Meena W/o Kailash Chand v. Kailash Chand S/o Late Ramdeva
2018-08-24
BANWARI LAL SHARMA
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The present misc. appeal is preferred by the appellant-nonapplicant-wife against the impugned judgment dated 27.09.2016 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Rajgarh District Alwar in Civil Misc. Case No. 166/2015 (Kailash Chand vs. Smt. Meena) whereby learned Court below allowed the application of respondent-husband submitted under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act and passed the decree of divorce. As per office report, this misc. appeal is barred by limitation by 338 days. For condoning the delay, application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed alongwith the appeal by the appellant-wife. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that since advocate who was contesting before the trial Court on behalf of appellant didn’t inform the appellant regarding the judgment of the case, he assured her that as and when needed, she will be called in the case but he didn’t call the appellant for evidence. Even after decision of the case, Advocate Surja Bhan Singh didn’t inform the appellant. On 01.11.2017 when Advocate was not picking up the phone of the appellant, then appellant came to Alwar Court to meet her Advocate where she came to know that her Advocate was not there and then another Advocate who was sitting near the seat of Shri Surja Bhan Singh informed that Shri Surja Bhan Singh is convicted in criminal case and is serving sentence. He submits that due to aforesaid circumstance, appellant couldn’t file appeal in time, therefore delay may be condoned and the appeal may be allowed. Learned counsel relied on B. Janakiramaiah Chetty vs. A.K. Parthasarthi And Ors. reported in 2003 (3) DNJ (SC) 701 and Smt. Neha Revadiya vs. Avdesh Kumar, D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 4446/2016 decided by Division Bench of this Court on 15.02.2018. Per contra Mr. Gajendra Singh Rathore learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent submits that no document is filed along with the application seeking condonation of delay regarding the conviction and sentence of Advocate, merely on the statement of neighbour Advocate whose name has not been disclosed, it is mentioned that Advocate of appellant was convicted and sentenced in a criminal case, cannot be a ground for condonation of delay.
He submits that during trial of the case, Advocate of appellant was regularly appearing before the trial Court and was participating in the proceedings but appellant neither filed the written statement nor examined herself as a witness to rebut the evidence of respondent-husband. He submits that sister of appellant Smt. Hema Devi is also married with the elder brother of respondent named Murarilal and was aware about the facts of the case and appellant was well in contact with her elder sister Smt. Hema Devi. He submits that appellant didn’t choose to file reply to divorce petition and failed to examine herself as witness before the trial Court. Not only this, the delay of 338 days is also considerable, if she was so vigilant she should have update her information regarding the proceedings of the trial of divorce petition but she failed to do so, therefore either she was not interested in contesting the divorce petition or she was so negligent, therefore there is no ground for condonation of delay. He further submits that she didn’t made any statement that after engaging Advocate how many times and on what dates she met with her Advocate. In absence thereof, it can be presumed that she was not interested in contesting the matter, therefore the application seeking condonation of delay may be dismissed and the appeal may also be dismissed. Learned counsel relied on Gyan Chand Kankariya And Ors. vs. Uttam Chand And Anr., S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 3107/2017 decided by this Court on 16.03.2018, Shanti (Smt.) And Ors. vs. Jagdish Aacharya And Ors. reported in 2017 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1054 and Sarla Devi (Smt.) vs. Manoj Yadav reported in 2007 (2) DNJ (Raj.) 677. I have considered the submissions made at Bar. In the matter of B. Janakiramaiah Chetty vs. A.K. Parthasarthi And Ors. (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court passed the judgment in following terms :- “Suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- being the damages caused on account of arrest and detention illegally by the defendants on 18.4.1989 and for costs. After filing of written statement by the defendant the following issues were settled for trial: 1. Whether on 18.4.1989 at 10.00 a.m. the 1st defendant and his staff whisked away the plaintiff in a high handed manner, while he was in his shop? 2. Whether the plaintiff was tortured by 1st and 2nd defendants? 3.
After filing of written statement by the defendant the following issues were settled for trial: 1. Whether on 18.4.1989 at 10.00 a.m. the 1st defendant and his staff whisked away the plaintiff in a high handed manner, while he was in his shop? 2. Whether the plaintiff was tortured by 1st and 2nd defendants? 3. Whether the learned Advocate Commissioner Chittoor found the plaintiff in Bhagayam P.S.? 4. Whether 1st defendant denied the quality of changes and courts of A.P.? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages as prayedfor? 6. To what relief? Additional issues reframed on 1.12.1997 :- 1. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit? 2. To what relief? D.1 to D.3 called absent. No representation for the defendants Suit is declared with costs. together with interest at 6% per annum from the date of suit till realization." observed that this clearly has imprints of an ex parte adjudication and not of a decision on merits. There is not even any indication as to what evidence was evaluated and/or whether the merits were tested, therefore quashed and set aside the judgment. In the matter of Smt. Neha Revadiya vs. Avdesh Kumar (supra) Division Bench of this Court while considering the case of Lata Kamat vs. Vilas reported in AIR 1989 SC 1477 , wherein it was observed that:- “Even though it may not have been unlawful for the husband to have married immediately after the High Court's decree for no appeal as of right lies from the decree of the High Court to this Court, still it was for the respondent to make sure whether an application for special leave had been filed in this Court and he could not by marrying immediately after the High Courts' decree, deprive the wife of the chance of presenting a special leave petition to this Court. If a person does so, he takes a risk and could not ask the Court to revoke the special leave on that ground.” and application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC read with Section 151 CPC was allowed and the ex-parte decree was set aside. But here in the case in hand, the decree is not ex-parte. From the perusal of impugned judgment, it reveals that appellant-non-applicant wife was served by the Court and engaged Shri Surja Bhan Singh as her counsel.
But here in the case in hand, the decree is not ex-parte. From the perusal of impugned judgment, it reveals that appellant-non-applicant wife was served by the Court and engaged Shri Surja Bhan Singh as her counsel. From the perusal of order-sheets which were placed by counsel for the respondent for our perusal, it reveals that after appearance of appellant-non-applicant on 01.12.2015 before the trial Court, vakalatnama was filed on 04.01.2016 by her counsel. Thereafter, time for reply was sought thrice and lastly on 21.07.2016 the reply was closed. Thereafter, on 11.08.2018 the affidavits of witnesses i.e. Kailash and Murarilal were submitted for examination in chief. Thereafter, after hearing on 27.09.2016 the judgment was pronounced.
Thereafter, time for reply was sought thrice and lastly on 21.07.2016 the reply was closed. Thereafter, on 11.08.2018 the affidavits of witnesses i.e. Kailash and Murarilal were submitted for examination in chief. Thereafter, after hearing on 27.09.2016 the judgment was pronounced. Learned trial Court after considering the statement of respondent-husband AW-1 and witness AW-2 Murarilal observed that :- ^^izkFkhZ ,-M- 1 dSyk'kpan us vkosnu esa mYysf[kr rF;ksa dks vius 'kiFk i= esa leFkZu fd;k rFkk uksfVl izn'kZ&1 ,oa Mkd jlhn izn'kZ&2 izys[kksa dks iznf'kZr djk;kA lk{kh us izfr ijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k fd og izkbZosV tkWc djrk gSA lk{kh us ;g Lohdkjk fd mlus vizkFkhZ;k ds fo:) nkEiR; thou iquZLFkkiuk ds fy, /kkjk 09 fgUnw fookg vf/kfu;e ds rgr dksbZ izkFkZuk i= is'k ugha fd;kA izkFkhZ us ;g Hkh ekuk fd yMdh dk jax lkaoyk gSA lk{kh us bl rF; dks xyr crk;k fd yMdh mlds ilUn ugha gks] blfy, rykd ys jgk gwaA ;g lgh gS fd ehuk nsoh dh cMh cgu mlds cMs HkkbZ dks C;kgh gSA fnukad 25-06-2013 dks fcuk fdlh dkj.k ds mldk ifjR;kx dj vius ihgj pyh xbZ vkSj viuk leLr L=h/ku o mlds bDrrhl gtkj :i;s ysdj pyh xbZ] ftldh mlus dksbZ fjiksVZ ntZ ugha djkbZA ;g lgh gS fd mldk vkSj ehuk nsoh dk ,d lkFk crkSj ifr&ifRu jguk lEHko ugha gSA lk{kh ,-M-2 eqjkjhyky tks fd izkFkhZ dSyk'k dks cMk HkkbZ gS vkSj ftlds lkFk vizkFkhZ;k ehuk nsoh dh cMh cgu gsek nsoh dk fookg gqvk gS] us vius 'kiFk i= esa vkosnu i= esa mfYyf[kr rF;ksa dk leFkZu djrs gq, ijh{k.k esa dFku fd;k fd dSyk'k mldk NksVk HkkbZ gS] mldh iRuh ehuk nsoh gS] 'kknh ds ckn ehuk nsoh 2&4 eghuk muds ?kj jghA mlds ckn fcuk izkFkhZx.k dks crk;s fnukad 25-06-13 dks xgus o iSls fudky dj ys xbZA lk{kh us ekuk fd bldh fjiksVZ ntZ ugha djkbZ] lk{kh us dgk fd geus le>kus ds dkj.k fjiksVZ ugha djkbZA lk{kh us dgk fd ;g lgh gS fd ehuk nsoh lkaoyh gS] ysfdu ;g xyr crk;k fd dSyk'k dks ehuk nsoh ilan ugha gks] blfy, ugha ys tkrk vkSj nwljh 'kknh djuk pkgrk gSA mi;qZDRk lk{; foospu ls Li"V gS fd lk{kh ,-M-1 dSyk'kpan o ,-M-2 eqjkjhyky nksuksa us viuh lk{; ls vkosnu esa vafdr rF;ksa dh iqf"V dh gS rFkk ijh{k.k esa nksuksa gh xokgku us vizkFkhZ;k }kjk fnukad 25-06-13 dks viuk L=h/ku o izkFkhZ ds :i;s ysdj vius ihgj pyh tkuk dgk gSA rFkk bl rF; ls badkj fd;k gS fd vizkFkhZ;k dk jax lkaoyk gksus ls izkFkhZ mls ilan ugha djrk gksA mDr lk{; ds [k.Mu esa vizkFkhZ;k }kjk dksbZ lk{; izLrqr ugha dh xbZ gS rFkk uk gh vizkFkhZ;k us ,slh dksbZ fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd lk{; is'k dh gS] ftlls ;g lkfcr gksrk gks fd izkFkhZ dk mlus mfpr o ;qfDr;qDr dkj.k ifjR;kx dj j[kk gksA i{kdkjksa ds e/; laca/k esa dksbZ fookn ugha gS fd vizkFkhZ;k izkFkhZ dh fookfgrk iRuh uk gksA vkSj bl laca/k esa Hkh dksbZ fookn ugha gS fd izkFkhZ dk vizkFkhZ;k ds lkFk fnukad 02-06-2009 dks fgUnw jhfr&fjokt vuqlkj fookg laiUu ugha gqvk gksA izkFkhZ Li"V :i ls vius vfHkopuksa esa rFkk lk{; esa bl rF; dk mYys[k fd;k fd vizkFkhZ;k fookg mijkUr fcuk fdlh dkj.k ds izkFkhZ dk ifjR;kx dj fnukad 25-06-2013 ls izkFkhZ ls vyx vius ihgj esa jg jgh gS vkSj bl nkSjkus i{kdkj esa fdlh izdkj ls Hkh ifr&iRuh ds :i esa laca/k LFkkfir ugha gq,A lk{kh dSyk'k pan us lk{; esa dgk fd gekjk crkSj ifRk&iRuh jguk lEHko ugh gSA vizkFkhZ;k dh vksj ls Lo;a ;k mldh vksj ls dksbZ vU; lk{kh mijksDr rF;ksa o lk{; ds [k.Mu Lo:i lk{; nsus ds fy, U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr ugha gqvkA izkFkhZ dh lk{; ds foijhr vizkFkhZ;k dh dksbZ lk{; ugha gksus ls izkFkhZ ds dFku v[k.Muh; gSA vr% ;g rF; fl) gksrk gS fd vizkFkhZ;k us fookg mijkUr izkFkhZ dk fcuk ;qfDr ;qDr dkj.k ds ifjR;kx fd;k gqvk gS rFkk i{kdkj dk ,d lkFk crkSj ifr&iRuh jgrs gq, oSokfgd thou ;kiu djuk laHko ugha gSA vr% izkFkhZ fookg foPNsn djkus dh vf/kdkjh gSA^^ therefore, it cannot be said that learned Court below didn’t consider the evidence which were available on record.
Accordingly, the case laws cited by learned counsel for the appellant doesn’t help the appellant. In the matter of Shanti (Smt.) And Ors. vs. Jagdish Aacharya And Ors. (supra), co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Pricipal Seat, Jodhpur observed that :- “Admittedly, the stand of the petitioners/defendants in the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, was that the counsel appearing on their behalf did not inform them about the decision of the suit and thereafter, when they inquired about the matter by engaging yet another counsel, on 22.6.12 they came to know about the suit being decreed vide judgment and decree dated 25.7.09. It is true that the law of procedure is hand maiden of justice and when the procedural technicalities and the substantial justice are pitted against each other, the later has to be preferred. But then, the matter always cannot be looked from one angle so as to condone the lapses on the part of erring litigant ignoring gross negligence on his part in dealing with the proceedings before the court. The petitioners cannot be permitted to seek condonation of delay attributing negligence on the part of the counsel all the time. A litigant should be vigilant enough and should keep himself informed about the proceedings pending before the Court. It is to be noticed that in the first instance, the written statement filed on behalf of the petitioners belatedly was refused to be taken on record by the trial court. Thereafter, on account of non appearance on their behalf, the matter was proceeded ex-parte against the petitioners, however, no steps were taken by the petitioners for setting aside the proceedings ex-parte. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioners were not serious in pursuing the litigation pending before the trial court for all these years and never attempted to find out the progress of the case. Thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, in the considered opinion of this court, the petitioners have not been able to make out the sufficient cause so as to condone the inordinate delay of two and half years in filing the appeal.” Similarly, in the matter of Gyan Chand Kankariya And Ors. vs. Uttam Chand And Anr (supra) this Court didn’t incline to condone the delay on the ground that plaintiff couldn’t contact with his counsel.
vs. Uttam Chand And Anr (supra) this Court didn’t incline to condone the delay on the ground that plaintiff couldn’t contact with his counsel. Since, it is a duty of party to keep in touch with his counsel and seek regular updates regarding the proceedings of his case from his counsel. Here in the case in hand, it seems that appellant didn’t contact with her counsel after engaging and signing vakalatnama, she failed to file reply to petition and examine herself, therefore her reply and witness were closed and learned Court below passed the impugned decree in presence of her counsel, therefore there is no ground for condonation of delay as well as no ground to interfere in the impugned judgment, therefore the application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed and the appeal is also dismissed.