ORDER : The first accused and the third accused in Crime No.36 of 2011 on the file of Central City Crime Branch, Tirunelveli City have filed these quash petitions. The prayer is to quash the FIR that has been registered against them for the offences under Sections 120(B), 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 384 and 506(I) IPC. 2. The defacto complainant in this case is one Ashok Pandian. The case of the defacto complainant is that the property in question originally belonged to one Samuvel who has been shown as the second accused in this case. The said Samuvel sold 4.32 acres in favour of one Matheesa Pandian on 03.11.1986. He also sold the remaining portion to the extent of 4.26 acres in favour of Durai Pandian who is none other than the elder brother of the defacto complainant herein. Though both these documents were presented for registration, the transaction could not be fully completed for want of income tax clearance certificate. The allegation of the defacto complainant is that Thiru.Matheesa Pandian, sold his 4.32 acres of land in his favour on 27.11.1986. Thus, the entire property in question, according to the defacto complainant came under the ownership of Ashok Pandian and Durai Pandian. 3. But, as already pointed out, for want of income tax clearance certificate, the sale deeds could not be released. Since the defacto complainant and his brother developed an apprehension that the land may change hands, they filed O.S.Nos.1415 of 1987 and 1417 of 1987 before the Principal District Munsif, Tirunelveli against the Samuvel for restraining him from alienating the property. Likewise, the said Samuvel also filed O.S.No.64 of 1988 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Tirunelveli against Matheesa Pandian, Durai Pandian and others. Matheesa Pandian also filed O.S.No.230 of 1995 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Tirunelveli. Durai Pandian also filed OS.No.232 of 1995. All the three suits were tried together and disposed of by judgment and decree dated 09.07.1999. The suit proceedings ended in favour of the Durai Pandian and Matheesa Pandian. Aggrieved by the same, Samuvel filed A.S Nos.18 of 2000, 214 of 1999 and 215 of 1999 before the learned First Additional District Court, Tirunelveli. The appeal proceedings however ended in favour of Samuvel and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was reversed. The suit proceedings ended in favour of the Durai Pandian and Matheesa Pandian. Aggrieved by the same, Samuvel filed A.S Nos.18 of 2000, 214 of 1999 and 215 of 1999 before the learned First Additional District Court, Tirunelveli. The appeal proceedings however ended in favour of Samuvel and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was reversed. Questioning the same, Matheesa Pandian and Durai Pandian filed Second Appeals before the Principal Bench of this Courtin SA.Nos.1676, 1677 and 1678 of 2001. In the said Second Appeals, interim order of status quo was granted. The said second appeals are said to be still pending. 4. While so, the first accused Thiru.Karuppasamy Pandian is said to have prevailed upon Ashok Pandian and Durai Pandian to withdraw the litigation initiated by them before this Court. In contravention of the interim order of status quo passed by this Court, A2/Samuvel had sold the property in favour of one Palani Kumar/A3 hereien on 26.02.2007. Even prior to this, CONT Petition No.524 of 2005 came to be filed as Samuvel had conveyed portions of the land in question in favour of few other parties. The threats said to have been held out by the first accused Karuppasami Pandian and the sale executed in favour of Pazhani Kumar form the cause of action for lodging the impugned F.I.R. 5. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the accused 1 and 3 and the learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant as well as the learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side). 6. The learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) pointed out that there are clear materials to implicate the petitioners herein. He took this Court through the statements recorded under Sections 161 of Cr.PC. He also contended that this Court ought not to view with disfavor the delay occasioned in launching the impugned F.I.R. 7. This F.I.R has been primarily registered for the offences of cheating and forgery. The offences of cheating will be made out only if it is shown that the accused herein had dishonestly induced the defacto complainant to deliver any property to any person. In this case, the defacto complainant has no where averred that he was cheated and dishonestly induced to do any act. In fact, his case is that he was threatened by the first accused. When his case is that he was threatened, he cannot in the same breath contend that he was cheated. In this case, the defacto complainant has no where averred that he was cheated and dishonestly induced to do any act. In fact, his case is that he was threatened by the first accused. When his case is that he was threatened, he cannot in the same breath contend that he was cheated. The two allegations simply do not go together. 8. Likewise, the case of forgery is also clearly not made out. As rightly contended by both the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, the case on hand is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929 (Mohd.Ibrahim vs. State of Bihar). The ratio has been laid down in the following manner : 13. The condition precedent for an offence under sections 467 and 471 is forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). This case does not relate to any false electronic record. Therefore, the question is whether the first accused, in executing and registering the two sale deeds purporting to sell a property (even if it is assumed that it did not belong to him), can be said to have made and executed false documents, in collusion with the other accused. 14. An analysis of section 464 of Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories: (1) The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. (2) The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. (3) The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. (3) The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a `false document', if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses. 15. The sale deeds executed by first appellant, clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of `false documents'. It therefore remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of complainant's land (and that accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor colluded with first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category. 16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bonafide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of `false documents', it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 17. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither section 467 nor section 471 of the Code are attracted. 9. Applying the aforesaid ratio, this Court is of the view that the offences of cheating and forgery are clearly not made out against the petitioners herein. That apart, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel, the defacto complainant had earlier filed a criminal case against the second accused in Crime No.464 of 2004 on the file of the E2 Royapettah Police Station. The said case also pertains to the very same property. In fact, a mere look at the facts would show that the very same sequence of events set out herein have been narrated in the said case also. The Hon'ble Principal Bench of this Court by order dated 28.04.2010 quashed the said F.I.R in Crl OP.No.36308 of 2007. In the said order, the defacto complainant herein was shown as the second respondent. But, he did not enter appearance in the said Crl.OP. The elder brother of the defacto complainant also lodged a criminal case in Crime No.9 of 2006 before the City Crime Branch, Tirunelveli City, the first respondent herein. The said case also was on the same set of facts. It was closed as one of mistake of fact. R.C.S Notice was served on the defacto complainant and the final report closing the F.I.R as one of mistake of fact was accepted by the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tirunelveli on 15.02.2007 in R.C.S.No.4 of 2007. 10. One other aspect remains to be disposed of. It was closed as one of mistake of fact. R.C.S Notice was served on the defacto complainant and the final report closing the F.I.R as one of mistake of fact was accepted by the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tirunelveli on 15.02.2007 in R.C.S.No.4 of 2007. 10. One other aspect remains to be disposed of. In the F.I.R, the allegation is that the first accused had held out threats against the defacto complainant and his brother in the year 2007. But, the F.I.R itself came to be registered only on 13.09.2011. Information was lodged on 11.09.2011. Thus, there is a gap of more than four years in lodging this complaint. The defacto complainant is said to be a realtor. His elder brother Durai Pandian is also a practicing lawyer in Chennai. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that Thiru.Durai Pandian, the elder brother of the defacto complainant is practicing on the criminal side. Even in the F.I.R, the defacto complainant has not averred anywhere that he felt intimidated. 11. Therefore, this Court cannot believe that Durai Pandian or his brother would have fell intimidated by the so called threats held out by the first accused. In any event, the long delay in lodging this F.I.R in a case of this nature by itself renders the allegations inherently improbable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1992 AIR 604 (State Of Haryana And Ors vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors) has held that F.I.R can be quashed in the following circumstance also. “Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.? 12. For all these reasons, this Court is of the view that the impugned F.I.R in Crime No.36 of 2011 on the file of the Inspector of Police, City Crime Branch, Tirunelveli deserves to be quashed. It is accordingly quashed. 13. In the result, these Criminal Original Petitions are allowed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.