. 1220/2017 (Moti Bhawan Nirman Sahakari Samiti v. State of Rajsthan and Others.), is not in a position to state how many members of the society have filed petitions and on specific query from the Court, he has not stated the position. 16. Counsel for the appellants merely contended that Block B & C, two blocks which were taken pursuant to the map which has been shown at Annexure-11 page 78 Sector 31 Area South of Loha Mandi where the land was clear, they have surrendered to JDA for conversion in 1999. He has also taken us to map of Block 4(B) & 4(C) and also provisions of Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 and contended that no opportunity was given since it was not a case of publication of notice by local authority under the scheme as framed under 4(B) & 4(C) and he merely contended that scheme was not framed under Section 45 of the JDA Act and Loha Mandi scheme land is not for a public purpose. 17. He has also strongly relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in case of State of Punjab v. Sanjeet Singh Grewal , (2007) 6 SCC 292 : (2007 AIR SCW 4480) wherein it has been held as under:- "34. We may also consider the submissions urged by the learned Additional Solicitor General at this stage. He submitted that the acquisition was sought to be made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. According to him Section 56 of the Act of 1995 does not contemplate compulsory acquisition of land. The submission overlooks the fact that the various schemes contemplated by the Act of 1995 may, for their implementation, involve acquisition of land. It may be that some of the schemes within the contemplation of the Act of 1995 may not involve acquisition of land. This, however, does not justify the very wide submission that no acquisition of land is at all contemplated in connection with schemes declared under Section 56 of the Act. It may be that some of the schemes within the contemplation of the Act of 1995 may not involve acquisition of land. This, however, does not justify the very wide submission that no acquisition of land is at all contemplated in connection with schemes declared under Section 56 of the Act. Depending on the nature of scheme framed for implementation, the planning authority may require land for its purposes and may, therefore, request the Government to invoke Section 42 of the Act which provides for acquisition of land for the purposes of the authority under the Act applying the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In this case admittedly the Planning Authority constituted under Section 31 of the Act requested the Government to acquire the lands in question by invoking Section 42 of the Act, for the purpose of setting up a new town, Anandgarh. The Scheme with which we are concerned in the instant case, therefore did involve acquisition of land and the Government did in fact issue the impugned Notifications for acquisition of land for the purposes of the aforesaid New Town Scheme. 35. The learned Additional Solicitor General also submitted that the High Court proceeded on the erroneous basis that a Scheme should first be formulated in detail before acquisition of land. We do not find that the High Court has committed such error. The High Court did not hold the acquisition to be bad on the ground that a detailed scheme had not been prepared, but on the ground that there was no valid scheme at all, and consequently no valid public purpose justifying the acquisition. 36. It was then contended that the State in exercise of its power of eminent domain may acquire lands under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and it is not denuded of its power to acquire land merely because under the Scheme of some other Act a certain procedure had been prescribed for acquisition of land. In the facts of this case we are not persuaded to accept this submission. In the instant case, the lands were sought to be acquired for the purpose of implementation of a New Town Scheme and, therefore, the procedure laid down in the Act of 1995 had to be followed. In the facts of this case we are not persuaded to accept this submission. In the instant case, the lands were sought to be acquired for the purpose of implementation of a New Town Scheme and, therefore, the procedure laid down in the Act of 1995 had to be followed. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that if this be the correct legal position the State may be powerless in case the Board under the Act of 1995 did not select a site for a new town. This submission also has no force because under sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act of 1995, if required by the State Government the Board is bound to select a site for a new town. In the instant case, the State never called upon the Board to select a site, and instead a New Town Planning and Development Authority was constituted under Section 31 of the Act which arrogated to itself the powers and functions of the Board to select a site and make a recommendation to the State Government." 18. He has contended with regard to Sections 42 and 45 under the JDA Act which reads as under:- "42. Modification or withdrawal of Project or Scheme.- (1) The Authority after making such inquiry as it may deem fit, may, if it is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, by notification published in the Official Gazette, declare that the project or scheme approved under sub-section (4) of section 39, is withdrawn and upon such declaration, no further proceedings, shall be taken in regard to such project or scheme. (2) If the Authority, after approval of any project or scheme under sub-section (4) of section 39, at any time, considers it necessary to make certain modifications therein, which in its opinion do not effect material alteration in the character of the project and scheme, may make suitable modifications. 45. (2) If the Authority, after approval of any project or scheme under sub-section (4) of section 39, at any time, considers it necessary to make certain modifications therein, which in its opinion do not effect material alteration in the character of the project and scheme, may make suitable modifications. 45. Power to State Government to acquire land.- (1) Where, on any representation from the Authority, it appears to the State Government that, in order to enable the Authority to perform any of its functions or to discharge any of its duties or to exercise any of its powers, or to carry out any of its projects or schemes or development programmes, it is necessary that any land in any part of the Jaipur Region should be acquired, the State Government may acquire the land (under and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894))." 19. It is contended that the said provisions are para materia and he has taken us to para 45 of the judgment of the Supreme Court and contended that the scheme was framed referred to in the petition. He further contended that the area which was acquired was for recreational purpose for residential and was not a Government land. 20. Mr. Anil Mehta has also adopted the aforesaid argument canvassed in other two appeals. 21. Counsel for the State has mainly contended that the fourth petition was withdrawn in view of the earlier order passed by this Court and this matter was adjourned after arguing for some time. 22. Counsel for the respondent-State has primarily raised the contention that there is no interest of the appellants in the property. There is no Khatedari rights nor of the Society, on the contrary in view of the order passed by Tehsildar on 16th October, 1999 u/S. 90B, it has been observed as under: 23. In that view of the matter, they have no right to challenge the proceedings under Sections 4 & 6 notification. The land has earlier resumed under Section 90-B by the order of Tehsildar. 24. Regarding Section 45 argument, he contended though no argument was canvassed, even otherwise under the other scheme he is not required to follow the statutory rules and therefore, it is a public purpose. 25. Mr. Anil Mehta contended that it is a public purpose under Section 3F. 24. Regarding Section 45 argument, he contended though no argument was canvassed, even otherwise under the other scheme he is not required to follow the statutory rules and therefore, it is a public purpose. 25. Mr. Anil Mehta contended that it is a public purpose under Section 3F. He has also relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others. v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and Others. , (2008) 9 SCC 552 wherein it has been observed as under:- "66. There is no dispute that an appropriate Government may acquire land for any 'public purpose'. The expression 'public purpose' is defined in Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act. v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and Others. , (2008) 9 SCC 552 wherein it has been observed as under:- "66. There is no dispute that an appropriate Government may acquire land for any 'public purpose'. The expression 'public purpose' is defined in Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act. As already noted earlier, the definition is inclusive in nature and reads thus: (f) The expression "public purpose" includes- (i) the provision of village-sites or the extension, planned development or improvement of existing village-sites; (ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning; (iii) the provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of Government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object of securing further development as planned; (iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons is placed or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government, or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State; (vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority; (viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office, but does not include acquisition of land for companies; 67. The expression ('public purpose') is of very wide amplitude. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The inclusive definition does not restrict its ambit and scope. Really, the expression is incapable of precise and comprehensive definition. The expression ('public purpose') is of very wide amplitude. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The inclusive definition does not restrict its ambit and scope. Really, the expression is incapable of precise and comprehensive definition. And it is neither desirable nor advisable to attempt to define it. It is used in a generic sense of including any purpose wherein even a fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited. 73. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh , (1952) SCR 889 MANU /SC/0019/1952 : ( AIR 1952 SC 252 ), a Constitution Bench of this Court was examining vires of certain provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and other State laws in the context of Article 31 of the Constitution (as then stood). The constitutional validity was challenged on the ground that the Act failed to provide for compensation and there was lack of public purpose. 74. The Court, however, negatived the contention. As to 'public purpose', Mahajan, J. (as His Lordship then was), observed; The expression 'public purpose' is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual. 75. In the concurring judgment, S.R. Das, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated; From what I have stated so far, it follows that whatever furthers the general interests of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual must be regarded as a public purpose. With the onward march of civilisation our notions as to the scope of the general interest of the community are fast changing and widening with the result that our old and narrower notions as to the sanctity of the private interest of the individual can no longer stem the forward flowing tide of time and must necessarily give way to the broader notions of the general interest of the community. The emphasis is unmistakably shifting from the individual to the community. The emphasis is unmistakably shifting from the individual to the community. This modern trend in the social and political philosophy is well reflected and given expression to in our Constitution. 95. Section 4 of the Act expressly authorizes the appropriate Government to issue preliminary notification for acquisition of land likely to be needed for any public purpose or 'for a company'. Likewise, Section 6 declares that when the appropriate Government is satisfied that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or 'for a company', a declaration shall be made to that effect. It is thus clear that appropriate Government may acquire land if such land is needed for any public purpose or 'for a company'. If it is so, acquisition will be governed by Part II of the Act and the procedure laid down in the said Part has to be followed. Part VII, on the other hand, deals with acquisition of land for companies. In such cases, previous consent of appropriate Government and execution of agreement for transfer of land is necessary and procedure laid down in that Part is sine qua non for the acquisition. 119. In our judgment, in deciding whether acquisition is for 'public purpose' or not, prima facie, Government is the best judge. Normally, in such matters, a writ Court will not interfere by substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Government. 129. We would have indeed considered the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants closely in the light of earlier decisions of this Court. We are, however, of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the Government was right in forming an opinion and reaching a satisfaction as to 'public purpose' and in initiating proceedings under Sections 4 and 6 and in invoking Part II of the Act. We, therefore, refrain from undertaking further exercise. In our considered opinion, it is not necessary for us to enter into larger question in view of 'fact situation' in the instant case. 130. As already adverted to earlier, the State of Andhra Pradesh in the background of 'World Tourism Organization Report' and 'Vision 2020 Document' took a policy decision for the development of the City of Hyderabad. For the said purpose, it decided to establish an Integrated Project which would make Hyderabad a major Business-cum-Leisure Tourism Infrastructure Centre for the State. 130. As already adverted to earlier, the State of Andhra Pradesh in the background of 'World Tourism Organization Report' and 'Vision 2020 Document' took a policy decision for the development of the City of Hyderabad. For the said purpose, it decided to establish an Integrated Project which would make Hyderabad a major Business-cum-Leisure Tourism Infrastructure Centre for the State. The project is both structurally as well as financially integrated. It is to be implemented through Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure and Investment Corporation (APIIC) which has taken all steps to make Hyderabad a world-class business destination. APIIC is an instrumentality of State and works as 'Nodal Agency' developing the project which would facilitate socio-economic progress of the State by generating revenues, weeding out unemployment and bringing new avenues and opportunities for public at large. Development of infrastructure is legal and legitimate 'public purpose' for exercising power of eminent domain. Simply because a Company has been chosen for fulfillment of such public purpose does not mean that the larger public interest has been sacrificed, ignored or disregarded. It will also not make exercise of power bad, mala fide or for collateral purpose vitiating the proceedings. 131. In our judgment, the respondents are right in submitting that in case of integrated and indivisible project, the project has to be taken as a whole and must be judged whether it is in the larger public interest. It cannot be split into different components and to consider whether each and every component will serve public good. A holistic approach has to be adopted in such matters. If the project taken as a whole is an attempt in the direction of bringing foreign exchange, generating employment opportunities and securing economic benefits to the State and the public at large, it will serve public purpose. 132. It is clearly established in this case that the Infrastructure Development Project conceived by the State and executed under the auspices of its instrumentality (APIIC) is one covered by the Act. The Joint Venture Mechanism for implementing the policy, executing the project and achieving lawful public purpose for realizing the goal of larger public good would neither destroy the object nor vitiate the exercise of power of public purpose for development of infrastructure. The Joint Venture Mechanism for implementing the policy, executing the project and achieving lawful public purpose for realizing the goal of larger public good would neither destroy the object nor vitiate the exercise of power of public purpose for development of infrastructure. The concept of joint venture to tap resources of private sector for infrastructural development for fulfillment of public purpose has been recognized in foreign countries as also in India in several decisions of this Court. 133. The entire amount of compensation is to be paid by State agency (APIIC) which also works as nodal agency for execution of the project. It is primarily for the State to decide whether there exists public purpose or not. Undoubtedly, the decision of the State is not beyond judicial scrutiny. In appropriate cases, where such power is exercised mala fide or for collateral purposes or the purported action is de hors the Act, irrational or otherwise unreasonable or the so-called purpose is 'no public purpose' at all and fraud on statute is apparent, a writ-court can undoubtedly interfere. But except in such cases, the declaration of the Government is not subject to judicial review. In other words, a writ court, while exercising powers under Articles 32, 226 or 136 of the Constitution, cannot substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Government as to what constitutes 'public purpose'. 134. Taking the facts in their entirety, we are of the view that the action of the State in initiating acquisition proceedings for establishing and developing infrastructure project cannot be held contrary to law or objectionable. The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing writ petitions as also writ appeals and we find no infirmity therein. All the appeals, therefore, are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed, however, leaving the parties to bear their own costs." 26. Regarding non filing of reply, he contended that person who was to file a reply on behalf of the State Government was IAS and local officer in 2003 and filed reply on behalf of State Government and the person has specifically contended that he has deposed on the basis of documents filed. There was no personal knowledge of any of the officer. There was no personal knowledge of any of the officer. In that view of the matter, the statement made that no reply was filed on behalf of the State is not acceptable but the same was made only with a view to misguide the Hon'ble Court. He has also taken us to Section 15 of Land Acquisition Act and contended that the JDA is not an interested party. He has also relied on the following judgments:- 1. Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors , (2000) 7 SCC 296 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3737 ):- 53. Now in the (ii) and (iii) type of objections, there is a personal element which has to be pleaded in the Section 5A inquiry and if objections have not been filed, the notification must be conclusive proof that the said person had "waived" all objections which were personal and which he could have raised. However, so far as objection (i) is concerned, even in case objections are not filed, the affected party can challenge in Court that the purpose was not a public purpose. 54. Learned Solicitor General Sri Salve rightly argued that in respect of each land owner whose land is acquired, the Section 4 notification if it is sought to be avoided on personal grounds as stated in (ii) and (iii) above, it is necessary that objection be filed to avoid a voidable notification. Otherwise, the notification which is not avoided on any personal grounds, remains operative and personal objections are deemed to be waived. 55. In the extracts from the Division Bench judgment set out earlier, it will be seen that two different concepts are unfortunately mixed up. Satisfaction regarding public purpose, it was said must be expressed in respect of each 'particular land'. This view, as already stated, is not correct. If the entire land is needed for a public purpose, it is not necessary for the Government (or here the Lt. Governor) to say in the Section 6 declaration that each piece of land is required for the public purpose. The Division Bench then mixed up this question with individual objections in each writ petition. Obviously, these individual objections of the type (ii) and (iii) mentioned above can only be personal to each writ petitioner or peculiar in respect of each of the pieces of land owned. The Division Bench then mixed up this question with individual objections in each writ petition. Obviously, these individual objections of the type (ii) and (iii) mentioned above can only be personal to each writ petitioner or peculiar in respect of each of the pieces of land owned. In that event, the rejection of the objections by the land acquisition officer and the "satisfaction" of the Government/Lt. Governor can relate only to each of these pieces of land and not the whole. Therefore, there is no question of the Division Bench holding in its order dated 18.11.88 that the satisfaction of the Lt. Governor in respect of the entire land is vitiated. As already stated, the satisfaction regarding public purpose was never in issue. 56. It was then argued that satisfaction under Section 6 for the rest of the land not covered by the 73 writ petitioner or even where no objections are filed under Section 5-A, must be held vitiated because the objections filed in certain other cases, were not properly considered by the officer and hence the Section 6 satisfaction of the Lt. Governor for the rest of the land is also vitiated. 60. Learned Solicitor General of India, Sri Harish Salve, has placed before us in written words, the scope and extent of the concession he is making on behalf of the Government. It reads as follows: In a case where the Joint Director (New Lease) of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) has expressly represented that the proceedings stand quashed, then the Government would consider the question of de-notification under Section 48 provided (a) The applicant who has constructed upon the land is the original owner and was the owner prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 4. It is made expressly clear that even those transferees who have acquired the land with permissions/NOCs under the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 are not covered by this. (b) The construction has been made after obtaining the approval of the MCD for the building plans. (c) The construction as exists is in strict compliance with the sanctioned plans and does not exceed the maximum built up area permissible in respect of farm houses - which is the applicable norm under the Building by-laws. (d) The extent of reacquisition would be in the discretion of the Govt. (e) If compensation has not been paid,- 2. (c) The construction as exists is in strict compliance with the sanctioned plans and does not exceed the maximum built up area permissible in respect of farm houses - which is the applicable norm under the Building by-laws. (d) The extent of reacquisition would be in the discretion of the Govt. (e) If compensation has not been paid,- 2. Union of India and Others v. Praveen Gupta and Others , (1997) 9 SCC 78 : ( AIR 1997 SC 170 ) :- 7. Shri Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel has pointed out that there is no real urgency in this matter and the respondents could have been given an opportunity to contend that land is not needed for any public purpose. In support thereof, he placed strong reliance on the judgments in Narayan Govind Gavate and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors , (1977) 1 SCR 763 : ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ); Dora Phalavli v. State of Punjab and Ors , (1980) 1 SCR 93 and State of Punjab and Anr. v. Gurdial Singh and Anr , (1980) 1 SCR 1071 : (AIR 1980 SC 399). The decision in Narayan Govind's case, has been distinguished by this Court in several cases. In the light of the ratio in catena of decisions, this Court has consistently held that acquisition of the property for the planned development of the housing accommodation is an urgent for acquisition and, therefore, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, exercising power under Section 17(4) has been held to be valid. It is true that in Dora Phalavli and Gurdial Singh's cases, the two Judge Bench of this Court in each of the cases held that enquiry under Section 5-A may not be dispensed with in a cavalier manner denying the opportunity to file the objections unless real urgency is shown. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. The very object of enquiry under Section 5-A, is whether the land proposed to be acquired is needed or is likely to be needed for the public purpose mentioned in the notification and whether any other suitable land other than the acquired land is needed for the said public purpose. In this case, the entire land in two villages was acquired. It is seen that timber business is being carried on in the walled city of old Delhi. In this case, the entire land in two villages was acquired. It is seen that timber business is being carried on in the walled city of old Delhi. It has become a source of traffic congestion and that it requires to be shifted urgently from the existing place to relieve the congestion by acquiring the concerned land for the public purpose, namely establishment of timber depots. It is true that a mention was also made that unauthorised construction has been made in that area proposed to be acquired. If the enquiry was conducted, delay would defeat the very public purpose of acquisition for shifting of timber business from the walled city and establishment of the timber depots outside the walled city. Therefore, the urgency mentioned in exercising the power under Section 4(1) was justified. Shri Goswami, learned senior Counsel for the Union of India, has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Jai Narain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , (1996) AIR SC 697. It is true, as pointed out by Shri Sanghi, that the acquisition in this reported decision was made for the establishment of sewerage plan as per the direction of this Court and, therefore, there was urgency. 8. But, as stated earlier, since the acquisition is for shifting of timber business from the walled city to the outskirts of the city, shifting itself is for urgent purpose, viz., to relieve the traffic congestion in the walled city. Under those circumstances, the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) cannot be said to be unwarranted in this case. It is true that there was a delay, from the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in publication of the declaration under Section 6. When it was pointed out that no counter-affidavit was filed in the High Court explaining the delay, we directed the learned Counsel for the State to produce the record. An averment has been made in the special leave petition that the delay was due to enquiry being conducted into the objections filed before Lt. Governor in this behalf and until the objections were over ruled, declaration under Section 6 could not be published. An averment has been made in the special leave petition that the delay was due to enquiry being conducted into the objections filed before Lt. Governor in this behalf and until the objections were over ruled, declaration under Section 6 could not be published. The note in the office file and the running file do indicate that certain persons kept on making representations right from 1983 and as far as present notification is concerned, objections had been received on April 25, 1990 and, thereafter, they have been considered after the Lt. Governor directed to enquire into the matter and submit the report. Consequently, they conducted the enquiry and submitted the report. 3. Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors , (1999) 2 SCC 384 : ( AIR 1999 SC 436 ). 9. On the question of urgency, the following facts and contentions emerge from the counter-affidavits. The establishment of a Market Yard is not merely one of mere urgency but one which makes it necessary to dispense with inquiry under Section 5-A. The existing market yard is situated in a very congested locality having no scope for expansion and the place where the Market is now located is not sufficient to cater to the growing needs of its constituents. There is no adequate space for free movement and parking of trucks/bullock carts etc. nor for providing necessary shelter for those who come to the market. The existing market is also devoid of any amenities necessary for hundreds of people who visit the market every day or for the bullocks which are being used to draw the carts. During rainy season it becomes well-nigh impossible to find out suitable shelters for the farmers and A producers of vegetables. It has become necessary to provide amenities and also construct roads in a planned manner. 10. In our view, the subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A is based on sufficient material and cannot be faulted. The photographs as to the filthy state of the present Mandi with garbage and stray cattle and pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be precarious and perhaps hazardous to store vegetables or foodgrains in the existing market. We are, therefore, of the view that the urgency clause was rightly invoked by the Government. The photographs as to the filthy state of the present Mandi with garbage and stray cattle and pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be precarious and perhaps hazardous to store vegetables or foodgrains in the existing market. We are, therefore, of the view that the urgency clause was rightly invoked by the Government. There are also enough precedents in connection with acquisition of land for markets where Section 5-A has been dispensed with and such action was upheld. 11. In connection with a similar acquisition for a market yard, when Section 5-A inquiry was dispensed with on the ground of urgency, the Allahabad High Court in Satyendra Prasad Jain (S.P. Jain) and Ors. v. State of U. P. , (1987) 1 AWC 382 : (1987 All LJ 965) observed: "The question herein is whether the State was justified in dispensing the requirements of enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A. It could be taken judicial notice of, that in regard to agricultural produce there were no proper market facilities. There were innumerable charges, levies and exactions which the agriculturists were required to pay without having any say in the proper utilisation of the amount paid by them. The Government of India and the various committees and commissions appointed to study the condition of agricultural markets in the country had stress to need to provide proper market yards for the sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The Planning Commission also stressed long ago in this regard. The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 has been enacted to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefore, in Uttar Pradesh. The proposed construction of market and market yard by the Mandi Samiti is, therefore, a step forward to ameliorate the conditions of producers with due representation to them in the Mandi Samities for the fair settlement of disputes relating to their transactions. It is a long felt need which is said to have been included in the planned Development Scheme." 12. It was further stated (P.3 & 4) as follows : "It cannot be said that there is no urgency in matter of acquiring the land in question." 13. The same question arose again in Kailaswati v. State of U.P. , (1978) AIR Allahabad 181. It was further stated (P.3 & 4) as follows : "It cannot be said that there is no urgency in matter of acquiring the land in question." 13. The same question arose again in Kailaswati v. State of U.P. , (1978) AIR Allahabad 181. That was a case where land was acquired for purpose of Market Yard to be constructed by the Krishi Utpadan Mani Samithi, Meerut. The inquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with. The same was upheld and it was held that there was immediate urgency as there was acute scarcity of godowns and warehouses where foodgrains purchased by Government had to be stocked. In our opinion, the above Judgment is also in point. When in such circumstances market yards are proposed to be established, it is, in our view, permissible to invoke the provisions of Section 17(4) and dispense with Section 5-A inquiry. 14. The decisions of this Court in Hari Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. , (1984) 2 SCC 624 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1020 ) where acquisition was made for a market yard and Union of India v. Praveen Gupta , (1996) 9 JT 624 : (1996 AIR SCW 4334) : ( AIR 1997 SC 170 ) where the acquisition was for a timber yard-show that the establishment of markets has been treated as one of grave urgency to remove congestion. The dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry was upheld in these cases." 27. The change of use was already made in the year 1999 and notification was issued in the year 1984 which has been produced by counsel for the appellant at Annexure-20 in the original petition which is dated 2nd August, 1984 where the need of the special market was established and it was for the purpose of establishing a market under different area for different land and not of the same land. He has also produced on record the award which came to be passed in the acquisition proceedings. On consideration and the statement made by counsel for the appellants that award was not passed in his case but as a layman, it is very clear that since petition was pending, no award could have been passed in the matter of appellants. He has also produced on record the award which came to be passed in the acquisition proceedings. On consideration and the statement made by counsel for the appellants that award was not passed in his case but as a layman, it is very clear that since petition was pending, no award could have been passed in the matter of appellants. Therefore, the contention of the appellants that no award is passed is an inaccurate statement made by counsel for the appellants and the same is required to be deprecated. 28. We have heard counsel for both the sides. 29. Before proceeding further with the matter, we make it clear that the land acquisition proceedings are being initiated by the local authority for keeping in mind statutory power and for a public good. We have gone through the basic note emphasised by counsel for the appellants and on going through the remarks made by JDA which we have reproduced hereinabove at Annexure-22, we are satisfied that there is application of mind and the person who has made a note is visionary and seen the interest of public at large of the land which is at preferred position of the city of Jaipur. It is true that the planning of city is visualised since it has taken one phase. 30. In that view of the matter, merely because there being official action and the planning is in a phased manner, we see no reason to accept the statement made by the counsel for the appellants that it could be done in one phase and the planning made by JDA in a phased manner and the same is concurring to Section 4 notification of the second phase when Section 6 notification came. On the contrary, it is established that there is high-need but they can do it in a phased manner so that ultimately JDA has to come out of their own funds and with the expensive planning in the phased manner. 31. We have gone through the reasoning adopted by the learned single Judge. Over and above, the reasoning adopted by the learned single Judge which we are not reproducing for the sake of brevity and we approve the view taken by the learned single Judge. On the first ground of 5-A, objections were not filed. 32. We are of the opinion that the contention raised by the appellants is misconceived. Over and above, the reasoning adopted by the learned single Judge which we are not reproducing for the sake of brevity and we approve the view taken by the learned single Judge. On the first ground of 5-A, objections were not filed. 32. We are of the opinion that the contention raised by the appellants is misconceived. If they have not filed any objection under 5-A, after notification 4 & 6 the said question will not arise. Regarding society they are not purchasers they were merely Khatedar. In that view of the matter, the petition on behalf of the society as the appellants was not maintainable. Even in the case of Panchu and Others. (In writ petition No. 7035/2003), the petitioners averred as under:- S.No. Khasra No. Area (In hectares) 1. 693 0.70 2. 695 0.01 3. 696 0.05 4. 698 0.06 5. 699 1.38 6. 701 0.01 7. 702 0.01 8. 703 0.72 9. 708 0.51 10. 709 0.06 11. 710 0.39 12. 679 0.83 13. 697 1.28 14. 704 0.62 15. 705 0.60 16. 706 0.46 17. 707 0.41 18. 711 0.23 19. 713 1.03 20. 714 0.01 21. 715 0.03 22. 796 0.29 23. 716 0.29 24. 717 2.66 25. 693/1139 0.40 26. 678/1231 0.12 Total. 9.95 hectares. (b) Petitioner Nos. 13 to 22 are the khate-dars of land bearing following khasra Nos.:- S.No. Khasra No. Area (In hectares) 1. 678 0.50 2. 719 2.82 3. 720 0.05 4. 721 0.01 5. 722 0.18 6. 723 3.59 7. 726 0.07 8. 727 2.84 9. 728 0.07 10. 729 6.68 11. 730 0.01 12. 731 0.11 13. 732 9.19 14. 745 2.23 15. 754 0.01 16. 755 4.37 17. 756 2.70 18. 746/1078 0.20 Total 35.63 hectares. Equivalent to 141 bigha 11 Biswas. The petitioners have divided their land inter-se and are in possession of their respective shares. However, the revenue records have not been modified accordingly. Photo state copies of the 3 Jamabandis are submitted herewith and are marked as Annexure-1, Annexure-2 and Annexure-3, respectively. 2. That out of the categorie B mentioned above, 47 bighas of land has been transferred by the petitioners to Balaji Engineering College, which land is situated in Khasra Nos.719 to 723, 726 to 732, 745 to 754, 755, 756, 746/1078. Photo state copies of the 3 Jamabandis are submitted herewith and are marked as Annexure-1, Annexure-2 and Annexure-3, respectively. 2. That out of the categorie B mentioned above, 47 bighas of land has been transferred by the petitioners to Balaji Engineering College, which land is situated in Khasra Nos.719 to 723, 726 to 732, 745 to 754, 755, 756, 746/1078. Out of 3.98 hectares of this land 2.43 hectares has been resumed under Section 90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 by the Authorized Officer, of Zone B-III, Jaipur vide order dated 16.04.2002. A copy of the order dated 16.04.2002 of the Authorized Officer, Zone B-III, Jaipur is submitted herewith and marked as Annexure-4. 4. That Smt. Geeta Devi wife of Banwari Lal and Shri Banwari Lal, shareholders in the land categorized in clause (b) hereinabove, have also sold their land through agreements of sale to Sindhu Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited. Smt. Geeta Devi had 1/9th share in the land and Shri Banwari Lal had also 1/9th share in the said land. The agreement executed by Smt. Geeta Devi on 18.09.1993 is submitted herewith and marked as Annexure-6. The houses have also been constructed over the entire land sold by Smt. Geeta Devi and Shri Banwari Lal. The constructions have also been made on other remaining portions of the land. 33. It is made clear that since some of the members of society have disposed of land and it has been handed over to some of the cooperative society, in that view of the matter, the contention which has been taken by the State Government requires very serious view. 34. The main argument of Mr. Pareek is on the basis of first, the State should have filed a reply. In our considered opinion, the manner which has been shown by counsel for the State that it is on behalf of State merely affirmation by officers of JDA authorised. In view of the affidavit in reply affirmed by the JDA officer but it is reply on behalf of State inasmuch as it has been specifically mentioned that the reply was finalized by the Advocate General, therefore, the reply is of the State. 35. In view of the affidavit in reply affirmed by the JDA officer but it is reply on behalf of State inasmuch as it has been specifically mentioned that the reply was finalized by the Advocate General, therefore, the reply is of the State. 35. In our considered opinion, it will be open for State Government to invoke power as per the necessity and looking to the fact that in phased manner the needs has quieted, the invocation of Section 17(1) or 17(4) is justified. In that view of the matter, two judgments relied upon by counsel for the State Government as referred above will apply in the case and the judgment relied upon by counsel for the appellants will not apply. 36. Regarding prior approval, in our considered opinion, this is a statutory requirement and considered only in case where the scheme is not statutory scheme. At the behest of the State Government or Central Government prior approval is required. The planning of necessity which is in the larger interest, is envisaged only by the local authority and statutory requirement as stated hereinabove. The knowledge which is sought to be relied upon is clear and it has to be approved rightly while in prior approval, it is required under Sections 4 & 6 notifications. The contention that the prior approval is required is misconceived. 37. Taking into consideration, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned single Judge is correct. Over and above, the reasoning of learned single Judge, the additional reasoning as referred above is required to be accepted. In our considered opinion, this is not a genuine litigation at the behest of some interested persons who are not agriculturists but this is wasting of public time by filing such frivolous litigation. In that view of the matter each of the appellant is imposed a cost of Rs. 10,000/- and Society will also pay a cost of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The cost will be paid to the State Legal Services Authority. The award is taken on record. 38. The appeals stand accordingly dismissed.