JUDGMENT : Heard the counsels appearing for the petitioners. 2. The writ petition was originally argued by learned Senior counsel Mr. V. Shivnath, but for the rejoinder, another Senior counsel Mr. Rajiv Ranjan was engaged who has argued the case in rejoinder to the arguments of the respondents. 3. Heard Mr. Anuj Kumar, counsel appearing for the private respondents. 4. Heard Mr. Rajiv Anand, counsel assisted by Ms. Priya Agrawal, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State. 5. At the outset, Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners Mr. V. Shivnath has submitted that this case has nothing to do with the properties acquired for A.G. Office House Construction Society Limited in Land Acquisition Case No. 261 of 1960-61 although in the writ petition, much has been stated about the acquisition of large chunk of property by the State for the said society. This position was reiterated by counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents as well as Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners during rejoinder. 6. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs: “For quashing the order dated 22.05.1987 passed by the Special Officer, Scheduled Areas Regulation, Ranchi in S.A.R. Case No. 4 of 1980-81 contained in Annexure-16 to this writ application by which the lands measuring 0.16 acres out of R.S. Plot No. 322 of Khata No. 163 situated at Village-Kadru, P.S. Argora, District: Ranchi have been ordered to be restored to Parna Pahan father of respondent no. 5 as well as the order dated 30.12.1989 passed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi, respondent no. 3 in S.A.R. Appeal No. 40R15 of 1987-88, contained in Annexure-17 to the writ application dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner no. 5 as well as the order dated 18.5.99 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi in Ranchi Revenue Revision No. 25 of 1990 contained in annexure- 18 to the writ application dismissing the revision filed by the petitioner no. 5.” 7. Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners during the course of argument has submitted as under: (a) The property involved in this case is Khata No. 163, Plot No. 322 village Kadru, P.S. Argora. The Plot No. 322 is a huge plot out of which some portion has been acquired by the respondent state and rest of the land is involved in this case was never acquired by the State. The Plot No. 322 is a huge plot out of which some portion has been acquired by the respondent state and rest of the land is involved in this case was never acquired by the State. (b) Counsel for the petitioners by referring to paragraph no. 4 of the writ petition submits that the property has been recorded as Bakasht Bhuinhari in R.S. record of rights finally published in the year 1955 and he submits that the property was recorded in the name of Parna Pahan. Said Parna Pahan orally settled 0.17 acres of land to the petitioners’ father Raja Ram Giri which was confirmed by virtue of grant of rent receipts and delivery of possession followed by customary Hukamnama dated 17.09.1948 and the said settlee remained in possession of the property. In the year 1958, the father of the petitioners had constructed building in portion of the said property at a cost of Rs. 50,000/-. The Hukmnama was for 0.17 acres of land and out of 0.17 acres of land, to the extent of 4 decimals, was acquired by the State of Bihar for the purposes of widening of road vide L.A. Case No. 13 of 1966-67 for which award was prepared in the name of the father of the petitioners and compensation was duly paid to the father of the petitioners. (c) However, the petitioners’ father expired in the year, 1967. Thereafter, the petitioners being the legal heirs and successors of Late Raja Ram Giri continued to remain in possession of the property and rather, started residing in the house standing thereon. Their name was mutated in Ranchi Municipality in the year, 1968 and they have been regularly paying taxes to Ranchi Municipality/Ranchi Municipal Corporation. (d) He further submits that the petitioners got the pipelines connection for water in the year, 1966 and got the electricity connection in the year, 1965. (e) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that in the year 1974 an application for restoration of the aforesaid land was filed under Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 by Parna Pahan, the ancestor of respondent no. 5 for the restoration of 1.96 acres of land being plot no. 322, 163, 164 and 214 of Khata No. 168, which included the property involved in this case. On the basis of such application, S.A.R. Case No. 982 of 1974 was registered by the Special Officer, S.A.R., Ranchi. 5 for the restoration of 1.96 acres of land being plot no. 322, 163, 164 and 214 of Khata No. 168, which included the property involved in this case. On the basis of such application, S.A.R. Case No. 982 of 1974 was registered by the Special Officer, S.A.R., Ranchi. (f) However, the claim of Parna Pahan was subsequently amended and he confined his claim for restoration of only 0.16 acres of land out of Plot No. 322 which is the subject matter of the instant writ petition. The said proceeding was subsequently converted into a proceeding under Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and was numbered as S.A.R. Case No. 4 of 1980-81 as the property is a Bhuinhari property. The notices were issued and the petitioners appeared and submitted that there is no contravention either of Section 46 or other provisions of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and the applicant Parna Pahan being a Bhuinhar of the property had created tenancy in favour of the father of the petitioners by virtue of Hukumnama and the transaction was valid. Further, a case was made out that the application for restoration was barred by limitation and adverse possession and Parna Pahan had no locus to claim restoration of the land. (g) Counsel for the petitioners by referring to the impugned order submits that vide order dated 22.05.1987, the S.A.R. Officer allowed the said Case No. 4 of 1980-81. While disposing of the said application, the S.A.R. Officer framed two issues : (a) Whether the applicant belongs to Scheduled Tribe (b) Whether there has been transfer of land in violation of Section 46 or any other provisions of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and whether the land involved in the case could be transferred back to the applicant. (h) The first issue was decided in favour of the applicant that he is a tribal. Counsel for the petitioners submits that so far as this issue is concerned, there is no dispute. (i) So far as the 2nd issue is concerned, the S.A.R. Officer held that the transfer was without prior approval of the Deputy Commissioner and accordingly, the said transfer violated the provisions of Section 48 read with Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. (i) So far as the 2nd issue is concerned, the S.A.R. Officer held that the transfer was without prior approval of the Deputy Commissioner and accordingly, the said transfer violated the provisions of Section 48 read with Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. (j) Counsel for the petitioners further submits that the issue regarding limitation was also considered by the said authority and the said authority examined the point of limitation by referring to Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and held that the claim of the petitioners that the application was time barred cannot be sustained. (k) Further, the said authority while examining the matter under 2nd proviso to Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 held that the petitioners could not prove before the said authority that the construction of the house over the land was prior to 1969. (l) The counsel submits that against this order, an appeal was filed which was numbered as S.A.R. Appeal No. 40 R 15 of 1987-88 which was dismissed vide order dated 30.12.1989. He submits that the appeal was dismissed by a cryptic order against which, a revision being Ranchi Revenue Revision No. 25 of 1990 was filed and the same was also dismissed vide impugned order dated 18.05.1999. (m) Counsel for the petitioners while assailing the aforesaid orders has referred to various provisions of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (herein after referred to as aforesaid Act of, 1908) which includes Section 5 which defines “tenure holder” and Section 6 which defines “Raiyat”. He has also referred to Section 46, Section 48 and Section 71A of the aforesaid Act of 1908. (n) Counsel for the petitioners by referring to aforesaid Sections and provisions of law has also referred to survey report 1927-1935, Ranchi, which is popularly known as Taylor’s Report and has referred to its Chapter IV as printed in the Manual of Chotanagpur Tenancy Laws published by Rajpal & Company. (o) He submits that in the aforesaid survey report, the paragraph no. 65 deals with the meaning of term Bhuinhari, paragraph no. 66 deals with different types of Bhuinhari holdings and paragraph no. 67 deals with general methods of entering Bhuinhari lands in the last settlement to present settlement records. Although, he has not referred to paragraph nos. 68 and 69 of said Chapter IV of said survey report 1927-1935, but, to complete the reference, paragraph nos. 66 deals with different types of Bhuinhari holdings and paragraph no. 67 deals with general methods of entering Bhuinhari lands in the last settlement to present settlement records. Although, he has not referred to paragraph nos. 68 and 69 of said Chapter IV of said survey report 1927-1935, but, to complete the reference, paragraph nos. 65, 66, 67, 68 and 69 of Chapter IV to said Survey Report 1927-1935 are quoted hereinbelow for ready reference:- “65. The meaning of Bhuinhari- Besides Mundari Khuntkatti lands there are a number of other special aboriginal tenures in Ranchi district. These can be divided roughly into two classes; firstly, lands which are really the ancestral holdings of the descendants of the aboriginal clearers of the villages, and secondly, lands which are service lands occupied by persons connected with the performance of the village worship, or the proceeds of which are devoted to defraying the costs of the village worship. A large number of both of these two kinds of tenure were included in the survey done by Babu Rakhal Das Haldar under the Chota Nagpur Tenures Act (Act II of 1869), commonly known as the Bhuinhari Survey. The object of the survey was to make a record of the ancestral holdings of the aboriginal tribes in Ranchi district. Lands entered in the registers prepared under this survey are generally known as Bhuinhari lands. The survey, however, only extended to thanas Khunti, Karra, Torpa, Kolebira, Bano, Basia, Palkot, Gumla, Raidih, Ghaghra, Sesai, Lohardaga, Kuru, Mandar, Bero, Lapung, Ranchi, Burmu, Ormanjhi and Angara. It did not include the Mundari Khuntkatti tenancies dealt with in the last chapter of which no record was prepared until the time of the last settlement; it also omitted a large number of aboriginal tenures which are in every respect similar to those tenures entered in the Bhuinhari registers. This chapter is intended to deal with both the special aboriginal tenures, other than Mundari Khuntkatti, which were included in the Bhuinhari registers and with similar tenures which are omitted. 66. Different types of Bhuinhari holdings- The following are the different types of tenures which were entered in the registers prepared under the Chota Nagpur Tenures Act (Act II of 1869):- (1) Bhuinhari, the cultivation of the original clearers of the village. (2) Bhuinhari Mahatoi, the official cultivation of the mahto. (3) Bhuinhari mundai, the official cultivation of the village munda. Different types of Bhuinhari holdings- The following are the different types of tenures which were entered in the registers prepared under the Chota Nagpur Tenures Act (Act II of 1869):- (1) Bhuinhari, the cultivation of the original clearers of the village. (2) Bhuinhari Mahatoi, the official cultivation of the mahto. (3) Bhuinhari mundai, the official cultivation of the village munda. (4) Bhuinhari pahanai, the official cultivation of the pahan or village priest. (5) Bhuinhari panbhara; lands given for the service of carrying water at the village sacrifices. (6) Bhuinhari Dulikatari- lands the income of which is devoted to religious purposes in the village. (7) Bhuinhari bhutkheta- lands the income of which is devoted to religious purposes in the village. 67. General methods of entering Bhuinhari lands in the last Settlement and present Settlement records- All these lands are included within the general term Bhuinhari; but it should be remembered that ordinarily speaking when lands are referred to as Bhuinhari without further qualification only the lands falling in class (1) above are meant. Mr. Reid has described fully at paragraph 158 page 68 of his last Settlement Final Report the ways in which these lands were identified and entered in the records in the last settlement. In the present settlement, last settlement entries in the Khewats were taken as correct unless challenged. In practice they were hardly ever challenged. There were a few fresh claims to Bhuinhari status which were decided according to the 1869 registers. Mr. Reid has remarked at paragraph 219, page 96 of the last Settlement Final Report that in origin Bhuinhari is a local variant of Khuntkatti. This is true in the sense that it is a reclaimer’s tenure, but it should be understood that it is quite distinct from Mundari Khuntkatti. The holders of Mundari Khuntkatti tenancies must be Mundaris whereas holders of Bhuinhari lands may belong to other aboriginal tribes. Bhuinhars’ interest in the general social life of the village is as the Mundari Khuntkattidars have in an intact village; nor is their interest in the village jungle and waste outside their tenures greater than that of ordinary settled raiyats of the village. In the survey of 1869 the Bhuinhari registers were prepared according to the different Khunts into which the Bhuinhars were divided. In the survey of 1869 the Bhuinhari registers were prepared according to the different Khunts into which the Bhuinhars were divided. The Khunts are based on the family relationship of the persons contained within them and correspond roughly to the killis of the Mundaris. In the last settlement the Bhuinhars were entered in the Khewat according to the Bhuinhari registers of the 1869 survey and the particular Khunt to which a Bhuinhar belonged was shown in column 3 of the Khewat. This entry was followed in the present settlement. Where further subdivision was found to have taken place, one serial number was kept for the last settlement groups but different batta numbers were given according to the shares into which the cultivation had been divided, a shamilat batta khewat serial being prepared for lands still held in common. Each Bhuinhar and Bhuinhari family cultivating jointly was given a Bhuinhari kkatian under the khewat serial or batta serial to which he or they belonged. It is most important to note that land is only considered to be Bhuinhari while it is held by members of a Bhuinhari family. As soon as it passes completely out of the hands of Bhuinhars it ceases to be Bhuinhari land. For instance, when a Bhuinhar has died heirless and his lands pass into the landlord’s hands they become bakasht. 68. Provisions of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act relating to Bhuinhari lands-The portion of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act dealing with Bhuinhari is section 48 read with section 46. One difference between the two sections is that section 46 is applied from January 1, 1903 whereas section 48 is applied from January 1, 1908. In section 48 it is stated that section 46(except sub-section 2) shall apply to all members of Bhuinhari families as if they were raiyats; but it is specifically stated that they are not governed by the rules made under section 46 for ordinary raiyats. A Bhuinhar therefore cannot legally transfer his land except by a mortgage or lease not exceeding 5 years, or by a bhugut bandhak not exceeding 7 years (or in the case of a registered society, 15 years). It should also be noted that section 48(b) bars the accrual of occupancy rights in any circumstances in Bhuinhari land transferred by lease. 69. It should also be noted that section 48(b) bars the accrual of occupancy rights in any circumstances in Bhuinhari land transferred by lease. 69. Transfers in Bhuinhari lands-It was found during settlement operations that there had been many transfers in Bhuinhari lands. These fell into two general categories – transfers between Bhuinhars of different khunts and transfers from Bhuinhars to non-Bhuinhars. The former kind of transfer consisted mainly of exchanges of land between the Bhuinhars of different khunts in the same village. At first these were treated as illegal, but for the greater part of the operations, they were recognized and the transferred areas entered in the transferees’ Bhuinihari khatas. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the transfer of Bhuinhari lands to non-Bhuinhars, and as many of these exchanges between Bhuinhars took place a long time ago, no useful purpose is served by no recognizing them. Transfers to non-Bhuinhars by leases and mortgages or by bhugut bandhaks for other than the legal periods were treated as illegal in the present settlement. In the case of legal leases, it was not felt desirable to fill up the records with khatas which would become obsolete in a year or two; details of them were therefore entered in the remarks column of the Bhuinhari bakasht khatas against the plots concerned but without the word beaini. In legal mortgages the mortgager was entered in the khewat in the next serial to the tenure concerned in the usual way, details of any third person’s possession under the mortgage being shown in the remarks column of the mortgagee’s bakasht khata against the plots concerned. All illegal transfers were entered in the records in column 14 of the bakasht Bhuinhari khatas against the plots concerned preceded by the word beaini. Before January 1, 1908 there was, of course, no bar to transfers in Bhuinhari lands. For transfers recorded in the last settlement the entry then made was maintainable. In some cases Bhuinhari lands were found in possession of the landlord, the Bhuinhar having died without direct heirs. If there was collateral heirs, possession being noted in the khatian; but when the entire branch of the Bhuinhar’s family had died out, the land was recorded as the landlord’s bakasht. In some cases Bhuinhari lands were found in possession of the landlord, the Bhuinhar having died without direct heirs. If there was collateral heirs, possession being noted in the khatian; but when the entire branch of the Bhuinhar’s family had died out, the land was recorded as the landlord’s bakasht. Where a Bhuinhari holding had been sold in an auction sale the auction-purchaser was given a lagan panewala status batta khewat in the same serial as the other Bhuinhari lands of that particular khunt.” (p) Counsel for the petitioners submits that the original authority has misdirected itself by examining the case in the light of Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and this aspect of the matter was totally ignored by the appellate authority. He further submits that the revisional authority has examined the matter from the point of view of Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and has held that the petition for restoration was filed within a period of 12 years from the date of transfer although, it was specific case of the petitioners that the property was transferred by way of Sada Hukumnama as back as in the year, 1948 and thereafter, a house was constructed over the property and rent was also paid. (q) Counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that it has come in the evidence also that the construction over the property was made as back as in the year, 1948-49. The counsel further submits that the aforesaid evidence was not disputed by the private respondents and accordingly, he submits that there was nothing on record to hold that the private respondents herein were dispossessed as back as in the year, 1948 and this aspect of the matter has not been properly considered by all the three authorities and therefore, the impugned orders are perverse and are fit to be set-aside. (r) He further submits that the period of limitation ought to have been counted from 1980-81 when the original application under Section 71A was converted into an application under Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and the limitation could not have been counted by referring to year 1974, when original application under Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 was filed by the applicant. He submits that if the period is taken from 1980-81 then the application for restoration was beyond period of 12 years and accordingly, it was clearly time-barred. This aspect of the matter has also not been considered by the authority. (s) The petitioners have relied upon following judgments: (i) AIR 1968 Patna 302 (F.B.) to submits that transfer by way of Sada Hukumnama can also be acknowledged and is a valid document. (ii) He has also referred to (2003) 4 SCC 161 to submit that unstamped and unregistered document can be looked into for collateral purposes. (iii) 2005 (3) JCR 211 Jhr. to submit that Sada settlement followed by continuous rent receipt creates a valid settlement. (iv) 1981 BLR (Rep.) 253 (H.C.) to submit that holders of Bhuinhari land are tenure holders whose interest has not vested under Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950, accordingly in respect of such tenure, power under Section 71A cannot be exercised. A specific provision in connection with such property has been made under Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. (v) 1993 (1) PLJR 368 to submit that in this case a proceeding initiated under Section 71A was subsequently converted into a proceeding under Section 48 and it has been held that the point of limitation in terms of Section 48 is required to be considered. (vi) 1992 (2) BLJR 986 wherein it has been held that limitation provided for restoration of land for violation of Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 would be 12 years and that the Schedule Area Regulation, 1969 as amended in the year, 1986 will be prospective in nature and thus, only in the event of the aforementioned period, limitation has not expired by the time when the aforesaid Scheduled Area (Amendment) 1986 came into force, the period of limitation would be extended to 30 years. (vii) 1997 (1) BLJR 401 to submit that the limitation under Section 48(4) of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 for restoration of land is 12 years. (viii) 1977 BBCJ 479 wherein it has been held that Bakasht Bhuinhari Pahani land is covered by Section 48 and it has also been held that right of intermediary for Bhuinhari tenure does not vest under Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. (t) Counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned orders are perverse in view of the aforesaid judgments and are accordingly, fit to be set-aside. 8. (t) Counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned orders are perverse in view of the aforesaid judgments and are accordingly, fit to be set-aside. 8. Counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents, on the other hand, submits that the provisions of Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and Section 48 of the said Act deal with restoration of land and the application for restoration of land under both the provisions are to be filed before the Deputy Commissioner. He submits that the application for restoration of land was filed before the Deputy Commissioner and initially he initiated proceeding for restoration for the entire land under Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and subsequently, the same was confined to the property involved in this case and the proceeding was converted into a proceeding under Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 in the year, 1980-81. 9. Counsel for the private respondents further submits that the application for restoration of land was filed by the recorded tenant in the year, 1974 and whether the same was filed under Section 71A or Section 48, in both the circumstances it was to be filed before the Deputy Commissioner only and therefore, the nomenclature or reference to Section 71 A or Section 48 of the aforesaid Act of 1908 has no bearing in the matter. The counsel reiterates that the application was filed in the year 1974 and accordingly, the period of limitation has to be considered with respect to the year 1974 only. 10. By referring to the Bihar Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969 counsel for the private respondents submits that as per regulation 2 of the said regulation, the expression ‘Deputy Commissioner’ shall mean Deputy Commissioner exercising jurisdiction in the Schedule Areas within his respective local limits and shall include such person as may be especially empowered by the State Government to discharge any of the functions of the Deputy Commissioner. He submits that there is no dispute that the Deputy Commissioner was competent for the purposes of entertaining an application under Section 71A as well as under Section 48 of the aforesaid Act of 1908. He submits that there is no dispute that the Deputy Commissioner was competent for the purposes of entertaining an application under Section 71A as well as under Section 48 of the aforesaid Act of 1908. Counsel for the private respondents further submits that only distinction between the two is that the period of limitation in the case of Section 48 is 12 years and in the case of Section 71A, the Deputy Commissioner may exercise his power at any time. 11. He submits that Section 48 at the relevant point of time was meant for Bhuinhari tenure and the period of limitation was 12 years. By referring to the application for restoration as contained in Annexure-15 to the writ petition, the counsel submits that it has been specifically mentioned that the land was transferred in the year, 1964 and in connection with the details of transfer, it has been mentioned that the property was taken over in the name of the aforesaid society for whom only a portion of the plot number involved in this case was admittedly acquired. 12. Counsel for the private respondents further refers to the details in connection with the alleged fraud for transfer of property by mentioning that his thumb impressions were taken by taking him in the state of intoxication. Counsel by referring to the impugned orders submits that admittedly the applicant was a member of Scheduled Tribe and the petitioners are claiming property by way of Sada Hukumnama which is admittedly an unregistered document and the same has been disputed by the private respondents herein. He submits that the said unregistered document cannot be taken into consideration in order to claim any right, title, interest or possession over the property. He submits that there is nothing on record that the applicant was dispossessed as back as in the year, 1948 and he submits that the alleged transfer/dispossession of the private respondent itself is in violation of Section 48 read with Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. 13. He submits that there is nothing on record that the applicant was dispossessed as back as in the year, 1948 and he submits that the alleged transfer/dispossession of the private respondent itself is in violation of Section 48 read with Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. 13. On the point of limitation, counsel for the private respondents submits that a finding has been recorded by the original authority that there is no evidence that the petitioners were in possession of the property prior to 12 years from the year, 1974 and accordingly, the application for restoration was within 12 years from the date of dispossession as alleged and claimed by the applicant in the application for restoration. 14. He submits that although in the original order, the authority has referred to Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 by examining the matter from the point of view of limitation, but the same has no bearing in the matter. The reason being that the revisional authority has ultimately held that the application for restoration was filed within a period of 12 years. Under Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, the application for restoration can be filed at any time and under Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, the application for restoration has to be filed within a period of 12 years at the relevant point of time. 15. Counsel for the private respondent submits that ultimately the order was passed by the learned Commissioner wherein after examining all the evidences, the said authority has recorded clear finding that the execution of Patta or the Hukumnama was specifically denied by the applicant Parna Pahan and the scribe of the Hukumnama namely, Basudeo Narain has also not supported the case of the petitioners. The revisional authority has clearly held that there is no document prior to 1965 showing the possession of land by the petitioners or his father and has returned a finding that the execution of Patta in the year, 1948 is a concocted story and that the petitioners’ father came in possession of the property sometimes in the year, 1963-64. It has been categorically mentioned that the petitioner or his father has not paid rent to the Bhuinhar (i.e. private respondents) and no such rent receipt has been produced by him before the authorities and the papers produced by the petitioner belong to 1965 onwards. It has been categorically mentioned that the petitioner or his father has not paid rent to the Bhuinhar (i.e. private respondents) and no such rent receipt has been produced by him before the authorities and the papers produced by the petitioner belong to 1965 onwards. It has been further held that the application for restoration was filed in the year, 1974 which was within the period of 12 years from the date of dispossession of land and further, it was found that there has been no permission for transfer of land by the Deputy Commissioner. It has been held that the transfer has been made against the provisions of Section 46 and 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and there being no provision for payment of compensation under the said Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, the same has to be restored to the tribal. 16. Counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioner has lost in all the three courts and in absence of any perversity or illegality, the impugned orders do not call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent- State has also supported the case of the private respondents and has submitted that there being no illegality or perversity in the impugned orders, the same require no interference. 18. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court finds as under: (a) That admittedly the property in question is recorded as Bakasht Bhuinhari in the record of rights finally published in the year, 1954 and the property involved in this case is governed by Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. An application for restoration of land including the lands involved in this case was filed by the ancestor of the private respondent namely, Parna Pahan in the year 1974 (S.A.R. Case No. 982 of 1974 -para 20 of the writ petition) who had made specific averment in his application regarding the date of his dispossession, the manner of his dispossession and the alleged fraud committed by the petitioners by putting the applicant in the state of intoxication. The petitioners have relied upon the Sada Hukumnama alleged to have been executed as back as in the year, 1948. The petitioners have relied upon the Sada Hukumnama alleged to have been executed as back as in the year, 1948. (b) This Court further finds that after examining the materials on record and the evidence of the parties, the revisional authority vide order dated 18.05.1999 had recorded that there is no document prior to 1965 showing the possession of the land by the petitioners and has recorded a clear finding that the story of execution of Patta in the year, 1948 is a concocted story. (c) As per the case of the petitioners, the building over the plot was constructed in the year 1958, but the story of dispossession of the applicant from the property prior to 1964-65 has been rejected by the authorities. There is nothing on record to show that the building was constructed in the year, 1958. Rather, one of the witnesses of the petitioners, on which the petitioners are relying, has stated that the building was constructed in the year 1948 which is contrary to the specific case of the petitioners. (d) This Court further finds that as per the case of the petitioners itself, the petitioners got their name mutated in the Ranchi Municipality only in the year 1968. The claim of the petitioners regarding receiving compensation in the acquisition case bearing L.A. Case No. 13 of 1966-67 in connection with 4 decimal of land out of 0.17 acres of land covered by Sada Hukumnama was of the year 1967-68 only and this also does not prove that the petitioner’s father was in possession of the property since 1948. The petitioners had failed to satisfy the authorities below regarding the possession of the property since 1948. The judgment relied upon by the petitioners in connection with Sada Hukumnama clearly says that Sada Hukumnama being an un-registered document can be relied upon for collateral purposes to establish the nature of possession and the said can be relied upon only if it is coupled by rent receipts and the same by itself cannot be used for establishing possession. (e) This Court finds that the petitioners have failed to prove their possession since the year, 1948 and also failed to prove their possession prior to 1965. The application for restoration was filed in the year 1974. (e) This Court finds that the petitioners have failed to prove their possession since the year, 1948 and also failed to prove their possession prior to 1965. The application for restoration was filed in the year 1974. (f) This Court if of the considered view that merely because the application for restoration of land in the year 1974 was initially initiated under Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 for a large area of land and was subsequently converted into a proceeding under Section 48 of the said Act of 1908 in the year, 1980-81 by confining it to the area involved in this case, the same will not entitle the petitioners to calculate the limitation from the year, 1980-81. This is particularly in view of the fact that the application was filed by the private respondents before the competent authority i.e. the Deputy Commissioner who is the competent authority in connection with the restoration of land under the provisions of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 under Section 48 as well as Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and the only difference is that in the case of Bhuinhari land (nature of land involved in this case), the period of limitation will be 12 years from the date on which the application was filed for restoration of land and under Section 71A of the aforesaid Act of 1908, the period of limitation has not been prescribed but still the same has to be filed within a reasonable period of time from the date of dispossession. (g) In such circumstances, this Court finds that the period of limitation has been rightly counted from 1974 and the claim of the original applicant that they were dispossessed sometime in the year 1964 was duly established and the petitioners herein had failed to satisfy the authorities below that they were in possession since 1948 or prior to 1964. (h) Accordingly, the judgments which have been relied upon by the petitioners reported in 1981 BLR (Rep.) 253 (H.C); certainly establish that the property has to be governed by Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and not by Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 but the respondents also do not dispute this proposition of law. The specific case of the respondents is that even if Section 48 is taken into consideration the application was not barred by limitation. The specific case of the respondents is that even if Section 48 is taken into consideration the application was not barred by limitation. The petitioners, on facts, have failed to establish their possession of the property prior to 1965, therefore, the claim of the petitioners that the application for restoration of land was time-barred, is rejected. (i) In Judgment reported in 1993 (1) PLJR 368 (Johan Lakra Vs. State of Bihar and Ors.) a proceedings initiated under Section 71 A of the aforesaid Act of 1908 was converted into a proceedings under Section 48, but nowhere this Judgment holds that the period of limitation has to be countered from the date such proceedings are converted under section 48 of the said Act of 1908 and in fact the matter was remanded for fresh consideration as the authorities below had not examined the matter from the point of view of the provisions of Section 48(4) of the aforesaid Act of 1908. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is quoted herein below for ready reference:- “6. It seems that on the basis of two different applications filed by respondent no. 5, Birsa Munda, dated 26.5.84 (annexure 1) proceedings were initiated by respondent no. 4 under section 71A of the Act but subsequently the same were converted into one under section 48 of the Act on the ground that the lands in question were Bhuinhari lands. 12. Therefore, in view of the statutory provisions, noticed above, as well as the law laid down by the Supreme Court, before making any declaration in terms of section 48(4) of the Act, it was incumbent upon the Deputy Commissioner under the Act to apply himself to the aspects as to whether (i) there was any transfer by a member of the Bhuinhari family in respect of the lands within the statutory period and (ii) whether such an action is permission in view of the limitation as to time provided for initiation of such proceedings as well as for perfection of title by a person possessing the land in contravention of any law.” (j) In 1992 (2) BLJR 986 (Bukan Ansari & Ors. Vs. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) the Court held that the limitation of 12 years under section 48 would be applicable only if 12 years of dispossession is completed prior to 1986, failing which it will be governed by section 71 A of the aforesaid Act of 1908 as it was amended in 1986 to include Bhuinhari land as well. The relevant portion of the said Judgment is quoted herein below for ready reference:- “6. This aspect of the matter has been considered by me in great details in C.W.J.C. No. 695 of 1987(R) disposed of on 23-9-1991. In that decision, it has been held that the limitation provided for restoration of the land for violation of Section 48 of the Act would be 12 years. It has further been held that under the Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969 as amended in 1986 will be prospective in nature and thus only in the event, the aforementioned period of limitation had not expired at the time when the aforementioned Schedule Areas (Amendment) Regulation, 1986 came into force, the period of limitation would be extended to 30 years. However, in this case, even if it would be held that zerpeshgi leases were executed in the year 1944, evidently the application for restoration was barred by limitation.” This Judgment also does not help the petitioners as admittedly the parties are governed by Section 48 and not by Section 71A of the aforesaid Act of 1908. (k) This Court further finds that no reliance can be placed on the Sada Hukumnama which is a document claimed by the petitioners by virtue of which, the petitioners claim that they came in possession of the property. The same being an unregistered document, cannot be relied upon for the purposes of claiming any right, title and interest or possession over the property and the same could at best be looked upon for collateral purpose to see the nature of possession over the property, if any. As the petitioners have not produced any evidence in connection with the claim of possession over the property prior to 1965, therefore, their claim that they came into possession of the property by virtue of Sada Hukumnama has been rightly rejected by the authorities below. (l) The Judgment reported in (2003) 4 SCC 161 (Bondar Singh and Others Vs. As the petitioners have not produced any evidence in connection with the claim of possession over the property prior to 1965, therefore, their claim that they came into possession of the property by virtue of Sada Hukumnama has been rightly rejected by the authorities below. (l) The Judgment reported in (2003) 4 SCC 161 (Bondar Singh and Others Vs. Nihal Singh and Ors.) also does not help the petitioner as the said case was based on admitted fact that the sale deed dated 09.05.1931 though unregistered, was an admitted document in the sense its execution was not in dispute. In the instant case the execution of unregistered Hukumnama is highly disputed. The relevant portion of the said Judgment giving this factual aspect is quoted here-in-below for ready reference:- “5. The main question, as we have already noted, is the question of continuous possession of the plaintiffs over the suit lands. The sale deed dated 9-5-1931 by Fakir Chand, father of the defendants in favour of Tola Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, is an admitted document in the sense its execution is not in dispute. The only defence set up against the said document is that it is unstamped and unregistered and therefore it cannot convey title to the land in favour of the plaintiffs….” (m) The Judgment relied upon by the petitioners reported in 2005 (3) JCR 211 Jhr. (Kalara Kharian & Ors. Vs. Bhairo Nagasia @ Ganesh Nagesia & Ors.) which followed the ratio of the Judgment reported in AIR 1968 Patna 302 (FB) which has also been relied upon by the petitioners, do not help the petitioners in any manner whatsoever and are clearly distinguishable on facts as the in those cases admittedly sada settlement was followed by continuous rent receipts. In the instant case there is no such corresponding facts and a finding has been recorded by considering the entire facts and evidences both oral and documentary that there is no evidence that the petitioners were in possession of the property prior to 1964 and the rent receipts were also not produced. This is over and above the facts that serious allegations of fraud were levelled against the petitioners. The relevant portion of the said Judgment for the purposes of this case is quoted herein below for ready reference: “8. This is over and above the facts that serious allegations of fraud were levelled against the petitioners. The relevant portion of the said Judgment for the purposes of this case is quoted herein below for ready reference: “8. From the perusal of record, it appears that the suit land was surrendered by virtue of registered deed of surrender dated 2.4.1938. The said deed has been marked as Exhibit 4. It further appears that the ex-landlord, after coming into possession and remaining in possession of the said land for about six years, settled the land by virtue of sada settlement in favour of the plaintiffs. The said sada settlement is followed by continuous rent receipts, Exhibit ‘2 series’. In Mt. Ugni and another v. Chowa Mahto and others. AIR 1968 Patna 302 (FB), it has been held that any sada settlement followed by actual possession and acceptance of rent creates a valid settlement in favour of the settllee-raiyat. The said legal position has not been disputed by Mr. Lal. Once the title is vested by virtue of a valid settlement, the same cannot pass on to the defendant by an oral admission of the plaintiff depriving of his title and possession. The Supreme Court in Ambika Prasad v. Ram Ekbal Rai, reported in AIR 1966 SC 605 , has held that title can not pass by mere admission. In view of the above, the learned Lower Appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiff has got valid right, title and that the contrary findings of the learned trial Court is illegal and unsustainable. The learned Lower Appellate Court has, thus, rightly set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and has rightly allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. 9. The said findings have been arrived at by the learned Lower Appellate Court on due discussion and consideration of facts and evidences on record as well as the relevant provision of law. I find no infirmity in the said finding of the learned Lower Appellate Court. The substantial question framed at the time of admission is not based on any factual or legal foundation as the Lower Appellate Court has not committed any error of law in accepting Exhibit 4 and other documents in evidence even in presence of any contrary oral statement made by the plaintiff No. 1. The substantial question framed at the time of admission is not based on any factual or legal foundation as the Lower Appellate Court has not committed any error of law in accepting Exhibit 4 and other documents in evidence even in presence of any contrary oral statement made by the plaintiff No. 1. Viewed from another angle, to constitute a statement made in deposition an admission of that party it has to be considered in entirety. A solitary line or two cannot be taken in isolation, as an admission of the party ignoring the presence of other evidences including unimpeachable documents on record, particularly, when the Court uses the same against the party, to his disadvantage. I, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment and decree of the learned Lower Appellate Court. The question framed in this second appeal at the time of admission is answered accordingly and this appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.” (n) The Judgment reported in 1997 (1) BLJR 401 (Harihar Sahu Vs. Commissioner South Chotanagpur and Ors.) also does not help the petitioners in any manner as in the said case it was an admitted case on the basis of revisional survey record of right that the applicant was dispossessed from the property since 1924. There is no such corresponding facts in the instant case. The relevant portion of the said Judgment for the purposes of this case is quoted herein below for ready reference:- “7. Admittedly, in this case the land was transferred in 1924 and since then the petitioner’s predecessor in interest alleged to have been in possession. Having the entry of the name of the petitioner’s ancestor in the revisional survey record of right as Gassaman Kubaza is taken to be the date of transfer then the earlier application filed in 1971-72 was much beyond the period of 12 years. I am, therefore, of the view that respondents authorities failed to consider this aspect of the matter the application for restoration was barred by limitation. It is also well settled that once the application for restoration is dismissed on merit a subsequent application between the same parties is not maintainable as being barred by res judicate.” 19. In the Judgment reported in AIR 1968 Pat 302 (FB) (Mt. Ugni and another Vs. It is also well settled that once the application for restoration is dismissed on merit a subsequent application between the same parties is not maintainable as being barred by res judicate.” 19. In the Judgment reported in AIR 1968 Pat 302 (FB) (Mt. Ugni and another Vs. Chowa Mahto and others) it was held as follows:- “It is true that a valid agricultural lease may be created by a registered instrument as pointed out in Jangal Singh v. Mukund Kumar, AIR 1948 Pat 446, and, if such a registered document is created, delivery of possession is not necessary to prove the title of the lessee. If, however, the lease is not registered, and is, therefore, inadmissible as evidence of title, it will always be open to the tenant concerned to show that he obtained raiyati interest on the strength of actual possession and acceptance of rent by the landlord. There is also no legal bar to a person claiming raiyati interest on two alternative pleas. He may claim such a right on the basis of a written document of lease. If, however, such claim fails on the ground that the document, being compulsorily registrable, was not registered, nevertheless his alternative claim based on actual possession, coupled with acceptance of rent by the landlord, may succeed. In that case, the unregistered lease will be admissible for the collateral purpose of proving the nature of possession.” This Judgment also does not help the petitioners in any manner as the rent receipts were not produced by the petitioners before the authorities below and the documents which have been annexed with the writ petition by claiming the same to be rent receipts by making a vague statement in para 7 of the writ petition cannot be appreciated and considered for the first time in the writ proceedings particularly in view of the fact that serious allegations of fraud has been alleged against the petitioners by the private respondents. 20. The Judgment relied upon by the petitioners reported in 1977 BBCJ 479 (Harakh Sao Vs. Dukhan Pahan & Ors.) to submit that the land has not vested under Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 has no relevance in this case as the applicability of Section 48 of the aforesaid Act of 1908 is not in dispute. 20. The Judgment relied upon by the petitioners reported in 1977 BBCJ 479 (Harakh Sao Vs. Dukhan Pahan & Ors.) to submit that the land has not vested under Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 has no relevance in this case as the applicability of Section 48 of the aforesaid Act of 1908 is not in dispute. The relevant portion of the said Judgment as relied upon by the petitioners is quoted herein below for ready reference:- “5. It appears that the holder of this bhuinhari tenure has been treated as a separate class under the Act and specific provisions have been made in respect thereof. Section 10 of the Act makes a provision that there shall be no enhancement of rent in respect of such tenures. Section 17 defines ‘settled raiyat’. But, there is a separate provision under section 18 in respect of holders of Bhuinhari tenure who may as well cultivate some land in the village as raiyats. Section 46 places restrictions regarding the transfers to be made by raiyats. So far as restriction over transfer of bhuinhari tenures is concerned, a separate provision under section 48 has been made. Section 47 provides for restriction of sale of raiyat’s right under the orders of court. The parallel provision in respect of bhuinhari tenure is under section 48 A. From these provisions it can be held that the rights of a raiyat and rights of a holder of bhuinhari tenure are not same and provisions under the Act have been made separately in respect of them. 6. In this connection it may be mentioned that after vesting of the estates under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Land Reforms Act) the rights and interest of intermediaries as well as tenure-holders have vested in the State of Bihar. But, so far as the interest of bhuinhari tenures is concerned, it has been specifically excluded. Section 2(q) of the Land Reforms Act defines ‘tenure’ and section 2(q)(iii) specifically says that it shall not include a bhuinhari tenure prepared and confirmed under the Tenures Act, 1969. The result will be that the consequence of vesting provided under section 4(a) of the Land Reforms Act will not, in any manner, affect so far as such tenures are concerned. The result will be that the consequence of vesting provided under section 4(a) of the Land Reforms Act will not, in any manner, affect so far as such tenures are concerned. Learned counsel appearing for the State Government had also to concede that such tenures are in existence even after the vesting of estates under the Land Reforms Act.” (o) Further this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not find any perversity or illegality calling for any interference in the impugned orders particularly the order passed by the learned Commissioner who has passed the impugned order after considering the entire materials on record. 21. As a cumulative effect to the aforesaid findings on law and facts, this writ petition is hereby dismissed.