JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri. Dev Brat Mukherjee, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri. Shailendra Singh Chauhan, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents and Sri. Devesh Pathak, learned counsel representing U.P. Pollution Control Board, Lucknow. 2. Sri. Devesh Pathak, learned counsel for the respondents-Pollution Control Board at the very beginning raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners have statutory alternative remedy for filing an appeal under Section 31 of 1981 Act, but learned counsel for the petitioners in response to the said objection submitted that in case of violation of principles of natural justice availability of alternative remedy may not be an absolute bar and placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, reported in [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ]: ( AIR 1999 SC 22 ). According to the learned Counsel, in the above case, Supreme Court has laid down three grounds wherein the Court may not relegate the petitioners for availing alternative remedy, firstly where there is violation of principles of natural justice, secondly where the order impugned in the petition is without jurisdiction and thirdly where it is a case of enforcement of any fundamental rights. He thus submitted that the Court may hear the matter on merits. We have in such situation proceeded to hear the matter on merits. 3. Since, the original record is before us, therefore, we feel that there, is no necessity to require the counter-affidavit and on the basis of the pleadings in the writ petition and the material placed along with the writ petition as also the original record, we have proceeded to hear the matter finally on merits. We are dealing with the original record of petitioner No. 1 and from the records of other four petitioners, we have noticed that they are similar and therefore, a reference to one would be enough. 4. We are dealing with the original record of petitioner No. 1 and from the records of other four petitioners, we have noticed that they are similar and therefore, a reference to one would be enough. 4. By means of this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have assailed the correctness of orders dated 27.06.2018/22.06.2018 passed by the respondent No. 3 invoking the provisions of Section 21(4) (first proviso) and Section 31-A of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the "1981 Act") whereby the consent given to the petitioners under Section 21 of 1981 Act has been revoked with a further direction to the petitioners to close down their Units and the District Magistrate/Collector, Chitrakoothas also been directed to ensure compliance of the said directions. 5. Yesterday i.e. 13.08.2018 after hearing learned counsel for the parties, we had required Sri. Devesh Pathak, learned counsel representing the Pollution Control Board to produce the original record as one of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the notice dated 11.05.2018 which finds mention in the impugned order has not been served upon the petitioners. Specific averment to this effect has been made in para 8 of the writ petition and also subsequent paras and grounds to that effect have also been framed. For ready reference, contents of para 8 are reproduced hereunder:- "8. That petitioner here submitted that as it is mentioned in the impugned order that on 11.05.2018 the Regional Office of the Board had sent the Notices to all the petitioners but petitioners were never been served with the earlier Notice as mentioned in impugned order, which all shows respondents just to harass the petitioners purposely by impugned order shut down their unit illegally although in the same area other big Units of Stone Crusher Plant are operated without following the norms of the Pollution Board but respondents could not bothered to take any action against them as big fishes greasing their palm but harassing many Crusher Plant Owners arbitrarily and illegally." 6. Today, Sri. Pathak has placed the original record of all the five petitioners. From the records, we find that a notice dated 11.05.2018 had been served upon all the five petitioners. Today, Sri. Pathak has placed the original record of all the five petitioners. From the records, we find that a notice dated 11.05.2018 had been served upon all the five petitioners. We also find an endorsement of the person receiving the notice along with the mobile numbers mentioned in the office copy of the Board. Further, petitioner Nos. 1, 2 & 3 have given their explanations/replies to the show cause notice dated 11.05.2018 which are available on record and these replies are of different dates. In case of petitioner No. 1 it is dated 28.05.2018, in case of petitioner No. 2 it is dated 01.06.2018 and in respect of petitioner No. 3, the reply is dated 19.05.2018. Insofar as petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 are concerned, only an endorsement of the notice is on record but there is no reply/explanation submitted by the said two petitioners. 7. Thus, at the outset, we have no hesitation in recording a finding that the petitioner No. 1 has made a false statement in the writ petition, which is so proved from the original record. The affidavit in support of the petition has been sworn by Sri. Mahesh Prasad Jaiswal son of Sri. Ram Chandra Jaiswal r/o Chakla Raj Rani, Sheo Rampur, District-Chitrakoot alleging himself to be petitioner No. 1 and also that he is doing pairavi on behalf of petitioner Nos. 2 to 5. 8. We accordingly are of the view that it is a fit case where criminal prosecution should be launched against the petitioner No. 1/deponent of the affidavit with respect to the false statement made to the knowledge of the deponent. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised three arguments before us. The first argument is that no opportunity was given to any of the petitioners to file any objections with respect to the inspection made on 06.06.2018 by the Committee constituted by the Pollution Control Board on 22.05.2018. The submission is that in absence of any opportunity having been given and the impugned order having civil consequences, the same stands vitiated and is liable to be quashed. The submission is that in absence of any opportunity having been given and the impugned order having civil consequences, the same stands vitiated and is liable to be quashed. The second argument advanced is that under Section 31 -A of 1981 Act powers of which have been exercised by the respondent-Board in issuing necessary directions for closure of the Units, do not have any backing as there are no directions of the Central Government which is required under the said provisions, and therefore, the impugned order directing closure of the Unit is bad in law. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of Gauhati High Court in the case of Mahabir Coke Industry & Anr. v. Pollution Control Board & Ors. dated 29.08.1996 reported in [1996 LAJ (Gau) 39 and AIR 1998 Gau 10 ]. The third argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Board has no power to direct the District Magistrate/Collector to execute any order/direction of the Board because an adequate remedy is provided under Chapter VI containing Sections 37 to 46 of the 1981 Act. Thus, the direction issued to the District Magistrate/Collector to ensure closure of the Units of the petitioners is also without jurisdiction. 10. The impugned order dated 27.06.2018 in all the cases refers to a notice dated 11.05.2018. Upon perusal of the said notice dated 11.05.2018, it was found that the petitioner No. 1 was given consent to run the Stone Crusher by the Competent Authority on 23.02.2017. The said notice dated 11.05.2018 further mentions that in the inspection made on 11.11.2017 by the Regional Office certain violations were found to have been committed as per the conditions attached with the consent letter. Based on the same, a show-cause notice was given to the petitioner on 27.03.2018 specifying the violations and the shortcomings as per the conditions attached with the consent letter. Despite the notice dated 27.03.2018, the petitioner did not remove the deficiencies and the violations pointed out in the notice. 11. Based on the same, a show-cause notice was given to the petitioner on 27.03.2018 specifying the violations and the shortcomings as per the conditions attached with the consent letter. Despite the notice dated 27.03.2018, the petitioner did not remove the deficiencies and the violations pointed out in the notice. 11. Again the Regional Office issued a notice dated 11.05.2018 to which a reply was given by the petitioner on 28.04.2018 and in the said reply the petitioner has sought to explain that all the shortcomings have been removed and that the Stone Crusher was being run following the standard prescribed for maintaining the air permissible pollution levels as also the ambient air quality and in fact there was no violation and further prayed for withdrawal of the notice. 12. Considering the contents of reply submitted by the petitioner No. 1 that all the deficiencies and the shortcomings have been removed as per the conditions of the consent letter and there are no other violations, the respondent-Pollution Control Board constituted a Committee on 22.05.2018 requiring it to make a fresh inspection in the light of reply of the petitioner No. 1. The said Committee made an inspection on 06.06.2018 and found that the violations were still there as prevailing earlier and even the deficiencies have not been removed. Based upon the said inspection note, the Regional Office proceeded to recommend to the Chief Environmental Officer of U.P. Pollution Control Board, Lucknow to take appropriate action invoking powers of Section 31-A of 1981 Act as the rules of environment were being violated and the air ambient quality was being compromised. Based upon the said material, the Board passed an order dated 27.06.2018, which is under challenge in the said writ petition. 13. The above facts reflected from the original record clearly make out that show-cause notice was given to the petitioners twice, and two inspections were made but despite the same the petitioner failed to either remove the deficiencies or to stop the violations of the conditions of the consent. Thus the argument that no opportunity has been given pursuant to the inspection report dated 06.06.2018, in our opinion, is without any basis. The petitioners were given opportunity twice to remove the deficiencies and the respondent-Pollution Control Board was only to verify as to whether the petitioners were actually following the conditions and maintaining the standards as stated in their reply. The petitioners were given opportunity twice to remove the deficiencies and the respondent-Pollution Control Board was only to verify as to whether the petitioners were actually following the conditions and maintaining the standards as stated in their reply. There was no occasion to issue any fresh show cause notice based on the report dated 06.06.2018 else, it would be an unending process to be adopted by the Board. The Regional Officer got the second inspection conducted only in order to facilitate and verify the contents of the reply of the petitioners. Thus, this argument that adequate opportunity as required under the provisos to Section 21 (4) of the 1981 Act has not been provided, is not substantiated and the same is accordingly rejected for the facts and reasons recorded above. 14. The second argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was no direction from the Central Government under Section 31-A of 1981 Act for closure of the petitioners' Unit and, as such, the Pollution Control Board could not have passed the orders for closure of the Units and it was a clear-cut violation of the provision of the said Section in our considered opinion is misconceived. For ready reference, we may reproduce Section 31-A of the 1981 Act. "31 A. Power to give directions Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, im. subject to the provisions of this Act, and to any directions that the Central Government may give in this behalf, a Board may, in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under this Act, issue any directions in writing to any person, officer or authority, and such person, officer or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions. Explanation.-For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that the power to issue directions under this section, includes the power to direct- (a) the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or (b) the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other service." 15. This section gives power to the Board to issue necessary directions in exercise of its powers and performance of its functions and such directions may be given to any person, officer or authority and such person or officer or authority would be bound to comply with such directions. This section gives power to the Board to issue necessary directions in exercise of its powers and performance of its functions and such directions may be given to any person, officer or authority and such person or officer or authority would be bound to comply with such directions. The only restriction on the Board is that it has to exercise such powers in accordance with the provisions of 1981 Act and to any directions that the Central Government may give in this behalf. The directions of the Central Government referred to in the said Section are referable to such directions which the Central Government may issue from time to time which may be in aid of the provisions of the Act and to provide necessary guidelines to the Board in discharging its functions. They are like general directions to fill up any lacuna in the provisions or which may be clarificatory in nature. It cannot be read under Section 31-A of 1981 Act by any stretch of imagination that for exercising powers for closure of a Unit after having withdrawn the consent, it would be the Central Government which will issue such direction for closure of the Units. Reading this interpretation in the said provisions of Section 31-A of the 1981 Act would actually mean that the Central Government has the power to ensure the closure of the Unit and it is not with the Board. In fact, it is otherwise the Board has all the powers and can issue directions in exercise of its powers and performance of the functions of the Act. 16. In the present case, where the Board has withdrawn its consent, the natural consequence would be that the Unit had to close because Section 21 of the Act provides that no Unit can run without the consent having been obtained from the Board. Reliance placed on the judgment of Gauhati High Court cannot come to the aid of the petitioners in view of the specific intent of the provisions of Section 31-A of 1981 Act as elaborated above. Thus, the second argument raised on behalf of the petitioners is also rejected. Reliance placed on the judgment of Gauhati High Court cannot come to the aid of the petitioners in view of the specific intent of the provisions of Section 31-A of 1981 Act as elaborated above. Thus, the second argument raised on behalf of the petitioners is also rejected. 16-A. The third argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Board has no power to direct the District Magistrate and therefore the District Magistrate/Collector has no authority to execute the orders/directions issued by the Board under Section 31-A of 1981 Act as specific procedure and provisions have been given under the Act itself in Chapter VI thereof covering Sections 37 to 46. Learned counsel for the petitioners has made specific reference to Sections 37 & 43. The submission in our opinion is misconceived. 17. Chapter VI deals with the penalties and procedures that is the penal provisions in addition to the exercise of the civil powers that may be exercised. It provides for criminal prosecution in addition to civil action where the person fails to comply with the provisions of Sections 21 & 22 or the directions issued under Section 31 -A of 1981 Act. That is to say that in case the petitioners would have continued to run the Units even after the direction for closure of the Unit would entail penal consequence for which they can be prosecuted for which the powers and procedure have been given in Chapter-VI. The argument that the District Magistrate cannot comply with the directions of the Board because of the provisions contained under Chapter-VI, is thus misconceived. 18. In fact Section 31-A of 1981 Act itself gives power to the Board to issue any direction in writing to any person, officer or authority, amenable to the directions of the Board and it cannot be said that the District Magistrate/Collector would not be an officer or authority to ensure compliance of the directions of the Board. The directions could have gone to any Administrative Authority for ensuring compliance of the directions of the Board. This is the intent of the provisions of Section 31-A of the 1981 Act. Thus, this argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners also has no substance and is rejected. 19. For the reasons recorded above, we do not find any merit in the petition and it is accordingly dismissed. 20. At this stage, Sri. This is the intent of the provisions of Section 31-A of the 1981 Act. Thus, this argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners also has no substance and is rejected. 19. For the reasons recorded above, we do not find any merit in the petition and it is accordingly dismissed. 20. At this stage, Sri. Mukharjee, learned counsel for the petitioners made two submissions for sympathetic consideration of this Court. Firstly, that the criminal prosecution against the deponent of the affidavit filed in support of the petitions may not be directed, however, any reasonable amount of costs may be imposed so that the deponent is made to suffer for his fault and does not repeat it again. 21. Accordingly, we provide that criminal prosecution may not be undertaken by the Senior Registrar of this Court provided the deponent Sri. Mahesh Prasad Jaiswal son of Sri. Ram Chandra Jaiswal r/o Chakla Raj Rani, Sheo Rampur, District-Chitrakoot, deposits a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) within a period of fifteen days from today with the Senior Registrar of this Court, whereupon the said amount may be transmitted to the Mediation & Conciliation Centre of Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court. 22. In case the amount is not deposited by the petitioner within 15 days from today, the Senior Registrar will proceed to launch the criminal prosecution against the deponent Sri. Mahesh Prasad Jaiswal as observed in the earlier part of this order. 23. The other submission made by Sri. Mukherjee is that in case the petitioners are able to remove all the deficiencies and also maintain the prescribed standards and fully comply with the conditions of the consent, they may represent to the Competent Authority, which may reconsider their claim for restoring their consent or providing a fresh consent as the law permits after verifying physically and also from the record that the petitioners have removed all deficiencies and fulfill all the conditions of the consent. We do not find any reason not to accept this submission and as such, it is ordered accordingly.