JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Issue notice, confined to respondent No.1. Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate, appears and waives service of notice on its behalf. 2. With the consent of the parties, the case is taken up for final hearing. 3. The defendant No.3-Guarantor is the petitioner, whose application (CMA No. 153/2018 in Civil Suit No. 7/12) under Order 8 Rule 9, Order 6 Rules 16 and 17 read with Section 151 CPC has been dismissed by the learned trial court vide order dated 4.9.2018, constraining him to file the instant revision petition. 4. The brief facts giving rise to this petition are that respondent No. 1/plaintiff filed a suit for recovery against petitioner/defendant No.3 and proforma respondents No. 2 and 3/defendants No. 1 and 2 (hereinafter, the parties to be referred to as the “plaintiff” and “defendants”). Defendant No.1 is the principal borrower, whereas defendants No. 2 and 3 are guarantors. Defendant No.1 filed his written statement, wherein he denied all the averments contained in the plaint including availing of the loan or defendants No. 2 and 3 having stood guarantors qua the same. This written statement was initially adopted by defendant No.3. 5. During trial, defendants No.1 and 2 were proceeded ex parte, however later on, on an application moved by defendant No.2, ex-parte proceedings against him were set aside and he was permitted to file written statement. In the written statement so filed, defendant No.2 acknowledged the availing of loan amount by defendant No.1, i.e. principal borrower. It is thereafter that defendant No.3 filed an application seeking permission to withdraw the previous written statement adopted by him and further sought permission to adopt the written statement filed by defendant No.2. However, the said application was dismissed by the learned trial court vide impugned order by according the following reasons:- “Perusal of zimini order dated 10.10.2012 shows that the applicant/defendant No.3 had adopted the written statement filed by defendant No.1, vide separate statement of his counsel on record and perusal of that written statement (filed by defendant No.1, which was along being adopted by applicant/defendant No.3) shows that the transaction of loan under reference has been denied vehemently, however, perusal of the proposed written statement (filed by the L.Rs. Of defendant No.2 on 22.2.2018), and intended to be adopted by the applicant/defendant No.3) shows that the transaction of loan has been admitted. Of defendant No.2 on 22.2.2018), and intended to be adopted by the applicant/defendant No.3) shows that the transaction of loan has been admitted. As a sequel to above, it is crystal clear that vide instant applicant applicant/defendant No.3 intends to plead new facts in his pleadings, which are mutually destructive to the facts pleaded by him in his earlier pleadings and hence, the instant application cannot be allowed, as the same would be against the statutory principle of estoppel, as the applicant/defendant No.3 cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold simultaneously. Moreover, it such applications are allowed, it would also be against the intent of legislature, as apparent from Order 6 Rule 15 (4) CPC. Reliance is also placed upon the dictum passed by Apex Court in M/s. Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills vs. M/s Lodha Ram & Co. AIR 1977 SC 680 ; Haji Mohadded Ishaq vs. Mohammed Iqbal AIR 1978 SC 798 : B.K. Narayana Pulai vs. Parameshwaran Pulai (2000) 1 SCC 712 ; Estralla Rubber vs. Dass Estate 2001 (8) SCC 97 , wherein it was held that an application for amendment to the written statement to withdraw the admission is not permissible. Hence, the applicant is dismissed with a cost of Rs.1000/- imposed upon the applicant/defendant No.3 to be paid to respondent/plaintiff.” 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record. 7. At the outset, it needs to be stated that the learned trial court has in fact not understood and appreciated the doctrine of estoppel, more particularly, the principle of “approbate and reprobate”, which is itself a species of estoppel and is intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais (See Halsbury' Laws of England, para 512, Volume XII, page 454). 8. The phrase “approbate and reprobate” is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in Indian Judicial System in doctrine of election, namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument. However, the doctrine of election is not confined to instruments. 8. The phrase “approbate and reprobate” is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in Indian Judicial System in doctrine of election, namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument. However, the doctrine of election is not confined to instruments. A person can not say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage, which is termed as “approbate and reprobate the transaction". This is only one of the applications of the doctrine of election and its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto. The law is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume XII, page 454, para 512:- "On the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais, and may conveniently be referred to here. Thus a party cannot, after taking advantage under an order (e.g. payment of costs), be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was founded; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true facts to the prejudice of third parties who have acted on it". 9. In C. Beepathuma and others v. Velasari Shankarnarayana Kadambolithaya and others AIR 1965 SC 241 (1), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a person cannot approbate and reprobate the same transaction. It shall be apposite to refer to observations as contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the report, which read thus: "17. 9. In C. Beepathuma and others v. Velasari Shankarnarayana Kadambolithaya and others AIR 1965 SC 241 (1), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a person cannot approbate and reprobate the same transaction. It shall be apposite to refer to observations as contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the report, which read thus: "17. The doctrine of election which has been applied in this case is well-settled and may be stated in the classic words of Maitland- "That he who accepts a benefit under a deed or will or other instrument must adopt the whole contents of that instrument, must con- form to all its provisions and renounce all rights that are inconsistent with it." (See Maitland's lectures on Equity Lecture 18). The same principle is stated in White and Tudor's Leading cases in Equity Vol. 1 8th Edn, at n. 444 as follows: "Election is the obligation imposed upon a party by courts of equity to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims in cases where there is clear intention of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both.....That he who accepts a benefit under a deed or will must adopt the whole contents of the instrument." 18. The Indian courts have applied this doctrine in several cases and a reference to all of them is hardly necessary. We may, however, refer to a decision of the Mardas High Court in Ramakottayya v. Viraraghavayya, ILR 52 Mad 556 : ( AIR 1929 Mad 502 FB) where after referring to the passage quoted by us from White and Tudor, courts Trotter, G.J. observed that the principle is often put in another form that a person cannot approbate and reprobate the same transaction and he referred to the decision of the Judicial committee in Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, ILR 42 Mad 523 : ( AIR 1918 PC 196 ). Recently, this court has also considered the doctrine in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1327 ." 10. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras vs. MR. P. Firm Muar, 1965 AIR (SC) 1216, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is only a species of estoppel and it applies only to the conduct of parties. 11. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras vs. MR. P. Firm Muar, 1965 AIR (SC) 1216, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is only a species of estoppel and it applies only to the conduct of parties. 11. In R.N. Gosian v. Yashpal Dhir, 1192 (4) SCC 683, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: "10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some ad- vantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage." 12. To the similar effect is the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd., 2013 (5) SCC 470 where the meaning of "approbate and reprobate" was explained in the following terms:- "15. A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot blow cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and 3. AIR 1965 SC 1216 4. (1992) 4 SCC 683 5. (2013) 5 SCC 470 reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or con- veyance, or order upon himself. Thus rule is ap- plied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the principles of what is right and of good con- science [Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, CIT v. V. MR. P. firm Muar (supra), Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD, Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd. and v. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer. 13. Similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others vs. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, 2014 (15) SCC 144 . 14. v. MCD, Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd. and v. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer. 13. Similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others vs. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, 2014 (15) SCC 144 . 14. Thus, it can be taken to be well settled that that a party litigant cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent positions in court to play fast and loose, to blow hot and cold and to approbate and reprobate to the detriment of his opponents. The principle is “ALLEGANS CONTARIA NON EST AUDIENDUS” (he is not to be heard who alleges things contradictory to each other). 15. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, the question now arises is whether the principle of “approbate and reprobate” could have been applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The answer obviously is in negative. 16. Firstly, the suit is at the stage of completion of pleadings and no advantage has in fact been obtained by defendant No.3 by adopting written statement filed by defendant No.1 so as to disentitle him to adopt written statement filed by defendant No.2. It is only when defendant No.3 had obtained some advantage to which he could only be entitled on the basis of his having adopted the written statement of defendant No.1,then he could not have turned around and adopted the written statement filed by defendant No.2. 17. Apart from above, it would also be noticed that in the written statement filed by defendant No.1, which had been adopted by defendant No.3, the claim of the plaintiff had been denied in toto including the availing of the loan by defendant No.1 and defendants No. 2 and 3 having stood guarantors, whereas in the written statement filed by defendant No.2, which was sought to be adopted by defendant No.3, the defendant No.2 had specifically acknowledged the availing of loan by defendant No.1 meaning thereby as regards availing of loan, there was a limited admission to that extent subject to of course other defences that had been set up by defendant No.2. 18. 18. Therefore, in this background, it was the plaintiff who otherwise was the only contesting party, who would be placed at some advantageous position when defendant No. 3 is permitted to adopt the written statement filed by defendant No. 2 and that is why I really fail to understand how this particular species of estoppel i.e. “approbate and reprobate” could have been applied to the facts of the instant case. 19. It needs to be reiterated that legal maxims and doctrines are not be mechanically applied, but have to be applied to the fact situation obtaining in a given case. 20. There is yet another reason why the impugned order passed by the learned trial court cannot sustain because the invocation of the provisions as contained in Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC, to my mind in the given facts and circumstances, is totally mis-placed. 21. Having said so, I find merit in the instant petition and the same is accordingly allowed. Consequently, the impugned order dated 4.9.2018 passed by the learned trial court in CMA No. 153/2018 in Civil Suit No. 7/12 is set aside and defendant No.3 is permitted to adopt the written statement filed by defendant No.2. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. Parties are left to bear their own costs.