JUDGMENT : Mir Alfaz Ali, J. 1. We have heard learned counsel Mr. N.H. Mazarbhuiyan for the appellant in Crl. A. (J)120 of 2015 and learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. S.K. Agarwal for the appellant in Crl. A. (J)121 of 2015. We have also heard learned Addl. P.P., Mr. M. Phukan for the State/respondent No. 1 and learned counsel, Mr. A.K. Hussain for the informant/respondent No. 2. 2. We propose to decide both the appeals by this common judgment, as both these appeals arose out of the common judgment, dated 19-09-2015, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, in Sessions Case No. 1/2011(G.R. Case No. (CPR) 119/2009), whereby, learned Addl. Sessions Judge convicted the appellants u/s. 304-B/34 IPC and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. 3. As per prosecution case, the victim Anjuma Bibi was married to the appellant Hasmot Ali, two and half years prior to the occurrence. Since after few days of the marriage, the appellants and the other co-accused named in the FIR started to torture the victim physically and mentally. They also demanded money and subjected her to torture for non-fulfillment of the demand. Ultimately on 06-07-2009, the parents of the victim was informed, that the victim Anjuma Bibi committed suicide. Immediately they came to the matrimonial home of the victim and found her dead. Suspecting foul play in the death of the victim, PW 1, paternal uncle of the victim, lodged the FIR (ext. 1), on the basis of which, Chapor P.S. Case No. 119/2009 was registered u/s. 304-B/34 IPC and investigation commenced. In course of investigation, the inquest report of the body was prepared by executive magistrate and post mortem examination was conducted by PW 6, Dr. K.A. Ahmed. 4. Dr. K.A. Ahmed, who conducted the post mortem examination on the body on the victim, found the following injuries: "i) There is blood mixed frothing is seen per nose. There is cyanosis of lip of fingers and lips. (ii) Achymosis is present over left side of submittal reason near base of tongue measuring 3" x 2". (iii) Bruise present over back measuring 3" x 1" left buttock measuring 4" x 1" left side of cheek measuring 2" x 1" and front of neck measuring 3" x 1". There is cyanosis of lip of fingers and lips. (ii) Achymosis is present over left side of submittal reason near base of tongue measuring 3" x 2". (iii) Bruise present over back measuring 3" x 1" left buttock measuring 4" x 1" left side of cheek measuring 2" x 1" and front of neck measuring 3" x 1". (iv) Abrasion present over chin measuring 2" x 1" and in nose measuring 1" x 1/2" In the opinion of the doctor cause of death was due to asphyxia, as a result of throttling. 5. On conclusion of investigation police submitted charge-sheet against the present appellants, who eventually stood trial. 6. In course of trial, charges were framed u/s. 302/304-B/34 IPC, to which the appellants pleaded not guilty. Seven witnesses were examined by the prosecution to establish the charges. On conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the accused persons were examined u/s. 313 CrPC, wherein, the appellants pleaded innocence and examined four witnesses in their defence. On appreciation of evidence, learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellants under Section 304-B IPC and awarded sentence as indicated above. 7. The materials on record reveals that there was no direct evidence, as to, who caused the death of the victim. Even the younger brother of the victim, who was admittedly with the victim at the time of occurrence was not examined either by the prosecution or the defence. Learned Sessions Judge recorded conviction and imposed sentence on the appellants, basically on the basis of presumption u/s. 113-B of the Evidence Act. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. N.H. Mazarbhuiyan and learned amicus curiae, Mr. S.K. Agarwala strenuously arguing for acquittal of the appellants, contend, that all the necessary ingredients for constituting the offence u/s. 304-B IPC, were not proved beyond doubt, and as such, the conviction and sentence of the appellants are not sustainable. 9. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. N.H. Mazarbhuiyan and learned amicus curiae, Mr. S.K. Agarwala strenuously arguing for acquittal of the appellants, contend, that all the necessary ingredients for constituting the offence u/s. 304-B IPC, were not proved beyond doubt, and as such, the conviction and sentence of the appellants are not sustainable. 9. Since the conviction of the appellants was recorded u/s. 304-B IPC, it would be apposite to have a look at the provision of Section 304-B IPC as well as Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which read as under: "304-B IPC Dowry death.- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.] S. 113-B Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code" 10. A conjoint reading of the above two provisions would show, that in order to bring home a charge of dowry death, the following ingredients are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt- i) Death occurred to a married woman within seven years of marriage (ii) Death was caused by burn or otherwise than under normal circumstances. (iii) The victim was subjected to harassment or cruelty by the husband or by the relatives of her husband. (iii) The victim was subjected to harassment or cruelty by the husband or by the relatives of her husband. (iv) Such harassment and cruelty was for demand of dowry. (v) The cruelty or harassment was perpetuated soon before her death. 11. Once all the above ingredients are solidly established beyond all reasonable doubt, then and then only a conviction u/s. 304-B IPC for dowry death is permissible. Though, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act provides for presumption of dowry death, in order to draw such a statutory presumption, clause (iii), (iv) and (v) as above have to be established. If the above three essential ingredients are not proved there cannot be any presumption u/s. 113-B of the Evidence Act. 12. Admittedly the victim was the wife of appellant Hasmot. It is in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, that marriage between the victim and the appellant Hasmot Ali took place about 2 to 2 ½ years before the occurrence. In fact, the death of the victim within seven years of marriage was not in dispute. As per the evidence of the PW 6 Dr. K. Ahmed, who conducted the post mortem examination, death of the victim was caused because of asphyxia, as a result of ante mortem throttling. The inquest report (Ext. 4) prepared by executive magistrate also lent support to the medical evidence as to the cause of death. This evidence as to cause of death remained unshaken. 13. DW 2 stated, that hearing hue and cry in the house of the accused/victim she went there and found the victim lying on the floor. She further deposed to have heard, that the victim committed suicide. According to DW 1, hearing about the occurrence, he rushed to the house of the accused/appellant and saw that the victim committed suicide by hanging. He also stated that DW 2 arrived at the place of occurrence before her, and she asked DW 2 and one Samiran to bring down the body. According to DW 1, the people who assembled at the place of occurrence brought down the body. The oral testimony of DW 1 and DW 2 would show, that they stood contradicted against each other, inasmuch as, according to DW 2, arriving at the place of occurrence, she saw the body of the victim lying on the floor. According to DW 1, the people who assembled at the place of occurrence brought down the body. The oral testimony of DW 1 and DW 2 would show, that they stood contradicted against each other, inasmuch as, according to DW 2, arriving at the place of occurrence, she saw the body of the victim lying on the floor. Whereas, DW 1, who admittedly arrived later, stated to have seen the victim hanging and asked the DW 2 and others present there, to bring down the body. The above contradictions and mutually destructive oral testimony of the DW 1 and DW 2 demonstrates, that either none of DW 1 & DW 2 had any personal knowledge about the cause of death of the victim or they were not telling the truth. Therefore, the oral testimony of the DW 1 and DW 2, that the victim committed suicide by hanging is hardly worthy of credence. Be that as it may, the evidence of the PW 6 (doctor) coupled with the PM report (Ext. - 2) and inquest report (Ext. -4) left no room for doubt, that death of the victim was not natural and caused otherwise than under normal circumstance. 14. PW 2, mother of the victim deposed, that after marriage, the conjugal life of the petitioner and the victim was peaceful for one year and thereafter, the accused started to torture the victim. 15. PW 3, the brother of the victim stated, that after marriage the conjugal life of the victim was peaceful and trouble started thereafter. According to PW 4, the victim led conjugal life with the accused for a period of only 1 ½ year. It is also apparent from the testimony of other witnesses that the death of the victim occurred after two years of the marriage. 16. The PW 2, PW 3 & PW 4 deposed that they had given Rs. 13,000/- and a gold ring to the appellants. In spite of such payment, the torture continued and another Rs. 7,000/- was given before the occurrence. According to PW 2 the appellant Hasmot himself came to the paternal house of the victim and took Rs. 7,000/- Whereas, according to PW 3, Rs. 7,000/- was paid through his younger brother. In view of above contradictory evidence of the PW 2 and PW 3, the prosecution version as to payment of Rs. 7,000/- is hardly convincing. According to PW 2 the appellant Hasmot himself came to the paternal house of the victim and took Rs. 7,000/- Whereas, according to PW 3, Rs. 7,000/- was paid through his younger brother. In view of above contradictory evidence of the PW 2 and PW 3, the prosecution version as to payment of Rs. 7,000/- is hardly convincing. Surprisingly the younger brother of the victim who was with the victim in her matrimonial home at the time of occurrence was not examined by the prosecution. So far the payment of Rs. 13,000/- and gold ring are concerned, apparently, except making omnibus statement, that Rs. 13,000 and a ring were given, no one stated specifically, as to when or by whom, such amount or the article was given. The father of the victim, who could be the best witness in this regard was not examined. According to PW 5, marital life of the victim was peaceful. Even the PW 2 and PW 3 (mother and brother of the victim) admitted, that for one year, after the marriage, victim was leading a happy and peaceful marital life. Situated thus, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Rs. 13,000/- and gold ring were given to the appellant at some point of time, at least after one year of marriage, in absence of any material on record, it is difficult to connect such alleged payment with the marriage. 17. PW 5, who was an independent witness and a neighbour of the accused and the victim, testified that family life of the deceased and Hasmot Ali was by and large peaceful. They never heard about any trouble in their marital life. According to PW 5, the victim never complained about any kind of torture by her husband. Admittedly the victim lived in the company of the appellant Hasmot for about one and half to two years and from the beginning till one year their marital life was peaceful and admittedly there was no demand during that period. It is also stated by PW 2 & PW 3 that there is no agreement for payment of dowry at the time of marriage. It is also stated by PW 2 & PW 3 that there is no agreement for payment of dowry at the time of marriage. What therefore, crystallizes from the evidence of all the three witnesses, being the two brothers and mother of the deceased is that after marriage, the conjugal life of the victim with her husband was peaceful for one year and there was no demand of dowry or any other demand during such period or at the time of marriage. Thus, the oral testimony of the PW 5, an independent witness, that the conjugal life of the accused appellant Hasmot and his wife (victim) was by and large peaceful and that there was no complain of torture by her husband or in-laws also, get support from the testimony of PW 2 and PW 3. 18. Apparently there was no mention in the FIR (Ext. -1) regarding payment of money or any other property. Thus, non-examination of the father of the victim as well as her younger brother, who was with the victim at the time of occurrence and no mention in the FIR about payment of any money or other property coupled with the oral testimony of the PW 5 as well as the very nature of oral testimony of PW 2, PW 3 & PW 4 as indicated above, rendered the prosecution version as to demand of dowry and harassment for such dowry demand unworthy of inspiring confidence. Therefore, in our considered view prosecution evidence was grossly inadequate to establish beyond doubt that there was any dowry demand. 19. In order to convict a person for the offence of dowry death, one of the essential ingredient, that must be proved by the prosecution is that soon before the death, the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relative of the husband, for or in connection with demand for dowry. The explanation to Section 304-B IPC provides that for the purpose subsection (1) of Section 304-B IPC the expression "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 reads as under: "Definition of 'dowry'. The explanation to Section 304-B IPC provides that for the purpose subsection (1) of Section 304-B IPC the expression "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 reads as under: "Definition of 'dowry'. -In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before [or any time after the marriage] [in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation II.- The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 20. The Apex Court, in Raminder Singh- Vs- State of Punjab reported in (2014) 12 SCC 582 , observed that in case of a demand for any property or valuable security, directly or indirectly, which has a nexus with the marriage would constitute demand for dowry. 21. In Ashok -VS- State of Haryana reported in (2010) 12 SCC 350 , the Apex Court observed that the expression "in connection with the marriage cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. The expression "in connection with the marriage" even in common parlance and on its plain language has to be understood generally. The object being that everything, which is offending at any time i.e. at before or after the marriage, would be covered under this definition, but the demand of dowry has to be "in connection with the marriage" and not so customary that it would not attract, on the fact of it, the provisions of this Section." 22. In Bachnni Devi-Vs- State of Haryana reported in (2011) 4 SCC 427 , the Apex Court observed that if a demand for property or valuable security, directly or indirectly has a nexus with the marriage would constitute demand for dowry, cause or reason of such demand being immaterial. 23. In Bachnni Devi-Vs- State of Haryana reported in (2011) 4 SCC 427 , the Apex Court observed that if a demand for property or valuable security, directly or indirectly has a nexus with the marriage would constitute demand for dowry, cause or reason of such demand being immaterial. 23. What would appear from the above authorities of the Apex Court is that expression "dowry demand" has been given an extended meaning and any demand having nexus with the marriage is considered to be dowry demand for the purpose of dowry death u/s. 304-B IPC. What is important to note is that any demand before or after or at the time of marriage may constitute "dowry demand" provided, there must be some connection or nexus between the demand for property or valuable security and the marriage. Unless such nexus is proved, the demand or payment of money shall not come within the purview of dowry demand. Whether a demand is or is not dowry demand or whether a demand has any nexus with the marriage, shall obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 24. As already indicated herein before, in order to bring the offence within the swipe of Section 304-B IPC, prosecution has to prove all the necessary ingredients provided in Section 304-B IPC beyond reasonable doubt. Even a presumption u/s. 113-B of the Evidence Act is not permissible, without there being the dowry demand. In the instant case, when the prosecution apparently failed to establish the factum of dowry demand, it was not possible to take a presumption of dowry death u/s. 113-B of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as, absence of any of the pre-condition necessary for drawing presumption u/s. 113-B of the Evidence Act, disentitles the court from drawing presumption of dowry death u/s. 113-B of the Evidence Act. 25. Thus, having scanned the entire evidence as discussed hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion, that the prosecution could not prove the charge u/s. 304-B IPC beyond reasonable doubt, and as such, the conviction and sentence of the appellants u/s. 304-B cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we allow the appeals and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants. Appellants be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 26. Appeal stands allowed. 27. Appreciating the assistance rendered by Mr. S.K. Agarwal, learned Amicus Curiae in Crl. Accordingly, we allow the appeals and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants. Appellants be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 26. Appeal stands allowed. 27. Appreciating the assistance rendered by Mr. S.K. Agarwal, learned Amicus Curiae in Crl. Appeal No. (J) 121/2015, we hereby provide that he will be entitled to Rs. 7,500/- as professional fees. Upon production of a copy of this judgment, Guwahati High Court Legal Services Committee shall pay the fee to Mr. S.K. Agarwal. 28. Send back the LCRs along with a copy of this judgment. A copy of this judgment be also sent to the Superintendent of the District Jail, Dhubri.