Advocates Appeared : For the Petitioner : Mr. G. Khandelia For the Respondents : Mr. P Sundhi JUDGMENT AND ORDER : ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, J. 1. Heard Mr. G. Khandelia, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. P. Sundhi, learned counsel appearing for both the respondents. 2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 15.12.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sonitpur at Tezpur in Misc. (J) Case No. 19/2014, arising out of Title Suit No. 22/2013, whereby the learned Court below accepted a petition filed by the respondents under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “1996 Act”) and referred the parties to arbitration. 3. The present petitioner had filed the suit, amongst others, for recovery of possession of the suit house in which the defendants are tenants, by evicting them with their men and materials, recovery of arrear enhanced rent due from the month of April, 2011 to March, 2012 and maintenance charges, etc. 4. It is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the parties that the suit of the plaintiff is under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. 5. In A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivan, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 386 , the Supreme Court at paragraph 35 had held as under:— “35. Ordinarily every civil or commercial dispute whether based on contract or otherwise which is capable of being decided by a civil court is in principle capable of being adjudicated upon and resolved by arbitration ‘subject to the dispute being governed by the arbitration agreement’ unless the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. In Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd., this Court held that (at SCC p. 546, para 35) adjudication of certain categories of proceedings is reserved by the legislature exclusively for public fora as a matter of public policy. Certain other categories of cases, though not exclusively reserved for adjudication by courts and tribunals may by necessary implication stand excluded from the purview of private fora. This Court set down certain examples of non-arbitrable disputes such as: (SCC PP. Certain other categories of cases, though not exclusively reserved for adjudication by courts and tribunals may by necessary implication stand excluded from the purview of private fora. This Court set down certain examples of non-arbitrable disputes such as: (SCC PP. 546-47, para 36) (i) disputes relating to rights and liabilities which give rise to or arise out of criminal offences; (ii) matrimonial disputes relating to divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights and child custody; (iii) matters of guardianship; (iv) insolvency and winding up; (v) testamentary matters, such as the grant of probate, letters of administration and succession certificates; and (vi) eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes where a tenant enjoys special protection against eviction and specific courts are conferred with the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. This Court held that this class of actions operates in rem, which is a right exercisable against the world at large as contrasted with a right in personam which is an interest protected against specified individuals. All disputes relating to rights in personam are considered to be amenable to arbitration while rights in rem are required to be adjudicated by courts and public tribunals. The enforcement of a mortgage has been held to be a right in rem for which proceedings in arbitration would not be maintainable. In Vimal Kishore Shah v. Jayesh Dinesh Shah, this Court added a seventh category of cases to the six non-arbitrable categories set out in Booz Allen, namely, disputes relating to trusts, trustees and beneficiaries arising out of a trust deed and the Trust Act.” 6. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph would go to show that eviction of a tenant and tenancy matters fall within non-arbitrable categories of disputes. 7. In that view of the matter, the learned learned Civil Judge, Sonitpur at Tezpur was clearly in error and had exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing the petition filed under Section 8 of the 1996 Act. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 15.12.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sonitpur at Tezpur in Misc. (J) Case No. 19/2014, arising out of Title Suit No. 22/2013 is set aside and quashed. 8. With the above observations and directions, the civil revision petition is allowed and disposed of. No cost. 9. The parties to this proceeding will appear before the learned trial Court on 5th March, 2018.