JUDGEMENT AND ORDER : This appeal is filed by the claimants against the judgment dated 27.05.2017 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident claims Tribunal, North Tripura, Dharmanagar, whereby and where under the learned Tribunal has disposed of the claim-application filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 with nil award. 2. When the matter is taken up for hearing there is no representation on behalf of the appellants. Mr. A. Gon Chowdhury, learned counsel appears on behalf of the United India Insurance Company Limited, i.e., respondent No.2 in this appeal. 3. Heard Mr. A. Gon chowdhury, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. 4. As I have decided to take up the matter for hearing in absence of the learned counsel for the appellants, I have very meticulously examined the records of the instant case. 5. At the very outset, Mr. Gon Chowdhury, learned counsel in his usual fairness has invited my attention to para 8 of the judgment passed by the learned Tribunal. It is revealed from the findings of the learned Tribunal that the ground for not awarding any compensation in favour of the claimants in the instant case is that the police report reveals that the accident took place due to mechanical disorder for which neither the owner nor the Insurance Company be held liable. According to me, this is an unexpected and absurd proposition as held by the learned Tribunal. 6. However, it leads me to take note of the present case. Briefly stated, that on 17.03.2016 Jagadish Tripura being a labourer along with another went to 32 KM border working site from Bakcherra Coastal Brick Field by vehicle bearing No. TR.01D-1600 (Truck) loaded with bricks through Chailengta-Chamanu road and while at about 11.30/11.45 hours the vehicle reached at Durgacherra near Assambasti when the driver of the vehicle lost his control and met with the accident and ultimately the vehicle fell down into a lunga resulting the death of Jagadish Tripura on the spot due to grievous injuries he suffered. It is stated in the claim-application that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent act and the driving of the driver of the vehicle No. TR.01D-1600(Truck). 7. It is stated in the claim-application that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent act and the driving of the driver of the vehicle No. TR.01D-1600(Truck). 7. On the basis of the pleadings and materials on record submitted by the respective parties the learned Tribunal has formed the following issues: (i) Whether the deceased Jagadish Tripura expired on spot on 17.03.2016 at about 11.30/11.45 hours at Assambasti (Durgacherra) on Chailengta to Chamanu road under Chailengta PS arising out of motor accident involving TR 01D 1600 (Truck) due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle bearing no. TR 01D 1600 (Truck)? (ii) Whether the claimants are entitled to get compensation for the death of Jagadish Tripura, if so, what would be the quantum of compensation and who is/are liable to make payment of the same? 8. The learned Tribunal while dealing with the first issue has arrived at a finding that the accident took place due to mechanical disorder as a result of steering lock and the police report does not support rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by its driver. On the basis of this finding the Tribunal has rejected the claim application of the claimants. 9. If this proposition of the learned member of the Tribunal is accepted, then, it will lead to opening of Pandora’s box to thwart the legitimate claims of the legitimate victims/claimants. No Court or Tribunal should allow this kind of approach in deciding any of the cases. This is wholly an irrational and illogical/cavalier approach of the learned Tribunal in deciding such sensitive issue. I am constrained to observe that the learned Member of the Tribunal has miserably misconstrued the meaning of the term “accident”. 10. The word “accident” has not been defined in the Motor Accident Act, 1988. The Courts or Tribunal has to go considering the meaning of the “accident” at its own parlance. In Sakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and anr. reported in AIR 2007 SC 248 , the Apex Court defines the expression “accident” which is reproduced below: [SC. Page 251, para 22] “We are not oblivious that an accident may cause an internal injury as was held in Fenton (pauper) v. J. Thorley & Co. In Sakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and anr. reported in AIR 2007 SC 248 , the Apex Court defines the expression “accident” which is reproduced below: [SC. Page 251, para 22] “We are not oblivious that an accident may cause an internal injury as was held in Fenton (pauper) v. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd. [1903 AC 443], by the Court of Appeal : “I come, therefore, to the conclusion that the expression “accident” is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed.” Lord Lindley opined. “The word “accident” is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning, Speaking generally, but with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any un-intended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss. But it is often used to denote any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause; and if the cause is not know the loss or hurt itself would certainly be called an accident. The word “accident” is also often used to denote both the cause and the effect, no attempt being made to discriminate between them. The great majority of what are called accident are occasioned by carelessness; but for legal purposes it is often important to distinguish careless from other unintended and unexpected events.” 11. Further, it is axiomatic to say that the Tribunal ought to have taken care of the meaning of “negligence” in the context of the present case. 12. Dictionary meaning of the word negligence as has been mentioned in Black”s Law Dictionary is: “Negligence. The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. Negligence is the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances; it is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances or failure to do what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances. Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, Del. Super., 318 A. 2d 614 617. Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, Del. Super., 318 A. 2d 614 617. Conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm; it is a departure from the conduct expectable of a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances. U.S. v. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc., 607 F.2d 624, 632. The term refers only to that legal delinquency which results whenever a man fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit, whether it be slight, ordinary, or great. It is characterized chiefly by inadvertence, thoughtlessness, inattention, and the like, while “wantonness” or “recklessness” is characterized by willfulness. The law of negligence is founded on reasonable conduct or reasonable care under all circumstances of particular case. Doctrine of negligence rests on duty of every person to exercise due care in his conduct towards others from which injury may result” 13. In Ravi Kapur Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 284 the Apex Court while dealing with a case defines “negligence” as under: [SCC Page 295. Para13] “13. “Negligence” means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one: it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration of the court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence.” 14. In M.S. Grewal and anr. Vs. Deep Chand Sood and ors. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 151 , the Apex Court at para-14 has observed: [SCC Page 162, Para 14] “14. Negligence in common parlance means and implies “failure to exercise due care, expected of a reasonable prudent person”. It is a breach of duty and negligence in law ranging from inadvertence to shameful disregard of the safety off other. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 151 , the Apex Court at para-14 has observed: [SCC Page 162, Para 14] “14. Negligence in common parlance means and implies “failure to exercise due care, expected of a reasonable prudent person”. It is a breach of duty and negligence in law ranging from inadvertence to shameful disregard of the safety off other. In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is unaware of the results which may follow from his act. Negligence is thus a breach of duty or lack of proper care in doing something, in short, it is want of attention and doing of something which a prudent and a reasonable man would not do (vide Black’s Law Dictionary). Though sometimes the word “inadvertence” stands and is used as a synonym ot negligence, but in effect negligence represents a state of the mind which, however, is much serious in nature than mere inadvertence. There is thus existing a differentiation between the two expressions-whereas inadvertence is a milder form of negligence, “negligence” by itself means and implies a state of mind where there is no regard for duty or the supposed care and attention which one ought to bestow. Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (18th Edn.) sets out four several requirements of the tort of negligence and the same read as below: “(1) The existence in law of a duty of care situation i.e one in which the law attaches liability to carelessness. There has to be recognition by law that the careless infliction of the kind of damage in suit on the class of person to which the claimant belongs by the class of person to which the defendant belongs is actionable. (2) Breach off the duty of care by the defendant i.e. that it failed to measure up to the standard set by law. (3) A causal connection between the defendant’s careless conduct and the damage. (4) That the particular kind of damage to the particular claimant is not so unforeseeable as to be too remote.” 15. Tribunal should not be oblivious of the fact that mechanical disorder caused at the time of driving of the motor vehicle is also a part of negligent act committed by the owner as well as the driver of the said vehicle. Tribunal should not be oblivious of the fact that mechanical disorder caused at the time of driving of the motor vehicle is also a part of negligent act committed by the owner as well as the driver of the said vehicle. If during the movement of the vehicle it suffers from any mechanical disorder that will lead to definite presumption that both the owner and the driver have failed to discharge their burden of proper maintenance and due care so that the vehicle can run freely without any disturbance. In the case in hand, both the driver and owner are found to be negligent to ensure proper maintenance of the vehicle and take sufficient care to avoid any mishap that led the vehicle to cause accident leading to the death of the deceased Jagadish Tripura. I reiterate that in the claim application the claimants have categorically stated that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent act and driving of the driver of the vehicle No.TR.01-D-1600(Truck). The Tribunal ought to have understood that Jagadish Tripura died out of the use of the vehicle No. TR.01-D-1600. 16. The word “use” has a wider connotation to cover the period when vehicle even suffers from any mechanical defect as because the accident thereby could be termed as “arising out of use of vehicle” within the phraseology of Section 165 of the M.V.Act. This Court is guided by precedent of (1) Shivaji Dayanu Patil V. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More, (1991)3 SCC 530 , (2) Samir Chanda V. Managing Director, Assam State Transport Corporation, (1998)6 SCC 605 and (3) Union of India V. Bhagawati Prasad(dead) and others, (2002) 3 SCC 661 . 17. In Shivaji Dayanu Patil (supra), a petroleum tanker had fallen of the road to a ditch. Several hours after the accident, the petroleum leaked out of the tanker and got collected in the ditch. The liquid caught fired somehow, killing several onlookers, who had assembled there. The issue was whether claim petition under M.V.Act was maintainable with respect to damages caused by the mishap. There, the Court noted that the word “use” in the act was “arising out of the use of vehicle”, as approached to “caused by use of vehicle”. Following an Australian decision, it was held, “caused by connotes a “direct” or “proximate” relationship of cause and effect. There, the Court noted that the word “use” in the act was “arising out of the use of vehicle”, as approached to “caused by use of vehicle”. Following an Australian decision, it was held, “caused by connotes a “direct” or “proximate” relationship of cause and effect. “Arising out of” extends this to a result that is less immediate, but it still carries a sense of consequence”. The Court further went on to add that the word “use” has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect or accident. 18. In Samir Chanda (supra), a bomb exploited inside the bus, as a result of which the appellant sustained serious injuries on his legs. This was held to be arising out of the use of vehicle entitling the victim to compensation under M.V.Act. 19. In Bhagwati Prasad(supra), the Court expanded the expression “use of vehicle” to cover those instances where accident occurred not due to the negligence of the driver of vehicle but due to external actors. On that premises, the Court held that claim petition in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was maintainable in case of collusion between a vehicle and a train, even if negligence was entirely on the part of railways. 20. In the present case, the learned Tribunal has rejected the claim of the claimants only on the ground that the accident was the result of mechanical defect occurred during its movement and the driver was not negligent. In such an obtaining factual matrix, it would be an erroneous perception to say that the vehicle was not in use as stipulated under Section 165 of the Act. 21. I find a definite link between the falling of the vehicle into lunga, out of some mechanical defects and use of vehicle, which is sufficient to attract jurisdiction under M.V.Act. However, even if a casual link is found leading to an accident out of the use of vehicle, then also, the above analogy will be applicable in absence of any negligence on the part of driver and will come within the purview of Section 165 of M.V.Act. 22. However, even if a casual link is found leading to an accident out of the use of vehicle, then also, the above analogy will be applicable in absence of any negligence on the part of driver and will come within the purview of Section 165 of M.V.Act. 22. I have scrutinized the evidence of P.W-1 wherein she has categorically stated that her husband Jagadish Tripura died due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle No. TR. 01D-1600(Truck), which has also been supported by the post mortem report (Exbt-3). There is no cross-examination on behalf of the owner of the vehicle. The Insurance Company in their cross examination only has put a suggestion that the claim of the claimants is exorbitant, which is denied by the P.W-1. P.W-2 has supported the statement of P.W-1. Neither the owner nor the Insurance Company have led any evidence before the Tribunal. On the basis of the evidence on record it is proved that the husband of the claimant No.1 died due to the rash and negligent act and driving of the driver of the offending vehicle. Further, the deceased died in the said accident out of use of the said offending vehicle No. TR.01D-1600(Truck) which remains uncontroverted. Accordingly, the issue No. (i) as framed by the learned Tribunal is decided in favour of the claimants. 23. Having decided the issue No.(i) as above, I deem it fit necessary to remit back the case to the learned Tribunal to decide the issue No. (ii) in accordance with law. 24. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant appeal is disposed of. It is made clear that the Tribunal shall dispose of the suit within a period of 60(sixty) days from the date of receipt of the L.C. records along with the copy of this judgment. Needless to say, the parties to the suit also need to be informed to participate in the hearing. Send back the L.C records.