JUDGMENT : Devendra Kumar Arora, J. Heard Sri D.K. Pathak, learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for opposite parties no.1 and 3 and Ms. Ishita Yadu, learned Counsel for opposite party no.2. 2. By means of instant writ petition, the petitioner has questioned the correctness of impugned judgment and order dated 01.08.1996, whereby IXth Additional District Judge has dismissed the Misc. Civil Appeal No.199 of 1995 filed by the petitioner against the judgment and order dated 29.03.1994 passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Lucknow in Payment of Wages Case No.284/1990 directing the petitioner to pay Rs.79,128.40 paise under Section 15 (3) of the Payment of Wages Act to the contesting respondent (respondent no.2 Smt. Sunita Tiwari) within fifteen days. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a scheme was sponsored by the World Bank and the National Co-operative Development Corporation for constructing 4600 Village Godowns for Primary Society in the State of U.P. within a period of four years and for implementation of the said scheme, certain employees were appointed on deputation, temporary and on ad hoc basis till completion of the said project/scheme. The U.P. Co-operative Bank Limited (in short "the Bank") being an Apex Bank of the State of U.P. was required to implement the said Scheme/Project. The contesting respondent was also appointed as Typist-Steno on daily wages clearly mentioning in her appointment letter dated 19.10.1982 issued by the Chief Project Officer of the Project that her appointment is purely temporary in nature and her services can be terminated at any point of time without any prior notice. It was further clarified in her appointment letter that Service Rules of the U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. will not apply to her. Vide order dated 25.01.1985, the Chief Project Officer accorded the consolidated salary of Rs.725/- per month to the contesting respondent. 4. It has also been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that services of the contesting respondent were lent by the Project to the Bank on same pay and allowances and also on same terms and conditions as of the Project and accordingly, the contesting respondent was relieved from the World Bank Project vide letter dated 22.03.1985 and she resumed her services in the Bank on the same day. The Registrar of the Co-operative Societies vide order dated 04.07.1985 instructed the petitioner that the employees of the World Bank Project be taken by the Bank on the same terms and conditions and emoluments as were being received by them in the World Bank Project. It was further clarified that the order of regularization of the services of the employees of the project would be considered later on. 5. It has further been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the contesting respondent while working in the Bank, the Labour Inspector on his routine inspection found that she is working in the Bank and without ascertaining the facts that as to whether she was an employee of the Bank or the World Bank Project made a complaint on 04.11.1986 under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 before the Prescribed Authority. It was alleged in the said complaint that wages to the workers of the opposite gender/sex for the same work from March, 1986 to August, 1986 has not been paid to the contesting respondent. The Conciliation Officer vide order dated 22.08.1987 without considering the stand of the Bank directed the Bank to pay difference in wages amounting to Rs.2,112/- and two times compensation amounting to Rs.4,224/- to the contesting respondent. Against the order dated 22.08.1987 passed by the Conciliation Officer, the General Manager of the Bank has approached the Appellate Authority/Deputy Labour Commissioner by filing Appeal No.1 of 1987 under sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 which was partly allowed vide order dated 02.11.1989 giving difference in the wages amounting to Rs.2,112/- but declined to grant the relief of compensation. In compliance of the order dated 02.11.1989, the Bank had already paid difference amounting to Rs.2,112- for the period March, 1986 to August, 1986. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that subsequently, the contesting respondent moved an application in May, 1990 under section 15(3) of the Payment of Wages Act at Lucknow against the petitioner for payment of difference in wages from 23.03.1985 to May 1990 amounting to Rs.39,564.20 paise, which was registered as P.W. Case No.284 of 1990 (Sunita Tewari Vs. Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Limited). Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Limited). As the aforesaid application was moved by the contesting respondent after an inordinate delay of five years, an application for condoning the delay without any plausible explanation was also moved by the respondent no.2 against which the petitioner filed detailed objections but without considering the objection filed by the petitioner, the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 29.03.1994 allowed the application of the contesting respondent moved under Payment of Wages Act, 1936 with a direction to the petitioner to pay Rs.39,564.20 paise and one time compensation to the same amounting to Rs.79,128.40 paise in favour of the contesting respondent within fifteen days. Against the order dated 29.03.1994, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 along with an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The appeal was registered as M.C.A. No.119 of 1995 and the said appeal has been dismissed by IXth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Lucknow vide order dated 01.08.1996, which is impugned in the instant writ petition. 7. It has again been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the State Government in its meeting dated 25.06.1992 considered the fact that the period of project was going to expire on 30.06.1992, it gave a decision to conclude the affairs of the project by September, 1992. The State Government vide order dated 20.10.1992, issued directions to the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board to regularise services of 93 Class-III and 35 Class-IV employees (total 128 employees) of the World Bank Project working in the Bank. Vide Government Order dated 30.09.1993, the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, UP issued directions to the UP Co-operative Institutional Service Board to undergo a process for allotment of aforesaid 128 employees of the World Bank Project working in the Bank. It has further been stated that in case of any legal impediment with regard to the allotment, the same be consulted with the State Government. Pursuant to the Government orders dated 20.10.1992 and 30.09.1993, the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board, vide letter dated 10.12.1993 allotted Class-III and Class-IV employees of the erstwhile World Bank Project working in the Bank on the terms and conditions of the World Bank Project to the Bank against the vacant posts of the concerned category. 8. Pursuant to the Government orders dated 20.10.1992 and 30.09.1993, the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board, vide letter dated 10.12.1993 allotted Class-III and Class-IV employees of the erstwhile World Bank Project working in the Bank on the terms and conditions of the World Bank Project to the Bank against the vacant posts of the concerned category. 8. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the World Bank Project was a separate entity and the U.P. Co-operative Bank Limited was a key to implement the Project. In fact, the Project was a brainchild of the State Government and it was closed by the State Government and the non-technical employees of the Project were directed by the State Government to be absorbed in various co-operative institutions including the Bank through the channel of the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board. Regulation-5 of the Service Regulations, 1975 provides that all the recruitments for the appointment in a co-operative society shall be made through U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board and according to Regulation-15, no appointment shall be made except in the manner provided for in the Service Regulations, 1975, therefore, a person can be an employee of the Co-operative Society only if he/she is appointed within the ambit of the Service Regulations, 1975 through U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board. The power of regular appointment emanates to a Co-operative Society from the power of allotment exercised by the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board. 9. It has also been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Payment of Wages Act do not apply to the Bank as the same is not a factory or railway or an industrial or other establishment specified in sub-clause (a) to (g) of Clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Sub-section (ii) of Section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 provides that the Bank does not come within the purview of the definition "Industrial or other establishment". It has further been contended that no Notification under Section 2(ii)(h) of the Payment of Wages Act has been issued by the State Government making the said Act applicable to the Bank. It has further been contended that no Notification under Section 2(ii)(h) of the Payment of Wages Act has been issued by the State Government making the said Act applicable to the Bank. Despite the non-applicability of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 to the Bank, the IXth Additional District and Sessions Judge (opposite party no.1) taking aid of the provisions of Section 22(f) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1984 and the Notification dated 31.03.1978 issued under Section 22(f) of the Minimum Wages Act, applied the provisions of Payment of Wages Act to the Bank holding the same as "Commercial Establishment" under the Minimum Wages Act. The IXth Additional District Judge has also erred in observing that as Section 2(g) of the Minimum Wages Act applies to the "Scheduled Employment" and as per Notification under Section 22(f) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, all the shops and commercial establishments come within the purview of "Scheduled Employment" and since the Bank being a commercial establishment under the Shop and Commercial Establishment Act, hence it also come under the purview of "Scheduled Employment". 10. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the State Government vide Notification dated 23.05.1985 has exempted the "Scheduled Banks" under the Reserve Bank of India, 1934 from the application of all the provisions of U.P. Shop & Commercial Establishment Act, 1962. The "Scheduled Bank" as defined under Section 2(e) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 means, a bank included in the second schedule. The U.P. Co-operative Bank Limited is also included in the second schedule of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and is one of the "Scheduled Bank", thus, the inference of the respondent no.1 about the applicability of the Payment of Wages Act and holding the bank as commercial establishment under the U.P. Shop and Commercial Establishment Act, 1962 is absolutely wrong and illegal. The respondent no.1 failed to appreciate that the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act were also not maintainable as the present case also involved the dispute about the appointment of contesting respondent and her employer during the relevant period. This issue could be decided only in Labour Court. The respondent no.1 failed to appreciate that the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act were also not maintainable as the present case also involved the dispute about the appointment of contesting respondent and her employer during the relevant period. This issue could be decided only in Labour Court. The respondent no.2 during the period 23.03.1985 up to May, 1990 was not an employee of the Bank but was an employee of the World Bank Project, hence a parity could not be drawn between her and a regular employee of the Bank. Moreover, the respondent no.1 failed to appreciate that the contesting respondent being an employee of the World Bank Project was working in the Bank on the terms and conditions of the Project and was being paid as per her appointment order and the orders issued by the Chief Project Officer from time to time. It is also contended that under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the Prescribed Authority has no jurisdiction to determine or decide the wages payable as it can only award delayed wages or deduction in wages. 11. In contrast, learned Counsel for the contesting respondent has submitted that the appointment of respondent no.2 was never disputed at any forum even at the stage of the case under Equal Remuneration Act or under the Payment of Wages Act. The creation of the World Bank Project Division by the petitioner-Bank was a colourable exercise of power and was with the aim to deprive the employees working therein from their rightful salary and other allowances. In fact, the so called World Bank Project Division is a part and parcel of the petitioner-Bank as such all the employees engaged in whatsoever nature under the said Scheme, were employees of the petitioner-Bank. 12. Learned Counsel for the contesting respondent has also submitted that a perusal of the letter dated 25.10.1985 written by the Chairman, Uttar Pradesh Sahkari Sansthagat Seva Mandal, who was the Appointing Authority of all U.P. Co-operative Employees, to the Chief Project Officer reveals that the Appointing Authority of the petitioner Bank himself has informed that the World Bank Project is a part and parcel of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Bank Limited as such all employees working therein are employees of the petitioner-Bank and they were entitled for the same wages and other allowances, which the other similarly situated employees of the petitioner-Bank were receiving. 13. 13. Learned Counsel for the contesting respondent has submitted that the amount of Rs.79,128.40 paise is a meager sum for the Bank, however, being a substantial amount for a lowly paid employee such as the contesting respondent, and in light of the fact that an interim order dated 16.07.1997 passed by this court is already operating in favour of the contesting respondent, grave injustice will be caused to the contesting respondent if the instant writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders are quashed, meaning thereby that the interim order dated 16.07.1997 will be vacated and the disputed amount will be recovered from her salary. 14. It has been vehemently argued that the instant writ petition has been preferred by the Bank with a view to deprive the answering respondent of her hard earned wages from the date of her regularization as provided in the aforesaid decision of the Board dated 31.01.2014 keeping in view the principle of "equal pay for equal work". Furthermore, the contesting respondent is entitled to equal pay for equal work done by her in parity with other regular employees of the Bank till date in furtherance of and in accordance with the impugned orders. Thus the instant writ petition is wholly misconceived and an abuse of the process of law by the Bank and is liable to be disposed of as such with directions to the respondents to pay contesting respondent equal pay for equal work done by her in parity with other regular employees of the bank till date. 15. Learned Counsel for the contesting respondent has submitted that the petitioner has raised certain factual disputes which have already been considered by the respondent no.1 in the appeal preferred by him. Thus, the instant writ petition, wherein questions of fact are involved, is barred by law laid down in the case of Shubhashree Das @ Milli Vs. State of Orissa and others, (2012) 9 SCC 729 and in the case of Orissa Agro Industries Corporation Limited and others Vs. Bharati Industries and others, (2005) 12 SCC 725 . Thus, the instant writ petition, wherein questions of fact are involved, is barred by law laid down in the case of Shubhashree Das @ Milli Vs. State of Orissa and others, (2012) 9 SCC 729 and in the case of Orissa Agro Industries Corporation Limited and others Vs. Bharati Industries and others, (2005) 12 SCC 725 . It has also been contended that impugned orders dated 29.03.1994 and 01.08.1996 are being assailed by the petitioner primarily on the ground that the contesting respondent is not entitled to equal pay for equal work at parity with the other employees of the petitioner Bank because the answering respondent was appointed by the Bank in 1985 for the World Bank Project Division of the petitioner Bank. In support of her contention, learned Counsel for contesting respondent has invited the attention of this Court towards letter dated 31.01.2014 (Annexure-SCA-1 to the Supplementary Counter Affidavit dated 23.10.2017) wherein it was decided by the Board that the contesting respondent would be deemed to be appointed in the Bank on ad hoc basis on 22.03.1985 and directed that seniority of the answering respondent be determined deeming the contesting respondent to have been regularised on the date on which next junior employee appointed on ad hoc basis in the Bank has been regularised. 16. Learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 has further submitted that the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Bank Limited is an Apex level society governed by the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and the State of Uttar Pradesh has deep and pervasive control over day to day affairs of the Bank. The employees of the Bank are governed by the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975 as such the Bank is covered under the definition of "State" as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India, hence the petitioner Bank is legally bound by the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which provides for "equal pay for equal work". 17. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 18. The concept of a social welfare legislation such as the Payment of Wages Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Equal Remuneration Act etc. 17. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 18. The concept of a social welfare legislation such as the Payment of Wages Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Equal Remuneration Act etc. are derived from Part IV of the Constitution of India which are the Directive Principles of State Policy to be adopted by the Government towards achieving the ends of being a Welfare State. Article 38(2), Article 39(d) and Article 43 reads as under for ready reference of this Court: "38(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities in income, and endeavor to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations. 39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State: The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women. (43) Living wage, etc, for workers 19. The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co operative basis in rural areas." 20. In the case of Bangalore Turf Club Limited Vs. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, (2014) 9 SCC 657, the Apex Court while discussing the scope and applicability of the provisions of a similar social welfare beneficial legislation has held as under: "17. The primary rule of interpretation of statutes may be the literal rule, however, in the case of beneficial legislations and legislations enacted for the welfare of employees, workmen, this court has on numerous occasions adopted the liberal rule of interpretation to ensure that the benefits extend to those workers who need to be covered based on the intention of the Legislature. 18. The ESI Act is a welfare legislation enacted by the Central Government as a consequence of the urgent need for a scheme of health insurance for workers. It would be beneficial to reproduce the preamble of the ESI Act in this context. 18. The ESI Act is a welfare legislation enacted by the Central Government as a consequence of the urgent need for a scheme of health insurance for workers. It would be beneficial to reproduce the preamble of the ESI Act in this context. It is as under: "An Act to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto." 19. In the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Francis De Costa 1993 Supp (4) SCC 100 (at page 105), this Court, held that: 5. The Act seeks to cover sickness, maternity, employment injury, occupational disease, etc. The Act is a social security legislation. It is settled law that to prevent injustice or to promote justice and to effectuate the object and purpose of the welfare legislation, broad interpretation should be given, even if it requires a departure from literal construction. The Court must seek light from loadstar Arts. 38 and 39 and the economic and social justice envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution which would enliven meaningful right to life of the worker under Article 21. Article 39(e) enjoins the State to protect the health of the workers under Article 41 to secure sickness and disablement benefits and Article 43 accords decent standard of life. Right to medical and disability benefits are fundamental human rights under Article 25(2) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7(b) of International Convention of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Right to health, a fundamental human right stands enshrined in socio-economic justice of our constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concomitantly right to medical benefit to a workman is his/her fundamental right. The Act seeks to succor the maintenance of health of an ensured workman. The interpretative endeavour should be to effectuate the above. Right to medical benefit is, thus, a fundamental right to the workman. 6. Moreover, even in the realm of interpretation of statutes Rule of Law is a dynamic concept of expansion and fulfillment for which the interpretation would be so given as to sub-serve the social and economic justice envisioned in the Constitution. Legislation is a conscious attempt, as a social direction, in the process of change. The fusion between the law and social change would be effected only when law is introspected in the context of ordinary social life. Legislation is a conscious attempt, as a social direction, in the process of change. The fusion between the law and social change would be effected only when law is introspected in the context of ordinary social life. Life of the law has not been logic but has been of experience. It is a means to serve social purpose and felt necessities of the people. In times of stress, disability, injury, etc. the workman needs statutory protection and assistance. The Act fastens in an ensured employment statutory obligation on the employer and the employee to contribute in the prescribed proportion and the manner towards the welfare fund constituted under the Act (Ss.38 to 51 of the Act) to provide sustenance to the workmen in their hours of need, particularly when they become economically inactive because of a cause attributable to their employment or disability or death occurred while in employment. The fact that the employee contributed to the fund out of his/her hard earned wages cannot but have a vital bearing in adjudicating whether the injury or occupational disease suffered/contracted by and employee is an employment injury. The liability is based neither on any contract nor upon any act or omission by the employer but upon the existence of the relationship which employer bears to the employment during the course of which the employee had been injured. The Act supplant the action at law, based upon not on the fault but as an aspect of social welfare, to rehabilitate a physically and economically handicapped workman who is adversely effected by sickness, injury or livelihood of dependents by death of a workman. 20. A three-Judge Bench of this Court, in reference to the ESI Act, in the case of Transport Corporation of India Vs. ESI Corporation; (2000) 1 SCC 332 (at page 357), held that: "27. Before parting with the discussion on this point, it is necessary to keep in view the salient fact that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to provide benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity, employment injury and for certain other matters in relation thereto. It is enacted with a view to ensuring social welfare and for providing safe insurance cover to employees who were likely to suffer from various physical illnesses during the course of their employment. It is enacted with a view to ensuring social welfare and for providing safe insurance cover to employees who were likely to suffer from various physical illnesses during the course of their employment. Such a beneficial piece of legislation has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to fructify the legislative intention underlying its enactment. When two views are possible on its applicability to a given set of employees, that view, which furthers the legislative intention should be preferred to the one which would frustrate it...." 28. Dealing with this very Act, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah AIR 1964 SC 1272 speaking through Gajendragadkar, J., (as he then was) held, accepting the contention of the learned Counsel, Mr. Dolia that: 10. .... It is a piece of social legislation intended to confer specified benefits on workmen to whom it applies, and so, it would be inappropriate to attempt to construe the relevant provisions in a technical or a narrow sense. This position cannot be disputed. But in dealing with the plea raised by Mr. Dolia that the section should be liberally construed, we cannot overlook the fact that the liberal construction must ultimately flow from the words used in the section. If the words used in the section are capable of two constructions one of which is shown patently to assist the achievement of the object of the Act, courts would be justified in preferring that construction to the other which may not be able to further the object of the Act. 21. In the case of Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corporation (2009) 9 SCC 61 (at page 66), it was observed that: 20. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a beneficial legislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the Preamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to employees of a factory in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provisions for certain other matters in relation thereto. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a social security legislation and the canons of interpreting a social legislation are different from the canons of interpretation of taxation law. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a social security legislation and the canons of interpreting a social legislation are different from the canons of interpretation of taxation law. The courts must not countenance any subterfuge which would defeat the provisions of social legislation and the courts must even, it necessary, strain the language of the Act in order to achieve the purpose which the legislature had in placing this legislation on the statute book. The act, therefore, must receive a liberal construction so as to promote its objects. 27. In the aforementioned context, this court further referred to the case of S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 , wherein it was held that: 12. It is a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. 31. We may safely conclude that the literal rule of construction may be the primary approach to be utilized for interpretation of a statute and that words in the statute should in the first instance be given their meaning as understood in common parlance. However, the ESI Act is a beneficial legislation. It seeks to provide social security to those workers as it encompasses. In light of the cases referred above, it may be seen that the traditional approach can be substituted. A dictionary meaning may be attached to words in a statute in preference over the traditional meaning. However, for this purpose as Well, the scheme, context and objects of the legislature must be taken into consideration. Taking into due consideration the nature and purpose of the ESI Act, the dictionary meaning as understood in the context of the said Act, would be preferably to achieve the objects of the legislature. 21. However, for this purpose as Well, the scheme, context and objects of the legislature must be taken into consideration. Taking into due consideration the nature and purpose of the ESI Act, the dictionary meaning as understood in the context of the said Act, would be preferably to achieve the objects of the legislature. 21. In the case of Bangalore Turf Club (Supra), while giving a broad and liberal interpretation to the word "establishment" the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held that the provisions of a social welfare legislation like the Employees' State Insurance Act may be made applicable to the employees of a Club or a Race Course even if the same has not been notified as an "Establishment" under sub-section 2(h) of the payment of Wages Act for the purpose of extending the benefits under such a welfare legislation. 22. It is a well settled proposition of law that while exercising its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court may not set aside an order and if it sets aside, it will perpetuate an illegality or have the inevitable effect of reviving an illegality i.e. the act of denial of equal pay for equal work to the answering respondent by the Bank which is in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the answering respondent under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been urged that if the instant writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside, it will have the inevitable effect of perpetuating an illegality qua the violation of fundamental rights of the answering respondent which is impermissible in the eyes of law as laid down by the Apex Court in various cases, few of which are reported in the case of Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust and another Vs. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel and another; (2012) 9 SCC 310 and Maharaj Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo Vs. State of Bihar and others; (1999) 8 SCC 16 . 23. The intention of the Constitution of India as well as the social welfare legislations like the Payment of Wages Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Equal Remuneration Act etc. are directed towards attaining the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution which, when achieved, would permit the State to claim that they have setup a welfare state. 23. The intention of the Constitution of India as well as the social welfare legislations like the Payment of Wages Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Equal Remuneration Act etc. are directed towards attaining the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution which, when achieved, would permit the State to claim that they have setup a welfare state. Article 38(1) enjoins the State to strive to promote welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effective as it may a social order in which the State shall strive to minimize the inequalities in income. Article 39(d) enjoins a duty to see that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women. The aforesaid contention of the answering respondent is based on judicial pronouncements rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, one of which has been in the case of State of Punjab and others Vs. Jagjit Singh and others, (2017) 1 SCC 148 , wherein while holding that even a temporary employee (daily wager, ad-hoc employee, etc.) is entitled to equal pay for equal work being done by such employee in parity with regularly appointed employees, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has laid down a precedent with regards to the matter of equal pay for equal work, which forms the backbone of the controversy raised by the petitioners in the instant writ petition. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced below for ready reference: - "54. There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of ''equal pay for equal work' has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded through a large number of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law declared by this Court. The same is binding on all the courts in India, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of the principle, have been summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. The principle of ''equal pay for equal work' has also been extended to temporary employees (differently described as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position, relating to temporary employees, has been summarized by us, in paragraph 44 hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly declared, is being reiterated by us, yet again. 55. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. The legal position, relating to temporary employees, has been summarized by us, in paragraph 44 hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly declared, is being reiterated by us, yet again. 55. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 56. We would also like to extract herein Article 7, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. The same is reproduced below:- "Article 7. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: (a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant; (b) Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays." India is a signatory to the above covenant, having ratified the same on 10.4.1979. There is no escape from the above obligation, in view of different provisions of the Constitution referred to above, and in view of the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the principle of ''equal pay for equal work' constitutes a clear and unambiguous right and is vested in every employee - whether engaged on regular or temporary basis. 57. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of ''equal pay for equal work', in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ''equal pay for equal work' summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ''equal pay for equal work' would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post. 24. In the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has hold that in a welfare State like India denying the fruits of labour to an employee based on artificial parameters (like daily wage employee, ad hoc employee etc.) is impermissible as long as the employee is discharging the same duties and holding the same responsibilities as a regular employee. 25. Under the Equal Remuneration Act, the contesting respondent is entitled to equal pay for equal work. The appointment of contesting respondent was never in dispute at any forum even at the stage of the case under Equal Remuneration Act or under the Payment of Wages Act. 26. The present case is to be examined in the light of the aforesaid legal position coupled with the fact that the finding of facts recorded by the court below cannot be upset unless perversity is established. In the case at hand, a perusal of the record shows that the respondent was being paid less wages as compared to other similarly situated employees of the petitioner-Bank, and this anomaly was detected by the Labour Enforcement Inspector during his routine checking and registered a case before the Competent Authority-cum-Regional Conciliation Officer under the Equal Remuneration Act. The Prescribed Authority under the Equal Remuneration Act after examining the entire facts of the case, passed an order that since the petitioner's Bank has paid less salary to the respondent during the period March, 1986 to August,1986, therefore, she is entitled to difference of wages amounting to Rs. 2,112.00 altogether with two times compensation. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner-Bank filed an Appeal which was registered as Appeal No. 1/87. 2,112.00 altogether with two times compensation. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner-Bank filed an Appeal which was registered as Appeal No. 1/87. The Appellate Authority after hearing the parties, confirmed the order of the Prescribed Authority except the payment of two time compensation. Consequently, the petitioner-Bank vide pay order dated 20.2.1990 credited an amount of Rs. 2,112/- towards difference of salary of the respondent. After the compliance of the orders of the Prescribed Authority under Equal Remuneration Act as well as orders of the Appellate Authority under the Equal Remuneration Act, no dispute was raised before any Forum. 27. It may be pointed out that when the employee came to know that she is entitled to equal salary from 21.3.1985 onwards and the Bank has paid less salary, she filed a case under Payment of Wages Act before the Prescribed Authority-Cum-Deputy Labour Commissioner, which was registered as case No. 284/90. The Prescribed Authority after going through the relevant record filed by the both parties, passed an order dated 29.3.1994 directing that a sum of Rs. 39,564/- has wrongfully been withheld from the salary of the employee as such the same is liable to be paid together with one time compensation i.e. a total sum of Rs. 79,128.40. At the cost of repetition, it is mentioned that at no point of time the appointment of the respondent was disputed either when proceedings were drawn under the Equal Remuneration Act or under the Payment of Wages Act. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Prescribed Authority has exceeded its jurisdiction. It may be noted that the findings of the case recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the conclusion have been arrived by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. 28. In the instant case, petitioners have utterly failed to show perversity in the impugned order, which would be reflected from the fact that during the pendency of the writ petition, the Board took a decision dated 31.1.2014 in relation to respondent and provided that the contesting respondent would be deemed to be appointed in the petitioner-Bank on ad hoc basis on 22.3.1985. The Board further directed that seniority of the answering respondent be determined deeming the private respondent to have been regularised on the date on which next junior employee appointed on ad hoc basis in petitioner-Bank has been regularized. It appears that the said decision was taken by the Board in view of the provisions contained in Regulation 26 of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Employee's Service Regulations, 1975. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I am of the view that no interference is required in the matter and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, which is hereby dismissed. It may be clarified that from the records it appears that the amount has already been released in favour of the respondent and as such petitioners are directed to release the security furnished by the respondent within a month from today.