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2018 DIGILAW 1801 (RAJ)

Bhanwar Kanwar v. Guman Singh

2018-08-28

BANWARI LAL SHARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT Banwari Lal Sharma, J. - The present misc. appeal is preferred against the impugned judgment dated 20.02.2017 passed by learned Commissioner Employee Compensation, Jaipur, District-1, Jaipur in Case No. ECCF28/2014 (Bhanwar Kanwar And Ors. vs. Guman Singh And Ors.) whereby learned Commissioner allowed the claim petition of appellants-petitioners and awarded Rs. 5,27,044/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 09.05.2014. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that though the income of deceased was considered after considering the existing rate of minimum wage but only 26 days income was considered and penalty was not imposed, therefore this misc. appeal may be allowed. 3. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants. 4. Section 30 of the Act provides for appeals to the High Court. To the extent, the provision reads as follow :- "30. Appeals. -(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:- (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A;] (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of subsection (2) of section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees:" 5. From the perusal of aforesaid provision, it reveals that the Commissioner is the last authority regarding facts. So far as penalty is concerned, it is a discretion of Commissioner. Since, Commissioner has exercised his discretion for not imposing penalty then Appellate Court should not interfere in the finding of the Commissioner. 6. From the perusal of aforesaid provision, it reveals that the Commissioner is the last authority regarding facts. So far as penalty is concerned, it is a discretion of Commissioner. Since, Commissioner has exercised his discretion for not imposing penalty then Appellate Court should not interfere in the finding of the Commissioner. 6. Recently, in the matter of Golla Rajanna Etc. Etc. vs. The Divisional Manager And Another, Etc. Etc. reported in 2017 (1) SCC 45 , Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that :- "The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, having regard to the evidence, had returned a finding on the nature of injury and the percentage of disability. It is purely a question of fact. There is no case for the insurance company that the finding is based on no evidence at all or that it is perverse. Under Section 4(1)(c) (ii) of the Act, the percentage of permanent disability needs to be assessed only by a qualified medical practitioner. There is no case for the Respondents that the doctor who issued the disability certificate is not a qualified medical practitioner, as defined under the Act. Thus, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has passed the order based on the certificate of disability issued by the doctor and which has been duly proved before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to reappreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court Under Section 30 of the Act." 7. Considering the provision of law, the aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court and the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant, since, no substantial question of law involves in this misc. Appeal, therefore same devoids merit which is hereby dismissed.