State Of U. P. Thru’ Sub Registrar-Sadar, Pratapgarh v. Chief Controller Revenue Authority, U. P.
2018-08-09
SALIL KUMAR RAI
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Heard the Standing Counsel for the petitioner and Sri R.C. Singh, counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 5. 2. A sale deed dated 12.5.2015 of a plot measuring 510 sq. meter and a building constructed on 240.5 sq. meter of the said plot was executed in favour of respondent nos. 2 to 5. In the aforesaid sale deed, it was disclosed that the building was a residential building and stamp duty was accordingly computed and paid by the respondents. Subsequently, the Sub-Registrar submitted a report dated 15.5.2015 stating that the building was occupied by the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer and consequently a reference dated 25.5.2015 under Section 47-A(1)(d) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘Act, 1899) was made by the Assistant Inspector General of Registration to the Collector, Pratapgarh recommending that the market value of the property and the stamp duty to be paid on the sale deed dated 12.5.2015 had to be determined on the rates fixed for commercial building and according to Rule 5(c)(ii) of the Uttar Pradesh Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘Rules, 1997’). On the aforesaid report, Case No. 22 under Section 47-A(2) of the Act, 1899 was registered in the court of Collector, Pratapgarh and in the said case, show cause notice was issued to respondent nos. 2 to 5 who submitted their reply to the same. In their reply, respondent nos. 2 to 5 stated that they had not received any rent from the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer and as the building was a residential building and not a commercial building, therefore, its market value had to be determined by ascertaining the value of its construction and not on the minimum monthly rent fixed by the Collector for the area. The Collector, Pratapgarh vide his order dated 12.8.2015 rejected the defence of respondent nos. 2 to 5 and relying on the report of the Sub-Registrar held that the building was a commercial building and the market value of the property and the stamp duty to be paid on the sale deed had to be determined accordingly. In view of the aforesaid finding, the Collector determined the market value of the property by multiplying the total area of the plot i.e. 510 sq.
In view of the aforesaid finding, the Collector determined the market value of the property by multiplying the total area of the plot i.e. 510 sq. meter with three hundred times the minimum rent fixed by the Collector for the area under Rule 4 of Rules, 1997 i.e. Rs.250/- per sq. meter. Consequently the Collector, Pratapgarh held that there was a deficiency of Rs.21,67,500/- in payment of stamp duty by respondent nos. 2 to 5 and therefore directed that the aforesaid amount along with a penalty of 5% on the said amount and an interest calculated at the rate of 1.5% per month be recovered from respondent nos. 2 to 5. Against the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector, Pratapgarh, respondent nos. 2 to 5 filed Appeal No. 175/2015-16 before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Uttar Pradesh at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as, ‘CCRA’) under Section 56 of the Act, 1899. The CCRA vide its order dated 30.11.2015 allowed Appeal No. 175/2015-16 and set-aside the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector on the ground that the area in which the property was situated had not been notified for offices and the building existing on the plot was not a commercial building under the Rules, 1997. In his order dated 30.11.2015, the CCRA held that there was no deficiency in payment of stamp duty on the sale deed dated 12.5.2015. The order dated 30.11.2015 passed by the CCRA in Appeal No. 175/2015-16 has been challenged by the State of Uttar Pradesh in the present writ petition. 3. It has been argued by the Standing Counsel that the building existing on the property was occupied by the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer and the aforesaid fact was not disclosed by respondent nos. 2 to 5 in the sale deed dated 12.5.2015. It was argued that in the aforesaid circumstances, the market value of the building and the stamp duty to be paid had to be determined under Rule 5(c)(ii) of Rules, 1997 as the building was a commercial building as defined in Section 2(d) of Rules, 1997 and therefore the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector was according to law.
It was argued that in the aforesaid circumstances, the market value of the building and the stamp duty to be paid had to be determined under Rule 5(c)(ii) of Rules, 1997 as the building was a commercial building as defined in Section 2(d) of Rules, 1997 and therefore the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector was according to law. It was further argued by the Standing Counsel that the absence of any notification declaring the area for office purposes and the nature of constructions were not relevant to determine the nature of the building, i.e. whether, the building was commercial or non-commercial. It was argued by the Standing Counsel that the actual rent paid to the petitioner was also not relevant to determine the market value of the property in as much as the building existing on the plot was a commercial building and therefore the Collector rightly determined the market value of the property applying the principle in Rule 5(c)(ii) of Rules, 1997. It was argued that for the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 30.11.2015 passed by the CCRA is vitiated due to consideration of irrelevant factors and is liable to be set-aside. Rebutting the arguments of the Standing Counsel, counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 5 argued that the constructions existing on the plot were temporary in nature and respondents did not receive any rent from the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer. It was argued by the counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 5 that there was no evidence on record showing that the building was let out on rent to the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer either by respondent nos. 2 to 5 or the vendors of respondent nos. 2 to 5 or they had received any rent from the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer and, therefore, the market value of the property could not have been determined treating the building to be a commercial building even though the same was occupied by the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer. On the basis of his aforesaid arguments, the counsel for respondents has argued that the order dated 30.11.2015 passed by the CCRA is according to law and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. I have considered the rival submissions of counsel for the parties and also perused the records. 5.
On the basis of his aforesaid arguments, the counsel for respondents has argued that the order dated 30.11.2015 passed by the CCRA is according to law and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. I have considered the rival submissions of counsel for the parties and also perused the records. 5. It is admitted that at the time of execution of the sale deed dated 12.5.2015, the building existing on the plot was occupied by the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer. A perusal of the records annexed with the writ petition and the supplementary affidavit show that, in proceedings before the Collector, the respondents had merely stated that they had not received any rent from the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer. The aforesaid denial does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the building was not let out on rent by the vendors of the respondents. However, the mere fact that the building was let out on rent by the vendors of the respondents and was occupied by the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer on rent at the time of execution of the sale deed would not in itself be sufficient to determine the market value of the property treating it to be a commercial building under Rule 2(d) of the Rules, 1997. A commercial building for the purposes of the Act, 1899 and the Rules, 1997 has been defined in Section 2(d) as follows: “(d) ‘Commercial building’ means commercial establishment or shop as defined respectively in clause (4) and clause (16) of Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962.” At this juncture, it would also be relevant to reproduce Sections 2(4) and 2(16) of the Uttar Pradesh Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘Adhiniyam, 1962’): “2. Definitions.
Definitions. - (4) ‘Commercial establishment’ means any premises, not being the premises of a factory, or a shop, wherein any trade, business, manufacture, or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary thereto, is carried on for profit and includes a premises wherein journalistic or printing work, or business of banking, insurance, stocks and shares, brokerage or produce exchange is carried on, or which is used as theatre, cinema, or for any other public amusement or entertainment or where the clerical and other establishment of a factory, to whom the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948, do not apply, work; (16) ‘shop’ means any premises where any wholesale or retail trade or business is carried on, or where services are rendered to customers, and includes, all offices, godowns or warehouses, whether in the same premises or not, which are used in connection with such trade or business;” 6. It is not the case of the petitioner State that the building was used as a shop as defined in Section 2(16) of the Adhiniyam, 1962. In that view of the matter, the building would be a commercial building only if it was covered by the definition of a commercial establishment as given in Section 2(4) of the Adhiniyam, 1962 i.e. the building was being used for any trade or business and the activities carried on it were for profit. Letting out a house on rent is not necessarily a trade or business and an activity for profit. In this context, it would be relevant to quote the observations of the Supreme Court in M/s. Sultan Brothers Private Ltd. Bombay, Appellant vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City II, Bombay, Respondent, AIR 1964 SC 1389 (V 51 C 183): “A very large number of cases was referred to in support of this contention but it does not seem to us that much assistance can be derived from them. Whether a particular letting is business has to be decided in the circumstances of each case. We do not think that the cases cited lay down a test for deciding when a letting amounts to a business. We think each case has to be looked at from a businessman’s point of view to find out whether the letting was the doing of a business or the exploitation of his property by an owner.
We do not think that the cases cited lay down a test for deciding when a letting amounts to a business. We think each case has to be looked at from a businessman’s point of view to find out whether the letting was the doing of a business or the exploitation of his property by an owner. We do not further think that a thing can by its very nature be a commercial asset. A commercial asset is only an asset used in a business and nothing else, and business may be carried on with practically all things. Therefore it is not possible to say that a particular activity is business because it is concerned with an asset with which trade is commonly carried on. We find nothing in the cases referred, to support the proposition that certain assets are commercial assets in their very nature.” (emphasis added) 7. Evidently, the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector is based on the premise that as the building was let out on rent and was occupied by a stranger, therefore, it was a commercial building as defined in Rule 2(d) of the Rules, 1997. The aforesaid assumption of the Collector is clearly contrary to law. 8. A reading of the order dated 12.8.2015 shows that while determining the market value of the property, the Collector had multiplied the total area of the plot with three hundred times the minimum rent fixed by the Collector for the area under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1997. It is evident from the sale deed dated 12.5.2015 as well as from the report of the Sub-Registrar that the building existed only on 240.5 sq. meter. Therefore, in any case, while determining the market value of the property, the Collector could not have multiplied the total area of the plot with three hundred times the minimum rent fixed for the area by the Collector under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1997. In view of Rule 5(c)(ii) of Rules, 1997 the minimum value of a commercial building is determined by multiplying three hundred times the minimum monthly rent of the building. The minimum monthly rent of the building is calculated by multiplying the constructed area of each floor of the building with the minimum rent fixed by the Collector under Rule 4 of Rules, 1997.
The minimum monthly rent of the building is calculated by multiplying the constructed area of each floor of the building with the minimum rent fixed by the Collector under Rule 4 of Rules, 1997. In the present case, the Collector has determined the value of the property by applying the factor given in the second column of Rule 5(c)(ii) to the total area of the plot, i.e., 510 sq. meters and not only on 240.5 sq. meters which was the constructed area of the building. For the aforesaid reason also the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector was contrary to law. 9. However, the order dated 30.11.2015 passed by the CCRA whereby the CCRA has set-aside the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector is also not supported by valid and legal reasons. In its order dated 30.11.2015, the CCRA has held that the building existing on the plot was not a commercial building because the constructions existing on the plot were not suitable for office purposes and the area had not been notified for official buildings. The CCRA has also set-aside the order dated 12.8.2015 on the ground that the alleged tenant in the building i.e. the Assistant Divisional Transport Officer is a government functionary. The aforesaid factors are not relevant to decide the nature of the building existing on the plot as well as to determine the market value of the property. 10. It is evident that while computing the stamp duty to be paid on any instrument, the market value of the property which is the subject of the instrument has to be determined. A perusal of Rule 3 of Rules, 1997 shows that in case of a building, the actual annual rent of the building is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while determining its market value even if the building is a non-commercial building. While passing the order dated 30.11.2015, the CCRA did not consider the said factor. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the order dated 30.11.2015 passed by the CCRA allowing Appeal No. 175/2015-16 is also contrary to law and liable to be set-aside. However, in view of the reasons stated before, the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector is also contrary to law and liable to be set-aside. 12.
11. In view of the aforesaid, the order dated 30.11.2015 passed by the CCRA allowing Appeal No. 175/2015-16 is also contrary to law and liable to be set-aside. However, in view of the reasons stated before, the order dated 12.8.2015 passed by the Collector is also contrary to law and liable to be set-aside. 12. The writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 30.11.2015 and 12.8.2015 passed by the CCRA and Collector are set-aside. The matter is remanded back to the Collector, Pratapgarh to decide Case No. 22 and pass fresh orders in the same in accordance with law and in the light of observations made in the judgment.