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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1810 (HP)

Jeewan Lakshmi v. Dr. Shrikant Baldi

2018-10-08

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) - Since in both the above captioned petitions, parties are same and question of law involved is also similar, as such, same are being taken up together for disposal vide this common judgment. 2. Present petitions are directed against orders dated 27.9.2012 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla in case No. 105-2 of 211 (CrMMO No. 93 of 2014) and case No. 104- 2 of 11 (CrMMO No. 94 of 2014) both titled as Dr. Shrikant Baldi v. Ms. Jeevan Laxmi Kukreja, whereby learned Court below taking cognizance of the complaints under Sections 500 and 211 IPC having been filed by the respondent issued process against the petitioner directing her to remain present in the court on 5.5.2014. 3. For having a bird''s eye view, necessary facts as emerge from the record are that the petitioner filed two complaints under section 10(2) of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 and Section 21 of the Maternity Benefits Act alleging therein that she was not paid due and admissible wages/maternity benefits, while she worked with the Himachal Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter, ''HRTC'') with effect from 1.6.1991 to 8.10.2001. Allegedly, complainant was posted as a Computer Operator with the HRTC with effect from 1.6.1991, vide appointment letter dated 30.5.1991 and she rendered her services in this capacity till 8.10.1991 but since she was not paid her admissible dues/maternity benefits, she filed two complaints as referred herein above arraying therein following persons as respondents-accused: Complaint under section 10(2) of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (Criminal Case No. 114/3 of 2010/02 1. Himachal Road Transport Corporation through its Managing Director, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 2. Mr. T.G. Negi, the then, Managing Director, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 3. Mr.P.K.Mahajan, Deputy General Manager, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 4. Mr.Raghubir Chowdhary, Deputy Divisional Manager (Computer), Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. Complaint under section 21 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (Criminal Case No. 115/3 of 2010/02 1. Himachal Road Transport Corporation through its Managing Director, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 2. Mr. T.G. Negi, the then, Managing Director, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 3. Mr. Daljeet Singh Dogra, Managing Director (Presetn) Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 4. Mr.P.K.Mahajan,(Admn) Deputy General Manager, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 5. Himachal Road Transport Corporation through its Managing Director, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 2. Mr. T.G. Negi, the then, Managing Director, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 3. Mr. Daljeet Singh Dogra, Managing Director (Presetn) Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 4. Mr.P.K.Mahajan,(Admn) Deputy General Manager, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 5. Mr.Raghubir Chowdhary, Deputy Divisional Manager (Computer), Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Shimla, H.P. 4. If the contents of the complaints having been filed by the petitioner are perused, there are no specific allegations, if any, by name, against any of the respondents-accused arrayed in the same, rather, complainant in the complaints has alleged that despite her having made several representations to the respondents-accused, she was not paid salary qua the work rendered by her in the capacity of a Computer Operator. It is a matter of record that the aforesaid complaints having been filed by the petitioner were dismissed vide judgments dated 8.3.2011 and 1.4.2011 (Annexure P-5, in both the petitions) and aforesaid judgments have attained finality. 5. After passing of aforesaid judgments in the complaint, as have been taken note hereinabove, present respondent filed two complaints under Sections 500 and 211 IPC i.e. Case No. 105-2 of 2011 and Case No. 104-2 of 2011 (Annexure P- 2, in both the petitions), against the petitioner, praying therein to summon, try and convict the petitioner for having committed offences punishable under Sections 500 and 211 IPC. Respondent alleged that due to false and baseless allegations made by the petitioner in her complaints, he not only felt humiliated but such humiliation was brought to the public domain and besides this, he also underwent immense mental agony and harassment. Respondent also averred in the complaints that due to the frivolous allegations having been levelled by the petitioner his official work was also affected in as much as he had to appear in person on various dates of hearing in the complaint having been filed by the petitioner. 6. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla, taking cognizance of the averments contained in the aforesaid complaints filed by the respondent, issued process against the petitioner vide impugned order dated 27.9.2012 (in both the complaints). In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this court in the instant proceedings, laying therein challenge to summoning orders dated 27.9.2012, with further prayer to quash and set aside the same. 7. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this court in the instant proceedings, laying therein challenge to summoning orders dated 27.9.2012, with further prayer to quash and set aside the same. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 8. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the case, this Court deems it necessary to elaborate upon the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. Hon''ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon''ble Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699 , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:- "7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court''s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." 9. Subsequently, Hon''ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 Subsequently, Hon''ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon''ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court''s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon''ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal''s case, i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings 10. Hon''ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , has reiterated that high Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled as Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , the Hon''ble Apex Court has held as under:- "22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Cr.P.C.") has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330 , paras 29-30) 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution''s/complainant''s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. The power vested in the High Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution''s/complainant''s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973: 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused." 11. Hon''ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259 , has held as under: "12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court''s power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 14. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736 , according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like". 15. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699 , observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts." 12. Hon''ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482 CrPC, 1973. 13. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.PC., High Courts can proceed to quash the proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the law. 14. Now in the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, this Court shall make an endeavor to examine the material available on record vis- a-vis impugned order to arrive at conclusion that whether facts of the case warrant exercise of power by this court under Section 482 Cr.PC for quashing of summoning process or not. 15. Having heard the learned counsel representing the parties and perused the material available on record, this court is persuaded to agree with the contention of Mr. Satyen Vaidya, learned Senior Advocate that there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that allegations, specific in nature, were ever made by the petitioner against the respondent. Careful perusal of the complaints having been filed by the petitioner under Section 10(2) of the Equal Remunerations Act/S. 21 of the Maternity Benefits Act, clearly suggests that same were filed in the year 2002 and respondent was never arrayed as respondent/accused in his personal capacity. If memorandum of parties of both the complaints filed by petitioner are perused, they clearly suggest that Mr. If memorandum of parties of both the complaints filed by petitioner are perused, they clearly suggest that Mr. T.G. Negi, who was the Managing Director, HRTC, at the relevant point in time, was arrayed as respondent/accused. Apart from above, having carefully examined the contents of the complaint having been filed by the petitioner, this court fins that there is no allegations specific in nature, against the Managing Director, HRTC, rather, petitioner has simply stated that she despite having made several representation has not been paid her admissible dues on account of services rendered by her in the HRTC. 16. Leaving it aside, it clearly emerges from the record i.e. complaints having been filed by the respondent under Sections 500 and 211 IPC, wherein summoning orders came to be issued against the petitioner, respondent remained posted as Managing Director of the Corporation with effect from May, 2006 to June, 2007, whereas complaints in question came to be filed by the petitioner in the year 2002 and as such, it is not understood that how respondent is aggrieved of the allegations, if any, contained in the complaints having been filed by the petitioner. At the cost of repetition, it may be observed that otherwise also, Managing Director of HRTC never came to be arrayed in his personal capacity rather, HRTC came to be sued through Managing Director. If the averments contained in the complaint filed by respondent under Sections 500 and 211 IPC are perused/examined, they nowhere disclose, offence, if any, committed by the petitioner under Sections 500/211 IPC. Respondent in para-11 of both the complaints has made very vague allegations that, "....due to false and baseless allegations made by the accused in her complaint and also in her deposition made in court, the complainant felt humiliated and was brought to public odium, and besides this he underwent immense mental agony and harassment..." There appears to be no material placed on record to substantiate aforesaid assertions. 17. Having carefully gone through the averments of the complaints having been filed by the petitioner under the Equal Remunerations Act and the Maternity Benefits Act, this court sees no force in the arguments of Mr. 17. Having carefully gone through the averments of the complaints having been filed by the petitioner under the Equal Remunerations Act and the Maternity Benefits Act, this court sees no force in the arguments of Mr. Raman Jamalta, learned counsel representing the respondent that due to false and frivolous allegations made in the complaints by the petitioner, undue harassment was caused to the respondent, who admittedly remained Managing Director, HRTC with effect from May 2006 to June, 2007, whereas, complaints in question came to be filed in the year 2002. Similarly, there is no material placed on record that the summons, by name, if any, ever came to be issued against the respondent in the complaints having been filed by the petitioner. After carefully going through the averments contained in the complaints having been filed by the respondent as well as material placed alongwith the same, this court has no hesitation to conclude that the magistrate, while issuing process, has not bothered at all to peruse the contents of the complaints as well as material placed alongwith the same, to see whether prima facie, case, if any, is made out against the petitioner. Contents of the complaints having been filed by respondent are wholly irrelevant as far as commission of offences punishable under Sections 500/211 IPC is concerned and as such, this court, while exercising power vested in it under section 482 CrPC, 1973 deems it fit to quash the summoning orders issued against the petitioner. 18. There is yet another aspect of the matter which also requires discussion i.e. limitation. Admittedly, the complaints under Sections 500/211 IPC came to be filed by the respondent in the year 2011 i.e. after dismissal of the complaints having been filed by the petitioner at this stage, it would be appropriate to take note of section 468 CrPC, 1973 which is reproduced hereunder: "468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only 1. (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only 1. Provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to certain economic offences, see the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974 (12 of 1974 ), section 2 end Sch. (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.]" 19. Sub-clause (c) of Clause (2) of Section 468 clearly provides that for the offences punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, no court shall take cognizance of the offence after three years. In the case at hand, offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner pertains to the year 2002 i.e. on which date, she filed complaints arraying therein Managing Director, HRTC as a respondent/accused but complaints under Sections 500/211 IPC came to be filed in the year 2011 i.e. after a period of almost nine years. Argument having been made by Mr. Raman Jamalta learned counsel representing the respondent that the limitation would commence from the date when complaints having been filed by petitioner were dismissed, is wholly misconceived and can not be accepted. Similarly, another contention of Mr. Jamalta that limitation in case of respondent would start from the year 2007, till which period, respondent remained posted as Managing Director, also deserves outright rejection, for the reasons that even if for the sake of argument, if it is presumed that limitation would start from the year 2007, even in that eventuality, proceedings initiated by respondent under Sections 500/211 IPC are barred by limitation in terms of section 468(2)(c) CrPC, 1973 which clearly provides that no proceedings for offences entailing imprisonment upto one year and not exceeding three years can be filed beyond three years. 20. 20. Apart from above, section 469 CrPC, 1973 provides for commencement of period of limitation. Section 469(1)(a) clearly provides that limitation would commence in relation to an offence on the date of said offence. Undisputedly, in the cases at hand, complaints under the Equal Remunerations Act and the Maternity Benefits Act, purportedly containing baseless allegations against the respondent, were filed in the year 2002, meaning thereby, limitation would commence from the date of filing of said petitions. Otherwise also, in the case at hand, it is an admitted case of the respondent that he had assumed charge of Managing Director, HRTC in the year 2006, meaning thereby he had come to know with regard to pendency of the complaints having been filed by petitioner on his assuming the office and proceedings, if any, under Sections 500/211 IPC could only be filed by him within a period of three years from the assuming of the office in May, 2006. 21. Reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by Hon''ble Apex Court in Sirajul v. State of U.P. (2015) 9 SCC 201 , whereby it has been reiterated that no person can be kept under continuous apprehension that he can be prosecuted at "any time" for "any crime" irrespective of the nature or seriousness of the offence. "People will have no peace of mind if there is no period of limitation even for petty offences. It has been held in the aforesaid judgment as under: "10. In response to this stand of the complainant, learned counsel for the accused submitted that even if it is assumed that the appellants had caused the injury in question, the nature of injury, in the circumstances can at best fall under Section 324 IPC in which case bar under Section 468 Cr.P.C., 1973 is applicable. In any case, even cases not covered by statutory bar of limitation could be held to be liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of right of speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. 11. We have given due consideration to the rival submissions. The question whether the proceedings in criminal cases not covered by Section 468 Cr.P.C., 1973 could be quashed on the ground of delay has been gone into in several decisions. 11. We have given due consideration to the rival submissions. The question whether the proceedings in criminal cases not covered by Section 468 Cr.P.C., 1973 could be quashed on the ground of delay has been gone into in several decisions. While it is true that cases covered by statutory bar of limitation may be liable to be quashed without any further enquiry, cases not covered by the statutory bar can be quashed on the ground of delay in filing of a criminal complaint in appropriate cases. In such cases, the question for consideration is whether there is violation of right of speedy trial which has been held to be part of Article 21 of the Constitution having regard to the nature of offence, extent of delay, person responsible for delay and other attending circumstances. In this regard, observations in judgments of this Court may be referred to. 12. In Japani Sahoo (supra), it was observed : "16. At the same time, however, ground reality also cannot be ignored. Mere delay may not bar the right of the "Crown" in prosecuting "criminals". But it also cannot be overlooked that no person can be kept under continuous apprehension that he can be prosecuted at "any time" for "any crime" irrespective of the nature or seriousness of the offence. "People will have no peace of mind if there is no period of limitation even for petty offences."" 22. Applying the ratio of law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment to the facts of the present case, petitioner could not have been allowed to prosecuted after nine years of filing the complaint that too for an offence under Sections 500/211 IPC, as such, proceedings initiated by the respondent under aforesaid provisions, are barred by limitation as prescribed under section 468 CrPC, 1973. 23. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, impugned orders dated 27.9.2012 in case No. 105-2 of 211 titled as Dr. Shrikant Baldi v. Ms. Jeevan Laxmi Kukreja and case No. 104-2 of 11 titled as Dr. Shrikant Baldi v. Ms. Jeevan Laxmi Kukreja, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla are quashed and set aside alongwith entire proceedings under Sections 500/211 IPC. 24. In view of above, both the petitions are allowed. pending applications are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, are vacated. Record of the learned Court below be sent back forthwith.