JUDGMENT G.S. Patel, J. - This Chamber Summons is filed by the original Judgment Debtor No.2 for the following reliefs: "(a) That the Defendant No. 2 be relieved of all the undertakings and may be allowed to withdraw all the statements made before this Hon''ble Court which are recorded in Exhibits - "F" to "J". (b) That the orders dated 16th February 2018 and 22nd February 2018 may be recalled and/or modified and the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 be heard on the present Chamber Summons without depositing of Rs. 4,75,00,000/- (Rupees Four Crores and Seventy Five Lakhs only) in this Hon''ble Court. (c) That it be declared that the Consent Decree dated 16th February 2016 passed by this Hon''ble Court is a nullity and incapable of being executed against the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. (d) That the Commercial Execution Application No. 63 of 2018 taken out by the Plaintiffs/Decree Holders to execute the Consent Decree dated 16th February 2016 be dismissed. (e) That the Plaintiffs be ordered and directed to refund the said amount of Rs. 2,56,77,688/- (Rupees Two Crores Fifty Six Lakhs Seventy Seven Thousand Six Hundred and Eighty Eight only) to the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. (f) That the Plaintiffs/Decree Holders be permanently restrained by an order and injunction of this Hon''ble Court from relying upon and/or taking any further steps pursuant to the Consent Decree dated 16th February 2016. (g) That it be declared that the Plaintiffs do not have any right of any nature of whatsoever in the film viz. "Phir Hera Pheri-3". 2. In essence, the application is to set aside the Consent Decree dated 16th February 2016. This is the wording of prayer clause (c). The submission by Mr Vashi, shortly stated, is that the Consent Decree is a nullity and cannot be executed against Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 3. I have heard Mr Vashi for the Applicant, the 2nd Judgment Debtor at length. I also heard Mr Purohit and Mr Mookhi for the Decree Holder. Having considered their submissions carefully, I am unable to accept the sole submission advanced by Mr Vashi that the decree must be held to be a nullity because it is hit by the provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act. I have, for the reasons that follow, dismissed the Chamber Summons. 4. Having considered their submissions carefully, I am unable to accept the sole submission advanced by Mr Vashi that the decree must be held to be a nullity because it is hit by the provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act. I have, for the reasons that follow, dismissed the Chamber Summons. 4. Before I turn to the rival submissions in detail, a brief factual background is necessary. The suit was originally filed for decree in favour of 1st Plaintiff in the amount of Rs. 74,10,000/- as per the particulars of the claim Exhibit "K" to the Plaint; in favour of the 2nd Plaintiff in the amount of Rs. 1,71,00,000/- as per the particulars of the claim, Exhibit "L" to the Plaint; and in favour of the 3rd Plaintiff for an amount of Rs. 2,25,86,250/- as per the particulars of the claim, Exhibit "M" to the Plaint. The second prayer sought a declaration that the Plaintiffs have a lien and charge on two films, ''Welcome Back'' and ''Hera Pheri 3'' produced by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 5. On 16th February 2016, Consent Terms were filed in the suit and the parties took a Consent Decree. A copy of the Consent Terms is at Exhibit "D" at page 31. In this, Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 submitted to a Decree in the following manner: "2. Decree against Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and in favour of: (a) Plaintiff No. 1 for sum of Rs. 65,00,000/- (Rupees Sixty Five Lakhs only) with interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum from 1st June 2015 till payment and/or realization of the decretal amount; (b) Plaintiff No. 2 for sum of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Fifty Lakhs only) with interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum from 1st June 2015 till payment and/or realization of the decretal amount. (c) Plaintiff No. 3 of sum of Rs. 1,98,12,500/- (Rupees One Crore Ninety Eight Lakhs Twelve Thousand Five Hundred only) with interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum from 1st June 2015 till payment and/or realization of the decretal amount." 6. Clause (3) of these Consent Terms contained the following undertakings: "3. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 undertake to this Hon''ble Court to pay the aforesaid decretal amount to the Plaintiffs within 1 year from the date hereof time being of essence." 7. Clause (3) of these Consent Terms contained the following undertakings: "3. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 undertake to this Hon''ble Court to pay the aforesaid decretal amount to the Plaintiffs within 1 year from the date hereof time being of essence." 7. Clauses 4 and 5 set out that Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had paid certain amounts to the Plaintiffs by specified cheques. Clause 6 said that if any of these cheques were dishonoured, the Plaintiffs would be entitled to execute the Decree immediately. 8. The point to be noted about this Consent Decree is not that it merely contained an amount acknowledged to be a decretal debt, but it contained also an undertaking by the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the Judgment Debtors, to pay the decretal debt. 9. The cheques issued by the Defendants were dishonoured and the Plaintiffs therefore put the Consent Decree in execution, filing Commercial Execution Application No. 63 of 2017. In this the Plaintiffs then took out a Chamber Summons in the usual form. On 28th November 2017 the matter was listed before KK Tated J. The Court had before it an application by means of Chamber Summons No. 218 of 2017 filed by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to raise the attachment by then levied on their Cosmos Bank, Vile Parle branch, bank account. On that Chamber Summons the following order came to be passed: "1. Heard learned Counsel for parties. At the request of learned Advocate for Applicant the matter is adjourned by one week to enable him to file affidavit cum undertaking that he will clear all the Plaintiffs'' dues within a particular time and also disclosing as to whether any liability is created by him on the property i.e. bungalow by name "Barkat" situated at Plot No. 20, Gulmohar Cross Road No. 5, J.V.P.D. Scheme, Mumbai 400 049. The matter shall appear on board on 29th November 2017." 10. The matter then reached on 13th November 2017. The 2nd Defendant was personally present in Court. He had filed an Affidavit of 20th November 2017, in paragraph 4 of which he solemnly stated that he would clear the decretal debt with interest by 15th January 2018. That undertaking to Court was accepted. Parties then filed Consent Minutes of the Order. These were taken on record. A copy of these Consent Minutes is at page 41. He had filed an Affidavit of 20th November 2017, in paragraph 4 of which he solemnly stated that he would clear the decretal debt with interest by 15th January 2018. That undertaking to Court was accepted. Parties then filed Consent Minutes of the Order. These were taken on record. A copy of these Consent Minutes is at page 41. The attachment was raised with an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- from the Cosmos Bank account being paid over to Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and the balance being paid to the Plaintiffs in part satisfaction of the decree. The matter was listed on 19th January 2018 for compliance. 11. It came up before me on that date. I noted the 2nd Defendant''s undertaking given to KK Tated J to clear all dues by 15th January 2018. He had not done so. His Advocate sought time. The 2nd Defendant was not personally present on that day, 19th January 2018, and therefore I placed the matter on 24th January 2018. 12. On the adjourned date of 24th January 2018, the 2nd Defendant was personally present. He sought a short accommodation and promised to pay the balance amount by 15th February 2018. The 1st Plaintiff was present in Court. He accepted this request. I noted a statement made by the 2nd Defendant''s Advocates that by 15th February 2018 - now already one month beyond the date assured to KK Tated J - an amount of Rs. 1 crore would be paid to the Plaintiffs and that the remaining amount would be paid by 15th April 2018. I noted that these statements by the learned Advocate then appearing were made on instructions of the 2nd Defendant. I specifically noted these as undertakings to the Court. In paragraphs 3 and 4, I said: "3. I will now make it clear that irrespective of what the Plaintiff does or does not want in future, if there is a single day''s breach of non-compliance of these directions, I will straightaway proceed to issue a contempt notice against Defendant No. 2. 4. It goes without saying that the amounts agreed to be paid cannot be interest-free. There is a interest component of 15% per annum already provided. All payments will be made computed with up to date interest." I then listed the matter on 16th February 2018. 13. 4. It goes without saying that the amounts agreed to be paid cannot be interest-free. There is a interest component of 15% per annum already provided. All payments will be made computed with up to date interest." I then listed the matter on 16th February 2018. 13. Matters took a different turn on the next date, 16th February 2018. I think it is best to reproduce that order rather than attempt any summary of it. "1. By a Chamber Summons No. 218 of 2017, the original 1st and 2nd Defendants sought to raise an attachment levied on 20th July 2017 on Bank Account No.0171001021809 which stands in their name in Cosmos Bank, Vile Parle Branch, Mumbai 400 057. The attachment was in execution of the consent decree dated 16th February 2016. The decree itself was in the amount of Rs. 2,90,45,058.31 with further interest. It now stands, without realisation, at a little over Rs. 4.5 crores. 2. In paragraph 2 of the Affidavit in Support of the Chamber Summons this is what 1st and 2nd Defendants say: "2. I say that Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have negotiated for settlement of the decretal amount and presently, out of the sum of Rs. 19 lakhs and odd lying in the said Bank Account No. 0171001021809 of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in Cosmos Bank, Vile Parle Branch, Mumbai 400 057, a sum of Rs. 13 lakhs will be received by the Plaintiffs in part satisfaction of their decretal amount and balance sum of Rs. 5 lakhs and odd will be taken by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and furthermore, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have agreed and undertaken that they will pay the entire balance decretal amount to the Plaintiffs by end of November 2017, with 15 days grace period and in the meantime, the immovable property of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 which has been already attached will continue till the entire decretal amount is paid by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to the Plaintiffs." 3. From this alone it is clear that there was no dispute about indebtedness or about the 1st and 2nd Defendant''s'' liability to pay the Plaintiff. Indeed, even without these statements, the fact that there was a consent decree was sufficient. 4. On 24th January 2018 when the matter was listed before me at Sr. From this alone it is clear that there was no dispute about indebtedness or about the 1st and 2nd Defendant''s'' liability to pay the Plaintiff. Indeed, even without these statements, the fact that there was a consent decree was sufficient. 4. On 24th January 2018 when the matter was listed before me at Sr. No. 2, the 1st and 2nd Defendants, i.e., the Applicants, were represented by Mr Ashok Bhatia. This is the order that was passed on that date. I reproduce it because it speaks for itself. "1. Although the 2nd Defendant is in breach of the Consent Minutes signed on 30th November 2017 by which he agreed to clear all dues of the Plaintiff on or before 15th January 2018, the 1st Plaintiff, who is personally present in Court, says he is willing to accommodate the 2nd Defendant for a short period till 15th February 2018. 2. Mr Bhatia for the 2nd Defendant states that by that date a pay order for Rs. 1 crore will be handed over to the Plaintiffs or their Advocates. The remaining amount will be paid by 15th April 2018. The statements are made on instructions of the 2nd Defendant, who is personally present in Court before me. The statements are accepted as undertakings to the Court. 3. I will now make it clear that irrespective of what the Plaintiff does or does not want in future, if there is a single day''s breach or non-compliance of these directions, I will straightaway proceed to issue a contempt notice against Defendant No. 2. 4. It goes without saying that the amounts agreed to be paid cannot be interest-free. There is a interest component of 15% per annum already provided. All payments will be made computed with up to date interest. 5. List the matter on 16th February 2018 for directions." 5. Today, Mr Merchant appears for the 1st and 2nd Defendants. I understand him to attempt an argument on instructions that the entire consent decree is fraudulent or otherwise needs to be setaside and that he proposes file an application for that purpose; and further, that his instructions are to say that nothing is due by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to the Plaintiffs except for an amount of Rs. 23,17,667/-. 6. As the order of 24th January 2018 shows, it was the 2nd Defendant who accepted the liability for the entire decretal amount. 23,17,667/-. 6. As the order of 24th January 2018 shows, it was the 2nd Defendant who accepted the liability for the entire decretal amount. I remember distinctly that the 1st Plaintiff was personally present in Court and represented by Mr Mookhi. I specifically asked Mr Mookhi and the 1st Plaintiff whether they were agreeable to the extension of time that the 2nd Defendant sought to make payment of the remaining decretal amount. The 1st Plaintiff was persuaded to say yes because the 2nd Defendant assured payment of the full amount by 15th February 2018. 7. It is indeed not a coincidence that the 1st and 2nd Defendants have used this time in between not to arrange payment but to come up with this incredible epiphany that they do not in fact owe anything more than a few lakhs to the Decree Holder because allegedly the amount of the consent decree was "not shown in the Judgment Debtors'' bank account". I say it is incredible because they did not seem to have this realisation at the time of the consent decree. They did not have this realisation on 31st August 2017 when the 2nd Defendant affirmed an Affidavit in Support of the Chamber Summons in paragraph 2 of which he made the statement set out above. These Defendants did not for several months thereafter and even as late 24th January 2018 have this realisation either. 8. Mr Purohit points out that on 23rd January 2018, a day before the matter was listed before me, the 2nd Defendant filed an undertaking in this Court accepting the decretal debt, accepting the default and undertaking to make payment, but only seeking time. I must note that on 19th January 2018, the 2nd Defendant''s Advocate sought time and it was on that basis that I asked the 2nd Defendant to remain present on 24th January 2018. 9. This has gone on incessantly. There is an order of 30th November 2017 by which further consent minutes were taken on record raising the attachment and unfreezing the account. By consent the bank was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs to the 1st and 2nd Defendants from the total amount of Rs. 19,77,688.24 available in that account and the balance amount was to be paid (and has been paid) to the Plaintiffs. By consent the bank was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs to the 1st and 2nd Defendants from the total amount of Rs. 19,77,688.24 available in that account and the balance amount was to be paid (and has been paid) to the Plaintiffs. Thus even on 13th November 2017 and, thereafter, when an amount was paid out of the Cosmos Bank account, the Defendants did not raise this ground that no amount is due. 10. I will not permit this. If the Defendants want to make out a case for setting aside the consent decree, they will be put to terms. The 1st and 2nd Defendants will be in the first instance have till 21st February 2018 to deposit an amount of Rs. 4.75 crores with the Prothonotary and Senior Master. Without that deposit, no application by the 1st and 2nd Defendants will even be allowed to be filed in the Registry which will insist on proof of deposit before accepting any application for setting aside the consent decree. This is an unusual and uncommon step but it is required and justified because of the repeated statements made on oath and on affirmation on Affidavit and statements made and undertakings solemnly given to this Court. 11. Execution will be stayed only till 5.00 p.m. on 21st February 2018. If no deposit is made by that date, the Plaintiff may proceed in Execution against every single property of 1st and 2nd Defendants. 12. Independently of this, and having regard to the statements made in the Affidavit in Support of this Chamber Summons, the undertaking dated 23rd January 2018 filed in the Commercial Execution Application by the 2nd Defendant and the statement recorded by this Court on 24th January 2018, issue Notice under Rule 9(1) of the Contempt of Court (Bombay High Court) Rules 2005 against Defendant No. 2 in his personal capacity and as the sole proprietor of Defendant No. 1 to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for having committed contempt of this Court. 13. This notice is returnable on 16th March 2018. 14. List the matter for directions and compliance on 22nd February 2018. 15. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this order." 14. On 22nd February 2018 there was another change of guard. Now Mr Vashi was engaged by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 13. This notice is returnable on 16th March 2018. 14. List the matter for directions and compliance on 22nd February 2018. 15. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this order." 14. On 22nd February 2018 there was another change of guard. Now Mr Vashi was engaged by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. I noted that the Appeal Court had declined to interfere. It was then that he submitted that he had instructions to challenge the original Consent Decree, and therefore in paragraphs 3 to 6 of that order I said this: "3. I have once again made it clear to Mr Vashi that any application by his clients to assail the original consent decree will not be entertained in view of their constant breaches of repeated and multiple undertakings given to this Court to pay the decretal debt, unless and until Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 make a deposit of Rs. 4.75 Crores with the Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court, Original Side. I once again clarify that I have not directed payment of this sum to the decree holder, but a deposit with this Court. The reason is that should the application to set aside the consent decree fail on merits, it is unjust to expect the decree holder to then run after the judgment debtors in execution, in view of the judgment debtors'' past promises and undertakings to this Court to pay that debt. It is this defiance and breach of solemn undertakings given to this Court, and accepted in good faith all along, that invites such a pre-condition. I do not believe any other view or approach is possible; for, if undertakings to a Court lack all sanctity, then nothing at all remains of the rule of law or of the authority of this Court. Undertakings given to a Court must be honoured with fidelity, on time, and without exception. Every single transgression must have the most severe consequences, failing which there is no purpose served at all by continuing to have a court in the first place. 4. Mr Vashi seeks time until 8th March 2018. 5. I am informed by Mr Mookhi that the Plaintiff has already filed a Chamber Summons in execution. That will also be listed on 8th March 2018. 6. 4. Mr Vashi seeks time until 8th March 2018. 5. I am informed by Mr Mookhi that the Plaintiff has already filed a Chamber Summons in execution. That will also be listed on 8th March 2018. 6. Having regard to the manner in which this matter has progressed, the Plaintiffs will not move against the attached residential premises until the next date. If a deposit is made, further execution will not be immediately necessary. If no deposit is made, execution may then proceed at once. This order is not to be viewed as a stay on execution but only as a final opportunity to the judgment debtors to demonstrate their bona fides and atone for their lapses." 15. In the meantime, I also issued a suo motu Show Cause Notice to Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 16. Finally, on 16th March 2018, Mr Vashi submitted a statement of total outstandings of Rs. 2,73,12,069/-. I allowed the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 the option of making either a deposit or providing a bank guarantee or some combination of the two. Ultimately, on 28th March 2018, I noted that the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had in fulfilment of the condition precedent deposited an amount of Rs. 2,75,00,000/-. It was then that the present Chamber Summons came to be filed. 17. Mr Vashi''s submission is that the consent decree is a nullity because the parent transaction on which the suit was founded was a "money-lending" transaction. The suit itself, in his reading of it, was not based on a negotiable instrument; negotiable instruments were issued only in discharge of liabilities under three agreements dated 6th February 2009, 24th August 2009 and 6th August 2015. According to him, on any reading of the Maharashtra Money Lending (Regulation) Act, 2014 ("the 2014 Act") or the erstwhile Bombay Money Lenders Act 1946 ("the 1946 Act"), the suit transactions are hit by the definition of money-lending. Therefore, no decree, even by consent, could have been made on such a plaint unless it was first established that the Plaintiffs had a valid moneylending license. 18. Mr Vashi makes a reference to several provisions of the 1946 Act: "2. Therefore, no decree, even by consent, could have been made on such a plaint unless it was first established that the Plaintiffs had a valid moneylending license. 18. Mr Vashi makes a reference to several provisions of the 1946 Act: "2. DEFINITIONS (2) "business of money-lending" means the business of advancing loans whether in cash or kind and whether or not in connection with or in addition to any other business; (9) "loan" means an advance at interest whether of money or in kind but does not include? Mr Vashi makes a reference to several provisions of the 1946 Act: "2. DEFINITIONS (2) "business of money-lending" means the business of advancing loans whether in cash or kind and whether or not in connection with or in addition to any other business; (9) "loan" means an advance at interest whether of money or in kind but does not include? (a) a deposit of money or other property in a Government Post Office, Bank or in any other bank or in a company or with a Co-operative society; (b) a loan to, or by, or a deposit with any society or association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or any other enactment relating to a public, religious or charitable object; (c) a loan advanced by Government or by any local authority authorised by Government; (cc) a loan advanced to a Government servant from a fund, established for the welfare or assistance of Government servants, and which is sanctioned by the State Government; (d) a loan advanced by a co-operative society; (d1) an advance made to a subscriber to, or a depositor, in a Provident Fund from the amount standing to his credit in the fund in accordance with the rules of the fund; (d2) a loan to or by an insurance company as defined in the Insurance Act, 1938; (e) a loan to, or by bank; (ee) loan to, or by, or deposit with, any body (being a body not falling under any of the other provisions of this clause), incorporated by any law for the time being in force in the State; (f) an advance, of any sum exceeding rupees three thousand made on the basis of a negotiable instrument as defined in the negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, other than a promissory note; (f1) an advance of any sum exceeding rupees three thousand made on the basis of a hundi (written in English or any Indian language); (f2) an advance made bona fide by any person carrying on any business, not having for its primary object the lending of money if such advance is made in the regular course of his business; (g) except for the purposes of sections 23 and 25, (i) and (ii) deleted by Mah 76 of 1975 (iii) a loan, by a landlord to his tenant for financing of crops or seasonal finance, of not more than Rs. 50 per acre of land held by the tenant; (iv) a loan advanced to an agricultural labourer by his employer; Explanation. The expression "tenant" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948, or any other relevant tenancy law in force relating to tenancy of agricultural lands, and the expressions "financing of crops" and "seasonal finance" shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Bombay Agricultural Debtors'' Relief Act, 1947; (10) "money-lender" means? (i) an individual, or (ii) an undivided Hindu family; or (iiia) a company, or (iv) an unincorporated body of individuals, who or which? (a) carries on the business of moneylending in the State; or (b) has his or its principal place of such business in the State; and includes a pawnbroker but does not include? (i) Government, (ii) a local authority, (iii) a bank, (iv) the Agricultural Refinance Corporation constituted under the Agricultural Refinance Corporation Act, 1963; or (v) any other banking financial or any institution which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf; (17) "suit to which this Act applies" means any suit or proceeding? (a) for the recovery of a loan made after the date on which this Act comes into force; (b) for the enforcement of any security taken or any agreement made after the date on which this Act comes into force in respect of any loan made either before or after the said date; or (c) for the redemption of any security given after the date on which this Act comes into force in respect of any loan made either before or after the said date; 5. MONEY-LENDER NOT TO CARRY ON BUSINESS OF MONEY-LENDING EXCEPT FOR AREA UNDER LICENSE AND EXCEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF LICENSE.- No money-lender shall carry on the business of money-lending except in the area for which he has been granted a licence and except in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence. 10. MONEY-LENDER NOT TO CARRY ON BUSINESS OF MONEY-LENDING EXCEPT FOR AREA UNDER LICENSE AND EXCEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF LICENSE.- No money-lender shall carry on the business of money-lending except in the area for which he has been granted a licence and except in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence. 10. STAY OF SUITS BY MONEY-LENDERS NOT HOLDING LICENCE (1) No court shall pass a decree in favour of a money-lender in any suit to which this Act applies including such suit pending in the court before the commencement of the Bombay Money-lenders (Amendment) Act, 1975 unless the court is satisfied that at the time when the loan or any part thereof, to which the suit relates was advanced, the money-lender held a valid licence, and if the court is satisfied that the money-lender did not hold a valid licence, it shall dismiss the suit. (2) Nothing in this section shall affect? (a) suits in respect of loans advanced by a money-lender before the date in which this Act comes into force; (b) the powers of a Court of Wards, or an Official Assignee, a receiver, an administrator or a Court under the provisions of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909. or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 or any other law in force corresponding to that Act, or of a liquidator under the Companies Act, 1956, to realize the property of a money-lender." These sections correspond to Sections 2(3), 2(13), 2(14), 2(24), 2(4) and 13 of the 2014 Act. 19. Mr Vashi submits that since this was not a suit based on a negotiable instrument, any decree on it, whether by consent or otherwise, is a nullity: the suit transactions fall within the definition of a ''loan'' , and are not covered by any of the exclusions in that definition. This, in his formulation, is sufficient to warrant a setting aside of the decree in its entirety. He is therefore entitled to an order relieving the Judgment Debtors of all undertakings and a discharge of the contempt notice. 20. In my view, Mr Purohit and Mr Mookhi are correct in their response that this formulation is fundamentally flawed. It proceeds on two incorrect assumptions. He is therefore entitled to an order relieving the Judgment Debtors of all undertakings and a discharge of the contempt notice. 20. In my view, Mr Purohit and Mr Mookhi are correct in their response that this formulation is fundamentally flawed. It proceeds on two incorrect assumptions. First, that every loan is by definition a money-lending transaction, or must, a priori be assumed to be so, unless covered by the exclusions in Section 2(9) of the 1946 Act., Section 2(13) of the 2014 Act., Second, that in every case where a loan is sought to be recovered, it is for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the Bombay Money Lenders Act does not apply, or that he has a valid money-lenders'' license. Mr Purohit submits that the definition of a ''loan'' must be read with the definition of business of money-lending in Section 2(2) of the 1946 Act., Section 2(3) of the 2014 Act. Further, where such a defence is set up, it is always for the defendant in a loan recovery action to show that the suit is barred by the money-lending Act applicable. 21. For the purposes of this discussion, I will leave aside all consideration of the various undertakings repeatedly given by the Defendants. Those in themselves would ordinarily be sufficient to dislodge any such arguments, for those undertakings were given to Court and the attempt to escape them, and the consequences of their violation, is clearly inequitable. I have put these to one side and considered Mr Vashi''s arguments on the money-lending statutes for only two reasons. First that Mr Vashi rests the whole of the present application only on his submissions under the Money Lenders Act; and second, his clients have made a sufficient deposit to fully secure the decretal claim as it now stands. 22. First as to the plaint, even assuming that I could go into this as a Court in execution. It appears to me self-evident from any fair reading of paragraphs 11 to 13 of the plaint that not only there is no case discernible of a money-lending transaction but that the cause of action is founded on dishonoured cheques. The reference to the agreement is in support of the claim for a lien. The demands made by the Plaintiffs on Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were in regard to the dishonour of post-dated cheques issued under the agreements. The reference to the agreement is in support of the claim for a lien. The demands made by the Plaintiffs on Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were in regard to the dishonour of post-dated cheques issued under the agreements. This in itself is sufficient to dislodge Mr Vashi''s case, for the suit would fall within the exclusion in Section 2(9)(f ) of the 1946 Act., Section 2(13)(k) of the 2014 Act. 23. Mr Vashi relies on the decision of Kamta Prasad v IInd Additional District Judge, Mainpuri and Others. , (1996) 28 AllLR 597 ., I do not think this decision assists him to any significant degree. Before the learned Single Judge in that case lay a Writ Petition against an order dismissing a revision and confirming an earlier order of the court below. In the court of first instance, evidence was led. That recovery was sought by one who was a money-lender was a question of fact and evidence. Paragraph 8 of the report makes it clear that there were concurrent findings that the Decree Holder was indeed a money-lender. The learned Single Judge held that the Court in revision could not reassess evidence; in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, the High Court could not enter into any fact-finding enquiry. The issue before the learned Single Judge was therefore this - that, as a proved money-lender, the decree holder not having complied with statutory provisions, whether he could sustain his decree and put it into execution. I do not see how this at all assists Mr Vashi today because the question now is not of non-compliance of a statutory fiat by a person proved to be a money-lender but whether the present Decree Holders are money-lenders at all. That is clearly for the Judgment Debtor to show. 24. Mr Vashi also relied on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Motilal Prabhulal G Vyas v Jayantilal Tulsidas Thanawala. , (2008) 6 BomCR 765 ., The learned Single Judge of this Court held on the facts of that case that the plaintiff was indeed carrying on business of money-lending. The law was adequately noted in paragraph 21, and a finding was returned to the effect that there was a continuity and systematic conduct of the business of money-lending. The learned Single Judge evaluated the evidence in this context. The law was adequately noted in paragraph 21, and a finding was returned to the effect that there was a continuity and systematic conduct of the business of money-lending. The learned Single Judge evaluated the evidence in this context. This will not, therefore, assist Mr Vashi, whose proposition is considerably wider. 25. What falls for consideration are these two questions: (1) are the decree holders in the "business of money-lending" as contemplated by settled law? And (2) On whom lies the burden of proving that the plaintiff is in the "business of money-lending" - the plaintiff or the defendant? 26. The 1946 Act and the 2014 Act both define the phrase "business of money-lending", but do not define the word "business". Does, therefore, a single or solitary lending transaction constitute the "business of money-lending"? Is every loan axiomatically a money-lending transaction unless shown otherwise? Must this ''business'' be systematic? 27. Black''s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition. tells us that a ''business'' is a commercial enterprise carried on for profit; a particular occupation or employment habitually engaged in for livelihood or gain. 28. As we shall see, the settled law indicates that: (a) ''Business'' connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose. Giving one or even a handful of loans does not make it the ''business of money-lending.'' (b) A debtor cannot escape his liabilities under a loan merely by asserting that the creditor is in the ''business of money-lending without a license''. The burden of proof is on the debtor to show that the money-lending statute applies to the creditor. He who asserts must prove. 29. In Central Bureau of Investigation v VC Shukla , (1998) 3 SCC 410 , the Supreme Court said, in relation to the definition of the word ''business'': "27. Coming now to the word "business", we need not search for its meaning in Black''s Law Dictionary, or Words and Phrases for this Court has dealt with the word in a number of cases. In Narain Swadeshi Wvg. Mills v. Commr. of Excess Profits Tax, a five-Judge Bench of this Court held that the word "business" connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose; and the above interpretation was quoted with approval in Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. CIT and Excess Profits Tax. In Narain Swadeshi Wvg. Mills v. Commr. of Excess Profits Tax, a five-Judge Bench of this Court held that the word "business" connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose; and the above interpretation was quoted with approval in Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. CIT and Excess Profits Tax. Again in Barendra Prasad Ray v. ITO this Court observed that the word business" is one of wide import and it means an activity carried on continuously and systematically by a person by the application of his labour or skill with a view to earning an income. ..." 30. In Shobhita Rani Kaushal v Ketty Dhanjibhoy , (2008) 6 BomCR 114 . this Court enunciated the law clearly. It said that the statutory scheme of the 1946 Act indicates individual transactions do not fall within the mischief of the Act. The phrase connotes a systematic, repetitive and continuous activity. For a person to be a money-lender, he must, in the regular course of his business, advance loans. Isolated transactions are not covered by the Act. Every loan given does not amount to engaging in the ''business of money-lending''. Before anyone is deemed a money-lender, it must be established that the person in question advances money with interest to others as a matter of regular course, and that he derives an appreciable part of his income through such business. No one becomes a money-lender because he gives the odd loan to his relations, friends, or acquaintances; nor does he become a money-lender merely because on one occasion - or even several isolated occasions - he may have lent money with interest to strangers. 31. Vivian Bose J considered both questions (i.e., the concept of the ''business of money-lending'' and on whom lies the burden of proving that the plaintiff is a money-lender) in Sitaram Shrawan Koshti v Bajya Parnya Bhoi , (1941) AIR Nagpur 177. a case under the 1946 Act. He said: "23. There is no proof that the Plaintiff is a ''moneylender''. The definition of ''moneylender'' given in the Act is ''a person who, in the regular course of business, advances a loan''. There is no proof here that the loan was advanced in the regular course of business. a case under the 1946 Act. He said: "23. There is no proof that the Plaintiff is a ''moneylender''. The definition of ''moneylender'' given in the Act is ''a person who, in the regular course of business, advances a loan''. There is no proof here that the loan was advanced in the regular course of business. The word ''regular'' shows that the Plaintiff must have been in the habit of advancing loans to persons as a matter of regular business. If only an isolated act of moneylending is shown to the Court it is impossible to state that constitutes a regular course of business. It is an act of business, but not necessarily an act done in the regular course of business. Consequently, the lower Court was wrong in applying this Act. It was argued that the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that he is not a money-lender. That however is incorrect. The Act only applies to money-lenders and therefore before it can be applied it must be shown by the person seeking to apply it and seeking to take advantage of its provisions that the Plaintiff is a money lender. ... " 24. The definition of ''money-lender'' envisages only those classes of persons whose regular business is to advance moneys and not those who advance moneys casually. The crux of the matter is: whether money is being advanced by Plaintiff purely as a moneylender for the purposes of gain having no other consideration before him, or is it mixed up with other consideration than that of pure gain and for interest. If this definition is considered from this angle, the plea based on the provisions of The Bombay Money-Lending Act needs outright rejection." 32. In Ganesh Madhavrao Hawaldar v Mithalal Keshaolal Dave , (1999) AIR Bombay 120. our Court held: "It is then submitted by Shri Kaptan, learned counsel for the Appellant, that the Plaintiff is a money lender and the suit was hit by section 10 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 by reason of the Plaintiff not having the money lending licence. On considering the entire evidence on record, I find no substance in the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the Appellant. The Plaintiff in emphatic terms says that he has never adopted money lending business. On considering the entire evidence on record, I find no substance in the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the Appellant. The Plaintiff in emphatic terms says that he has never adopted money lending business. The burden of proof was, therefore, on the Defendant to show that the Plaintiff had adopted the money lending business as a profession. In this respect, the Defendant had led evidence to show that the Plaintiff had advanced a loan to him as well as to his son. He was, however, unable to show that besides him and his son, other persons had also borrowed money from the Plaintiff. It is well settled that mere one or two casual transactions of money lending do not make a person as a professional money lender. I am fortified in this view by the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mrs. K. Sundersanam v. S. Venkatarao , (1963) AIR A.P. 442 (described below). In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff had adopted money lending business as a profession. In my view, the lower appellate Court has rightly held that the Plaintiff not being a money lender was not required to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders'' Act. No fault can be found with the said findings recorded by the lower appellate Court. I, therefore, find no substance in the aforesaid submissions made by the learned counsel for the Appellant." 33. Again, in Nandram Kaniram v NB Rahatekar , (1994) 1 MhLJ 380 ., this Court held: "3. It is a common ground that this is not the only transaction of this nature between the parties. During last seven years, such transactions were entered into by Plaintiff with some other traders. Total of these transactions was 6 or 7. Basic question that arises in this second appeal is whether the Plaintiff could be said to carry on "the business of money-lending" so as to bring him within the definition of the term "moneylender" as per section 2(10) of the Bombay Money-Lenders Act (''the Act''), and whether the transaction amounted to "loan" as defined under section 2(9). "9. ... This takes me to the last point over which there was considerable debate before me. Now, whether or not, an individual is carrying on business of money-lending is essentially a question of fact. "9. ... This takes me to the last point over which there was considerable debate before me. Now, whether or not, an individual is carrying on business of money-lending is essentially a question of fact. The final Court of fact has recorded a finding of fact in favour of the Plaintiff. I see no reason to interfere with the same in second appeal. Here is a professional carrying on profession in a city like Pune. He must have had savings from the professional income. It would be natural for him to invest the same in a manner by which he can derive maximum return. If he has chosen to advance his savings on interest to reputed and known traders through a Hundi Dalal on few occasions, it cannot be said that he was a professional money-lender. Money-lending business always imports a notion of system, repetition and continuity. These elements have been held to be absent in the instant case and I see no perversity in reaching that conclusion. Neither law, nor equity is in favour of the Defendant who is trying to delay and defeat the just claim and avoiding his solemn liability to honour his commitment. The last point is also therefore without any substance." 34. In Gajanan v Seth Brindaban , (1970) 2 SCC 360 , the Supreme Court heard an appeal against a judgment of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench), under the CP Money Lenders'' Act, 1934. The Supreme Court held: ""Moneylender" as defined in Section 2(v) of the Act means a person who, in the regular course of business advances a loan as defined in this Act and it includes, subject to the provisions of Section 3, the legal representatives and successors-in-interest of the person who advanced the loan; and the expression "moneylending" is also to be construed accordingly. By virtue of Section 2(ix) "Sub-Registrars" appointed under the Indian Registration Act are to function under the present Act. ... By virtue of Section 2(ix) "Sub-Registrars" appointed under the Indian Registration Act are to function under the present Act. ... According to Section 11-H no suit for the recovery of a loan advanced by a moneylender is to proceed in a civil court until the court is satisfied that he holds a valid registration certificate or that he is not required to have such certificate by reason of the fact that he does not carry on the business of moneylending from the scheme of these provisions it is evident that for a person to be a moneylender he must, in the regular course of business, advance a loan. There is a long catena of authorities on the statutes regulating and controlling moneylenders in which the expression "moneylender" has been so construed as to exclude isolated transaction or transactions of moneylending. This is, therefore, the consistent and unbroken line of authority. See further: In Re Marine Container Services (India) Pvt Ltd , (1999) 2 MhLJ 728 ; K Sundersanam v S Venkata Rao , (1963) AIR A.P. 442. 35. Finally, Mr Purohit draws my attention to two decisions of this Court. The first is of SC Gupte J in Ashok Commercial Enterprises & Anr v Parekh Aluminex Ltd. , (2014) 3 BankCas 361 (Bom) Summons for Judgment No. 21 of 2013 decided on 24th February 2014,. The provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act were noted. Gupte J held that the provisions of the 1946 Act did not apply to the suit as it was based inter alia on a negotiable instrument. The matter was carried in Appeal.15 Apart from the fact-specific findings in that decision, what is material is the interpretation of the Division Bench on the purpose and ambit of the money-lending statute. The Parekh Aluminex court said that the money-lending statute (the 1946 Act at the time) was directed to the elimination of a grave societal evil; to ensure that usurious interest was not charged; and to therefore regulate and control defined money-lending transactions of this stripe. The definition was narrowly tailored, the appeal court said, and did not lend itself to a more expansive or liberal meaning which might curtail freedom to contract. There was no room or warrant to expand the scope of the act, and its provisions would have to be construed literally and strictly. The definition was narrowly tailored, the appeal court said, and did not lend itself to a more expansive or liberal meaning which might curtail freedom to contract. There was no room or warrant to expand the scope of the act, and its provisions would have to be construed literally and strictly. The fact that the cheques in question followed the loans would make no difference. The advances made (loans given) and the negotiable instruments for their return (the cheques) formed part of a composite agreement. The cheques were not independent of the loans advanced. I should imagine that very nearly this factual scenario applies to the present case. 36. From this discussion, the following propositions emerge: (a) Not every loan is axiomatically a money-lending transaction for the purposes of the 1946 or the 2014 Acts. There is no such presumption in law. (b) It is doing of the ''business of money-lending'' that attracts the provisions of the statute. In interpreting the phrase, the correct emphasis is on the word ''business'' , not ''money-lending''. It is the word ''business'' , and not the expression ''money-lending'' , that is determinative. Simply put, every instance of lending money is not money-lending. Not every lender is a Shylock. (c) To constitute ''business'' , a single isolated instance does not, and even several isolated stray instances do not, constitute ''the business of money-lending''. To be engaged in the ''business of money-lending'' , the activity must be systematic, regular, repetitive, and continuous, and must generate an appreciable revenue. The fact that the borrower is a stranger to the lender does not on its own make the latter a ''money-lender''. (d) A loan recovery action is not barred merely because there is a loan. It has to be shown that the loan was part of ''the business of money-lending''. (e) A plaintiff seeking a recovery of a loan is not required to show that his suit is not barred by the Money Lenders Act. It is always for the defendant who puts up money-lending as a defence to show that the transaction is forbidden by the Money Lenders Act. 37. In my view, the Judgment Debtor has not been able to satisfy any of these tests. The Chamber Summons fails. 38. It is always for the defendant who puts up money-lending as a defence to show that the transaction is forbidden by the Money Lenders Act. 37. In my view, the Judgment Debtor has not been able to satisfy any of these tests. The Chamber Summons fails. 38. There is, of necessity, an added limitation to the spread of this discussion in this particular case: Mr Vashi''s application is one made in execution, and of necessity, it is not sufficient to him to show that the decree might or could have been or was possibly a nullity (as might have been sufficient before the Parekh Aluminex courts in the context of the defence to a summons for judgment in a summary suit). Mr Vashi must demonstrate that this is indeed so, and he must do so with such certainty that no other view is possible. The decree against him has attained finality, and no executing court can go behind the decree to see if it was validly passed - and, in fairness, that is not Mr Vashi''s proposition at all. But this does not mean that when he canvasses that the decree is a nullity, he must establish this conclusively. 22ND JULY 2018 39. The Judgment Debtors deposited an amount of Rs. 2.75 crores on 23rd April 2018. In view of the forgoing order by which I have dismissed the Judgment Debtor''s Chamber Summons, the Decree Holder is of course entitled to appropriate such part of the amount deposited as is sufficient to cover the decretal debt. Both sides are agreed that the decretal debt as of today, inclusive of all interest, is Rs. 2,73,60,674/-. This is less than the amount deposited. Consequently, on withdrawal of the amount, which I will permit the Decree Holder to do, the decree will be fully satisfied and will be got so marked within a period of four weeks from the date when this order is uploaded. 40. Mr Vashi seeks a stay of the operation of the order and especially of the portion allowing the Decree Holder to apply for a withdrawal. At his request the order is stayed for a period of four weeks. 41. However, since the decretal debt is now fully covered by the deposit of Rs. 2.75 crores, there is no purpose in continuing with the attachment. At his request the order is stayed for a period of four weeks. 41. However, since the decretal debt is now fully covered by the deposit of Rs. 2.75 crores, there is no purpose in continuing with the attachment. The Decree Holder does not need to proceed against the property in execution since there are sufficient funds deposited in Court to meet the decretal debt. I am therefore inclined to raise the attachment until an actual withdrawal is allowed to the Decree Holder. The reason is this: the amount deposited by the Decree Holder, even if invested by this office, will earn interest at a rate no more than 6% or 7% per annum. The decretal debt prescribes interest at 15% per annum. Thus, if there is a further delay of several weeks, the Decree Holder''s decretal claim for interest alone will exceed the available balance now in the hands of the Prothonotary and Senior Master. For this reason, since the order of withdrawal is stayed for a period of four weeks, the existing attachment will also continue for a period of four weeks. 42. There remains the question of Sheriff''s poundage. In the present matter, I am waiving the Sheriff''s poundage entirely. The property has never been put to sale and no steps towards the sale have yet been taken. There is an attachment but the property attached is in use and occupation by the Judgment Debtors and no further steps in that behalf either. The attachment, as I have noted, continues now, in effect, only in regard to any anticipated shortfall or difference in the claim for interest and nothing further. The rest is fully secured by deposit in this Court. 43. The Chamber Summons is disposed of in these terms. Show Cause Notice No. 34 of 2018 is discharged. All other interlocutory applications are disposed of as infructuous. Since the uploading of this order was somewhat delayed, the stay will run for four weeks from the date the order is uploaded.