JUDGMENT : Heard, Mr. H.K. Mahato, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Mukesh Kumar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. 2. The instant Criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 05.10.2005 and order of sentence dated 06.10.2005, passed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-III, Khunti (Ranchi) in S.T. No.285 of 1992, whereby the sole appellant, Bidyadhar Choudhary has been convicted for the offence committed and punishable under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and awarded rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for the offence committed and punishable under Sections 304B and rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for the offence committed and punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. However, both the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 3. The prosecution case is based upon the complaint filed by the complainant/informant, Mahendra Nath Manjhi (P.W.1), on 20.06.1991 against Bidyadhar Choudhary, Dileep Choudhary, Most. Nalita Choudhary and Kalipado Manjhi alleging therein, that on 10.06.1991, his daughter (Usha Devi) whose marriage solemnized with Bidyadhar Choudhary (appellant) in the year 1990, has been killed by the accused persons. The informant has alleged that in the month of January, 1991, his son-in-law demanded Rs.18,000/-for installation of paddy mill and flower mill at Village- Taroi, which was paid by the informant /complainant. The complainant has further stated that subsequently the accused persons demanded Rs.25,000/-to purchase motorcycle, but because of inability to pay the amount, all the accused persons tortured his daughter and accused Nos.2 and 3 were having intention that daughter of the informant should not remain at her sasural. The informant/complainant has further stated that while his daughter (Usha Devi) came to his house, she used to disclose about the torture meted out to her. The informant has stated that on the information given by his daughter (Usha Devi), the complainant went to the Village-Taroi, but Bidaee was not given. Thereafter the informant/complainant went before the neighbour, Professor Badri Choudhary, who gave assurance that everything will be normalized and thereafter the complainant returned. On 11.06.1991 at around 8 -9 a.m., two persons came from Village - Taroi and said that Surajmal Manjhi had called him at Village-Taroi. Surajmal Manjhi is cousin of Bidyadhar Choudhary (appellant) . The informant after hearing this message, came to village-Taroi on Motorcycle and found that her daughter was hanged with rope to the beam. On 11.06.1991 at around 8 -9 a.m., two persons came from Village - Taroi and said that Surajmal Manjhi had called him at Village-Taroi. Surajmal Manjhi is cousin of Bidyadhar Choudhary (appellant) . The informant after hearing this message, came to village-Taroi on Motorcycle and found that her daughter was hanged with rope to the beam. The accused No.1 disclosed that after he left his house, Usha Devi (deceased) committed suicide by hanging herself with a rope tied in a beam. The accused has also disclosed to the informant, that they have already informed the Police and are awaiting for the Police, till then no person was allowed to go near the dead-body. The Sub-Inspector came at around 11 -12 noon and took the dead-body and in connivance with the accused, the Sub Inspector prepared a false paper. The complainant has given written report and from perusal of whatever he has given in writing at the Police Station, it would be apparent that Usha Devi was tortured by the accused persons. Since no action was taken by the Police, as such, the complaint petition has been filed. The complaint petition was sent to the concerned Police Station under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and on the basis of that, the Police registered First Information Report bearing Tamar P.S. Case No. 70 of 1991 dated 16.07.1991 corresponding to G.R. No.359 of 1991 under Section 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code against. 4. After investigation, the Police submitted charge-sheet vide Charge-sheet No.73 of 1991 dated 25.11.1991. The cognizance of the offence has been taken vide order dated 23.12.1991 and the case has been committed to the Court of Sessions vide order dated 26.02.1992. 5. The charge has been framed against the sole accused/appellant, Bidyadhar Choudhary under Sections 304B and 498A I.P.C. vide order dated 26.11.1996, to which the accused/appellant pleaded his innocence and thus, he was put under trial. 6. The prosecution has examined altogether four witnesses and also adduced documentary evidence as Exhibits in order to prove its case. Mahendra Nath Manjhi, informant of the case and father of the victim has been examined as P.W.1, Anant Manjhi, brother-in-law of the informant has been examined as P.W.2, Sudevi Devi, mother of the deceased and wife of the informant has been examined as P.W.3 and Dr. R. P. Sahu, Medical officer has been examined as P.W.4. Mahendra Nath Manjhi, informant of the case and father of the victim has been examined as P.W.1, Anant Manjhi, brother-in-law of the informant has been examined as P.W.2, Sudevi Devi, mother of the deceased and wife of the informant has been examined as P.W.3 and Dr. R. P. Sahu, Medical officer has been examined as P.W.4. Signature of the complainant, Mahendra Nath Manjhi on the complaint petition has been proved and marked as Exhibit-1 and signature of Dr. R. P. Sahu on the post-mortem report of the deceased has been proved and marked as Exhibit-2. 7. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the appellant/accused has been recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 01.06.2005, wherein the appellant has categorically stated that his wife has committed suicide by hanging herself. The defence has also examined one defence witness, Dina Nath Manjhi, who is brother-in-law of the appellant as D.W.1 and has stated that the deceased has died by committing suicide by hanging. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the records, the learned trial court has passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence against the appellant. Being aggrieved at, and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant has preferred the present Criminal Appeal before this Hon'ble Court assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 9. Heard, Mr. H. K. Mahato, learned counsel for the Appellant. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, is bad in law and cannot sustain in the eyes of law. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that basic ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304B I.P.C. is lacking in this case and there is no allegation of demand of dowry as well as there is no evidence of any torture, soon before the death of the deceased, for non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that since the basic ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304B I.P.C. is lacking, the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act will not come into play. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that since the basic ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304B I.P.C. is lacking, the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act will not come into play. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that the onus has not been shifted upon the appellant rather the onus remains with the prosecution to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt against the appellant. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that the Investigation officer of the case has not been examined in this case and that has certainly caused prejudice to the appellant, as the appellant has not got an opportunity to cross-examine him to elucidate certain fact to disbelieve the prosecution case. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has drawn attention of this Court towards the evidence adduced by P.W.1 (Mahendra Nath Manjhi) who is complainant and father of the deceased. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that proper information was given by Surajmal Manjhi, who is none else but cousin of the appellant, regarding death of the daughter of the complainant. From perusal of the evidence, it appears that during examination -in-chief, informant (P.W.1) has stated that Police came to the place of occurrence, but no case was registered on that day. The signature of the informant (P.W.1) on the complaint petition has been proved and marked as Exhibit-1. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that P.W.1 (informant) went inside the room where his daughter was hanging in a rope tied with beam of the house. The signature of the informant (P.W.1) on the complaint petition has been proved and marked as Exhibit-1. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that P.W.1 (informant) went inside the room where his daughter was hanging in a rope tied with beam of the house. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that from the perusal of evidence of P.W.1 (Mahendra Nath Manjhi) in Para-2 of his cross-examination wherein it has been stated that he went to room where deadbody of her daughter was hanging and door of the room was open, but he has not acknowledged, what was the condition of bolt (sitkin) and condition of the door, as such, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the deceased committed suicide and the appellant has taken all sorts of legal recourse by informing the police as well as the father of the deceased regarding death of the deceased and that is the reason the dead-body was hanging with support of the rope in the beam of the house and the complainant has seen the same. The Police came as admitted by the complainant itself, but no case or allegation was made against the appellant on that day by the informant and subsequently filed present complaint case with ulterior motive and gain. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that the marriage of the daughter of the informant was an arranged marriage and they were living happily as husband and wife. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that the victim used to come to her father's house with this appellant happily and used to get 'Bidaee' happily. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that from perusal of the cross-examination of the complainant, the complainant has admitted that he remained at the place of occurrence for 2-3 hours and has met the Police officer and he has given the statement before the Police but what statement has been given, he could not recollect. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant while relying on the aforesaid submissions, has further submitted that the conviction of the appellant under Section 304B and 498A I.P.C. cannot sustain in the eyes of law. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant while relying on the aforesaid submissions, has further submitted that the conviction of the appellant under Section 304B and 498A I.P.C. cannot sustain in the eyes of law. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that any demand which has no relation with marriage cannot be termed to be dowry under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has also put reliance in the case of APPASAHEB AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, reported in (2007) 9 Supreme Court Cases 721, wherein it has been held that “correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential - On facts held, demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that from the evidence of P.W.1, who is complainant and father of the victim, there is no evidence with respect to torture. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon a judgment, as reported in the case of Baijnath and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2017) 1 Supreme Court Case 101, wherein it has been held that presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicates the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113-B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus, the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent, coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. 11. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent, coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has also relied upon a judgment, as reported in 2016 (3) J.L.J.R. 639 , in the case of Nageshwar Rajwar and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand wherein it has been held as follows : “15. Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under : “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death,-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death. As stated earlier, the prosecution, under Section 304B IPC, cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and such was caused “soon before her death”. In view of the Explanation to the said Section the word dowry has to be understood, as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which reads as under :- “Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 defines “dowry’ means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly - (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person. at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law(Shariat) applies.” 23. at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law(Shariat) applies.” 23. Further, in the case of “Trimukh Maroti Kiran V. State of Maharashtra”, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681 wherein charges were framed under Section 304-B, 302 I.P.C. The Court have held that provision under Section 106 of the Evidence Act which burdens the accused with special knowledge of any fact to explain, it can be invoked but in the instant case charge has only been framed under Section 304-B I.P.C. and in terms of provision under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, prosecution have to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on following ingredients of Section 304-B I.P.C. namely; “(a) The marriage was within seven years, (b) Cause of death was unnatural (c) Soon before the death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or the relatives of the husband.” Thereupon in terms of provision of 113-B of the Evidence Act, onus were shifted on the accused persons to explain that in what circumstances the deceased died but in the instant case, the prosecution has failed to establish that soon before death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellants or their family members. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has also relied upon a judgment, as reported in 2015 (5) SCC 201 , in the case of Major Singh and ors. Vs. State of Punjab wherein it has been held as follows :-. 10. If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these Sections 304B Indian Penal Code and Section 113 of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. 10. If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these Sections 304B Indian Penal Code and Section 113 of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows :- “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death,-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death.” It is imperative to note that both these sections set out a common point of reference for establishing guilt of the accused person Under Section 304B, which is “the woman must have been 'soon before her death' subjected to cruelty or harassment ' for or in connection with the demand of dowry”. 17. Applying these principles to the instant case, we find that there is no evidence as to the demand of dowry or cruelty and that deceased Karamjit Kaur was subjected to dowry harassment “soon before her death”, Except the demand of scooter, there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of dowry demand. Assuming that there was demand of dowry, in our view, it can only be attributed to the husband - Jagsir Singh who in all probability could have demanded the same for his use. In the absence of any evidence that the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowry “soon before her death” by the Appellants, the conviction of the Appellants under Section 304B Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained. The trial court and the High Court have not analyzed the evidence in the light of the essential ingredients of Section 304B Indian Penal Code and the conviction of the Appellants Under Section 304B Indian Penal Code is liable to be set aside. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further relied upon a judgment, as reported in 2014 (9) SCC 645 , in the case of Manohar Lal Vs. State of Haryana where it has been held as follows :- 16. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further relied upon a judgment, as reported in 2014 (9) SCC 645 , in the case of Manohar Lal Vs. State of Haryana where it has been held as follows :- 16. Section 304-B IPC relates to dowry death and reads as follows: “304-B. Dowry death - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” 17. For the purpose of the said section, a presumption can be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (a) Death of the woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) Such death took place within seven years of her marriage; (c) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives; (d) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry; and (e) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. 18. In the case of Sunil Bajaj v. State of M.P, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 417 , the Court held: “5. We have given our attention and consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. Normally this Court will be slow and reluctant, as it ought to be, to upset the order of conviction of the trial court as confirmed by the High Court appreciating the evidence placed on record. But in cases where both the courts concurrently recorded a finding that the accused was guilty of an offence in the absence of evidence satisfying the necessary ingredients of an offence, in other words, when no offence was made out, it becomes necessary to disturb such an order of conviction and sentence to meet the demand of justice. But in cases where both the courts concurrently recorded a finding that the accused was guilty of an offence in the absence of evidence satisfying the necessary ingredients of an offence, in other words, when no offence was made out, it becomes necessary to disturb such an order of conviction and sentence to meet the demand of justice. In order to convict an accused for an offence under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied: (1) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (2) such death must have occurred within 7 years of her marriage; (3) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by relatives of her husband; (4) such cruelty or harassment must be for or in connection with demand of dowry. 6. It is only when the aforementioned ingredients are established by acceptable evidence such death shall be called ‘dowry death’ and such husband or his relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. It may be noticed that punishment for the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B is imprisonment of not less than 7 years, which may extend to imprisonment for life. Unlike under Section 498-A IPC, husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty shall be liable for imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Normally, in a criminal case the accused can be punished for an offence on establishment of commission of that offence on the basis of evidence, may be direct or circumstantial or both. But in case of an offence under Section 304-B IPC, an exception is made by deeming provision as to nature of death as ‘dowry death’ and that the husband or his relative, as the case may be, is deemed to have caused such death, even in the absence of evidence to prove these aspects but on proving the existence of the ingredients of the said offence by convincing evidence. Hence, there is need for greater care and caution, that too having regard to the gravity of the punishment prescribed for the said offence, in scrutinising the evidence and in arriving at the conclusion as to whether all the abovementioned ingredients of the offence are proved by the prosecution. In the case on hand, the learned counsel for the appellant could not dispute that the first two ingredients mentioned above are satisfied.” 19. The expression “soon before her death” used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act was considered by this Court in Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in (2003) 8 SCC 80 , which reads as under: “8. Section 304-B IPC which deals with dowry death, reads as follows: ‘304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.’ The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows: (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows: 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10-8-1988 on ‘Dowry Deaths and Law Reform’. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background that presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of ‘dowry death’ in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been ‘soon before her death’ subjected to cruelty or harassment ‘for or in connection with the demand of dowry’. Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the woman. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304-B IPC.) (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.” Similar observation was made by this Court in Balwant Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 724 . In the said case this Court held: “10. These decisions and other decisions of this Court do lay down the proximity test. It has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court that ‘soon before’ is an expression which permits of elasticity, and therefore the proximity test has to be applied keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. The facts must show the existence of a proximate live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death of the victim.” 14. Thus, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in absence of basic ingredient under Section 2 of the D. P. Act and Section 304 B I.P.C. that is demand of dowry, harassment and torture soon before the death for non-fulfillment of dowry and since demand of dowry has not been proved by the prosecution, as such, the appellant cannot be convicted under Section 304B and 498A I.P.C. 15. Brother-in-law of the informant has been examined as P.W.2 (Anant Manjhi). This witness has categorically stated that his statement has not been recorded by the Police. Sudevi Devi, mother of the victim and wife of the informant has been examined as P.W.3. This witness has reiterated the same statement as made by P.W.1 by saying that financial help was taken after marriage for installation of flour mill and paddy mill. 16. This witness has categorically stated that his statement has not been recorded by the Police. Sudevi Devi, mother of the victim and wife of the informant has been examined as P.W.3. This witness has reiterated the same statement as made by P.W.1 by saying that financial help was taken after marriage for installation of flour mill and paddy mill. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that this witness (P.W.3) mother of the victim has stated in Para-8 of her cross-examination that she has never seen any quarrel with the son-in-law and daughter. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in view of such specific averment of wife of the informant and mother of the deceased(P.W.3) as stated in Para-4, there is no material to convict the appellant under Section 498A I.P.C. Basic ingredient is also lacking to constitute an offence under Section 304-B I.P.C., as such, the appellant cannot be convicted. 17. Dr. R. P. Sahu has been examined as P.W.4 and he has made autopsy of the deceased and gave opinion that (1) Ligature mark ante -mortem (ii) death was due to hanging. This witness (P.W.4), during cross-examination, has admitted that the deceased died due to hanging and no external injury on the person of the deceased has been found. 18. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that if a person is killed and then hanged with rope, then the Doctor will find that death is prior to hanging and in case where death has been caused because of hanging, there must be some mark of struggle or injury which is completely lacking in this case. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the evidence of Doctor (P.W.4) while relying on the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.3, has submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence cannot sustain in the eyes of law. 19. Heard Mr. Mukesh Kumar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State while supporting the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, has submitted that the same has been passed upon the material available on record, as such, has rightly convicted the appellant, as the deceased died within seven years of marriage and her death was unnatural death. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that amount was taken for installation of Flower mill and paddy mill and subsequently demand of Rs.25,000/-was made for purchase of Motorcycle and the same will come under the purview of Dowry. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that the deceased died within seven years of marriage and her death was unnatural death. The girl was subjected to cruelty and torture, as stated by P.W.1, for demand of dowry, as such, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is well-founded on the material available on record and this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, at this stage. 20. Heard, Mr. H. K. Mahato, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Mukesh Kumar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the Sate and perused the record including the First Information Report, the charge framed against the appellant and the evidence of all the four witnesses, exhibits and statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C, evidence of defence witness as well as impugned judgment of conviction. This Court has perused and scrutinized the evidence of P.W.1 and from perusal of the evidence as made out in the complaint petition and the deposition of P.W.1 (Mahendra Nath Manjhi), this Court is of the firm view that there is no ingredient to constitute an offence under Section 304B I.P.C., as the demand of dowry has not been proved by the prosecution. Dowry has been defined under Section 2 of the D.P. Act. Dowry must be related with the marriage. Any demand subsequent to the marriage which has no bearing with the marriage, cannot be termed as dowry. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 2007 (9) SCC 721 (supra), On facts held, demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry . I have also perused the judgments cited by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant being reported as i.e. (a) (2007) 9 SCC 721 [Appasaheb and Another VS. State of Maharashtra] (b) Baijnath and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2017) 1 Supreme Court Case 101 (c) 2015 (5) SCC 201 (Major Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab) (d) 2014 (9) SCC 645 (Manohar Lal Vs. State of Maharashtra] (b) Baijnath and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2017) 1 Supreme Court Case 101 (c) 2015 (5) SCC 201 (Major Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab) (d) 2014 (9) SCC 645 (Manohar Lal Vs. State of Haryana) (e) 2018 (2) PLJR 635 (Naresh Yadav & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar) (f) 2016 (3) J.L.J.R. 639 (Nageshwar Rajwar and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand). From the testimony of Mahendra Nath Manjhi (P.W.1) and Sudevi Devi (P.W.3) when compared with the complaint petition, this Court is of the opinion that P.W.3 in Para-8 of her cross-examination, has categorically stated that she has never seen fight or quarrel with the son-in-law and her daughter. No ingredient or incident has been stated by P.W.1 to show that victim was ever tortured or assaulted soon before her death for demand of dowry and in absence of such evidence and considering the judgments, as referred above, this Court is of the opinion that the appellant cannot be convicted under Section 498A and 304B I.P.C. This Court has also perused the evidence of P.W.4 (Doctor) who has categorically stated that deceased died because of hanging and he did not find any mark of violence on the person of the deceased. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances and coupled with the non-examination of the Investigating officer which has caused serious prejudice to the appellant, appellant cannot be convicted under Section 304B I.P.C.. As discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 21. Accordingly, the Judgment of conviction dated 05.10.2005 and order of sentence dated 06.10.2005, passed by the learned Addl. Judicial Commissioner-III, Khunti (Ranchi) in S.T. No.285 of 1992, is hereby set aside, by giving benefit of doubt. 22. The appellant is on bail, as such, he is discharged from the liability of the bail bonds. 23. In the result, the instant criminal appeal stands allowed. 24. Let L.C.R. along with a copy of this judgment be sent to the court concerned at once. Appeal allowed