JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. Defendants are the appellants against a reversing judgment. 2. Plaintiff-respondent instituted the suit for a declaration that she is an occupancy tenant over the suit land and for permanent injunction. The case of the plaintiff was that the suit land originally belonged to Kujanga estate. In the year 1951, the Raja of Kujang with due permission of Collector, Cuttack under Act 1 of 1948 inducted Bipin Bihari Mandal, Akhil Chandra Patra and others as tenants in respect of Ac.78.00 dec. of land. Akhil Chandra Patra was inducted as a tenant in respect of Ac.7.00 dec. of land including the suit land. Akhil Chandra Patra was in possession of the suit land. He used to pay rent. The land vested in the State. State of Orissa accepted him as a tenant. On 5.6.1957, Akhil Chandra Patra sold the suit land to Radha Krushna Bera by means of a registered sale deed. Radha Krushna Bera sold the same to one Niharbala Mandal by means of a registered sale deed. Niharbala Mandal sold the suit land to the plaintiff on 23.2.1965 by means of a registered sale deed. She was in possession of the suit land. Possession of the plaintiff over the suit land was recorded as illegal in the ROR of the year 1966. The plaintiff through her husband approached the Tahasildar, Marsaghai, defendant no.2, several times for acceptance of rent etc. from 1968. While matter stood thus, on 4.3.1977, the Tahasildar denied to accept rent and threaten to lease out the suit land to others. With this factual scenario, she instituted the suit seeking the relief’s mentioned supra. 3. The defendants entered contest and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendants was that the ex-intermediary was in possession of the suit land. The land vested in the State. State is in possession of the land. Radha Krushna Bera had encroached upon the suit land for which Encroachment Case No.128 of 1968-69 was initiated against him. A case under Sec.5(i) of Orissa Estates Abolition Act (“O.E.A. Act”) was subjudice. The suit land did not appertain to the plot number of the land leased out to Bipin Bihari Mandal, Akhil Chandra Patra and others. The suit land was lying as Abadajogya Anabadi in Bhateni jungle block. A case under Sec.5(i) of Orissa Estates Abolition Act (“O.E.A. Act”) was subjudice. The suit land did not appertain to the plot number of the land leased out to Bipin Bihari Mandal, Akhil Chandra Patra and others. The suit land was lying as Abadajogya Anabadi in Bhateni jungle block. The plaintiff had no semblance of right, title and interest over the same. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck eight issues. Learned trial court came to hold that Akhil Chandra Patra was in possession of the suit land till 1957. He acquired tenancy right over the same. He transferred the land to Radha Krushna Bera by means of a registered sale deed vide Ext.7. Radha Krushna Bera was in possession of the suit land till 1966. He sold the land to Niharbala Mandal by means of a registered sale deed dated 21.3.63, Ext.8. Thereafter Niharbala Mandal sold the land to the plaintiff on 23.2.65, Ext.9. The plaintiff had acquired right of occupancy over the suit land under Sec.25 of the Orissa Tenancy Act (“O.T. Act”). It further held that neither the plaintiff nor her vendor was in possession of the suit land. The final R.O.R. was published in the year 1966 in the name of Radha Krushna Bera with a note of illegal possession over the suit land. Since 1967, the plaintiff’s title was denied. Right to sue accrued in 1967. The suit was barred by limitation. Held so, it dismissed the suit. Assailing the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the plaintiff filed T.A. No.8 of 1981 before the learned Subordinate Judge, Kendrapara. Learned appellate court came to a conclusion that cause of action arose on 4.3.77 when the defendant no.2 threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land. The suit was filed within the period of limitation. Held so, it allowed the appeal. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law. “(1) Whether the suit is barred under section 58 of the Limitation Act ? (2) Whether the courts below are justified in decreeing the suit holding inter alia that Akhil Chandra Patra, Radha Krushna Bera were the occupancy raiyats ?” 6. Heard Mr. R.P. Mohapatra, learned A.G.A. for the appellants and Mr. B.K. Dagara, learned counsel along with Ms. Arnapurna Barik, learned counsel for the respondent. 7. Mr. (2) Whether the courts below are justified in decreeing the suit holding inter alia that Akhil Chandra Patra, Radha Krushna Bera were the occupancy raiyats ?” 6. Heard Mr. R.P. Mohapatra, learned A.G.A. for the appellants and Mr. B.K. Dagara, learned counsel along with Ms. Arnapurna Barik, learned counsel for the respondent. 7. Mr. Mohapatra, learned A.G.A. for the appellants, submitted that the suit schedule land originally belonged to Kujang estate. The same vested in the State after coming into operation of the O.E.A. Act free from all encumbrances. There is no pleading that Akhil Chandra Pratra was an occupancy raiyat. Successive alienation of land will not confer title. He further submitted that the learned trial court dismissed the suit. Once the learned trial court dismissed the suit, a duty is cast on the learned appellate court to decide the appeal on all issues. But then, the learned appellate court decided the question of limitation only. The finding of the learned appellate court that the defendants neither filed any appeal nor cross-examined is perverse. He further submitted that R.O.R. was published in the year 1966 in the name of the State. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant no.2 had not received rent. The cause of action arose in the year 1967. Under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is three years. The suit was instituted in the year 1978. Thus the suit was grossly barred by limitation. 8. Countering the submission of learned A.G.A., Mr. Dagara, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that in paragraph 8 of the plaint, it is pleaded that since 1968, the plaintiff through her husband approached the Tahasildar, Marsaghai, defendant no.2, several times for acceptance of rent and correction of rent schedule. Though the defendant no.2 promised to look into the matter, but he refused to accept rent on 4.3.77, denied the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land and threatened to dispossess her. The cause of action arose on the said date. On 4.3.77, the defendant no.2 denied the title of the plaintiff. Thus, the suit was instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. He further submitted that the suit land originally belonged to Kujang estate. The ex-intermediary obtained permission from the Collector, Cuttack in Misc. Case No.399/48-49 under Act 1 of 1948 to lease out the land. On 4.3.77, the defendant no.2 denied the title of the plaintiff. Thus, the suit was instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. He further submitted that the suit land originally belonged to Kujang estate. The ex-intermediary obtained permission from the Collector, Cuttack in Misc. Case No.399/48-49 under Act 1 of 1948 to lease out the land. Akhil Chandra Patra and others were inducted as tenants. They reclaimed the suit land, which was in Bhateni jungle block. The ex-intermediary accepted the rent. Akhil Chandra Patra was inducted as a tenant in respect of Ac.7.00 dec. of land. As the areas were unsurveyed, the Amin demarcated and identified Ac.7.00 dec. of land and delivered possession to Akhil Chandra Patra. Akhil Chandra Patra reclaimed the land and was in possession of the same. After vesting of the estate in the year 1952, Akhil Chandra Patra and others were recognized as occupancy tenants. The ex-intermediary submitted ekpadia in his name. Akhil Chandra Patra sold Ac.3.00 dec. of land to Radha Krushna Bera by means of a registered sale deed vide Ext.7. Thereafter Radha Krushna Bera sold the same to Niharbala Mandal on 21.3.63. Niharbala Mandal sold the suit land to the plaintiff by means of a registered sale deed dated 23.2.65 and delivered possession of the land to her. Plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. She used to pay rent. The suit land had been wrongly recorded in the name of the State. He further submitted that plaintiff was an occupancy tenant. He relied on the decisions of the apex Court in the case of Mst. Rukhmabai vs. Lala Laxminarayan and others, AIR 1960 SC 335 , C. Mohammad Yunus vs. Syed Unnissa and others, AIR 1961 SC 808 and Girijanandini Devi and others vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 . 9. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for both the parties, it will necessary to set out the provisions of the O.E.A. Act and the Orissa Communal Forest and Private Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1948 (“Act, 1948”). Sec. 5 of the O.E.A. Act provides for consequences of vesting of an estate in the State. The same is quoted below: 5. Sec. 5 of the O.E.A. Act provides for consequences of vesting of an estate in the State. The same is quoted below: 5. Consequences of vesting of an estate in the State– Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, on the publication of the notification [in the Gazette] under subsection (1) of Section 3, [or sub-section (1) of Section 3A] [or from the date of the execution of the agreement under Section 4 as the case may be] the following consequences shall ensue namely : (a) Subject to the subsequent provisions of this Chapter the entire estate including all communal lands and porambokes, other non-raiyati lands, waste lands, trees, orchards, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals (whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or not inclusive of rights in respect of any lease of mines and minerals) quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and other irrigation works, water channels, fisheries, ferries, hats and bazars and building or structures together with the land on which they stand shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and such Intermediary shall cease to have any interest in such estate other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act.” 10. Sec.3 of the Act, 1948 deals with prohibition of the alienation of communal forest and private lands. Sec.4 provides transactions of the nature specified in Sec.3 to be void. The same are quoted hereunder: “3. Prohibition of the alienation of communal forest and private lands–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any express or implied agreement, but subject to the provisions of Subsection (2), no landlord shall, without the previous sanction of the Collector, sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise assign or alienate or convert into raiyati land any communal forest or private land or create occupancy rights therein: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to prohibit a landlord from leasing out his private land for a period not exceeding two years without the previous sanction of the Collector. xxx xxx xxx “4. xxx xxx xxx “4. Transactions of the nature specified in Section 3 to be void–(1) Any transactions of the nature prohibited by Section 3 which took place on or after the 1st day of April, 1946, shall be void and inoperative and shall not confer or take away or be deemed to have conferred or taken away any right whatever on or from any party to the transaction.” 11. Sec. 5 of the O.E.A. Act contains a non-obstante clause. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, on the publication of the notification in the Gazette under sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3 or sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3-A or from the date of the execution of the agreement under Sec.4, as the case may be the following consequences shall ensue. Clause (a) of Sec.5 provides that subject to the subsequent provisions of this Chapter the entire estate including all communal lands and porambokes, other non-raiyati lands, waste lands, trees, orchards, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals (whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or not, inclusive of rights in respect of any lease of mines and minerals) quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and other irrigation works, water channels, fisheries, ferries, hats and bazaars and buildings or structures together with the land on which they stand shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and such intermediary shall cease to have any interest in such estate other than the interest expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act. Thus on the publication of the notification in the Gazette under sub-sec.(1) of Sec. 3 or sub-sec(1) of Sec. 3-A or from the date of the execution of the agreement under Sec.4 of the Act, the forests shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and such intermediary shall cease to have any interest in such estate other than the interest expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act. 12. Sec.3 of the Act, 1948 contains a non-obstante clause. Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3 provides that nothing in the said sub-sec. shall be deemed to prohibit a landlord from leasing out his private land for a period not exceeding two years without previous sanction of the Collector. 12. Sec.3 of the Act, 1948 contains a non-obstante clause. Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3 provides that nothing in the said sub-sec. shall be deemed to prohibit a landlord from leasing out his private land for a period not exceeding two years without previous sanction of the Collector. Any transaction of the nature prohibited by Sec.3 which took place on or after the 1st day of April, 1946 shall be void and inoperative. Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.4 provides that nothing contained in the Sub-sec. shall be deemed to invalidate-(i) any such transaction in respect of private land or forest land entered into prior to the 30th day of November, 1947 in favour of any religious, charitable or educational institution or of any hospital or of any local authority or cooperative society registered either under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, VI of 1932 or the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, VI of 1935, as the case may be, of any other public body or institution; 3(ii) any such transaction in respect of private land or forest land entered into prior to the 30th day of November, 1947 in favour of any person in good faith and for valuable consideration. An exception has been carved out in the proviso with regard to the transaction in respect of private land or forest land entered into prior to the 30th day of November, 1947. 13. The land originally belonged to Kujang estate. The same was Abadajogya Anabadi. The kissam of the land was jungle. The plaintiff asserts that the Collector, Cuttack accorded permission under Act 1 of 1948 in Misc. Case No.399/48-49 to lease out the land, but then the same had not been exhibited. 14. The word ‘raiyat’ has been defined in Sec.5(2) of Orissa Tenancy Act. It means primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself, or by members of his family or by hired servants, or with the aid of partners, and includes also the successors-in-interest or persons who have acquired such a right. It means primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself, or by members of his family or by hired servants, or with the aid of partners, and includes also the successors-in-interest or persons who have acquired such a right. Sec.23(1) of the Act provides that every person who, for a period of twelve years whether wholly or partly before or after the commencement of this Act, has continuously held as a raiyat land situate in any village, whether under a lease or otherwise, shall be deemed to have become, on the expiration of that period, a settled raiyat of that village. Sec.24(1) postulates that every person who is a settled raiyat of a village within the meaning of Sec.23 of the Act shall have a right of occupancy in all land for the time being held by him as a raiyat in that village. 15. There is no pleading that Akhil Chandra Patra was a settled raiyat of the village and held the land as raiyat. Akhil Chandra Patra executed the registered sale deed in favour of Radha Krushna Bera in respect of the suit land vide Ext.7. The sale deed was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Contai, West Bengal. To attract jurisdiction of registering authority, Ac.0.01 dec. of land out of Ac.0.53 dec. appertaining to khata no.3, khewat no.2 of mouza-Badanautabania, Dist.-Midnapur, West Bengal was included. The sale deed was executed in respect of Ac.3.00 dec. out of Ac.78.00 dec. appertaining to khata no.4, khewat no.1 of mouza-Bhateni, Dist.-Cuttack. Ext.8 is the registered sale deed dated 21.3.63 executed by Radha Krushna Bera in favour of Niharbala Mandal. The sale deed was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Contai, West Bengal. An area Ac.0.0½ dec. of land out of Ac.1.09 dec. appertaining to khata no.129, plot no.296 of village-Danya Ghamopai, Dist.-Midnapur was included. The sale deed was executed in respect of an area Ac.3.00 dec. appertaining to khatian no.-4, Touji-14 of village-Bhateni, Dist.-Cuttack. This amounts to fraud on the law of registration. There was no intention that the small strip of land should pass under the deed. Thus the deeds had been executed in contravention of Sec.28 of the Registration Act, 1908. 16. The sale deed was executed in respect of an area Ac.3.00 dec. appertaining to khatian no.-4, Touji-14 of village-Bhateni, Dist.-Cuttack. This amounts to fraud on the law of registration. There was no intention that the small strip of land should pass under the deed. Thus the deeds had been executed in contravention of Sec.28 of the Registration Act, 1908. 16. In Inuganti Venkatarama vs. Sobhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur Garu and others, AIR 1936 PC 91 , the apex Court held that where the property sought to be transferred by a deed is situated in one district, but a small strip of land situated in another district is included in the deed, without any intention on the part of the parties that it should pass under the deed but solely with a view to obtain registration in the latter district, it amounts to fraud on the law of registration, being a device to evade the Registration Act, and the registration obtained in such a way is not valid. There being no effective registration, a suit for possession on the basis of the deed does not lie. It was further held that the criterion by which the question as to validity or otherwise of the registration is to be decided is whether upon the facts established by evidence, the small strip of land was really intended to pass under the deed. The motive may be immaterial if the requirements of law have been complied but of this the intention is critical. This Court in Officiating Common Manager, Bhingarpur Debottar Estate and another vs. Brahman Nijon, Uttar Bada and Dakshinabada represented by its President and others, 1989 (II) OLR 350 reiterated the same view. 17. While the matter stood thus, Niharbala Mandal sold the land to the plaintiff by means of a registered sale deed dated 23.2.65, Ext.9. Thus, the plaintiff cannot acquire title over the suit land. Though the learned trial court held that plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land since 1965, but abruptly came to a conclusion that plaintiff was an occupancy raiyat. The judgment suffers from internal inconsistencies. 18. In Mt. Bolo vs. Mt. Thus, the plaintiff cannot acquire title over the suit land. Though the learned trial court held that plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land since 1965, but abruptly came to a conclusion that plaintiff was an occupancy raiyat. The judgment suffers from internal inconsistencies. 18. In Mt. Bolo vs. Mt. Koklan and others, AIR 1930 P.C. 270 , the apex Court held that there can be no “right to sue” until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. 19. The apex Court in the case of Daya Singh and another vs. Gurdev Singh (Dead) By LRs. and others, (2010) 2 SCC 194 placing reliance in the case of C. Mohammad Yunus (supra), held that the cause of action for the purposes of Article 58 of the Act accrues only when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or there is at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. Therefore, the mere existence of an adverse entry into the revenue record cannot give rise to cause of action. 20. The R.O.R. was published in the year 1966, Ext.6, in the name of the State of Orissa. The kissam of the land is “Jungle-2”. In the remarks column, the unauthorised occupation of Radha Krushna Bera and Siba Prasad Bera had been recorded. The plaintiff asserts that the Tahasildar, Marsaghai, defendant no.2, stopped the collection of rent since 1967. Her husband approached the defendant no.2 since 1968 several times for acceptance of rent and collection of rent schedule in ROR. On 4.3.77, the defendant no.2 refused to accept rent and denied the title. The plaintiff rose from the deep slumber and instituted the suit in the year 1978. Under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is three years for institution the suit, to obtain any other declaration when the right to sue first accrues. In the instant case, right to sue accrued in the year 1967. Thus, the suit was barred by limitation. 21. Under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is three years for institution the suit, to obtain any other declaration when the right to sue first accrues. In the instant case, right to sue accrued in the year 1967. Thus, the suit was barred by limitation. 21. The apex Court in the case of Girijanandini Devi and others (supra) held that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. 22. Learned trial court dismissed the suit. Plaintiff filed appeal. In such a contingency, a duty is cast on the learned appellate court to answer all issues. General agreements with the reasons given by the court would not be suffice. The learned appellate court reversed the finding of the learned trial court on the question of limitation, but concurred with the other findings. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 23. In Mst. Rukhmabai (supra), the apex Court held that the right to sue under Art.120 of the Limitation Act accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such a right, however ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit. Whether a particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether that threat effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right. The same view was reiterated in C. Mohammad Yunus (supra). There is no quarrel over the proposition of law. 24. Before parting with the case, this Court likes to observe that the land vested in the State after coming into operation of the O.E.A. Act. Curiously, one Sri Purna Chandra Patnaik, styling himself as Supervisor, Kujang, Burdwanraj Agent Office issued the extract of the register maintained by the ex-landlord Ext.1 on 16.8.79. He had no authority to issue Ext.1. Similarly, he issued Ext.1/a on 16.3.79. The same reveals the name of certain persons in Bhateni Sahajoga Krushi Samiti. Curiously, one Sri Purna Chandra Patnaik, styling himself as Supervisor, Kujang, Burdwanraj Agent Office issued the extract of the register maintained by the ex-landlord Ext.1 on 16.8.79. He had no authority to issue Ext.1. Similarly, he issued Ext.1/a on 16.3.79. The same reveals the name of certain persons in Bhateni Sahajoga Krushi Samiti. Under what circumstances, the ex-landlord maintained the office long after abolition of estate, is not difficult to fathom. Obviously, the same is to espouse the cause of certain persons to give unfair advantage. Several of such instances have come to the notice of this Court in respect of the land belonging to Kujang estate. Number of appeals have been filed before this Court. In M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and others, (1997) 1 SCC 388 , the apex Court held that the doctrine of Public Trust primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. Our legal system-based on English Common Law-includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership. The officials of the State should rise to the occasion and initiate proceeding against those persons, who have manipulated the records to grab the valuable property of the State. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 25. In the wake of aforesaid, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is allowed. Consequently, the suit is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.