JUDGMENT : Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. Introduction: 1. This writ of quo warranto follows a predictable path: a relator accuses a person of flaunting his political connections and occupying a public office—the position of a Vice Chancellor, at that—though he lacks the qualification. The so-called usurper denies it. He pleads, as a defence, his credentials and takes shelter under equivalency of qualification. The State and his immediate employer, the University, support him. Has he usurped a public office? Contretemps and Course Correction: 2. We rendered the judgment on 19th February 2018, made it available the next day—20th February. Soon thereafter, on the very same day, we realised that a Madras High Court’s judgment we had extensively referred to— K.V. Jeyaraj v. Chancellor of Universities ( 2014 (4) CTC 257 )—stood overruled. True, we did not conclude the case based on that judgment’s holding, persuasive as it may have been. 3. As we have examined the judgment further, we have realised that Jeyaraj was taken in appeal to the Apex Court. And it was, indeed, reversed in Kalyani Mathivanan v. Jeyaraj ( 2015(6) SCC 363 ). Adding to our discomfiture, we have, in our judgment, referred to Kalyani Mathivanan, too. To rectify this regrettable faux pau, on 21st February 2018 we informed the counsel concerned that we would be recalling our judgment and render a fresh one. The recalling, we may observe, was only to remove references to the judgment that stood nullified and ceased to exist, for the doctrine of merger applies. Even without K.V. Jeyaraj, we hold, the ratio of our judgment and the case outcome remain unaffected. 4. Today, the matter posted under the caption 'to be spoken to', Sri Raveendran, the learned Senior Counsel for the University, first, submitted that a Special Leave Petition had already been filed. He submitted, next, that if the Court recalled the judgment, then, it must re-hear the matter. Objections noted. 5. We may observe that in this “fresh judgment” we have not discussed anything that prejudices the pleas on either side, nor have we dealt with, anew, questions of law or facts. As already mentioned, we have removed all references to K.V. Jeyraj, the judgment rendered by the Madras High Court. 6. That apart, we have explicitly referred in paragraph 25 to the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Chancellor. As already mentioned, we have removed all references to K.V. Jeyraj, the judgment rendered by the Madras High Court. 6. That apart, we have explicitly referred in paragraph 25 to the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Chancellor. Besides, we have added paragraphs 62 to 67, elaborating on precedential interpretation, to keep the discussion coherent and cohesive. 7. Let there be no cavil or quarrel on cosmetic corrections we have made. And let not a party's winning or losing detract the Court's determining the dispute. Failings there may have been, for we are fallible. Indeed, our duty is divine. Facts: 8. Petitioner Premkumar claims to be a public-spirited person: an environmentalist who also founded a cultural organisation. In October 2017 he came to this Court seeking a writ of quo warranto against Dr. Babu Sebastian, the second respondent. Premkumar asserts that recently he came to know that Dr. Sebastian had managed “to sneak into the post of the Vice Chancellor of Mahatma Gandhi University (M.G. University), misusing the clout commanded by him in the corridors of power.” Dr. Sebastian, according to Premkumar, did not satisfy the basic mandatory stipulations required for his holding the post of Vice Chancellor. He lacks the qualification. 9. UGC Regulations 2010 (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) prescribes the qualifications, among others, for the post of Vice Chancellor. Since the Government of Kerala adopted those regulations from 18.09.2010, a person to be appointed Vice Chancellor must be “a distinguished academician, with a minimum of ten years of experience as a professor in a university system or 10 years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research and/or academic administrative organisation.” 10. In 2014, the third respondent Chancellor annulled the appointment of the then Vice Chancellor and proposed to appoint a new Vice Chancellor. The Search Committee, appointed by the Chancellor, shortlisted three applicants. The previous Chancellor resigned on 26.08.2014 but, in great haste, appointed Dr. Sebastian Vice Chancellor on 30.08.2014. 11. Many people, including the President of the Cochin University Teachers’ Association and the editor of a prominent daily newspaper represented to the succeeding Chancellor, in September 2014, the very next month, but to no avail. In April 2015 one retired teacher also complained, the outcome being no different. Sebastian Vice Chancellor on 30.08.2014. 11. Many people, including the President of the Cochin University Teachers’ Association and the editor of a prominent daily newspaper represented to the succeeding Chancellor, in September 2014, the very next month, but to no avail. In April 2015 one retired teacher also complained, the outcome being no different. Then came petitioner Premkumar’s turn. He, too, complained and, later, filed this writ petition pro bono publico. Submissions: Petitioner’s: 12. Sri Shyam Krishnan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has elaborately argued both on the procedural lapses committed by the Chancellor and also on Dr. Sebastian’s lacking the basic qualification to hold the post of Vice Chancellor. He cited a plethora of precedents, too. We will briefly touch upon the submissions, for Dr. Sebastian raised a technical issue which needs to be answered first: inordinate delay in seeking judicial intervention. Laches. 13. To begin with, Sri Krishnan has submitted that once a statute mandates a procedure for filling up a post, such as Vice Chancellor, the authorities ought to adhere to the procedural rigour without exception. To support his contentions, he has relied on Taylor v. Taylor, ([L.R] 1 Ch.D. 426) Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor,( AIR 1936 PC 253 ) Babu Varghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, ( (1999) 3 SCC 422 ) K.V. Jeyaraj v. Chancellor of Universities and GVK Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer(( 2011(4) SCC 36 ). 14. Sri Krishnan has further contended that Premkumar particularly alleged mala fides on the respondents’ part, but they remain undenied. He asserts that mala fides not expressly denied stand proved. In support, he relies on State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh ( (1980) 2 SCC 471 ). 15. Power must be exercised bona fide and for legitimate purposes. Exercising executive power in haste spells out doom to fairness in public affairs, submits Sri Krishnan. In this regard, he relies on Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal ( (1985) 3 SCC 1 ), and Kapoor (DR) v. State of Himachal Pradesh ( (1981) 4 SCC 716 ). On the question whether State of Kerala adopted UGC Regulations, the learned counsel stresses that the State did. He has also submitted that even this court judicially acknowledged that the state adopted the Regulations, as seen from the unreported judgment, dt.27.11.2017, in WPC No. 4851 of 2017. 16. On the question whether State of Kerala adopted UGC Regulations, the learned counsel stresses that the State did. He has also submitted that even this court judicially acknowledged that the state adopted the Regulations, as seen from the unreported judgment, dt.27.11.2017, in WPC No. 4851 of 2017. 16. After elaborately referring to the University Grants Commission Act, the MG University Act, and the Statutes of the University, besides other analogous rules and administrative directions, Sri Krishnan repeatedly emphasised that Dr. Sebastian lacked the qualification. About the consequences that flow from a person’s lacking the qualifications, and yet his holding the post, the learned counsel has relied on MD Tiwari v. Union of India. ( 2014 (4) ADJ 92 ) As to the laches and delay, the learned counsel has relied on Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal ( (2013) 1 SCC 501 ), Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose ( (2009) 7 SCC 1 ). Dr. Kashinath T. Jalmi v. The Speaker ( (1993) 2 SCC 703 ) and B.R. Kapoor v. State of Tamilnadu. ( (2001) 7 SCC 231 ) Respondents’: State of Kerala’s: 17. Sri KV Sohan, the learned State Attorney, has made strenuous efforts to support the Chancellor’s action in appointing Dr. Sebastian the Vice Chancellor. According to him, it is in bad taste to impute motives to an exalted person like the Chancellor. He also asserts that the Chancellor’s filling up a vital vacancy in a university acting as its Chief Executive, an apolitical role, cannot be called in question just because the appointment took place on the cusp of the Chancellor’s resignation. University’s: 18. Sri Raveendran, the learned Senior Counsel, has spared no efforts to impress upon the Court that the authorities followed the procedure to perfection, that Sebastian possessed the qualification, and that the appointment has been in order. That apart, Sri Raveendran frontally attacked Premkumar’s locus standi and, what he termed as, the inordinate delay in his approaching the Court. Specific is his contention that even the best of causes fail to fructify if the suitor is indolent. In other words, Premkumar’s writ petition suffers, contends the learned Senior Counsel, from incurable laches. 19. Sri Raveendran, to begin with, has contended that unless adopted by the State Government, UGC Regulations, on their own, will not apply to educational institutions, including universities, in the State. In other words, Premkumar’s writ petition suffers, contends the learned Senior Counsel, from incurable laches. 19. Sri Raveendran, to begin with, has contended that unless adopted by the State Government, UGC Regulations, on their own, will not apply to educational institutions, including universities, in the State. To hammer home his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to Kalyani Mathivanan v. Jeyaraj, Prathapan (Dr.) v. State of Kerala (LR 2015(3) Ker. 674), and Radhakrishnan Pillai (Dr.) v. Travancore Devaswom Board ( 2016(2) KHC 119 (F.B.). 20. First, Sri Raveendran insisted that UGC Regulations prescribed no qualification to the post of Vice Chancellor. Then he contended, in the alternative, that Dr. Sebastian possessed every qualification to be appointed Vice Chancellor. To elaborate, he has submitted that Dr. Sebastian may not have worked as a professor, but he held an equivalent post, or even a higher one. The learned Senior Counsel took pains to take us through Dr. Sebastian’s counter affidavit and the documents filed along with it. All of them, according to him, unmistakably establish that Sebastian possesses the qualification. And Premkumar’s hue and cry on the issue of qualification amounts to much ado about nothing. In this regard, he relies on Chandrakala Trivedi v. State of Rajastan ( (2012) 3 SCC 129 ) to elaborate on what equivalency connotes. 21. And Sri Raveendran has submitted that, though Sebastian had specifically questioned the correctness of Premkumar’s various contentions, Premkumar did not traverse in his reply affidavit those counter allegations. This amounts to, according to the learned Senior Counsel, an admission—for whatever remains undenied amounts to the adversary’s accepting it as correct. In this regard, Sri Raveendran relied on Naseem Bano (SMT) v. State of U.P. (1993 Supp.(4) SCC 46), Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Abhishek Shukla ( (2009) 5 SCC 368 ). 22. The learned Senior Counsel has also devoted a good deal of his submissions to the maintainability of the writ petition. Apart from asserting that Premkumar has no locus standi, Sri Raveendran also contended that the writ suffers from laches—incurable at that. To exemplify under what circumstances quo warranto can be sought and how it can be sustained, he has relied on certain decisions. To sustain a specific plea that the writ is barred by laches, Sri Raveendran has referred to Abraham Kuruvilla (Dr.) v. Sree Chitra Tribunal Institute of Medical Sciences & Technology ( 2013(4) KHC 40 ). To exemplify under what circumstances quo warranto can be sought and how it can be sustained, he has relied on certain decisions. To sustain a specific plea that the writ is barred by laches, Sri Raveendran has referred to Abraham Kuruvilla (Dr.) v. Sree Chitra Tribunal Institute of Medical Sciences & Technology ( 2013(4) KHC 40 ). He has also, incidentally, referred to the de facto doctrine, as explained in Raghavan Nair v. Joint Registrar ( 1993(1) KLT 725 ). 23. In the end, Sri Raveendran has reiterated that Dr. Sebastian has almost completed his tenure as Vice Chancellor, and any adjudication at this belated stage serves no other purpose than unsettling and upsetting the administration, besides exposing the University to needless controversies. Second Respondent’s: 24. Though Sri Murali Purushothaman, the learned counsel for Dr. Sebastian, has been equally insistent and meticulous in his submissions, as was Sri Raveendran for the University, the arguments ran on the same lines. So we avoid reproducing those submissions. Third Respondent's: 25. Sri Jaju Babu, the learned Senior Counsel for the Chancellor, has taken us through the record as well as the statutory provisions. He has submitted that no motives could be attributed to the Chancellor. That apart, he has submitted that the Chancellor has followed the procedure to a perfection and observed the statutory mandate, both in letter and spirit. The learned Senior Counsel has also relied on certain decisions which we will refer to in the course of our discussion. Analysis: 26. This writ petition, ostensibly, in public interest, throws open two issues: (1) Has Dr. Babu Sebastian been qualified to hold the post of Vice Chancellor, and (2) has Premkumar approached this Court on time, seeking a public law remedy?’ 27. An adverse answer to the second issue puts paid to the first one. It needs no answer. So we will, first, consider the second question. Relator’s Standing or Locus: 28. Well established is the legal proposition that a writ of quo warranto lies when the appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisions. True, the University and Dr. Sebastian, too, have questioned Premkumar’s locus standi to file the writ petition. Dr. Sebastian has, in fact, alleged that Premkumar was fielded by persons unhappy with his appointment as the Vice Chancellor. But this objection to the suitor’s standing in a writ of quo warranto cannot detain us for long. True, the University and Dr. Sebastian, too, have questioned Premkumar’s locus standi to file the writ petition. Dr. Sebastian has, in fact, alleged that Premkumar was fielded by persons unhappy with his appointment as the Vice Chancellor. But this objection to the suitor’s standing in a writ of quo warranto cannot detain us for long. Legion are the judicial precedents. 29. If we examine this prerogative writ—quo warranto—from the judicial perspective of England, the place of its origin, the writ’s primary object is to shield the sovereignty of the Crown from invasion, and to prevent abuse of public office, by a usurper or intruder. So every subject is deemed to be interested and may institute quo warranto proceedings. (Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol.1, paras 179-80, as quoted in V. G. Ramachandran’s Law of Writs, EBC (2006), p.1355) 30. In India, too, any person may challenge the validity of an appointment to a public office, whether or not that person’s fundamental or other legal right has been infringed. But the court must be satisfied that the person so applying is bona fide, and there is a necessity in public interest to declare judicially that there is a usurpation of public office. (Id., 1355) Indisputably, a writ of quo warranto questioning a usurper’s occupying public office, according to the Supreme Court, can be maintained even by a busybody (N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose (2009) 7 SCC 1 ). 31. A citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, for he stands in the position of a relater. He need not have any special or personal interest. The real test is to see whether the person holding the office is authorised to hold the same under law. Delay and laches, according to the Supreme Court in Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal, ( (2013) 1 SCC 501 ) constitute no impediment for the court to deal with the lis on merits. 32. In Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha Vs. Dhobei Sahoo ( (2014) 1 SCC 161 ) the Supreme Court has pointed out that the concept of locus standi, which strictly applies to service jurisprudence, should have no entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of Quo Warranto. 32. In Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha Vs. Dhobei Sahoo ( (2014) 1 SCC 161 ) the Supreme Court has pointed out that the concept of locus standi, which strictly applies to service jurisprudence, should have no entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of Quo Warranto. The basic purpose of a Writ of Quo Warranto, it was pointed out, is to confer jurisdiction on the Constitutional Courts to see that the public office is not held by a usurper, a person with no legal authority. 33. So we may go on to examine the next hurdle: Does the writ petition suffer from laches? Is Premkumar’s delayed approach to the Court fatal? Writ of Quo Warranto and Laches: 34. Dr. Babu Sebastian has been the Vice Chancellor for more than three years, and his total tenure—four years—will end in about six months. He asserts that Premkumar approached the Court, belatedly. True, laches do play a role in the court’s determining the suitor’s rights to relief. Laches do not spare the matters filed pro bono. That said, we must also acknowledge that the courts will not apply the principle of laches with the same vigour as they apply the laws of limitation: Law brooks no latitude beyond what it permits. But a legal principle or doctrine does; it provides for the play in the joints, as it were, for a principle is a crystalized legal notion, not yet transcended to the level of law, that is, the statutory mandate. Pithily put, law controls delay; equity controls laches. Yet we may examine the precedential position on this point. 35. To claim a writ of quo warranto, a citizen must satisfy the court, among other things, that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority. And that necessarily leads to, according to the Supreme Court, (University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 ) the enquiry whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law. Recently, in tune with its earlier pronouncements, the Supreme Court in Dhobei Sahoo, has left no room for any doubt on the inapplicability of the doctrine of delay or laches to the writ remedy for quo warranto. 36. Recently, in tune with its earlier pronouncements, the Supreme Court in Dhobei Sahoo, has left no room for any doubt on the inapplicability of the doctrine of delay or laches to the writ remedy for quo warranto. 36. There is a difference, holds Dhobei Sahoo, between personal interest or individual interest on the one hand, and interest by a citizen as a relator to the Court on the other. The plea of delay or laches should be allowed no play because the person holds the public office as a usurper; the usurper’s continuance affects the public interest. The court must see that the larger public interest and the basic tenets of good governance are not thrown to the winds. 37. Given the above proposition of law, we must hold that the writ petition suffers from no laches; rather laches, if any, are inconsequential. In other words, Premkumar’s delayed approach does not defeat his demand that Dr. Sebastian should account for the position he holds. Has Dr. Sebastian legitimately occupied the post of Vice- Chancellor, or has he usurped it? (a) Statutory Scheme: (i) The Mahatma Gandhi University Act, 1985: 38. The MG University Act governs the eponymous institution. Section 10 of the Act deals with the post of Vice Chancellor. It mandates that the Chancellor appoints the Vice Chancellor, on the recommendation of the committee appointed by him for this purpose. Subsection (2) deals with the committee’s composition: it comprises three members—one elected by the Senate, one nominated by the Chairman of the University Grants Commission, and the third nominated by the Chancellor. Indeed, the proviso puts a fetter. No person holding any office under the University shall be nominated as a member of the committee. And the Chancellor will appoint one of the members of the committee to be its convener. Further discussion on the selection procedure may be obviated, for UGC Regulations have taken over this task, and we will discuss those Regulations elsewhere. 39. Sub section (12), in our view, throws light on the role of the Vice Chancellor in a university. Indeed, Premkumar persists that Vice Chancellor is the chief academic officer; on the other hand, both the University and Dr. Sebastian assert that he is only the chief executive officer, for he does not engage in actual teaching. So this subsection assumes importance. Indeed, Premkumar persists that Vice Chancellor is the chief academic officer; on the other hand, both the University and Dr. Sebastian assert that he is only the chief executive officer, for he does not engage in actual teaching. So this subsection assumes importance. The provision proclaims that the Vice Chancellor “shall be the principal academic and executive officer of the University, and all the officers of the University shall be under his administrative control.” 40. In the end, we must acknowledge that the MG University Act does not prescribe qualifications for the post of Vice Chancellor. Does that mean a person of whatever academic qualification and ability can be appointed to the post? We will see. 41. Before proceeding further, we may notice that Mahatma Gandhi University Statutes, 1987, in chapter 2, under the caption “officers of the University”, speaks about the Vice Chancellor’s powers and his service conditions. (ii) The UGC Act, 1956: 42. We may now turn our attention to the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, and the Regulations under that Act. To trace UGC's power to frame regulations, we may refer to section 26 of the Act. But with its power disputed by neither party, we need not labour to elaborate that provision. Suffice it to say that in June 2010, the UGC framed the Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education (“the UGC Regulations.”) (iii) The UGC Regulations: 43. First, we may note that the regulations aim at maintaining standards in higher education institutions. Second, the title tells us that it concerns, essentially, the minimum qualifications for the teachers and other academic staff to be appointed in the universities and colleges. Despite the dispute about the Vice Chancellor’s status—is he an academician or an administrator?—the Regulations do prescribe educational qualifications for the post of Vice Chancellor as well. Let us examine the relevant provision: Regulation 7.3.0. VICE CHANCELLOR: i. Persons of the highest level of competence, integrity, morals and institutional commitment are to be appointed as Vice-Chancellors. The Vice-Chancellor to be appointed should be a distinguished academician, with a minimum of ten years of experience as Professor in a University system or ten years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research and/or academic administrative organization. ii. The Vice-Chancellor to be appointed should be a distinguished academician, with a minimum of ten years of experience as Professor in a University system or ten years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research and/or academic administrative organization. ii. The selection of Vice-Chancellor should be through proper identification of a Panel of 3-5 names by a Search Committee through a public Notification or nomination or a talent search process or in combination. The members of the above Search Committee shall be persons of eminence in the sphere of higher education and shall not be connected in any manner with the University concerned or its colleges. While preparing the panel, the search committee must give proper weight-age to academic excellence, exposure to the higher education system in the country and abroad, and adequate experience in academic and administrative governance to be given in writing along with the panel to be submitted to the Visitor/Chancellor. In respect of State and Central Universities, the following shall be the constitution of the Search Committee. (a) a nominee of the Visitor/Chancellor, who should be the Chairperson of the Committee. (b) a nominee of the Chairman, University Grants Commission. (c) a nominee of the Syndicate/Executive Council/Board of Management of the University. iii. The Visitor/Chancellor shall appoint the Vice Chancellor out of the Panel of names recommended by the Search Committee. iv. The conditions of service of the Vice Chancellor shall be prescribed in the Statutes of the Universities concerned in conformity with these Regulations. v. The term of office of the Vice Chancellor shall form part of the service period of the incumbent concerned making him/her eligible for all service related benefits. (italics and emphasis added) 44. The initial part of Regulation 7.3.0. (i) is more like an exhortation: that the prospective candidate should possess the highest level of competence, integrity, morals, and institutional commitment. The latter part mandates that the candidate should be (a) a distinguished academician, (b) with at least ten years of experience as Professor in a University system or (c) ten years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research or academic administrative organization. 45. The qualification criteria have two elements: (1) distinguished academic record; (2) at least 10 years’ experience as a professor; or the same amount of experience in an equivalent position in a “reputed research or academic administrative organisation.” 46. 45. The qualification criteria have two elements: (1) distinguished academic record; (2) at least 10 years’ experience as a professor; or the same amount of experience in an equivalent position in a “reputed research or academic administrative organisation.” 46. To adjudicate the issue before us, we are to examine regulation 7 in detail. But before we do that, we must address another issue. The University, as well as Dr. Sebastian, has contended that by the time the appointment took place, the UGC Regulations had not held the field. In other words, the State Government did not adopt the Regulations; nor did it amend the University Acts. This assertion leads us to address another question. Do the UGC Regulations bind the State and its Universities? 47. The record reveals that Dr. Sebastian was appointed on 30.08.2014. The UGC Regulations came into force on 30.06.2010. Nevertheless, there remains a question: in a federal setup, do these Regulations automatically apply to all the educational institutions across the country? Or should the respective State Governments adopt the regulations and bring about corresponding amendments to the University Acts and statutes in those States, as they desire? 48. About the applicability of UGC regulations, there was, initially, some precedential uncertainty. Now it stands settled. Much like the MG University Act, the Madurai Kamaraj University Act categorises the Vice Chancellor as the officer of the University. Section 11 of that Act contains a similar appointment procedure as section 10 of the MG University Act does. Even for the Vice Chancellor’s powers and duties, Section 12 of the Madurai Kamaraj University Act is analogous, if not in pari materia, with subsections 12 to 17 and Statute No. 2 of MG University Statutes, 1997. 49. In Kalyani Mathivanan the Supreme Court posed unto itself the question whether any of the provisions of the State legislation (the University Act, 1965) and the Statutes framed thereunder conflict with the Central legislation: the UGC Act, 1956, including the UGC Regulations, 2010. First, on facts, the Supreme Court has observed that the post of Vice-Chancellor under the University Act, 1965, is a post of an officer. The UGC Act, 1956, is silent about this aspect. The UGC Regulations, 2000, are also silent about the post of Vice-Chancellor. The provisions as for the Vice-Chancellor have been made for the first time under the UGC Regulations, 2010. 50. The UGC Act, 1956, is silent about this aspect. The UGC Regulations, 2000, are also silent about the post of Vice-Chancellor. The provisions as for the Vice-Chancellor have been made for the first time under the UGC Regulations, 2010. 50. On the UGC Regulations’ applicability to state universities, Kalyani Mathivanan holds that the UGC Regulations, 2010, do not apply to the universities, colleges, and other higher educational institutions coming under the purview of the State Legislature. But they do apply if the State Government adopts and implements the Regulations subject to the terms and conditions. 51. In other words, the UGC Regulations are directory. The State universities, colleges, and other higher educational institutions remain unaffected, for it is left to the State Government to adopt and implement the Regulations. Thus, the UGC Regulations are partly mandatory and partly directory. 52. Applying the above proposition to the facts, Kalyani Mathivanan has upheld the Vice Chancellor’s appointment because the State of Tamil Nadu has not, by then, adopted the UGC Regulations. 53. What about the State of Kerala? They do bind the State and its Universities only if the State has adopted them. This conclusion leads to another question. When Dr. Sebastian was appointed as the Vice Chancellor, had the Government adopted UGC Regulations? 54. As is evident from Ext.P3, the Government of Kerala adopted the UGC Regulations with effect from 18.09.2010. The order also mandates that all the universities in the State must incorporate the Regulations in their statutes within one month from the date of the order. The Government also assured that it would initiate, if necessary, steps to amend the Acts of the universities, to implement the Regulations. The MG University, on its part, issued the Ext.P4 order on 01.08.2011, implementing the UGC regulations. To support this assertion further, we may examine what this Court said on earlier occasions. 55. First, we will examine Prathapan. A Division Bench observed that the UGC Regulations had to be implemented by the State Government. On 10.12.2010 the Vice Chancellor of the Kerala University was appointed. In this context, Prathapan observed that the University Act was never amended to incorporate the UGC Regulations. So on the strength of Regulation 7.3.0, the VC’s appointment, it was held, could not be invalidated. Prathapan, perhaps passingly, observed that UGC itself dropped the Regulation 7.3.0, by its resolution, dated 18/19.07.2012. In this context, Prathapan observed that the University Act was never amended to incorporate the UGC Regulations. So on the strength of Regulation 7.3.0, the VC’s appointment, it was held, could not be invalidated. Prathapan, perhaps passingly, observed that UGC itself dropped the Regulation 7.3.0, by its resolution, dated 18/19.07.2012. Passingly, we said, because once State or the University did not adopt the Regulations by the time it appointed the VC, the UGC’s later dropping the Regulations remains inconsequential. 56. But before going further, we will also dispel the cloud around the lasting effect of the UGC Regulations, in the face of Dr. Sebastian’s plea, and in the light of Prathapan’s observations: that UGC itself dropped them by resolution, dt.19.07.2012. Premkumar contends that it was only a resolution that was never implemented. He has drawn our attention to Ext.P 15 amendment to the Regulations. As rightly contended by him apart from cosmetic corrections and improvements to the Regulations, the amendment has not brought about any major changes to Regulation 7.3.0. Particularly, on the Vice Chancellor’s qualifications, it has remained undisturbed. 57. Had the UGC dropped the Regulations, its amending them later would not have arisen. That apart, a validly promulgated regulation, having statutory force, cannot be annulled, much less dropped, through a mere resolution, as if they were administrative instructions. In fact, the University Grants Commission itself passed a resolution on 18th and 19th of July 2012 to scrap Paragraph 7.3.0 of the Annexure to the UGC Regulations. The Regulations issued under Section 26 of the University Grants Commission Act cannot come into effect except through a notification issued in the Official Gazette. Under sub section (2) of section 26, no regulation could be made except with the previous approval of the Central Government. The resolution passed in the 487th meeting of the UGC has not so far received the Central Government’s approval, nor has it been notified in the Official Gazette. Therefore, the UGC’s mere resolution cannot override the Regulations, notified in the Official Gazette with the prior approval of the Central Government. 58. Soon after Prathapan, this Court had another occasion to examine the interplay between the State enactments and UGC Regulations. In Radhakrishnan a Full Bench—one of us, CJ Antony Dominic, authoring the judgment—dealt in detail with the same issue. 58. Soon after Prathapan, this Court had another occasion to examine the interplay between the State enactments and UGC Regulations. In Radhakrishnan a Full Bench—one of us, CJ Antony Dominic, authoring the judgment—dealt in detail with the same issue. Radhakrishnan, first, holds that the State of Kerala has already adopted the UGC Regulations through GO, dated 10.12.2010. Once the UGC Regulations were adopted by the State Government and implemented with effect from 18.9.2010, the Full Bench observes, the Universities must comply with the Regulations in the State. It also, next, observes that anything “in conflict with the Central law and the subordinate legislation made thereunder, will be void and inoperative.” 59. Whether or not the University Acts enacted under Entry 25 of List III or the Statutes framed thereunder are amended in line with the UGC Regulations, the Universities and affiliated colleges in Kerala State are bound to comply with the UGC Regulations, 2010, declares Radhakrishnan. The reason weighed with Radhakrishnan is that the State did adopt the Regulations with effect from 18.9.2010. In the end, it holds that the petitioners’ plea must be accepted: that the appointments in the University be made in terms of UGC Regulations from 18.9.2010. 60. The High Court of Allahabad, too, has examined the applicability of UGC Regulations. A Vice Chancellor was appointed on 24.06.2012. By then, the State of UP, as observed by the High Court in Amrit Prasad v. State UP ( 2016 (1) ADJ 698 ) had not adopted the UGC Regulations, nor had the Universities amended their Statutes in terms of UGC Regulations. The High Court repelled the petitioner’s reliance on two GOs—one issued in December 2010 and another in December 2013. In fact, it observed that those two GOs would apply to teaching staff, but Vice Chancellor is not a teacher; he is, on the contrary, an officer of the University. If the State has not adopted the Regulations “in reference of Vice-Chancellor, then appointment of Vice-Chancellor . . . has to be upheld in all eventuality,” is the finding of Amrit Prasad. 61. First, Radhakrishnan, a Full Bench decision of this Court, has taken a different view. And it binds us. Second, the very UGC Regulations speak of not only Teachers and other Academic Staff, but also of the Vice Chancellors. . . has to be upheld in all eventuality,” is the finding of Amrit Prasad. 61. First, Radhakrishnan, a Full Bench decision of this Court, has taken a different view. And it binds us. Second, the very UGC Regulations speak of not only Teachers and other Academic Staff, but also of the Vice Chancellors. Viewed differently, if UGC Regulations concern only the teaching staff—perhaps they may—and if the Vice Chancellor is not a teaching staff, the State Government adopting them vis-à-vis the VC seems incongruous and unlikely. Amrit Prasad’s proposition leads us to another question. Is the Vice Chancellor an Academician or an Administrator? 62. This question arises because of our propensity to pigeonhole every person and thing. Labelling is perhaps an innate urge: a thing must be either white or black; an issue must be either right or wrong; a fact must be either true or false; a person must be either good or bad; an official must be either an academician or an administrator. 63. It is common knowledge that many authorities combine multiple functions. They will not cease to answer one description because they are also answering another description. To this proposition, a Vice Chancellor is no exception. More particularly, if the statute prescribes qualifications, it is not for the court to dilute them just because the appointee may have to discharge other functions, perhaps, unconnected with the prescribed qualifications. Not to be content with a mere ipse dixit, we will examine the statutory position. Section 10 (12) of the MG University Act proclaims that the Vice Chancellor “shall be the principal academic and executive officer of the University, and all the officers of the University shall be under his administrative control.” 64. In Kalyani Mathivanan the Apex Court has observed, after examining the UGC Regulations, 2010, that the Vice-Chancellor should be a distinguished academician with a minimum of ten years of experience as Professor in a university system or ten years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research and/or academic administrative organisation. But with specific reference to the Madurai Kamaraj University Act, 1965, and the Statutes made thereunder, the Apex Court has observed that Vice Chancellor is not a teaching post, but an officer of the university. 65. Before proceeding further, we may observe that Kalyani Mathivanan has, on facts, held that the Tamil Nadu Government has not adopted the UGC Regulations, 2010. 65. Before proceeding further, we may observe that Kalyani Mathivanan has, on facts, held that the Tamil Nadu Government has not adopted the UGC Regulations, 2010. So the question of conflict between the State legislation and the Statutes framed under the Central legislation, it is held, does not arise. Kalyani Mathivanan further points out that once the State Government adopts the UGC Regulations, it needs to amend the State legislation, In that event, too, there will be no conflict between the State legislation and the Central legislation, concludes Kalyani Mathivanan. 66. Succinctly stated, Kalyani Mathivanan proceeds on the premise that State of Tamil Nadu did not adopt UGC Regulations. Here, for State of Kerala, if we hold that the Regulations apply, they occupy the field. Then, the State’s statutes and enactments yield to that extent. In that event, what those statues or enactments contain about the posts already dealt with by the Regulations assumes no importance—rather besides the point. Holding & Ratio: 67. Precedential predominance of the Apex Court’s decisions undisputed, we may observe that the meat of the matter in a judgment is its ratio decidendi or holding, if we can equate these two expressions. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. As is often quoted, Lord Halsbury so observed in Quinn v. Leathem. ([1901] AC 495 at 506, as quoted at p.43, Precedent in English Law, Cross & Harriss, 4th Ed.,) 68. The American jurisprudence maintains a perceptible distinction between holding, ratio—and even dictum. A holding consists of the ''courts' determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision.'' Everything else amounts to dicta—what Francis Bacon in I6I7 called the ''vapours and fumes of law.” Bryan A. Garner et al., in The Law of Judicial Precedent (Thomson Reuters, 2016, pp.44-46) observe that “at times, judges say that the holding consists of only those legal propositions absolutely necessary to the result. At other times, courts give holding a more capacious meaning, within it all the legal propositions that were actually found applicable to a decision, that were based on the case-specific facts, and that led to the result-whether or not they were strictly necessary.” 69. A near-synonym for holding is the fuzzy Latinism ratio decidendi—often shortened to ratio. Ratio decidendi is normally seen as a genus—proposition of which the concrete holding is one species or instance. As the definitions of holding and ratio have varied, so has that of dictum. A dictum, in the words of Posner J., is ''a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously impairing the holding.'' To conclude, we may quote from the same treatise: While the line between holding and dictum is theoretically stark, it can get blurry in practice: ''The distinction between… dicta and the elusive ratio decidendi [i.e., holding] is in essence a distinction between relevance and irrelevance, and much of the difficulty in elucidating the conception of the ratio decidendi arises from attempts to give a precise meaning to relevance in this context.” 70. Close at hand are a plethora of precedents from the Apex Court. In Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, ( (1997) 6 SCC 538 ) has observed that ratio decidendi is based on the facts actually decided. It is an authority for those facts. 71. It is a well-settled proposition of law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not that everything said therein constitutes a precedent. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in State of Punjab v. Baldev Sigh, ( (1999) 6 SCC 172 ) has held that the courts are obliged to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents bearing it in mind that a decision of the court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it was rendered. 72. Here, as we are going to observe soon, State of Kerala did adopt the UGC Regulations. So we will proceed on the premise that the UGC Regulations, including the qualifications, do apply. Even if the pleadings are examined, Dr. Sebastian has contended that he has been qualified in terms of both the University Act and the UGC Regulations. 73. 72. Here, as we are going to observe soon, State of Kerala did adopt the UGC Regulations. So we will proceed on the premise that the UGC Regulations, including the qualifications, do apply. Even if the pleadings are examined, Dr. Sebastian has contended that he has been qualified in terms of both the University Act and the UGC Regulations. 73. Granted that the UGC Regulations apply to State of Kerala and further granted that they govern the qualifications, we will examine whether Dr. Sebastian is “a distinguished academician, with a minimum of ten years of experience as Professor in a university system or 10 years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research and/or academic administrative organisation.” We cannot fail to notice that even the alternative qualification insists that if the prospective candidate has not worked in a university, he must have worked in a “research or academic administrative” organisation. 74. Neither syntactically nor semantically the expression “academic administrative” appears appealing. But it emphatically shows the legislative intent: even if a person works in any other establishment than a university, that establishment must be predominated by academic activities. Administration, if any, must be incidental and relate to only those academic activities. Therefore, we have no manner of doubt that a Vice Chancellor is an amalgam of an academician and an administrator—an academic administrator, so to say. Granted that a Vice Chancellor is an academician, we cannot entertain any doubt that UGC Regulations do apply to the post of the Vice Chancellor, the academic qualifications included. 75. To clinch the issue, we may quote from Kothari Commission (1964-66): A Vice-Chancellor is one who stands for the commitment of the university to scholarship and pursuit of truth (334). A Vice-Chancellor should be a person of vision and academic leadership, with an ability for administration. He should command high respect among all sections of the society. The Vice Chancellor should be a distinguished academic...[who] has a commitment to the values for which the universities stand...He must have the ability to provide leadership to the university by his academic worth, administrative competence and moral stature. (Kothari Commission 1964-66: 334) 76. So a Vice Chancellor is an academician par excellence, combining, no doubt, administrative acumen. Does Dr. Sebastian have the qualifications prescribed under Regulation 7.3.0 of the UGC Regulations? 77. From Dr. (Kothari Commission 1964-66: 334) 76. So a Vice Chancellor is an academician par excellence, combining, no doubt, administrative acumen. Does Dr. Sebastian have the qualifications prescribed under Regulation 7.3.0 of the UGC Regulations? 77. From Dr. Sebastian’s own pleadings we gather that in 1983 he entered service as a lecturer in the Department of Malayalam, in a college now affiliated to MG University. In 1996 he was promoted as Associate Professor. He implies that he could have been, sooner or later, a Professor, but the government did not sanction the post of Professor in government and aided colleges. Dr. Sebastian proclaims that he has 19 years’ experience in “college-level teaching.” He also has 18 years’ experience as university research guide. Additionally, he has served as chairperson of PhD Award Committee, besides serving in the adjudication committee for PhD award in University of Kerala. 78. In October 2003 Dr. Sebastian was appointed Director of the State Institute of Education Technology (SIET), Department of Education. He has been the Director of SIET for more than 10 years. That apart, Dr. Sebastian has one-year experience as the Executive Director, State IT School Project, and one-year experience in the same rank at VICTERS Education Channel, Department of Education. On his appointment as a Vice Chancellor on 30.08.2014, he gave up his position in SIET. 79. Impressive are the achievements. But the question remains whether they amount to anything in the face of specific qualifications or eligibility criteria set out in UGC Regulations. Indeed, repetitive as it may sound, we need to revisit those qualifications prescribed by UGC. 80. The prospective appointee must be (a) a distinguished academician, (b) with a minimum of ten years’ experience as professor in a university system. In the alternative, he may have (a) 10 years’ experience (b) in an equivalent position in a reputed research and/or academic administrative organisation. 81. Admittedly, Dr. Sebastian is neither a professor nor has he worked in a university. Therefore, the first limb of regulation 7.3.0 does not apply. Then we must focus on the second limb: 10 years’ experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research or academic-administrative organisation. Indisputably, Dr. Sebastian worked as the Director of SIET for more than 10 years. So the question is, does the post of Director equal that of Professor? Further, is SIET a reputed research organisation or an academic-administrative organisation? 82. Indisputably, Dr. Sebastian worked as the Director of SIET for more than 10 years. So the question is, does the post of Director equal that of Professor? Further, is SIET a reputed research organisation or an academic-administrative organisation? 82. State Institute of Educational Technology (SIET, Kerala), as its website proclaims, is responsible for the planning, research, production, and evaluation of digital contents like video, audio programmes, multimedia objects, software, and so forth for educational purposes. SIET Kerala also aims to implement schemes to generate teaching technologies and learning process in the modern context. SIET Kerala is the latest in the array of seven SIETs in the country. Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, sanctioned the State Institute of Educational Technology for Kerala in 1998. (http://www.sietkerala.gov.in/ accessed on 15.02.2018) 83. A Government website (http://nroer.gov.in/582ea46516b51c01da6b837e/ accessed on the same day) reveals that SIET’s Executive Committee, with the Minister for Education as Chairman, and the Secretary for General Education as the Vice Chairman, has 16 members in all. The full-time Director carries on the administration and general management. The Institute plays a catalytic role in fostering, as well as supporting and supplementing, the educational movement in the state, particularly in the arena of Primary education. Its area of operation covers the preparation of video/audio programmes for the children of 5 to 17 years of age (Class 1 to Class 12) and the teachers in the regional language to support the conventional classroom teaching. 84. As to “the highest level of competence, integrity, morals and institutional commitment”, we may observe that they are subjective, not easily amenable to judicial scrutiny. More concrete are the academic qualifications: the candidate should be a distinguished academician. We take, given Dr. Sebastian’s qualifications, that he is an academician. But nobody could maintain that he has ten years’ experience as a professor in a university system. Now, what is left is “ten years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research and or academic administrative organization.” 85. Ten years’ experience, Dr. Sebastian has. SIET is the institution. It specializes, as its website reveals, in bringing out educational material for primary education for children between 5-17 years. Let us call it either a research organisation or an academic-administrative organisation. The Shakespearean rhetoric —what’s in a name? ("What's in a name? Ten years’ experience, Dr. Sebastian has. SIET is the institution. It specializes, as its website reveals, in bringing out educational material for primary education for children between 5-17 years. Let us call it either a research organisation or an academic-administrative organisation. The Shakespearean rhetoric —what’s in a name? ("What's in a name? That which we call a rose; By any other name would smell as sweet." Romeo and Juliet (II, ii, 1-2)—does not get affected, though. 86. As for the status of the SIET, we have already extracted from the institution's website and also the government website. Premkumar took a specific plea that Dr. Sebastian’s predecessor in SIET was a High School Headmaster on deputation. This assertion has not been contradicted. Our access to the institution’s website now reveals that one Sri Mohammed Azeer A.K. is or was the Director. The website mentions no period. He has these qualifications: B.Tech in Computer Science and Engineering, M.Tech in Computer and Information Technology, Post Graduate Degree in Business Administration (MBA). He also has seven Years’ experience in ICT related projects, five years’ experience as Assistant Professor in Computer Science Department, and eight years’ experience as Head of Department, Computer Science and Engineering, Technical Education. He has never been a professor, however. 87. General Education Department’s website shows Sri Amburaj as the Director. Even going by the name, the Director is not a Professor, nor has he a Ph.D in any academic discipline. In fact, Premkumar all along contended, rather vociferously, that any person with mere graduation could hold the post of Director. Neither the State nor the University, not to speak of Dr. Sebastian, its former Head, could place before us any material to establish that the institution involves any academic research catering to higher education. On the contrary, the institution itself declares that it prepares video/audio programmes for the children of 5 to 17 years and the teachers in the regional language to support the conventional classroom teaching. 88. The respondents laid much emphasis on Chandrakala Trivedi. In that case, the appellant passed the Secondary Examination, as it was permissible for a candidate passing that examination to get admitted to higher classes, with a preparatory course. The appellant went onto complete her graduation from the Open University; B. Ed. Degree on a regular basis; and M.A degree, too. 88. The respondents laid much emphasis on Chandrakala Trivedi. In that case, the appellant passed the Secondary Examination, as it was permissible for a candidate passing that examination to get admitted to higher classes, with a preparatory course. The appellant went onto complete her graduation from the Open University; B. Ed. Degree on a regular basis; and M.A degree, too. She claimed that she satisfied the eligibility criteria for the post of a teacher. She was provisionally selected. But later, the respondent authorities rejected her claim, on the premise that she did not pass the Senior Secondary Examination (intermediate), which is the basic qualification. The High Court felt that the appellant’s higher qualification is no substitute for the basic qualification—Senior Secondary or Intermediate. 89. In that context, the Supreme Court in Chandrakala Trivedi has observed that the word 'equivalent' must be given a reasonable meaning. By using the expression, 'equivalent' one means that there are some degrees of flexibility or adjustment which do not lower the stated requirement. There has to be some difference between what is equivalent and what is exact. Besides that, if a person is provisionally selected, a certain degree of reasonable expectation of sustaining that selection comes into existence. 90. We wonder whether Chandrakala Trivedi throws any light on the controversy of equivalency. It may not. The facts are different and the holding is fact-centric. Yet we acknowledge that equivalency of qualification essentially lies in academic domain, calling for an element of expertise. And the courts must be slow to enter the arena earmarked for the experts. First, here, we are not called upon to decide one-to-one corresponding courses to be evaluated or compared. Second, during the selection, neither the Selection Committee nor the Chancellor bestowed their attention on it. 91. We are not, at any rate, deciding equivalency of any two qualifications. Instead, we are comparing two offices or positions. We do not think it involves or requires any academic excellence or expertise to decide the issue. 92. From the above analysis, we are compelled to conclude that the post of Director in SIET cannot be likened to that of a Professor. By the same token, we cannot term SIET a reputed research or academic-administrative organization comparable to a University, which exclusively caters to higher education. We, therefore, hold that Dr. Sebastian lacked the qualification to the post of Vice Chancellor. Achievements as Justification: 93. By the same token, we cannot term SIET a reputed research or academic-administrative organization comparable to a University, which exclusively caters to higher education. We, therefore, hold that Dr. Sebastian lacked the qualification to the post of Vice Chancellor. Achievements as Justification: 93. Indeed in his counter affidavit, Dr. Sebastian has listed out the achievements the University has to its credit under his stewardship. They appear, no doubt, to be commendable. Without sounding pejorative or uncharitable to Dr. Sebastian's proclaimed achievements, we must observe, as a matter of metaphor, that unqualified, a man may perform miracles treating many medical maladies, yet he cannot be called a Doctor—for he remains a quack. 94. Under these circumstances, we regret out inability to allow Dr. Sebastian to overcome a fundamental deficit or defect— qualification—to justify his claim to the post of Vice Chancellor. The performance or achievements are post-appointment. The appointment flawed, there can be no retroactive defect curing or justification supplying. Does the Writ Petition suffer from non-joinder of necessary parties? 95. Both the University and Dr. Sebastian have contended that Premkumar ought to have brought on record the three members of the Selection Committee, for they alone could throw light on what weighed with them during their shortlisting the three names. 96. Of the three experts in the Selection Committee, two belong to this State—nothing to be read between the lines, however. One is the highest ranked civil servant of the State, and the other is a legislator. Neither can answer, in the strict sense, the description: a person of eminence in the sphere of higher education. The third member does. In fact, that member, admittedly an acclaimed academician entirely unconnected to the selection, recommended only one name—not Dr. Sebastian’s. 97. In adversarial litigation, unless mala fides or motives are attributed to the members of the selection committee, they need not be brought on record. It pays to examine M. D. Tiwari in this regard. 98. In M. D. Tiwari, for the post of Director in an IIT, a deemed University, the Selection Committee appointed by the Chancellor shortlisted candidates. But eventually, none was found suitable. Its task completed, the Selection Committee became functus officio. It is an incidental finding, though. 99. Examined deeper, M. D. Tiwari, rendered by the Allahabad High Court, concerns equivalency of qualifications. One of the candidates worked as a “Director III-A”. But eventually, none was found suitable. Its task completed, the Selection Committee became functus officio. It is an incidental finding, though. 99. Examined deeper, M. D. Tiwari, rendered by the Allahabad High Court, concerns equivalency of qualifications. One of the candidates worked as a “Director III-A”. The Allahabad High Court has held that the candidate’s working in that position “cannot be equated with requirement of standing of 10 years as Professor.” 100. At any rate, we conclude that the members of the Selection Committee are not the necessary parties to this lis. The Composition of Search Committee : 101. We may further address the issue of the Search/Select Committee, especially its composition. The proviso to subsection (2) of Section 10 cautions that no person holding any office under the University shall be nominated as a member of the Committee. Because of Radhakrishnan's pronouncement that from June 2010 the UGC Regulations were enforced in the State of Kerala, we may as well refer to the procedural prescription for selecting a Vice Chancellor under those Regulations. 102. Regulation 7.3.0(ii) mandates that the selection of Vice-Chancellor should be through proper identification of a panel of 3-5 names by a Search Committee. The members of the Search Committee shall be persons of eminence in the sphere of higher education and shall not be connected in any manner with the University concerned or its colleges. 103. On facts, the then Chancellor constituted a Committee with three persons: the then Chief Secretary was the Chancellor’s nominee; Dr. Balram, the Director of Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, was the UGC’s nominee; and Sri Benny Behanan, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, was the Syndicate’s nominee. Pertinently, Mr. Behanan was both a Member of the Senate and Syndicate of the same University. There is no material, particularly, the details of his qualifications, for this Court to hold that he is a person of eminence in the sphere of higher education. That said, we cannot ignore the fact that he is connected with the University; he is a part of both the Senate and the Syndicate, contrary to the statutory mandate. The wording as we observe is specific and sweeping: “Shall not be connected in any manner with the University.” 104. That said, we cannot ignore the fact that he is connected with the University; he is a part of both the Senate and the Syndicate, contrary to the statutory mandate. The wording as we observe is specific and sweeping: “Shall not be connected in any manner with the University.” 104. As to the impact of procedural lapses on any selection, we may observe that from the days of vintage Taylor v. Taylor, the courts have held that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. In other words, where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done as mandated. 105. So we have no other option than holding that the composition of the Search Committee is flawed. Illegality v. Impropriety: 106. Illegality, plain and simple, as defined by the American Heritage English Dictionary, is what is prohibited by law or by official rules. On the other hand, impropriety is what is not suited to circumstances or needs; not in keeping with conventional mores; indecorous. It is unseemly and inconsistent with established truth, fact, or rule; incorrect. 107. Academic institutions are autonomous, functioning under the direct gaze of the first citizen of that State, the Governor doubling as the Chancellor. All along, universities do have a pride of place in any country’s cultural and educational ethos. The academia live in ivory towers, and they frown at intellectual imbecility or improbity leading to compromise on principles and curtailment of academic freedom. For them, supposedly, politics is an anathema, and their pandering to the shifting political whims is an abomination. 108. Here is a curious turn of events. Of the three candidates shortlisted, two did not give in their applications any “Reference Persons.” But Dr. Sebastian did. In his application, he mentions as reference persons two ministers in power then. First, there does not seem to be any requirement to be fulfilled by giving reference names. If there had been any requirement, the other two candidates, too, would have done so. Second, it hides nothing about a candidate’s flexing political muscle. The Selection Committee comprised one civil servant and one MLA. We do not say they had been influenced, nor do we say that the application entailed rejection. 109. If there had been any requirement, the other two candidates, too, would have done so. Second, it hides nothing about a candidate’s flexing political muscle. The Selection Committee comprised one civil servant and one MLA. We do not say they had been influenced, nor do we say that the application entailed rejection. 109. We do, however, observe that it is a pernicious practice to indulge in name-dropping. It is an act of impropriety, not of illegality. We earnestly wish that the authorities may ensure, by suitable regulations, that such practice earns a disqualification, for it is not so subtle an effort to exert pressure or influence on the selection outcome. Here, yet, we do not conclude, much less rule, that Dr. Sebastian has incurred any disqualification by his conduct. The Adjudicatory Ambit: 110. In Dhobei Sahoo the Supreme Court has limned the court’s adjudicatory ambit or limitation to entertain a writ of quo warranto: the writ of this nature can be issued when the person holding the public office lacks the eligibility criteria or when the appointment is contrary to statutory rules. So we confined our discussion to the extent of eligibility and procedural failings. Nothing more. Conclusion: (a) The constraints of neither standing nor laches apply to Premkumar’s cause. (b) Dr. Sebastian, despite his having been at the helm of the affairs for more than three and half years, is unqualified to hold the post of Vice Chancellor. (c) The Post of Director, SIET, does not equal the post of Professor in a University. (d) The composition of the Selection Committee is flawed: a member of the Senate and Syndicate ought not to have been part of the Committee. (e) Of the Search Committee, one of the three members— the MLA—for want of record, possesses no eminence in the sphere of higher education, despite his holding a pivotal position. 111. As a result, the writ of quo warranto is issued, declaring that Dr. Babu Sebastian is unqualified to hold the public post—Vice Chancellor. Tailpiece: 112. Dr. Babu Sebastian has held, all along, in these three and half years, the pivotal post of Vice Chancellor. While holding that post, he may have performed numerous duties connected with that office, could have passed countless orders, and must have taken a plethora of policy decisions. They all must be, as a matter of necessity, saved, by applying the de facto doctrine. While holding that post, he may have performed numerous duties connected with that office, could have passed countless orders, and must have taken a plethora of policy decisions. They all must be, as a matter of necessity, saved, by applying the de facto doctrine. And we do so. The writ of quo warranto stands allowed. No order on costs.