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2018 DIGILAW 1776 (HP)

Lal Singh And Ors v. Mathru And Ors

2018-10-01

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2018
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - The appellants are the defendants, who having lost before both the learned Courts below, have filed the instant appeal. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff is owner in possession alongwith other co-sharers of land comprised in Khewat/Khatauni No.220/306, Khasra Nos.562, 564 and 2705/1429, Kita 3, measuring 7 bighas situated in Mauja Kummi, H.B No.230, Illaqua Balh, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. It was averred that the defendants are strangers and, therefore, without any right, title or interest have started causing interference with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff and other co-sharers in the suit land since 20.11.2008. Hence the suit. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants by filing written statement, wherein preliminary objections regarding maintainability, locus-standi, valuation etc. were raised. On merits, the contents of the plaint were denied. It was averred that the plaintiffs had acquired ownership by way of adverse possession and revenue entries are prima facie wrong, illegal and incorrect contrary to the factual position of the spot. It was submitted that since the defendants had now become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession, therefore, there is no question of interference and prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court on 20.06.2009 framed the following issues: 1. Whether the defendants are interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff and other co-sharers in the suit land? OPP 2. If Issue No.1 is proved in affirmative whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from making any sort of interference with the suit land? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable as plaintiffs are out of possession? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit? OPD 5. Relief. 5. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs and the appeal filed against the said judgment and decree, was dismissed by the learned first Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 27.2.2018 constraining the defendants to file the present suit. 6. It is argued by Mr. H.S, Rangra, learned counsel for the appellants that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are totally perverse and, therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 6. It is argued by Mr. H.S, Rangra, learned counsel for the appellants that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are totally perverse and, therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law. On the other hand, it is vehemently argued by Shri G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the respondents that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below is in consonance with the pleadings, evidence and law and, therefore, the appeal filed by the appellants should be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the grounds of the appeal and material placed on record. 8. What is ''perverse'' was considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another , (2009) 10 SCC 206 , wherein it was held as under:- "26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another , (1977) AIR Karnataka 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough,1878 1 LR1r 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, 106 NW 814, the Court defined ''perverse'' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner''s Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster''s Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. 5. Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. , (2003) 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8 "8...We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others , (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the requirement findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of ''perverse'' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others , (1992) Supp2 SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. The meaning of ''perverse'' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others , (1992) Supp2 SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under requirement the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 9. What is ''perverse'' has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ''Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and Others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- "25..... A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated." 10. What is ''perversity'' recently came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs.Sohan Devi and Others , (2016) 3 SCC 78 , wherein it was held as under:- "8. "Perversity" has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam , (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect." 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram , (2010) 15 SCC 530 , at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram , (2010) 15 SCC 530 , at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." 11. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondent-defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Material alteration of a property is not a fact confined to the exclusive/and personal knowledge of the owner. It is a matter of evidence, be it from the owner himself or any other witness speaking on behalf of the plaintiff who is conversant with the facts and the situation. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. Even the witnesses on behalf of the defendant, partially admitted that the defendants had effected some structural changes. 12. Be that as it may, the question whether there is a structural alteration in a tenanted premises is not a fact limited to the personal knowledge of the owner. It can be proved by any admissible and reliable evidence. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs-1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs-1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That finding has been endorsed by the first appellate court on reappreciation of the evidence, and therefore, the High Court in second appeal was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of fact. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man''s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 13. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann , (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278- 79) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis--vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,- (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100." The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with." 14. In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India , (2013) 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration , (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case6, SCC p. 615) "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. , (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police , (1999) 2 SCC 10 , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. , (2009) 10 SCC 636 and Babu v. State of Kerala , (2010) 9 SCC 189 .)" This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity. 15. We do not propose to discuss other judgments, though there is plethora of settled case law on this issue. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court." 11. Adverting to the facts of the case, it would be noticed that plea of adverse possession as raised by the defendants is very stereotyped, wherein they have claimed that the land in question is in open, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the defendants and to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and such possession is, therefore, since over a period of more than 12 years. It would be noticed that no exact date of the possession has been set out in the pleadings. As per settled law, mere long possession is not enough to prove the plea of adverse possession and it does not result in conversion of peaceful possession into adverse possession. 12. It would be noticed that no exact date of the possession has been set out in the pleadings. As per settled law, mere long possession is not enough to prove the plea of adverse possession and it does not result in conversion of peaceful possession into adverse possession. 12. The issue, in question, has been considered in detail by a Learned Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.306 of 2016 titled Satpal Vs. State of H.P decided on 8.8.2016, wherein it was observed as under:- "22. Moreover, the plea of adverse possession as raised by the petitioner is absolutely vague as the petitioner has not cared to mention the date from which his possession in fact became adverse. This question assumes importance as the petitioner initially had set up a lawful title in himself. 23. In Kamla and Others vs. Baldev Singh and Others , (2008) 1 ShimLC 215 , this court has held as under:- "........Moreover, in case defendant or his father were in possession of the suit land as owner and the possession was never taken by the plaintiffs in pursuance of the decree, they can be said to be in possession as owner, but they cannot be treated to be in adverse possession of the suit land in any manner. The learned trial Court has not given its findings that the defendant or his father continued to be owner of the suit land even after passing of the decree since the decree was never executed, but has given the findings in the alternative that the defendant has become owner by way of adverse possession. This plea was taken by the defendant in the alternative but he never pleaded as to from which date his permissive possession as owner became adverse to the true owners i.e. plaintiffs and what overt act was done by him to show his hostile title to the suit land. This plea was taken by the defendant in the alternative but he never pleaded as to from which date his permissive possession as owner became adverse to the true owners i.e. plaintiffs and what overt act was done by him to show his hostile title to the suit land. There were no allegations as to when the possession became adverse, in which year or month or in what manner and the simple general allegation made by the defendant in the alternative were accepted by the trial Court without looking into the question that the original possession of the defendant over the suit land or that of his father was permissive being an owner and it never became adverse as against the true owner and if it became adverse in what manner and from which date, month or year. The permissive possession as owner does not itself become adverse as against the true owner until and unless some overt act is done by the defendant to show his hostile title towards the true owner which pleadings were very much lacking in the written statement and as such, the defendant was never proved to be in adverse possession of the suit land as owner. Those findings were rightly reversed by the learned first Appellate Court and the learned first Appellate Court had rightly observed that there was complete lack of animus on the part of the defendant to hold the suit land adversely to the plaintiffs. It was also observed that it has also not been shown as to what time possession of the defendant became hostile to that of the plaintiffs which had ripened into ownership. To my mind, there was nothing for the trial Court to conclude that the defendant has become owner by way of adverse possession in the absence of specific pleadings or proof and, therefore, the learned first appellate Court had come to a right conclusion in reversing the findings under Issue No. 1 in regard to the plea of adverse possession. Once the defendant had failed to prove adverse possession over the suit land, the only conclusion that can be drawn is the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief of possession and it was rightly given by the first appellate Court." 24. This court in Brij Mohan Sood vs. Parshotam Singh and Others,2014 1 HimLR 556, has held as follows:- "11. Once the defendant had failed to prove adverse possession over the suit land, the only conclusion that can be drawn is the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief of possession and it was rightly given by the first appellate Court." 24. This court in Brij Mohan Sood vs. Parshotam Singh and Others,2014 1 HimLR 556, has held as follows:- "11. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is well settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is " nec vi, nec clam, nec precario" i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession has to show (a) on what date he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party ; (d) how long his possession is continued; and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. It has to be remembered that the person pleading adverse possession has no equity in his favour since he is trying to defeat the right of the true owner, therefore, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession (Refer Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma vs. Raj Kumari Sharma (Smt.) and Others , (1996) 8 SCC 128 ). 12. Having observed so, it is clear from the pleadings of the defendant that he has "11. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is well settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is " nec vi, nec clam, nec precario" i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession has to show (a) on what date he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party ; (d) how long his possession is continued; and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. It has to be remembered that the person pleading adverse possession has no equifailed to plead the essential ingredients of adverse possession. In absence of the essential ingredients of adverse possession, no amount of evidence can be looked into by this Court. Even otherwise, the defendant has set-up a title in himself and has not acknowledged or attorned the plaintiffs to be the owners. Apart from preliminary objection No.1 , in paragraph-3 of the preliminary objection, the defendant has made the following averments: "The plaintiffs are not the owners of the land rather the defendants are its owners and the plaintiffs have got no locus standi to file the suit." Throughout in the written statement, the defendants have claimed themselves to be the owners of the suit property and thus the plea of adverse possession is not available to them." 25. This court further in Deepak Parkash vs. Sunil Kumar,2014 1 HimLR 654, has emphasized on the requirement of law of pleading the exact date from which the possession became adverse, in the following terms: "14. It appears that the learned lower Appellate Court completely ignored the pleadings of the parties or else the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court on the basis of such pleadings would not have been disturbed much less reversed. A perusal of the written statement would show that pleadings with regard to adverse possession were not only deficient but in fact did not meet the requirement of law. The defendant even failed to specify the definite date on which his possession became adverse. 16. Faced with such situation, learned counsel for the respondent/ defendant would contend that he had led sufficient evidence to prove his plea of adverse possession. The defendant even failed to specify the definite date on which his possession became adverse. 16. Faced with such situation, learned counsel for the respondent/ defendant would contend that he had led sufficient evidence to prove his plea of adverse possession. I am afraid that I cannot agree with the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondent/defendant. 17. It is settled law that no amount of evidence beyond pleadings can be looked into. It is further well settled principle of law that the evidence adduced beyond the pleading would not be admissible nor can any evidence be permitted to be adduced which is at variance with the pleadings. The Court at the later stage of the trial as also the Appellate Court having regard to the rule of pleading would be entitled to reject the evidence wherefor there does not exist any pleading." 26. In Om Parkash and Others. vs. Gian Chand and Others.,2014 2 HimLR 1071, one of us (Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J) dealt in detail with the question of adverse possession particularly when the defendant therein had not spelt out any specific date from which his possession became adverse and it was observed as follows:- "11. Therefore, the moot question is as to whether the pleadings set out by the defendants can meet the requirement of law or not. This question assumes importance, because admittedly, the defendants have not spelt out any specific date from which their possession became adverse." 13. What is adverse possession has been dealt with by a learned Division Bench in Satpal''s casein Para No.10 of the judgment and the same reads thus:- "10. Now, adverting to the question of adverse possession, it is well recognized proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner''s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner''s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. It is equally settled that a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour and since such a person is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish necessary facts to establish his adverse possession. In the eyes of law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Even non-use of the property by the owner for a long time won''t affect his title." 14. Adverting to the facts by pleadings of the defendants, it would be noticed that they have not even acknowledged the plaintiffs to be the actual owners of the land and have set up a title in themselves. 15. In P. Periasami vs. P. Periathambi , (1995) 6 SCC 523 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court ruled that: "Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property." 16. In Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Government of India and Others , (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that one who pleads adverse possession should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. 17. Over the years there has been a new paradigm to Limitation Act as the same has undergone a change. The burden of proof is now on the person who alleges his adverse possession, particularly once a party has proved its title. The starting point of limitation commences not from the date when the right of ownership arises in favour of the original owner but from the date a party claims his possession to have become adverse. 18. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, it was incumbent upon the defendants to have not only stated the specific date on which their possession came hostile but have acknowledged and attorned to the title of the ownership of the plaintiffs and thereafter, led foundation for the plea of adverse possession. Having failed to do so, I am afraid that the pleas of the adverse possession raised by them was not at all sustainable in the eyes of law. 19. Having failed to do so, I am afraid that the pleas of the adverse possession raised by them was not at all sustainable in the eyes of law. 19. As regards the ownership of the plaintiff and other cosharers, the same has been duly proved on record. One of the plaintiffs has appeared as PW/1 and placed on record affidavit Ext.PW1/A, on the basis of which, it is established that she alongwith mother Smt. Mathru and sister Swari are owner in possession of the suit land alongwith other co-sharers, whereas the defendants are strangers to the suit land and, therefore, have no right, title and interest over the same. 20. The defendants have not even been found to be in possession of the suit land. Therefore, they are not even entitled to raise the plea of adverse possession. Since they have not any right, title and interest over the suit land, therefore, the learned courts below have committed no error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs. 21. It is otherwise more than settled that the appellate Court continues to be a final court of fact and law and second appeal to the High Court lies only where there is a substantial question of law. Meaning thereby, the pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before this Court in second appeal. It shall be apt to refer to three Judge Bench decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs , (2001) 3 SCC 179 , wherein it was observed as follows: "15......The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." 22. What would be the substantial question of law was thereafter considered in para 12 of the judgment, which reads thus: "12. What would be the substantial question of law was thereafter considered in para 12 of the judgment, which reads thus: "12. The phrase ''substantial question of law'', as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta & Another. Vs. T. Ram Ditta , (1928) AIR PC 172, the phrase "''substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 of the C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. The Century Spinning and Manufacuring Co., Ltd. , (1962) Supp3 SCR 549, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju , (1952) ILR(Mad) 264:- "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. Noony Veeraju , (1952) ILR(Mad) 264:- "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:- "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 23. Finally, in paragraph 14, the Hon''ble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines on the test of as to what is the substantial question of law, which reads thus: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." 24. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below are based on the correct appreciation of the pleadings and evidence and are pure findings of fact which are immune from challenge in second appeal. 25. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. 26. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.