JUDGMENT : Arun Bhansali, J. This appeal has come up for orders on an application filed by the appellant u/Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay caused in challenging the decree dated 29.4.2016. 2. The case throws up interesting facts, wherein, an award dated 22/4/2003 was passed by the arbitrator in an arbitration between the parties. The appellant State filed an application under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (‘the Act of 1940’) seeking setting aside of the award dated 22/4/20013. 3. The Addl. District Judge, Dungarpur by his judgment dated 1/4/2016 passed the following order: ^^¼34½ vr% mi;qZDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr izkFkZuk i= varxZr /kkjk 30 lifBr /kkjk 33 vkchZVªs'ku ,DV] 1940 vLohdkj dj [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA^^ 4. The appellant State filed the present appeal under Section 39 of the Act of 1940 on 30/6/2016, in title it was indicated as “an appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the Act of 1996’) against the order dated 1/4/2016, whereby, the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was dismissed”. 5. The respondent appeared on caveat and filed reply to the stay application. In reply, objections were raised regarding maintainability of the appeal purportedly under Section 39 of the Act of 1996 and it was also pointed out that the order dated 1/4/2016 passed by the trial court was subsequently amended on an application filed by the respondent on 16/4/2016 and as the appeal has been filed only against the order dated 1/4/2016, the same was not maintainable. 6. Where after, an application under Section 151 CPC was filed by the appellant for correction in title, prayer of appeal and further to add order dated 1/4/2016 and 29/4/2016 in place of order dated 1/4/2016 in the memo of appeal. Along with the application copy of order dated 29/4/2016 passed by the trial court as well as amended order dated 1/4/2016 and decree dated 29/4/2016 were produced. 7. The amended order dated 29/4/2016 reads as under: ^^¼34½ vr% mi;qZDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr izkFkZuk i= varxZr /kkjk 30 lifBr /kkjk 33 vkchZVªs'ku ,DV] 1940 vLohdkj dj [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA rFkk vf/kfu.kkZ;d }kjk ikfjr iapkV fnŒ 22-4-03 ;Fkkor j[kk tkrk gSA [kpkZ i{kdkjku viuk&viuk ogu djsaxsA mDrkuqlkj fMØh ipkZ cuk;k tkosaA^^ 8. 7. The amended order dated 29/4/2016 reads as under: ^^¼34½ vr% mi;qZDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr izkFkZuk i= varxZr /kkjk 30 lifBr /kkjk 33 vkchZVªs'ku ,DV] 1940 vLohdkj dj [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA rFkk vf/kfu.kkZ;d }kjk ikfjr iapkV fnŒ 22-4-03 ;Fkkor j[kk tkrk gSA [kpkZ i{kdkjku viuk&viuk ogu djsaxsA mDrkuqlkj fMØh ipkZ cuk;k tkosaA^^ 8. The application filed by the appellant under Section 151 CPC was allowed by a coordinate bench of this Court, proposed amendments indicated in the application’ were permitted to be carried out and the order dated 1/4/2016 (Amended on 29/4/2016) as well as the decree dated 29/4/2016 were taken on record. The objection of the respondent that appeal be treated to be filed after the prescribed period of limitation from the date of filing of the decree was ordered to be considered at the time of admission of the appeal. 9. There after, the present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay in challenging the decree dated 29/4/2016. 10. It is inter alia indicated in the application that deponent is a person of technical field, the orders dated 1/4/2016 and 29/4/2016 are word to word same and on account of language and the fact that the order was not changed, the deponent was not aware of passing of the decree dated 29/4/2016 and that as such the same could not be made available to the counsel, who filed appeal before this Court. 11. Submissions have been made that omission on the part of the appellant is not deliberate or willful and the same was occasioned on account of similarity between the orders and, there fore, the delay, if any, be condoned. 12. A reply to the application has been filed by the respondent inter alia contesting the application on the ground that the appellant has failed to prove its diligence and that day to day delay has not been explained. There is a delay of 623 days. The reasoning of deponent being a person of technical field was not germane for condonation of delay and that the application was liable to be rejected. 13. Both the learned counsel made submissions in consonance with the pleadings made in application seeking condonation of delay and reply contesting the same. 14. There is a delay of 623 days. The reasoning of deponent being a person of technical field was not germane for condonation of delay and that the application was liable to be rejected. 13. Both the learned counsel made submissions in consonance with the pleadings made in application seeking condonation of delay and reply contesting the same. 14. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 15. It would be appropriate to notice four provisions of the Act of 1940 relevant in the present case, which read as under: “17. Judgment in terms of award. Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award. 30. Grounds for setting aside award.- An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely- (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. 33. Arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application. Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits: Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also and it may pass such orders for the discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit. 39. 39. Appealable orders.- (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order: An Order- (i) ………… (ii) ……….. (iii) ………. (iv) ……….. (v) ……….. (vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award.” 16. A bare look at the order impugned dated 1/4/2016 as modified by order dated 29/4/2016 would reveal that initially the order was only an order under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Act of 1940, whereby, prayer made by the appellant seeking setting aside of the award dated 22/4/2004 was rejected. However, later on by the amendment made on 29/4/2016, the same was made a composite order under Section 30/33 and Section 17 of the Act of 1940, whereby, after refusing setting aside of the award, a decree has been ordered to be prepared, following which a decree dated 29/4/2016 has been prepared. As noticed hereinbefore, the order dated 29/4/2016 now makes the order a composite order. 17. A bare look at the provisions of Section 39 of the Act of 1940 would reveal that under the said section, appeal lies against the ‘order’ setting aside or refusing to set aside the award and as noticed the trial court by its order dated 1/4/2016 refused to set aside the award by dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Section 30/33 of the Act of 1940. Section 39 of the Act does not envisages filing of an appeal against the decree, the same provides for filing of an appeal against the order only. 18. The mere fact that on account of dismissal of the application under Section 30/33 of the Act of 1940 a decree follows under Section 17, does not and cannot take away the right of a party to question the validity of passing of the order under Section 30/33 of the Act of 1940 and that right, irrespective of passing of a composite order, remains intact and the party can question validity of the order passed by the trial court insofar as dismissal of application under Section 30/33 of the Act of 1940 is concerned. 19. 19. The challenge to the decree as passed in terms of Section 17 is independent and limited on the ground that decree is in excess and not in accordance with the award and nothing more and, therefore, in the present case, even if the composite order has been passed by the trial court after amending the original order, the challenge as laid by the appellant against the order dated 1/4/2016, remains intact and it cannot be said that the appeal is in any manner barred by limitation so as to seek condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 20. A perusal of the sequence of events as already noticed herein before also indicates that both, the trial court as well as counsel for the appellant, were unaware of the requirements and/or the provisions of the Act of 1940, inasmuch as the trial court forgot to pass the order making the award rule of the court in terms of Section 17 of the Act of 1940 and the counsel despite the fact that order itself was titled as under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Act of 1940, termed the same as order passed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 in title of the memo of appeal. 21. Though, in the application filed seeking condonation of delay, the deponent has assumed all the responsibility by claiming himself to be a technical person and being unaware of passing of the order dated 29/4/2016 and its implication, the fact of the matter is that none were aware, not only this even the stamp reporter of this Court did not point out the said discrepancy in the memo of appeal. 22. In view of the above discussion, besides the fact that the appeal as filed by the appellant against the order passed by the trial court under Section 30/33 of the Act of 1940 cannot be said to be barred by limitation, against the decree dated 29/4/2016 passed by the trial court by amending the order dated 1/4/2016, for the reasons discussed herein before, sufficient cause has been made out seeking condonation of delay, and as such, the delay in challenging the decree independent of rejection of objections under Section 30/33 of the Act of 1940, which have been held to be within limitation, is condoned. List the appeal for admission.