JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - Since all these appeals arise out of the same award, therefore, they were taken up together for consideration and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. For the sake of convenience and to maintain clarity, facts of RFA No. 683 of 2011, titled as ''General Manager, NHPC vs. Vikal Sood and Others'' are being referred to. 3. Brief facts of the case are that a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ''Act'') was issued on 25.8.2007 whereby it was proposed to acquire the land situated at Phati-Dushad, Kothi-Banogi, District Kullu, H.P. for the construction of various components of Parbati Hydroelectric Project Stage-III. 4. After the completion of all codal formalities under the Act, the Collector Land Acquisition, after following the procedure laid down in the Act, determined the rates pertaining to different qualities of the land in the following manner: S. No. Name of Phati Classification of land Rate per bigha (Rs.) 1. Dushar Bathal Awwal 3,48,036.00 Bathal Dom 2,23,100.00 Bathal Som 1,69,556.00 Gair Mumkin Bir 1,05,471.00 Bagicha 3,48,036.00 5. The claimants/respondents, being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award, preferred various reference petitions, before the Collector, wherein it was submitted that the market value of the land under acquisition had not been determined in accordance with law and, therefore, the same was liable to be modified and enhanced. 6. The then learned Reference Court after taking into consideration the purpose of acquisition of the land held that the claimants were entitled to uniform rate of compensation of Rs. 20,000/- per biswa irrespective of kind and quality of the land. 7. Aggrieved by the award so passed, the beneficiaries have filed these appeals questioning the award on number of grounds as taken in the appeal. 8. At the outset, it may be observed that it is settled principle of law that if the entire land is put for a public use and no area is left out for carrying out any developmental activity, then the claimants are entitled for compensation for the entire acquired land, at uniform rates, regardless of its categorization. This aspect of the case has been considered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in RFA No. 282 of 2010 titled Suresh Kumar and Others vs. Collector Land Acquisition, NHPC, decided on 22.10.2016 alongwith connected matters, wherein it was observed as under: "26. This aspect of the case has been considered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in RFA No. 282 of 2010 titled Suresh Kumar and Others vs. Collector Land Acquisition, NHPC, decided on 22.10.2016 alongwith connected matters, wherein it was observed as under: "26. It is a settled principle of law that if the entire land is put for a public use and no area is left out for carrying out any developmental activity, then the claimants are entitled for compensation for the entire acquired land, at uniform rates, regardless of its categorization. 27. The apex Court in Haridwar Development Authority vs. Raghubir Singh & others , (2010) 11 SCC 581 , has upheld the award of compensation on uniform rates. 28. In Union of India vs. Harinder Pal Singh and Others , (2005) 12 SCC 564, while determining the compensation for acquisition of land pertaining to five different villages, the apex Court uniformly awarded a sum of Rs. 40,000/- per acre, irrespective of the classification and the category of land. 29. Further, in Nelson Fernades vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer , (2007) 9 SCC 447 , while dealing with the case where the land was acquired for laying a Railway line, the Court held that no deduction by way of development charges was permissible as there was no question of any development thereof. 30. Similar view stands taken by this Court in Gulabi and etc. Vs. State of H.P. , (1998) AIR H.P. 9 and later on in H.P. Housing oard vs. Ram Lal and Others. , (2003) 3 ShimLC 64 , which judgment has attained finality as SLP (Civil) No. 15674-15675 of 2004 titled as Himachal Pradesh Housing Board vs. Ram Lal (D) by LRs & Others, filed by the H.P. Housing Board came to be dismissed by the Apex Court on 16.8.2004. 31. This judgment was subsequently referred to and relied upon by this Court in Executive Engineer & Another. Vs Dilla Ram,2008 LatestHLJ 1007 (HP) and relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Harinder Pal Singh , wherein the market value of the land under acquisition situated in five different villages was assessed uniformly, irrespective of its nature and quality, also awarded compensation on uniform rates." 9. Vs Dilla Ram,2008 LatestHLJ 1007 (HP) and relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Harinder Pal Singh , wherein the market value of the land under acquisition situated in five different villages was assessed uniformly, irrespective of its nature and quality, also awarded compensation on uniform rates." 9. Adverting to the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that the entire land that was acquired was put to public purpose and Power Project stood constructed thereupon. It was used only for one purpose and as such, there cannot be any error in the uniform determination of the market value of the acquired land. 10. It is vehemently argued by Ms. Shreya Chauhan, learned counsel for the appellants that the only sale exemplar Ex.PW-4/B was the sale deed pertaining to a very small piece of land measuring 0-3-0 bigha and had been sold for Rs. 1,80,000/- by PW-4 Vinod Kumar to Ram Kishan and could not therefore have been made the basis for determining the compensation and if made, then atleast 75% deduction was required to be made on this amount in terms of the judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Chandrashekar (dead) by LRS. and Others vs. Land Acquisition Officer and another , (2012) 1 SCC 390 . She further vehemently argued that the value of small pieces of land cannot form the basis for determination of compensation for large tracks of land and relied upon the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar vs. Town Improvement Trust, Bhopal , (1989) 2 SCC 329 , Land Acquisition Officer & Sub-Collector, Gadwal vs. Sreelatha Bhoopal (Smt.) and another , (1997) 9 SCC 628 , Nelson Fernandes and Others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, South Goa and Others , (2007) 9 SCC 447 , and Bhule Ram vs. Union of India and another , (2014) 11 SCC 307 . 11. Obviously, there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments as the same even otherwise are binding on this Court in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. However, the question is that the ratio laid down therein is applicable to the facts of the present case. 12. 11. Obviously, there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments as the same even otherwise are binding on this Court in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. However, the question is that the ratio laid down therein is applicable to the facts of the present case. 12. Adverting to Chandrashekar''s case , therein the acquisition was by Gulbarga Development Authority and the purpose of the acquisition was for construction of housing colonies and it was in this background that after relying upon the various judgments that the Hon''ble Supreme Court provided for deduction upto 75%, that too, mainly on two counts :(i) deduction for providing development infrastructure and; (ii) deduction for developmental expenditure/ expenses and these deductions have been explained by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the following manner: "19. Based on the precedents on the issue referred to above it is seen that as the legal proposition on the point crystallized, this Court divided the quantum of deductions (to be made from the market value determined on the basis of the developed exemplar transaction) on account of development into two components. 19.1. Firstly, space/area which would have to be left out, for providing indispensable amenities like formation of roads and adjoining pavements, laying of sewers and rain/flood water drains, overhead water tanks and water lines, water and effluent treatment plants, electricity sub-stations, electricity lines and street lights, telecommunication towers etc. Besides the aforesaid, land has also to be kept apart for parks, gardens and playgrounds. dditionally, development includes provision of civic amenities like educational institutions, dispensaries and hospitals, police stations, petrol pumps etc. This "first component", may conveniently be referred to as deductions for keeping aside area/space for providing developmental infrastructure. 19.2 Secondly, deduction has to be made for the expenditure/expense which is likely to be incurred in providing and raising the infrastructure and civic amenities referred to above, including costs for levelling hillocks and filling up low lying lands and ditches, plotting out smaller plots and the like. This "second component" may conveniently be referred to as deductions for developmental expenditure/expense. 20. It is essential to earmark appropriate deductions, out of the market value of an exemplar land, for each of the two components referred to above. This would be the first step towards balancing the differential factors. This "second component" may conveniently be referred to as deductions for developmental expenditure/expense. 20. It is essential to earmark appropriate deductions, out of the market value of an exemplar land, for each of the two components referred to above. This would be the first step towards balancing the differential factors. This would pave the way for determining the market value of the undeveloped acquired land on the basis of market value of the developed exemplar land." 13. While in the present case, the purpose of acquisition is construction of Hydroelectric Dam where all the lands that have been acquired are required to be submerged in water and, therefore, the ratio laid down in Chandrashekar''s case , has no bearing to the facts of the instant case. 14. That apart, the Hon''ble Supreme Court while relying upon the various decisions in Chandrashekar''s case , has itself held the cumulative deductions to be about 67% of the sale consideration of the exemplar sale transaction and it is only upper bench mark that has been kept at 75% as would be evident from the following observations: " 22. In 2009 in Lal Chand''s case and in 2010 in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board''s case , it has been held, that while applying the sale consideration of a small piece of developed land, to determine the market value of a large tract of undeveloped acquired land, deductions between 20 to 75 percent could be made. But in 2009 in Subh Ram''s case , this Court restricted deductions on account of the "first component" of development, as also, on account of the "second component" of development to 33-1/3 percent each. The aforesaid deductions would roughly amount to 67 percent of the component of the sale consideration of the exemplar sale transaction(s). 23. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the analysis of the legal position referred to in the foregoing two paragraphs, we are of the view that there is no discrepancy on the issue, in the recent judgments of this Court. In our view, for the "first component" under the head of "development", deduction of 33-1/3 percent can be made. Likewise, for the "second component" under the head of "development" a further deduction of 33-1/3 percent can additionally be made. The facts and circumstances of each case would determine the actual component of deduction, for each of the two components. In our view, for the "first component" under the head of "development", deduction of 33-1/3 percent can be made. Likewise, for the "second component" under the head of "development" a further deduction of 33-1/3 percent can additionally be made. The facts and circumstances of each case would determine the actual component of deduction, for each of the two components. Yet under the head of "development", the applied deduction should not exceed 67 percent. That should be treated as the upper benchmark. This would mean, that even if deduction under one or the other of the two components exceeds 33-1/3 percent, the two components under the head of "development" put together, should not exceed the upper benchmark. 24. In Lal Chand''s case and in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board''s case , this Court expressed the upper limit of permissible deductions as 75 percent. Deductions upto 67 percent can be made under the head of "development". Under what head then, would the remaining component of deductions fall? Further deductions would obviously pertain to considerations other than the head of "development". 25. Illustratively, a deduction could be made keeping in mind the waiting period required to raise infrastructure, as also, the waiting period for sale of developed plots and or built-up areas. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "waiting period". Illustratively again, deductions could also be made in cases where the exemplar sale transaction, is of a date subsequent to the publication of the preliminary notification. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "de-escalation". Likewise, deductions may be made for a variety of other causes which may arise in different cases. It is however necessary for us to conclude, in the backdrop of the precedents on the issue, that all deductions should not cumulatively exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent. A deduction beyond 75 percent would give the impression of being lopsided, or contextually unreal, since the land loser would seemingly get paid for only 25 percent of his land. This impression is unjustified, because deductions are made out of the market value of developed land, whereas, the acquired land is undeveloped (or not fully developed). Differences between the nature of the exemplar land and the acquired land, it should be remembered, is the reason/cause for applying deductions. 26. Another aspect of this matter must also be kept in mind. This impression is unjustified, because deductions are made out of the market value of developed land, whereas, the acquired land is undeveloped (or not fully developed). Differences between the nature of the exemplar land and the acquired land, it should be remembered, is the reason/cause for applying deductions. 26. Another aspect of this matter must also be kept in mind. Market value based on an exemplar sale, from which a deduction in excess of 75 percent has to be made, would not be a relevant sale transaction to be taken into consideration, for determining the compensation of the acquired land. In such a situation the exemplar land and the acquired land would be uncomparable, and therefore, there would be no question of applying the market value of one (exemplar sale) to determine the compensation payable for the other (acquired land). It however needs to be clarified, that even though on account of developmental activities (under the head "development"), we have specified the upper benchmark of 67 percent, it would seem, that for the remaining deduction(s), the permissible range would be upto 8 percent. That however is not the correct position. The range of deductions, other than under the head "development", would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Such deductions, may even exceed 8 percent, but that would be so only, where deductions for developmental activities (under the head "development") is less than 67 percent, i.e., as long as the cumulative deductions do not cross the upper benchmark of 75 percent. We therefore hold, that the range for deductions, for issues other than developmental costs, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, they may be 8 percent, or even the double thereof, or even further more, as long as, cumulatively all deductions put together do not exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent." 15. As regards the other judgments relied upon by the appellant(s) as quoted in paras supra, again there can be no quarrel that these propositions as it needs no reiteration that the price of small tracks of land cannot be made the basis for making out the value of huge tracks of land. As regards the other judgments relied upon by the appellant(s) as quoted in paras supra, again there can be no quarrel that these propositions as it needs no reiteration that the price of small tracks of land cannot be made the basis for making out the value of huge tracks of land. Huge tracks of lands are required and, in fact, have been acquired for the purpose of construction of hydroelectric dam by the appellants and, therefore, the sale deed exemplar pertaining to small pieces of land of 3 biswas, obviously cannot be made the basis for working out the costs and calculating the value of the acquired land. Yet nonetheless it cannot be ignored that no development activities over this land had to be carried out, rather the same is required to be simply submerged after its acquisition. Therefore, the learned Reference Court has committed no error in working out the market price after making an appropriate deduction of 67% and thereafter determined the compensation of Rs. 20,000/- per biswa irrespective of the kind and quality of the land. 16. That being so, these appeals warrant no interference and are accordingly dismissed, so also all pending applications, if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 17. Registry is directed to place a copy of this judgment on the files of connected matters.