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2018 DIGILAW 1796 (JHR)

Madan Mohan Prasad Singh son of Shri Kuldip Singh, Police Station & District-Lohardaga v. State of Jharkhand

2018-08-09

ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mrs. Swati Shalini, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 2. Heard Mr. R.R. Tiwari, counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents. 3. Heard Mr. Ashish Kumar Thakur, A.C. To S.C. (L&C) appearing on behalf of the respondent state. 4. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs. “For quashing the order dated 30.05.2002 passed in Board/S Case No. 3 of 2002 by the Board of Revenue whereby and whereunder he has been pleased to set aside the order dated 28.01.2002 passed by the Additional Collector, Lohardaga; and for issuance of direction upon the respondent no. 5 to execute a registered deed in favour of the petitioner in accordance with the order dated 28.01.2002 passed by the Additional Collector Lohardaga.” 5. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent no. 5 had purchased a portion of R.S. Plot No. 183 in R.S. Khata No. 75, admeasuring 3.15 acres Tanr-II land corresponding to New Survey Khata No. 112, Plot No. 184 of area 67 decimal, New plot no. 185 having an area of 1.2 acres and New plot no. 186 having an area of 2.18 acres bound and butted as follows:- North : New Plot No. 183 South : New Plot No. 187 East : New Plot No. 183 West : New Plot No. 224 6. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner filed application for pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 1961 (hereinafter referred as ‘aforesaid Act of 1961’) and claimed to be the adjoining raiyat of the vended property. Counsel submits that the entire property as mentioned above was sold by a single deed dated 29.03.2001 and the petitioner was the adjoining raiyat by virtue of another sale deed dated 27.03.1993. She submits that the notices were issued by the authority and the case was numbered as pre-emption case no. 3/2001. After issuance of notice, the parties had appeared and order dated 30.10.2001 was passed which is contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition and by the said order the Sub Divisional Officer, Lohardaga rejected the application for pre-emption. 7. She submits that the notices were issued by the authority and the case was numbered as pre-emption case no. 3/2001. After issuance of notice, the parties had appeared and order dated 30.10.2001 was passed which is contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition and by the said order the Sub Divisional Officer, Lohardaga rejected the application for pre-emption. 7. She submits that from perusal of order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Lohardaga it appears that the only reason for rejecting the application for pre-emption was that the property was consisting of three plots bearing number 184,185 and 186 and the property of the petitioner was touching only plot no. 184 towards northern side and the property was not touching the rest plots i.e. plot nos. 185 and 186. In such circumstances it was held that the petitioner is not entitled for her claim of pre-emption under Section 16 (3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961. 8. Against this, the petitioner filed appeal which was numbered as pre-emption appeal no. 3R 15/2001-02 and the appellate authority after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and after going through the materials, recorded that as per the aforesaid registered deed no. 613 dated 29.03.2001 , which was recorded as ‘Tanr’ land , and further it was also mentioned in the sale deed, that the vendee or the purchaser of the property may also engage himself in agriculture in connection with vended property. It was also found that the valuation of the property for the purposes of registration was also done by taking into account that it was agricultural land. 9. She also submits that after considering the deed, the authority held that the appellant i.e. the petitioner herein is a raiyat and the property of the petitioner i.e. adjoining property is also a raiyati land. It was also found that the vended property is also a raiyati land and the purchaser comes within the definition of raiyat. It was recorded that the vended property as well as adjoining property are part of the same R.S. Plot and length of adjoining boundary of the vended property and adjoining property is about 76 ft. Accordingly, the appellate authority held that the petitioner herein is an adjoining raiyat. It was recorded that the vended property as well as adjoining property are part of the same R.S. Plot and length of adjoining boundary of the vended property and adjoining property is about 76 ft. Accordingly, the appellate authority held that the petitioner herein is an adjoining raiyat. The entire vended property constitutes one block and in such circumstances the said authority held that the case of petitioner herein was fully covered under the provisions of Section 16 (3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961 and thereafter by detailed order, the appellate authority allowed the appeal. 10. Against the appellate order, the private respondents filed revision before the revisional authority and the revisional authority allowed the revision on the sole ground that the appellate authority had erred in considering the fact that three vended plots i.e. 184,185 and 186 are one block and held that the land of the petitioner touches only northern side of the plot no. 184 and is therefore not adjacent to the other two plots i.e. plot no. 185 and 186, therefore the petitioner is adjacent raiyat only to plot no. 184. The revisional authority further held that as partial pre-emption cannot be allowed, because the petitioner being not adjacent raiyat to plot nos. 185 and 186, the application for pre-emption filed by the petitioner could not have been allowed and in such circumstances, the revisional authority allowed the revision filed by the private respondents vide order dated 30.05.2002. 11. Counsel for the petitioner while assailing the order passed by the revisional authority submits that property involved in this case i.e. plot nos. 184, 185 and 186 not only constitute one block, but the same was transferred by single sale deed and accordingly the point regarding adjacent of the property has to be examined with respect to the entire block and the petitioner admittedly being in the northern portion of the boundary of the block and adjacent to plot no. 184, was adjacent raiyat in the entire property and accordingly the application for pre-emption which was filed by the petitioner was rightly considered and the claim of the petitioner was allowed by the appellate authority. She submits that the revisional authority has misdirected itself by holding that the if the claim of the petitioner is allowed, then this will amount to partial pre-emption. 12. She submits that the revisional authority has misdirected itself by holding that the if the claim of the petitioner is allowed, then this will amount to partial pre-emption. 12. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that under the provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1961, there is no provision which deals with property plot wise and whatsoever is required to be seen is whether the pre-emptor is adjacent raiyat to the vended property. The vended property may consists various plots and in such circumstances, they will constitute one single transaction. She submits that in this view of the matter, impugned order is perverse and is fit to be set aside. She has also relied upon the judgment reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 46 SC and submits that it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that reading of Section 16 (3) (i) of the aforesaid Act of 1961 clearly indicates that any transfer of land which is made after commencement of the said Act to any person other than the co-sharer or raiyat of the adjoining land , any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled for pre-emption as per the procedure prescribed. She submits that purchaser of the property is neither co-sharer of the vended property nor the adjoining raiyat of the vended property and the petitioner is adjoining raiyat of the vended property, therefore the provisions of Section 16 (3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961 is attracted and her claim for pre-emption is to be allowed. She also submits that the right to pre-emption is a statutory right and if the condition precedent under Section 16 (3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961 is satisfied, then the authorities have no option but to allow the application for pre-emption. 13. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent on the other hand submits that the impugned order has been rightly passed and he submits that for the purposes of provisions of Section 16 (3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961, the petitioner in order to succeed ought to have been shown being adjacent to all the three plots and merely because the petitioner was adjacent to plot no. 184, therefore the right of pre-emption could not have been allowed and the same would amount to allowing the claim of pre-emption with respect to plot no. 184, therefore the right of pre-emption could not have been allowed and the same would amount to allowing the claim of pre-emption with respect to plot no. 184 only and will not cover all the three plots. 14. He submits that over and above, the above point in the instant case, the petitioner cannot be said to be raiyat and accordingly the provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1961 are not attracted in the instant case. He submits that the purchaser in the instant case is not the “land holder” within the meaning of the aforesaid Act of 1961, in view of the judgment passed by this court reported in 1979 BBCJ 151 , the petition for pre-emption will lie only when all the three parties are the land holders, i.e. transferor, transferee as well as the pre-emptor. Accordingly, the provisions of Section 16 (3) is not attracted. He has also relied upon the judgment reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 848 ; 1998 (1) PLJR 758 ; 2007 (2) JLJR 662 and submits that in view of the aforesaid judgments, the provisions of aforesaid Act of 1961 is not applicable, therefore the application of pre-emption filed by the petitioner is itself misconceived and the same was rightly rejected by the original court. He submits that for the purpose of pre-emption application, the purpose for which the property is being purchased is required to be considered and as per the sale deed itself, the property was purchased for the purposes of construction of school building, therefore provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1961 are not attracted. 15. After hearing counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record this court finds that admittedly the property involved in this case being plot no. 184,185 and 186 was purchased as one block vide sale deed dated 29.03.2001 and the property has been recorded as ‘Tanr’ property in the record of rights. Further, admittedly the property of the petitioner is adjoining to plot no. 184 towards the north and the petitioner’s plot is not adjacent to plot nos. 185 and 186 separately. The petitioner having filed the application for pre-emption in the year 2001, notices were issued to the private respondents , objection was filed by the private respondents and physical inspection of the vended property with its surroundings was also conducted. 184 towards the north and the petitioner’s plot is not adjacent to plot nos. 185 and 186 separately. The petitioner having filed the application for pre-emption in the year 2001, notices were issued to the private respondents , objection was filed by the private respondents and physical inspection of the vended property with its surroundings was also conducted. The private respondent had also raised objection that the property has been purchased for opening a school. 16. As per the inspection report, the property at the time of purchase and even at the time of filing of the pre-emption application was lying vacant. It is an admitted fact that the vacant land was purchased by the private respondents. The original authority considered the case of the parties and rejected the claim of the petitioner on the sole ground that the petitioner is not the adjoining raiyat in connection with all the plots. Original authority also formulated three points for consideration. (a) Whether the property is raiyati land? (b) Whether the applicant is raiyat within the meaning of the aforesaid Act? (c) Whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief for pre-emption under the provisions of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act? So far as first issue is concerned, the authority clearly held that the property is a raiyati land and is recorded as ‘Tanr’ -II. Merely because the property has been remained vacant, the same has not changed the nature of the land and held that the vended property is being cultivated. The said authority further held that the raiyat is a person who acquires the rights for cultivation or has a right to cultivate and held that the petitioner comes within the definition of raiyat. But so far as third issue is concerned, the same was decided against the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner is adjoining raiyat of only plot no. 184 and not of 185 and 186. 17. Against this, appeal was filed and the appellate authority passed a detailed order by considering the fact that property involved in this case is agricultural land and held that the land of the appellant is raiyati land and therefore the appellant is raiyat. 184 and not of 185 and 186. 17. Against this, appeal was filed and the appellate authority passed a detailed order by considering the fact that property involved in this case is agricultural land and held that the land of the appellant is raiyati land and therefore the appellant is raiyat. It further held that the land involved in this case is fit for agriculture and is raiyati land, therefore private respondents also falls within the definition of raiyat and held that considering the entire block of land, the petitioner is adjoining raiyat of the vended property. The appellate authority while disposing of the appeal also considered the fact that as per the deed of the vended property it was also mentioned that the purchaser of the property can also undertake agricultural operation. In the appellate order it was also mentioned that the value of the vended property was done as per the valuation applicable for agricultural land. 18. Against the order of the appellate authority, revision was filed. From perusal of the impugned order passed by the revisional authority, it appears that the only point which was argued by the private respondent before the appellate authority was that the land of the pre-emptor is adjacent in the northern portion of one plot out of three vended plots. Accordingly, pre-emptor cannot be said to be adjacent raiyat of all the three plots and therefore partial pre-emption cannot be allowed. It was also argued that the right of pre-emption is a weak right. 19. Although in the impugned order, a decision reported in 1998 (2) All PLR. 183 has been relied upon, but this judgment has not been cited or relied upon by any of the parties during the course of arguments. 20. The definition of land, land holder and raiyat as defined under section 2 of the aforesaid act of 1961 are as under:- (f) Land means land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture and includes land which is an orchard, kharhur or pasturage or {forest land or {also the land} perennially submerged under water} or the homestead of land holder. (g) Land holder means a family as defined in clause (ee) holding land as raiyat or as under raiyat or a mortgagee of land in possession of holding land permanently settled by government or lessee of land not resumable by Government. (g) Land holder means a family as defined in clause (ee) holding land as raiyat or as under raiyat or a mortgagee of land in possession of holding land permanently settled by government or lessee of land not resumable by Government. (k) Raiyat means primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself, or by members of his family or by hired servants or with aid of partners and includes also the successors in-interest or persons who have acquired such a right and includes, in the district of Santhal Parganas’ a village head man in respect of his private land, if any, but does not include in the areas to which the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Ben. Act VI of 1908, applies a Mundari, Khuntkattidar or a Bhuinhar, From perusal of the aforesaid definitions , it is apparent that Raiyat means that the person who has acquired right for the purpose of cultivating ; land holder interalia means a family holding the land as raiyat. As per definition of the land, it means land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture. This court finds that the property involved in this case is agricultural land and it has been rightly held to be so by the original authority with particular reference to the clause of the sale deed itself wherein it has been clearly mentioned that the purchased property is capable of being used for agriculture and was clearly indicated that the property can be used for agriculture purpose also. Such finding has neither been disturbed by the appellate authority nor by the revisional authority. Accordingly, the vendor as well as the purchaser were raiyat within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. So far as the petitioner is concerned, the petitioner is admittedly adjoining raiyat having property adjoining to one of the plots of the vended property. Section 16 of the aforesaid Act reads as under:- “16. Restriction on future acquisition by transfer, etc.-(1) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, either by himself or through any other person, acquire or possess by transfer, exchange, lease, mortgage, agreement or settlement and land which together with the land, if any, already held by him exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling area. Restriction on future acquisition by transfer, etc.-(1) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, either by himself or through any other person, acquire or possess by transfer, exchange, lease, mortgage, agreement or settlement and land which together with the land, if any, already held by him exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling area. 2(i) After the commencement of this Act, no document incorporating any transaction for acquisition or possession of any land by way of transfer, exchange, lease, mortgage, agreement or settlement shall be registered, unless a declaration in writing duly verified is made and filed by the transferee before the registering authority under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 9XVI of 1908), as to the total area of land held by himself or through any other person any where in the State. (ii)No such registering authority shall register any document evidencing any transaction, if, from the declaration made under clause (i), it appears that the transacton has been effected in contravention of the provision of sub-section (1). (iii) No land shall be transferred, exchanged, leased, mortgaged, bequeathed or gifted without a document registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908) 3(i) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document, of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed: Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. (ii) On such deposit being made the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision: Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer or the raiyat, as the case may be, shall be evicted from the land and possession there of shall be restored to the transferee and the transferee shall be entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten percent of the purchase money out of the deposit made under clause (i) (iii) if the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure prescribed in Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (V of 1908) shall be, so far as, may be followed.” 21. From perusal of Section 16 (3) it is apparent that as per the said sub section when any transfer of land is made to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred is entitled for pre-emption. This sub section does not use the term land holder. In such circumstances, this court is of the considered view that the provisions of the section has to be read as it is and the term land holder having not been used in the sub section, therefore the contention of the respondent being not a land holder within the definition of Section 2 (g) of the aforesaid act is totally misplaced. As it has been held above the purchaser herein comes within the definition of raiyat as defined in the aforesaid Act of 1961. 22. As it has been held above the purchaser herein comes within the definition of raiyat as defined in the aforesaid Act of 1961. 22. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme court in the judgment reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 46 (SC) Sheoji Mahto and others versus Additional member Board of Revenue in para 3 as follows:- “A reading of Section 16(3)(i) clearly indicates that when any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act, to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled within three months of the date of registration of the document of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal below held the appellants to be raiyats holding land adjoining to the land sold to the respondents by registered sale deed. An application was also filed within three months from the date of the registration of the document. Under these circumstances, the two conditions having been satisfied by operation of Section 16(3)(i), the appellants are entitled to pre-emption of the said land. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in refusing to entertain the writ petition dismissed in limine. The Collector was also wrong in allowing the appeal.” 23. So far judgment reported in 1979 BBCJ 151 (Mukhi Mali versus state of Bihar) is concerned this court finds that that the judgment has to be read as a whole. The facts of that case is totally different from the facts of the instant case. In that case the seller of the property was the labourer by profession and the nature of the property as described was not for agricultural purpose but had structure over it and therefore it was contended that the vender was not the land holder within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the aforesaid Act. In that case the seller of the property was the labourer by profession and the nature of the property as described was not for agricultural purpose but had structure over it and therefore it was contended that the vender was not the land holder within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the aforesaid Act. The Hon’ble Court held that the nature of the land in that case was not agricultural and if the land is not homestead of a land holder i.e., raiyat, it will not be land within the meaning of the Act of 1961 and the provisions of Section 16 (3) will not be applicable. In such circumstances, this court finds that the facts as well as the ratio of judgment reported in 1979 BBCJ 151 (supra) is entirely different from the facts of this case and is accordingly of no help to the private respondents. 24. So far as the judgment reported in 2007 (2) JLJR 662 ( Ram Prasad Sao versus State of Bihar) is concerned, it was the specific case that the property involved in the said case was falling within the municipal area and there was evidence that the building had come up around the vended property. In the instant case, there is no such evidence, rather the evidence is that when the property was purchased by the private respondents herein, the adjoining areas were undertaking agricultural operations and accordingly this judgment also does not help the private respondents. 25. So far as judgment reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 848 ( Nathuni Singh Yadav and another versus State of Bihar ) is concerned, in that case it was held that if the landless person is not allowed to purchase , taking the matter to its logical conclusion, such person can never acquire any land. There is no such fundamental facts in the present case that the private respondents i.e., the purchaser of the land, is a landless person. Accordingly, this judgment also has no applicability to the facts of this case. 26. So far as judgment reported in 1998 (1) PLJR 758 (Urmila Devi versus State of Bihar) is concerned, in the said case there was nothing on record to show that the land was “agricultural land” and the land in the said case fell within the municipal area. 26. So far as judgment reported in 1998 (1) PLJR 758 (Urmila Devi versus State of Bihar) is concerned, in the said case there was nothing on record to show that the land was “agricultural land” and the land in the said case fell within the municipal area. In the instant case the nature of the land being agricultural land was held by the original authority and this finding was never disturbed by the appellate or revisional authority. Accordingly, even this judgment which has been relied upon by the respondent does not help the respondents in any manner. 27. This court finds that the parties herein are covered by the definition of raiyat, as defined under the provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1961 and the petitioner being the adjoining raiyat of the vended property purchased by the private respondent in one block having three contiguous plots through one transaction of sale by one sale deed, the application of the petitioner for pre-emption ought to have been allowed. The private respondent herein are complete stranger, they are neither the adjoining raiyat nor the co-sharer of the vended property. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in judgment reported in (2010) 6 SCC 441 (Suresh Prasad Singh versus Dulhin Phulkumari Devi ) while considering the right of pre-emption under the aforesaid Act of 1961 has held by following the earlier judgment in the case of Shyam Sunder and others versus Ram Kumar and another reported in (2001)8 SCC 24 that right of pre-emption has been recognised by statute , it has to be treated as mandatory and not discretionary. It would be useful to quote para 20 and 21 of the aforesaid judgment which reads as follows:- “The learned Single Judge deciding the writ petition and the Division Bench of the High Court deciding the LPA appear to have taken a view that the right of pre-emption is a weak right, presumably because the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sudama Devi v. Rajendra Singh and the learned Single Judge in Ram Pravesh Singh v. Board of Revenue have taken this view. Whatever may have been the views of the Patna High Court and this Court in the earlier decisions cited by the learned counsel for Respondent 1, a five-Judge Bench of this Court in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar1 has now held that where a right of pre-emption is recognised by statute, it has to be treated as mandatory and not discretionary. The relevant passage from the judgment in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar1 is quoted hereinbelow: (SCC pp. 37-38, para 17) “17. … The right of pre-emption of a co-sharer is an incident of property attached to the land itself. It is some sort of encumbrance carrying with the land which can be enforced by or against the co-owner of the land. The main object behind the right of pre-emption, either based on custom or statutory law, is to prevent intrusion of a stranger into the family holding or property. A co-sharer under the law of pre-emption has right to substitute himself in place of a stranger in respect of a portion of the property purchased by him, meaning thereby that where a co-sharer transfers his share in holding, the other co-sharer has right to veto such transfer and thereby prevent the stranger from acquiring the holding in an area where the law of pre-emption prevails. Such a right at present may be characterised as archaic, feudal and outmoded but this was law for nearly two centuries, either based on custom or statutory law. It is in this background the right of pre-emption under statutory law has been held to be mandatory and not mere discretionary.” Thus, even if there has been a long lapse of 19 years, the High Court could not have rejected the claim of the appellant for pre-emption when the claim was recognised by the statute, had been lodged in accordance with the statute and within the time prescribed by the statute and in the manner provided by the statute. 21. Respondent 1, however, claims to be a boundary raiyat saying that she had purchased under an earlier sale deed dated 11-1-1980 a plot of land adjoining to the land in respect of which the appellant has applied for pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act. 21. Respondent 1, however, claims to be a boundary raiyat saying that she had purchased under an earlier sale deed dated 11-1-1980 a plot of land adjoining to the land in respect of which the appellant has applied for pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act. The learned counsel for Respondent 1 has relied on the decision of the Patna High Court in Ram Pravesh Singh v. Board of Revenue for the proposition that the claim of pre-emption was not maintainable against a person who holds an adjacent plot of land. This view of the Patna High Court is based upon its earlier judgment in Ramachabila Singh v. Ramsagar Singh that if the transferee happens to be an adjacent raiyat in respect of some other plots, a co-sharer cannot claim any right of pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act. As a matter of fact, Section 16(3) confers the right of pre-emption not only on the co-sharer but also on the raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred. We are, however, of the considered opinion that a complete stranger who was not originally a raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred cannot be allowed to defeat the right of pre-emption of a co-sharer by first purchasing an adjoining plot of land and thereafter claiming to be a raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred. The decisions of the Patna High Court are cases of original boundary raiyats resisting the claim of pre-emption by a co-sharer of the transferred land. The object of Section 16(3) of the Act is to recognise the right of pre-emption of the co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred and this object would be frustrated if strangers are allowed to first buy one plot of land and then resist the claim of right of pre-emption of a co-sharer or a boundary raiyat on the basis of such first purchase of a plot of land.” 29. From perusal of the impugned order it appears that the Board of Revenue while passing the impugned order has considered the judgment reported in 1998(2) All PLR 183 (Rudal Singh vs. Additional member Board of Revenue) to hold that in order of succeed, the pre-emptor should be adjoining raiyat to all the vended plots. From perusal of the impugned order it appears that the Board of Revenue while passing the impugned order has considered the judgment reported in 1998(2) All PLR 183 (Rudal Singh vs. Additional member Board of Revenue) to hold that in order of succeed, the pre-emptor should be adjoining raiyat to all the vended plots. Although this judgment has not been cited by any of the parties during the course of argument, but this court considers it proper to consider it while passing this judgment as the same has been relied upon in the impugned order to reject the claim of the petitioner who is adjoining to only one of the plot out of three which were sold as one compact block. While going through the said judgment reported in 1998 (2) All PLR 183 (supra) this court finds that in the said judgment there was no plea that all the plots formed a compact block and the court gave a finding that the plots did not constitute a compact block. It would be useful to quote para 5 of the aforesaid judgment which is as follows :- “5. As indicated above, attempt was also made by the counsel for the petitioners to show that they hold land adjacent to all the plots. In this connection a vague submission was also made that the lands in question form one compact block. However, no averment to that effect is made. In view of the numbers of the plots in question I am inclined to think that they do not form compact block. That being the position, in view of the categorical finding recorded by the DCLR affirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities that the petitioners do not hold land adjacent to plot Nos. 469 and 483, it is not possible to accept their claim of pre-emption. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the pre-emptor must be adjacent raiyat of all the plots (if the claim is founded on adjacency), for there can not be partial pre-emption.” In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no dispute that the vended plots constituted a compact block, this court finds that the aforesaid judgment reported in 1998 (2) All PLR 183 does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. 30. 30. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, the impugned order dated 30.05.2002 passed by the Board of Revenue in Board case no 3 of 2002 is hereby set-aside and the appellate order passed by Additional Collector, Lohardaga in pre-emption appeal no 3R 15 /2001-02 is upheld. Accordingly this writ petition is allowed. The Collector is directed to take appropriate steps for the purposes of executing, registering a document of transfer of the property involved in this case and put the petitioner in possession of the property in accordance with the provisions of section 16(3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961.