JUDGMENT : MOHAMMAD RAFIQ, J. This writ petition has been filed by Satya Narain Sharma questioning the validity of Section 3(viii) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, with prayer that the same be declared ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the Notification dated 23.05.2007 (Annexure-10) whereby exemption has been granted to the respondent no. 5 from the applicability of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short, ‘the Act of 2001’), be quashed and set aside. Prayer has also been made for setting aside the order dated 11.09.2006 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Devsthan, registering the respondent no. 5 as Public Trust. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent no. 5 is a society registered under the Jaipur Societies Registration Act, 1943, on 19.02.1949 with registration no. 15 of 1948-49. The petitioner is a tenant of the shop of respondent no. 5 situated in Kishanpole Bazar, Jaipur, since 1961. According to the petitioner, the property in question was originally owned by late Pandit Shri Ram Shanker S/o late Pandit Shri Sheodin Ji, R/o Chaukari Modi Khana, Jaipur. He created a Waqf of the said property by Waqf deed. The copy of the Hindi translation of the Wakf deed originally written in Urdu, has been placed on the record. According to the petitioner, the respondent no. 5 had a limited right over the property in question. However, the Assistant Devsthan Commissioner, without making proper enquiry in terms of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 (for short, ‘the Act of 1959’) and without issuing proper public notice, registered the same as public trust vide order dated 11.09.2006. The font size of the script of the notice published in the daily newspaper ‘Dainik Bhaskar’ was so small that it was not legible. 3. It is contended that the respondent no. 5 is earning profits by selling ayurvedic medicines in the open market. The entire control of the Society was earlier in the hands of late Shri Mohan Das Agarwal and after his death, it came in the hands of Ram Das Agarwal, who is an influential leader of Bhartiya Janta Party. The respondent no. 5, considering that the shop in the tenancy of the petitioner was located in Kishanpole Bazar, Jaipur, wanted to get the same evicted, so that it could be let out to a person of his liking. The respondent no. 5, considering that the shop in the tenancy of the petitioner was located in Kishanpole Bazar, Jaipur, wanted to get the same evicted, so that it could be let out to a person of his liking. The respondent no. 5, therefore, filed an application before the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur, for eviction but subsequently he filed an application before the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur on 08.08.2008 for withdrawal of the application for eviction on the ground that it has got exemption from the Act of 2001. The copy of the notification granting exemption dated 23.05.2007 has been placed on the record. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the very application for seeking exemption was moved before the concerned authority of the State after the eviction petition was filed against the petitioner. Since the respondent no. 6 was having influence in the Government being an active politician and his move was supported by Mr. Surendra Pareek, the then MLA and Mr. Girdhari Lal Bhargava, the then M.P. of B.J.P., he was granted benefit by colourable exercise of the power by the State. Learned counsel cited the note-sheet of the proceedings of the State (Annexure-9) to show that the Director, Local Bodies, Government of Rajasthan, objected to grant of exemption. The State Government without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, issued the exemption notification dated 23.05.2007. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that Section 3 (iii) of the Act of 2001 confers unguided and unbridled power on the State Government for granting exemption and it suffers from vice of excessive delegation of power and is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The State Government without any criteria and by adopting the method of pick and choose, grants exemption to public trusts of their liking. Under Section 2 (3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, the earlier enactment on the subject, the State Government was having power to grant exemption to any educational, religious or charitable institution. However, it contained definite guideline which ensured that the power was not misused by the State. Under Section 2 (3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, the earlier enactment on the subject, the State Government was having power to grant exemption to any educational, religious or charitable institution. However, it contained definite guideline which ensured that the power was not misused by the State. It provided that the State Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in public interest, may, by notification in official gazette, exempt from all or any of the premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for the purpose of that institution. However, Section 3 (iii) of the Act of 2001 merely provides that nothing contained in Chapter II and III of the Act of 2001 shall apply to any premises belonging to such religious, charitable or educational trust or class of such trusts as may be specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette. 6. Mr. H.V. Nandwana, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.N. Parasuraman v. State of Tamil Nadu - (1989) 4 SCC 683 , and argued that the Supreme Court in that case held that determination of legislative policy and formulation of rule of conduct are essential legislative functions, which cannot be delegated. What is permissible to leave to the delegates is the task of implementing the object of the Act after the legislature lays down adequate guidelines for the exercise of power. Since no such guidelines have been laid down, Section 3(viii) of the Act of 2001, which confers unguided and unbridled powers on the State Government, is liable to be declared ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. On the contrary, Mr. Mahendra Goyal, learned counsel for the respondent no. 5, opposed the writ petition and submitted that vires of Section 3 (viii) of the Act of 2001 have been challenged by the petitioner only with a view to avoiding alternative remedy available to the petitioner under the Act of 2001. It is denied that the aforesaid provision confers arbitrary or unbridled power on the State Government or that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. It is denied that the aforesaid provision confers arbitrary or unbridled power on the State Government or that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner has failed to give any cogent reasons to demonstrate as to in what manner the State Government has misused the said power. The notification granting exemption dated 23.05.2007 does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The State Government while keeping in view of the fact that the respondent no. 5 is a charitable institution, was fully justified in granting exemption to the trust from the Act of 2001. It is denied that notice for public trust was not issued. After the application was submitted by the respondent no. 5 to Assistant Devsthan Commissioner for registration of the said Trust under Section 72 of the Act of 1959, a public notice was published in daily newspaper of Rajasthan, namely, ‘Dainik Bhaskar’ on 13.06.2006. Learned Assistant Commissioner-I, Devsthan Department, Jaipur Division, Jaipur, also passed an order dated 11.09.2006, whereby it ordered for the registration of the respondent no. 5 as public trust. It further recorded a specific finding that the trust fulfills all the ingredients. 8. Reference is made to Section 18 (1) of the Act of 1959, which provides for detailed procedure for holding inquiry for registration. Section 18 (2) of the Act of 1959 provides that the Assistant Commissioner shall give in the prescribed manner public notice of the inquiry proposed to be made under subsection (1) and invite all persons having interest in the public trust under inquiry to prefer within sixty days objections, if any, in respect of such trust. However, once an entry has been made in the register in accordance with the findings of the Assistant Commissioner, the same is final in nature in view of Section 21 of the Act of 1959. It is contended that once the exemption was granted to the respondent no. 5, there was no point in continuing the eviction petition filed before the Rent Tribunal under Section 9 of the Act of 2001 and therefore it was rightly withdrawn. It is contended that compliance of not only Section 16 but also Section 17 of the Act has been completely made. The registration of the respondent no. 5 can not directly be challenged before this Court by filing the present writ petition. It is contended that compliance of not only Section 16 but also Section 17 of the Act has been completely made. The registration of the respondent no. 5 can not directly be challenged before this Court by filing the present writ petition. The petitioner has remedy of filing appeal under Section 20 and thereafter he has remedy of filing civil suit under Section 22 of the Act of 1959 against the order of registration. This writ petition is therefore liable to be dismissed. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has, in support of his arguments, relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan - AIR 1957 SC 510 , P.J. Irani v. The State of Madras - AIR 1961 SC 1731 , S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu - AIR 1985 SC 257 , and that of this Court in Kamal Kishore v. State of Rajasthan - 2008 (1) WLN 1 ; 2008 (1) RLW 192 and Mohd. Yamin v. State of Rajasthan - 1988 (2) WLN 238 : AIR 1989 Raj 30 . 10. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. We have also carefully gone through the cited judgments on behalf of both the parties. 11. The case before the Supreme Court in A.N. Parasuraman, supra, arose out of the Tamil Nadu Private Educational Institutions (Regulation) Act, 1966. Section 22 of the said Act provided that the Government may, subject to such conditions as they deem fit, by notification exempt any private educational institution or class of private educational institutions from all or any of the provisions of the Act of 1966 or from any rule made under that Act. Challenge was made before the High Court to Section 22 as also various other provisions including Section 28 of the said Act. The High Court declared Section 28 as invalid, which provided that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the said Act, the government may “do anything which appears to them to be necessary for the purposes of removing the difficulty”. The High Court declared Section 28 as invalid, which provided that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the said Act, the government may “do anything which appears to them to be necessary for the purposes of removing the difficulty”. It was in that context that the Supreme Court held that the said provision does not lay down correct and adequate guidelines for exercise of the power by the delegate, as a result of which the authority is in a position to act in discriminatory and arbitrary manner. The purpose of the Act is said to regulate the private educational institutions but does not give any idea as to the manner in which the control over the institutions can be exercised. Such are not the facts of the present case. 12. The Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh, supra, was considering the challenge to vires of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949. The argument in that case was that Section 15 of the Ordinance, which authorises the Government to exempt any person or class of persons from the operation of the Ordinance does not lay down the principles on which exemption could be granted leaving the matter to the unfettered and uncanalised discretion of the Government, and therefore is repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution. Repelling that argument, the Supreme Court held it is true that the Section does not indicate the grounds on which exemption could be granted but preamble to the Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearness the policy of the legislature and as that governs Section 15, the decision of the Government cannot be said to be unguided. 13. In P.J. Irani, supra, the constitutionality of Section 13 of the Madras Building (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1949 was questioned. In that case, initially the Government rejected the application for exemption on the ground that the matter was subjudice, however, after dismissal of the appeal, the appellant moved the Government for fresh and further protection. The Government by fresh order granted the exemption sought and issued the relevant notification. In that case, initially the Government rejected the application for exemption on the ground that the matter was subjudice, however, after dismissal of the appeal, the appellant moved the Government for fresh and further protection. The Government by fresh order granted the exemption sought and issued the relevant notification. Similar argument was made before the Supreme Court that Section 13 of the Madras Building (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1949, conferred an unguided and arbitrary power on the Government to discriminate between one building and another and choose at their will and pleasure particular buildings, which would be subject to the provisions of the Act and others which would not be so subject, the tenants in the latter being deprived of the protection conferred on other tenants similarly situated. The Supreme Court held that it was not correct to say that the enactment did not sufficiently disclose the policy and purpose of the Act which furnished adequate guidance flowing from the preamble to the Act i.e. (1) the regulation of letting, (2) the control of rents, and (3) the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants from residential and non-residential buildings. The Supreme Court in para 17 and 18 of the report held as under:— “17. Though the enactment thus conferred these rights on tenants, it was possible that the statutory protection could either have caused great hardship to a landlord or was the subject of abuse by the tenant himself. It was not possible for the statute itself to contemplate every such contingency and make specific provision therefor in the enactment. It was for this reason that a power of exemption in general terms was conferred on the State Government which, however, could be used not for the purpose of discriminating between tenant and tenant, but in order to further the policy and purpose of the Act which was, in the context of the present case, to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore, held that while S. 13 of the Act was constitutionally valid, any individual order of exemption passed by the Government could be the subject of judicial review by the Courts for finding out whether (a) it was discriminatory so as to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution, (b) the order was made on grounds which were germane or relevant to the policy and purpose of the Act, and (c) it was not otherwise mala fide. 18. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the approach and conclusion of the learned Judges of the High Court to the consideration of the question of the constitutional validity of S. 13 of the Act.” 14. Before the Supreme Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar, supra, challenge was made to the legality and/or validity of the total exemption granted to all such buildings from all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, in exercise of the powers conferred upon the State Government under Section 29 of the Act. The Supreme Court, relying on its earlier judgment in P.J. Irani, supra, and taking note of the material furnished by the Government in their counter affidavit, rejected the argument and held thus:— “7. ……………….In other words the legislature itself has made a rational classification of buildings belonging to Government and buildings belonging to religious, charitable, educational and other public institutions and the different treatment accorded to such buildings obviously proceeds on the well-founded assumption that the Government as well as the landlords of such buildings are not expected to and would not indulge in rack-renting or unreasonable eviction. These and similar other provisions crystallize the policy and purposes of the Act and furnish the requisite guidance which can legitimately govern the exercise of power conferred on the State Government under Section 29 of the Act. These and similar other provisions crystallize the policy and purposes of the Act and furnish the requisite guidance which can legitimately govern the exercise of power conferred on the State Government under Section 29 of the Act. The guidance thus afforded may illustratively be indicated by stating that the power to grant exemptions or make exceptions could be legitimately exercised by the State Government in areas or cases where the mischief sought to be remedied by the Act is neither prevalent nor apprehended as also in cases (individual or class of A cases) where a uniform or inflexible application of law is likely to result in unnecessary or undue hardship (here to landlords) or in cases where the beneficial provision is likely to be or is being abused by persons for whom it is intended (here the tenants). The question is whether in issuing the Notification dated 16th August 1976 the State Government has exercised the power in conformity with such guidance and the same is valid as not offending Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. We have already stated that the respondents have contended that the question of constitutional validity of granting exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or secular from rent control legislation as offending the equal protection clause of Article 14. has been concluded by the observations made by this Court in P.J. Irani's case (supra) while Counsel for the petitioners and the appellants on the other hand have urged that it is not; according to Counsel for the petitioners and the appellants all that the observations made by this Court in that case decide is that the classification of buildings belonging to Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts as also to public charitable trusts could be regarded as a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia but that test of nexus which is also required to be satisfied for purposes of Article 14 has not been pronounced upon by this Court and this aspect is still open to argument- We shall proceed on the basis that the question is res integra and consider whether the respondents, particularly the State Government have furnished proper material on the basis of which the exemption granted can be justified. 9. 9. It can not be disputed that public religious and charitable endowments or trusts constitute a well recognized distinct group inasmuch as they not only serve public purposes but the disbursement of their income is governed by the object with which they are created and buildings belonging to such public religious and charitable endowments or trusts clearly fall into a distinct class different from buildings owned by private landlords and as such their classification into one group done by the State Government while issuing the impugned notification must be regarded as having been based on an intelligible differentia. Counsel for the petitioners and the appellants also fairly conceded that such classification would be a rational one, more so in view of the observations made by this Court in that behalf in P.J. Irani's case (supra).” 15. This court in Mohd. Yamin, supra, upheld the constitutional validity of Section 2(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The relevant discussion in para no. 8 of the report reads as under:— “4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that sub-section (3) of Section 2 is unconstitutional inasmuch as it discriminates between landlords by granting exemption only to the landlords falling within the ambit of sub-section (3) of Section 2 while denying that benefit to other landlords. In our opinion, there is no merit in this contention. It is permissible to classify the landlords in this manner for the purpose of granting exemption from the provisions of the Act only in respect of premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution, the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of institution. It is obvious that the income derived from any premises belonging to any educational, religious or charitable institution when utilised wholly for the purpose of the institution is in fact spent for public benefit as distinguished from the income derived from a premises belonging to any other person which is utilised for private gain.” 16. The object of the Act of 2001 is to provide for control of eviction from, letting of, and rents for, certain premises in the State of Rajasthan and matters incidental thereto. Apart from the object of the Act of 2001, Section 3 (viii) of the Act of 1950 provides the requisite guidelines, which reads as under :— “3. The object of the Act of 2001 is to provide for control of eviction from, letting of, and rents for, certain premises in the State of Rajasthan and matters incidental thereto. Apart from the object of the Act of 2001, Section 3 (viii) of the Act of 1950 provides the requisite guidelines, which reads as under :— “3. Chapter II and III not to apply to certain premises and tenancies.- Nothing contained in Chapter II and III of this Act shall apply,- … … (viii) to any premises belonging to such religious, charitable or educational trust or class of such trusts as may be specified by the State Government by modification in the Official Gazette;” 17. Clearly, Section 3 (viii) itself provides that exemption could be granted to only such public trusts where premises belong to religious, charitable or educational trust or class of such trusts as may be specified by the State Government. Even the class of such trusts, as may be specified by the State Government, has to have the character analogous or similar to religious, charitable or educational. The predominant object of the trust therefore should be religious, charitable or educational. The context in which the exemption is granted is that the protection available to the tenants under Chapter II and III of the Act of 2001 would not be available to the tenants of the premises let out by such trusts, the major being the grounds of eviction contained in Section 9 of Chapter III and eviction on other various grounds contained in different provisions of that Chapter of the Act. It is no doubt true that exemption notification granted in a particular case to a particular trust may be subjected to challenge in that case. When it is done, the government would be obliged to disclose the materials by which it was satisfied to extend such exemption to such trust but it can not be said that the provisions of the aforesaid vest unguided and unbridled power in the State Government for extending exemption to such public trusts. 18. Coming now to the challenge to the registration of the public trust, we are not inclined to interfere with the validity of the Act of 1950 as we have upheld the constitutional validity. 18. Coming now to the challenge to the registration of the public trust, we are not inclined to interfere with the validity of the Act of 1950 as we have upheld the constitutional validity. But we leave it open to the petitioner to assail the aforesaid order before the Appellate Authority under Section 20 of the Act of 1959 and if eventually the appeal is dismissed, to file civil suit. In this respect we are inclined to uphold the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents as we have upheld the constitutional validity of the Act. However, considering that the appeal has remained pending before this court for nine long years and the appeal now filed would be delayed as the limitation for filing the appeal has expired, we direct that if the appeal is now filed by the petitioner within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, the same shall be heard by the Appellate Authority on merits and shall not be dismissed on the ground of limitation. 19. In view of above discussion, the writ petition is dismissed, however, with aforesaid observations. This also disposes of the pending applications in this writ petition, if any.