JUDGMENT Alok Sharma, J. - Under challenge is the impugned order dated 25.9.2017 passed by the Additional District Judge No.19, Jaipur Metropolitan (HQ Sanganer) dismissing the petitioner-plaintiff's (hereafter 'plaintiff') application filed under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC read with section 21 (5) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereafter 'Act of 1963') seeking amendment to the plaint in his suit for specific performance against the respondents-defendants (hereafter 'defendants') pursuant to the agreement to sell dated 6.12.2006. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that it laid a suit for specific performance founded on an agreement to sell dated 6.12.2006, allegedly executed by the defendants. It's case was that the defendants having agreed to sell Khasra Nos.150, 151, 152, 153, as also 133 and 134 in Village Kalyanpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur to the plaintiff for consideration of Rs. 70 lakhs thereafter refused to execute a sale deed and have it registered. The suit was thus necessitated. Appropriate decree were sought. Written statement of denial followed from the defendants after service of summons in the suit. The defendants alleged that the agreement to sell dated 6.12.2006 was forged, fabricated and doctored inasmuch as even while in fact it related to one bigah of land in Khasra No.150, as filed with the suit the agreement reflected conveying an area of 2.79 hectare. On the aforesaid pleadings, issues were framed and trial commenced. 3. On 18.8.2017 the plaintiff filed an application under Section 21(5) of the Act of 1963 read with Order 6, Rule 17 and section 151 CPC stating that during the pendency of the suit, the suit property in so far as it pertained to Khasra Nos.150, 151, 152, 153, in Village Kalyanpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur had been acquired by the State Government and thereon in the record of rights as of 23.9.2013 in respect of the aforesaid Khasras the name of Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) reflected instead that of the defendants. It was submitted that in terms of the State Government's circular dated 21.6.2012 on agricultural lands of Khatedars being acquired and transferred to the JDA, such khatedars were to be compensated by way of allotment/s of the developed land in the manner and to the extent indicated. It was submitted that in terms of the State Government's circular dated 21.6.2012 on agricultural lands of Khatedars being acquired and transferred to the JDA, such khatedars were to be compensated by way of allotment/s of the developed land in the manner and to the extent indicated. The plaintiff in the amendment application prayed that in the facts stated the plaint be allowed to be amended and in the alternative compensation in lieu of specific performance, in the eventuality of the suit being decreed be allowed to be claimed. 4. The defendants opposed the amendment application filed by the plaintiff. Their case was that if the amendment sought were to be allowed, the nature of the suit would be altered from one for specific performance to one for damages. Further it was stated that the amendment sought was ten years since the laying of the suit and about five years subsequent to the circular dated 21.6.2012 and hence the application therefor liable to be dismissed for reason of delay. The proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC which discourages belated amendments subsequent to the framing of issues was invoked as a defence on the fact that in the suit; issues were framed years ago and evidence recorded prior to the amendment sought. Hence this petition. 5. Mr.Sudesh Bansal counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the Trial Court has misdirected itself in invoking the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC to dismiss the application for amendment seeking compensation in lieu of specific performance in a suit for specific performance. Mr.Sudesh Bansal submitted that Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 provides that albeit no compensation shall be awarded in the suit unless the plaintiff had claimed such compensation in the suit, yet where the plaintiff had not initially claimed any such compensation in the plaint, the Court at any stage of the proceedings would allow him to amend the plaint on terms which may seem to be just. Mr.Sudesh Bansal emphatically adverted to the explanation to Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 which provides that the circumstance that the contract has become incapable of specific performance would not preclude the Court from exercising the jurisdiction to award compensation in lieu of specific performance in certain cases as provided for under Section 21 of the Act of 1963. In support of his contention, Mr.Sudesh Bansal relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Singh vs. Natthu Singh in [ (1992) 1 SCC 647 ] wherein the Court observed that in a suit for specific performance where the contract, for no fault of the plaintiff, becomes impossible of performance, Section 21 of the Act of 1963 enables award of compensation in lieu of and in substitution of specific performance. Mr.Sudesh Bansal also relied upon the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of M/s.V.S. Lad & Sons vs. Sociedade De Fomento Industrial Pvt. Ltd in [(2012) AIR CC 3031] holding that Section 21(5) of the Act of 1963 is independent even of the issue of limitation and compensation in addition or lieu of specific performance can be claimed at any point of time in the course of proceeding in a suit for specific performance. Mr.Sudesh Bansal also relied on the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Deewan Singh and another vs. Ramniwas & Others [(2015) 57 RCR (Civil) 307] to submit that an amendment under Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 has been given overriding effect even over the limitations thereto under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC. He submitted that in dismissing the plaintiff's application for amendment in the suit for specific performance adverting to the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC and stage of proceedings in the suit the trial court clearly misdirected itself and committed a palpable error in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. 6. Mr.J.K. Yogi, counsel for the defendants has obviously supported the impugned order 25.9.2017. He submitted that the plaintiff's suit for specific performance is founded upon a forged, fabricated and doctored agreement to sell dated 6.12.2006. Allowing an amendment to the plaint to claim compensation in lieu of specific performance with reference to Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 would entail further delay in the adjudication of the suit filed over ten years ago pendency of which has oppressed the defendants. Mr.J.K. Yogi further submitted that in the event the amendment belatedly sought were to be allowed, it would change the nature of the suit i.e. from one for specific performance to one for compensation. 7. Heard. Considered. 8. Mr.J.K. Yogi further submitted that in the event the amendment belatedly sought were to be allowed, it would change the nature of the suit i.e. from one for specific performance to one for compensation. 7. Heard. Considered. 8. Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 indeed provides that no compensation shall be awarded unless the plaintiff has claimed such compensation in his plaint. Yet it also provides that where the plaintiff has not claimed any compensation in the plaint, the Court can at any stage of the proceedings allow him to amend the plaint to seek compensation in lieu or in addition to specific performance on such terms as may be seem just, and permit including a claim for such compensation. The explanation to Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 further provides that where an agreement to sell has become incapable of specific performance it would not preclude the Court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by Section 21 of the Act of 1963 and to award compensation in lieu thereof. In the instant case a suit for specific performance pursuant to the agreement to sell dated 6.12.2006 was laid by the plaintiff on 21.5.2017. The defendants contested it on ground of the agreement to sell being forged, fabricated and doctored. The Trial Court will determine the authenticity of agreement to sell dated 6.12.2006 at the trial. Be as it may, during the pendency of the contest in the suit, Khasra Nos.150, 151 and 152 in Village Kalyanpura Tehsil Sanganer (part of the suit property) have been acquired by the State and now stand in the name of JDA as evident from the mutation dated 23.9.2013. Evidently in this view of the matter the plaintiff's suit for specific performance to the extent of Khasra Nos.150, 151, 152, 153, in Village Kalyanpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur cannot be decreed. 9. In this view of the matter the plaintiff resorted to Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 for amendment of the plaint and to compensation qua the said Khasras in the event it were to prove before the trial court that the agreement to sell dated 6.12.2006 to the extent of Khasra Nos.150, 151 and 152 in Village Kalyanpura Tehsil Sanganer conferred an enforceable right in it. The judgments of the Apex Court, the MP High Court and the Karnataka High Court referred to above make it pellucid that the amendment in a suit for specific performance seeking compensation by resort to Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 is a category of its own and is to be considered dehors both the Limitation Act as also Order 6, Rule 17 CPC. The submission of Mr.J.K. Yogi counsel for the defendants with regard to the agreement to sell dated 6.12.2006 being forged and doctored and hence not enforceable is not a matter for this Court to address. That issue will amongst others struck in the trial will be addressed by the Trial Court on the basis of evidence before it. Further the submission of Mr.J.K. Yogi that in the event the amendment were to be allowed it would alter the nature of the suit for specific performance to one for compensation, is not tenable. The explanation to Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963 provides for such a scenario where a suit for specific performance has been rendered incapable of being decreed for reasons of not being capable of being enforced for reasons not attributable to the plaintiff. The trial court in its impugned order has overlooked this state of law detailed above specifically provided for under Section 21 of the Act of 1963 and misdirected itself in adverting to interalia Order 6, Rule 17 CPC to dismiss the plaintiff's application for amendment. 10. In this view of the matter, in the facts of the case and in the state of law as it presents itself to the Court, the impugned order dated 25.9.2017 passed by the Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is so. Amendment to the plaint sought by the plaintiff interalia under Section 21 (5) of the Act of 1963- the appropriate statutory provision would stands allowed and the plaintiff would be entitled to claim compensation in lieu of specific performance for Khasra Nos.150, 151, 152, 153, in Village Kalyanpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur. 11. At this stage Mr.J.K. Yogi counsel for the defendants submitted that the plaintiff's suit is pending for over a decade to the defendants' detriment. 11. At this stage Mr.J.K. Yogi counsel for the defendants submitted that the plaintiff's suit is pending for over a decade to the defendants' detriment. He submitted that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in SBCWP No.11130/2017 filed at the instance of defendants while disposed it of had directed the Trial Court to expedite the proceedings and complete the trial in the suit within a period of one year from the date of certified copy of its order. He prayed that the Trial Court be required to therefore finally decide the plaintiff's suit as expeditiously as possible and in any event within a period of six months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. 12. The submission of Mr.J.K. Yogi, counsel for the defendants is reasonable and innocuous. Its acceptance it cannot entail any detriment to the plaintiff. It is therefore directed that the trial in the underlying suit be completed within 6 months. In the event of non-cooperation by the plaintiff, the trial court shall be free to dismiss the suit for default in prosecution, and conversely in the event of non-cooperation by the defendants, to initiate ex-parte proceedings against them. The power in this regard not be unnecessarily restrained but invoked when warranted. 13. The petition stands allowed accordingly.