JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant petition under S. 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘Act’) is directed against Award dated 2.10.2015 passed by learned arbitral tribunal, whereby claim petition having been filed by petitioners-claimant (hereinafter, ‘claimant’) has been dismissed in toto. 2. Factual matrix of the case, as emerges from the record, is that the claimant came to be allotted two plots bearing Nos. 24 and 25 at Industrial Area, Tahliwal, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh by respondent Department for setting up factory/plant for manufacturing the food products. Possession of Plots No. 25 and 24 was handed over to the claimant on 8.8.1995 and 14.11.1995, respectively. As per terms and conditions contained in the lease deed, claimant was required to establish factory on the said plots within a period of one year after obtaining sanction for construction of building from the concerned authority. The period was extendable by six months. Record reveals that despite repeated show cause notices having been issued by the respondent, claimant failed to set up factory /plant and commence production. Record further reveals that respondent vide communication dated 20.11.1999 cancelled the allotment of plots and terminated the lease, however, subsequently, having taken note of the representation dated 17.12.1999 filed by the claimant, further period of one month was granted to the claimant to do the needful, but even after expiry of time granted to the claimant pursuant to its representation dated 17.12.1999, claimant failed to commence production. Respondent granted extension of time on four occasions to enable the claimant to set up factory/plaint and commence production, however, the fact remains that the claimant failed to set up factory/plant even during extended period and accordingly, vide communication dated 25.4.2003, plots No. 24 and 25, Industrial Area, Tahliwal, Una, came to be allotted to M/s Betamax Remedies Pvt. Ltd., who allegedly, without having any authority of law, entered into premises and took over possession of the plots from the claimant. Being aggrieved with aforesaid action of the private company i.e. Betamax Remedies Pvt. Ltd., claimant approached this court by way of writ petition i.e. CWP No. 571 of 2005, but same was also dismissed on 15.6.2007. Record further reveals that claimant had also approached Hon'ble Apex Court laying therein challenge to the interim order passed by this court in CWP No. 571 of 2005 but the same was also dismissed. Record further reveals that claimant had also approached Hon'ble Apex Court laying therein challenge to the interim order passed by this court in CWP No. 571 of 2005 but the same was also dismissed. It may be noticed that this court while dismissing CWP No. 571 of 2005, had categorically recorded that in case, petitioner has suffered damages and has not been paid price of the structure erected by it on the plots then it may take appropriate action for recovery of amount in accordance with law. After dismissal of SLP filed by claimant against interim order passed by this court, whereby interim protection granted was ordered to be vacated, claimant filed a review petition before this court, however, same was also dismissed. Subsequently claimant, while invoking arbitration clause provided in lease deed dated 21.5.1996, requested respondent to appoint an arbitrator for adjudication of the dispute. Claimant claimed that in terms of Clause 6(x) of the lease deed it is entitled to amount /damages qua buildings/machinery and cost of construction. Claimant claimed that it is entitled for a sum of Rs. 62,10,000/- on account of buildings, machineries and cost of construction raised by it on the plots No. 24 and 25. Since respondent failed to accede to the aforesaid request of claimant, it approached this court by filing application under S. 11 of the Act praying therein for appointment of an arbitrator. This court vide order dated 9.10.2009, appointed Mr. Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Senior Advocate as main Arbitrator and Ms. Divya Sood and Ms. Renu Parwari, as Co-arbitrators to adjudicate upon the dispute inter se parties. Above named arbitrators, vide award dated 2.10.2015, rejected the claim of the claimant in toto. In this background, claimant has approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for setting aside the Award and grant it adequate compensation as prayed for in the claim petition having been filed by it before the learned arbitral tribunal. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 4. Having carefully perused the grounds of challenge vis-à-vis impugned Award passed by the learned arbitral tribunal, this court finds that challenge to the Award is on the ground of public policy. As per Mr. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 4. Having carefully perused the grounds of challenge vis-à-vis impugned Award passed by the learned arbitral tribunal, this court finds that challenge to the Award is on the ground of public policy. As per Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel representing the claimant, award is against the public policy of India and contrary to the material evidence adduced on record by respective parties. To substantiate aforesaid argument Mr. Dadwal, while inviting attention of this court to Clause 6(x) of the lease deed, as referred to hereinabove, contended that project sought to be set up by claimant could not materialize, because of non-sanctioning of the capital by the financial institutions and as such, respondent ought to have paid amount as claimed in the claim petition qua the buildings, machinery and cost of construction raised by the claimant on the plots allotted in its favour. He further argued that being less or, the respondent had the first option to acquire the building and machinery, if any, on the spot and that too on agreed price, failing which amount qua the same is/was required to be determined by the arbitrator as provided under Clause 6(x). Mr. Dadwal, further argued that as per own case set up by respondent, plots originally allotted in favour of the claimant came to be re-allotted in favour of Betamax Remedies Pvt. Ltd. vide communication dated 25.4.2003, who subsequently, without having any authority of law forcibly entered into the premises and took possession thereof. Lastly, Mr. Dadwal, contended that as per Clause 6(x), claimant is entitled to the amount as referred to herein above but learned arbitral tribunal, despite there being specific evidence available on record to the effect at the time of handing over possession of the plots to M/s Betamax Remedies Pvt. Ltd., building and machinery were standing on the plots in question, failed to award amount in favour of claimant, as prayed for in the claim petition. He further contended that it has specifically come in the evidence that respondent before handing over the possession of the land in favour of Betamax Remedies Pvt. Ltd. had got cost of structure assessed at Rs.60,67,564/-, but despite availability of such evidence on record, learned arbitral tribunal failed to award any amount in favour of the claimant. 5. To the contrary, Mr. 5. To the contrary, Mr. Dinesh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, while supporting the impugned award passed by learned arbitral tribunal contended that there is no illegality or infirmity in the same, as such, same needs to be upheld. While making this court to travel through the impugned award, Mr. Thakur, made a serious attempt to persuade this court to agree with his contention that in view of meticulous findings returned by the learned arbitral tribunal, no scope is left for this court to interfere. He further contended that this court, while exercising powers under S. 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, has a very limited scope of re-appreciating the evidence, as such, present petition deserves to be dismissed. Mr. Thakur, further argued that it is amply clear from the record that the respondent vide communication dated 3.6.2005, had asked the claimant to remove the structure and as such, Clause 6(x) is not applicable in the present case. He further argued that since respondent did not exercise option available to it to acquire structure, if any, constructed on the spot, claim, if any, set up by the claimant for compensation on account of building and machinery and cost of construction allegedly raised by claimant on the plots allotted in its favour, rightly came to be rejected by the learned arbitral tribunal. 6. Before ascertaining correctness of aforesaid submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis impugned award passed by the learned arbitrator, it would be apt to take note of judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited versus Western Geco International Limited (2014) 9 Supreme Court Cases 263; wherein Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited versus Saw Pipes Limited (2003) 5 Supreme Court Cases 705, has held as under:- “34. It is true that none of the grounds enumerated under Section 34(2)(a) were set up before the High Court to assail the arbitral award. What was all the same urged before the High Court and so also before us was that the award made by the arbitrators was in conflict with the “public policy of India” a ground recognized under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) (supra). What was all the same urged before the High Court and so also before us was that the award made by the arbitrators was in conflict with the “public policy of India” a ground recognized under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) (supra). The expression “Public Policy of India” fell for interpretation before this Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 and was, after a comprehensive review of the case law on the subject, explained in para 31 of the decision in the following words: (SCC pp.727-28) “31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase “public policy of India” used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term “public policy” in Renusagar case 1994 Supp(1) SCC 644, it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be — award could be set aside if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void.” 35. What then would constitute the ‘Fundamental policy of Indian Law’ is the question. The decision in Saw Pipes Ltd. (supra) does not elaborate that aspect. Even so, the expression must, in our opinion, include all such fundamental principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country. What then would constitute the ‘Fundamental policy of Indian Law’ is the question. The decision in Saw Pipes Ltd. (supra) does not elaborate that aspect. Even so, the expression must, in our opinion, include all such fundamental principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country. Without meaning to exhaustively enumerate the purport of the expression “Fundamental Policy of Indian Law”, we may refer to three distinct and fundamental juristic principles that must necessarily be understood as a part and parcel of the Fundamental Policy of Indian law. The first and foremost is the principle that in every determination whether by a Court or other authority that affects the rights of a citizen or leads to any civil consequences, the Court or authority concerned is bound to adopt what is in legal parlance called a ‘judicial approach’ in the matter. The duty to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of the power exercised by the Court or the authority does not have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora concerned. What must be remembered is that the importance of Judicial approach in judicial and quasi judicial determination lies in the fact that so long as the Court, Tribunal or the authority exercising powers that affect the rights or obligations of the parties before them shows fidelity to judicial approach, they cannot act in an arbitrary, capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial approach ensures that the authority acts bonafide and deals with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and that its decision is not actuated by any extraneous consideration. Judicial approach in that sense acts as a check against flaws and faults that can render the decision of a Court, Tribunal or Authority vulnerable to challenge.” 7. It clearly emerge from the aforesaid judgment that the concept of “public policy” connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. Similarly, award/judgment/decision likely to adversely affect the administration of justice has been also termed to be against “public policy” 8. Reliance is also placed upon a judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Hindustan Tea Company v. M/s K. Sashikant & Company and another, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 81; wherein it has been held as under:- “Under the law, the arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the dispute between the parties. Reliance is also placed upon a judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Hindustan Tea Company v. M/s K. Sashikant & Company and another, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 81; wherein it has been held as under:- “Under the law, the arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the dispute between the parties. The award is not open to challenge on the ground that the Arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion or has failed to appreciate facts. Where the award which was a reasoned one was challenged on the ground that the arbitrator acted contrary to the provisions of Section 70 of the Contract Act, it was held that the same could not be set aside.” 9. Similarly, Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Sudarsan Trading Company v. The Government of Kerala and another, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 890, has held as under:- “It is not open to the court to probe the mental process of the arbitrator and speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator as to what impelled him to arrive at his conclusion. In the instant case the arbitrator has merely set out the claims and given the history of the claims and then awarded certain amount. He has not spoken his mind indicating why he has done what he has done; he has narrated only how he came to make the award. In the absence of any reasons for making the award, it is not open to the Court to interfere with the award. Furthermore, in any event, reasonableness of the reasons given by the arbitrator, cannot be challenged. Appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is never a matter which the Court questions and considers. If the parties have selected their own forum, the deciding forum must be conceded the power of appraisement of the evidence. The arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as the quantity of evidence and it will not be for the Court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence before the arbitrator.” 10. Reference is also made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Company Limited and others (2006) 11 Supreme Court Cases 181. Reference is also made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Company Limited and others (2006) 11 Supreme Court Cases 181. The relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as under:- “In terms of the 1996 Act, a departure was made so far as the jurisdiction of the court to set aside an arbitral award is concerned vis-a-vis the earlier Act. Whereas under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act, the power of the court was wide, Section 34 of the 1996 Act brings about certain changes envisaged there under. Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 did not contain the expression “error of law…”. The same was added by judicial interpretation. While interpreting Section 30 of the 1940 Act, a question has been raised before the courts as to whether the principle of law applied by the arbitrator was (a) erroneous or otherwise or (b) wrong principle was applied. If, however, no dispute existed as on the date of invocation, the question could not have been gone into by the Arbitrator. The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it. The arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to (a) fundamental policy of Indian law;(b) the interests of India; (c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal or arbitrary. Such patent illegality, however, must go to the root of the matter. The public policy violation, indisputably, should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the court. Such patent illegality, however, must go to the root of the matter. The public policy violation, indisputably, should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the court. Lastly where the Arbitrator, however, has gone contrary to or beyond the expressed law of the contract or granted relief in the matter not in dispute, would come within the purview of Section 34 of the Act. What would constitute public policy is a matter dependant upon the nature of transaction and nature of statute. For the said purpose, the pleadings of the parties and the materials brought on record would be relevant to enable the court to judge what is in public good or public interest, and what would otherwise be injurious to the public good at the relevant point, as contradistinguished from the policy of a particular government. 11. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law that scope of interference by Court is very limited while considering objections having been filed by the aggrieved party under Section 34 of the Act. Award passed by the learned arbitrator can be interfered with in case of a fraud or bias or violation of principles of natural justice. Interference, if any, on the ground of ‘patent illegality’ is only permissible, if the same goes to the root of the case. Violation should be so unfair and unreasonable so as to shock the conscience of the Court. In the judgment referred herein above, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that what is to be constituted as ‘public policy’ is a matter dependent upon the transaction and nature of the statute, but the same should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the Court, as has been observed herein above. 12. Similarly, there can not be any dispute, as has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court that Courts while deciding objections, if any, filed by the aggrieved party under Section 34 of the Act, against the award passed by learned arbitrator, does not sit in appeal over the findings returned by the learned arbitrator and there can not be any reappraisal of evidence on the basis of which learned arbitrator has passed the award. Otherwise also, in terms of Section 34 of the Act, objections, if any, filed by the aggrieved party can be considered by the Court, if the award is in any manner against public policy, which certainly has to be liberally interpreted in view of the facts of the case. 13. With a view to test the genuineness and correctness of the submission of the learned counsel representing the petitioner that the Award passed by the learned Arbitrator is against the public policy, this court carefully perused record vis-à-vis impugned Award passed by the learned arbitral tribunal, perusal whereof clearly suggests that since claimant failed to set up factory/plant and commence production on the plots allotted in its favour despite repeated opportunities afforded to it, allotment made in its favour came to be cancelled vide order dated 20.11.1999. Record further reveals that even after passing of cancellation order dated 20.11.1999, further opportunities were granted to the claimant to commence production on the allotted plots but ultimately when claimant failed to start production, plots in question came to be allotted in favour of M/s Betamax Remedies Pvt. Ltd., vide letter dated 25.4.2003, as has been taken note herein above. Claimant being aggrieved with the forcible dispossession by M/s Betamax Remedies Pvt. Ltd., had approached this court by filing CWP No. 571 of 2005, wherein no relief was granted, and claimant went to Hon'ble Supreme Court of India but no relief was granted to the claimant there too. 14. Question which needs to be determined in the instant proceedings is that whether claimant is entitled to amount if any, in terms of clause 6(x) of the lease deed, which reads as under: “(x) That in the event of the project not materializing (sic materialining) or the industry failing, the lease will be terminated and the less or shall have the first option to acquire on such termination the buildings, machinery etc. at an agreed price or (sic of) failing that at price determined by a sole arbitrator agreed upon by both the less or and the lessee or in the absence of such a sole agreed arbitrator (sic arbitrators), one to be appointed by the less or and one by the lessee. The provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and any statutory modifications thereof shall apply to any such arbitration. The provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and any statutory modifications thereof shall apply to any such arbitration. If the less or does not exercises vacant possession of the said land after removing any construction made or machinery fixed etc. within a period of two years completed from the date of termination of the lease.” 15. Careful perusal of clause contained in lease deed clearly suggests that in the event of project not materializing, right was reserved to the respondent to terminate the lease deed and it also had a right/option to acquire the buildings, machinery etc. on agreed price, failing which mater was to be decided by sole arbitrator agreed upon by both, lessee and the lessor. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that dispute arose inter se parties on account of claim of the claimant qua cost of building, machinery and cost of construction allegedly set up /raised by it on the allotted plots and ultimately arbitrator came to be appointed pursuant to orders passed by this court in arbitration proceedings. 16. Careful perusal of impugned award passed by the arbitrator clearly suggests that issue raised before this court by way of instant petition filed under S. 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, has been carefully and elaborately dealt with by the learned arbitral tribunal. Though, having perused the findings returned by the learned arbitral tribunal qua the issue, this court sees no reason, more so in the instant proceedings to elaborate further upon the issue. However, on the persistence of learned counsel representing the claimant, this court examined issue afresh and is of the view that the finding returned by learned arbitral tribunal is absolutely based upon correct appreciation of the Clause 6(x) of the lease deed. 17. Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel representing the claimant, was unable to dispute that vide notice dated 3.6.2005, claimant was asked to remove the structure. Perusal of aforesaid communication clearly reveals that respondent asked the claimant to remove the structure, if any, raised by it on the allotted plots and as such, there appears to be force in the arguments of Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel representing the claimant, was unable to dispute that vide notice dated 3.6.2005, claimant was asked to remove the structure. Perusal of aforesaid communication clearly reveals that respondent asked the claimant to remove the structure, if any, raised by it on the allotted plots and as such, there appears to be force in the arguments of Mr. Dinesh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, that since respondent did not exercise its first option in terms of clause 6(x), there was no occasion for the respondent to pay amount, if any, qua the building, machinery and cost of construction, if any, raised on the plots by claimant. Otherwise also, it clearly emerges from the record that factum with regard to removal of structure by third party i.e. Betamax Remedies Pvt. Ltd. was very much in the knowledge of the claimant, who being aggrieved with its forcible dispossession by Betamax Remedies had approached this court by way of CWP No. 571 of 2005, which was also dismissed. 18. It clearly emerges from the record that claimant while approaching this court in CWP No. 571 of 2005 had alleged that machinery, building and wall constructed by it has been demolished by third party i.e. Betamax Remedies meaning thereby it is admitted case of claimant that the structure, machinery, if any, on the plots was never taken into possession by the respondent. 19. Having carefully perused the material available on record, this court is not persuaded to agree with the contention of Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel representing the claimant that since learned arbitral tribunal had evidence before it to the effect that respondent before handing over possession to Betamax Remedies had got the valuation of structure done and assessed the same at Rs.60,67,546, learned arbitral tribunal ought to have awarded said amount to the claimant, because if aforesaid argument advanced by Mr. Dadwal is presumed to be correct, even in that eventuality, there is no evidence available on record adduced by the claimant that aforesaid amount of Rs.7,68,564/- was actually released by respondent and subsequently eaten up by it. Only evidence available on record is that respondent at the time of handing over possession to Betamax Remedies had got the cost of the structure standing on the plot assessed at Rs.7,68,546/-. Only evidence available on record is that respondent at the time of handing over possession to Betamax Remedies had got the cost of the structure standing on the plot assessed at Rs.7,68,546/-. Otherwise also, as has been noticed herein above, there is ample evidence that structure, if any, standing on the plot was demolished and damaged by Betamax Remedies as was alleged by claimant in CWP No. 571 of 2005. 20. Having considered the facts of the case in light of the aforesaid exposition of law, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that the impugned award, as has been assailed before this Court by way of objections under Section 34 of the act, is neither against public policy nor has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Perusal of the objections filed by the objector suggests that neither there are any specific allegations that Award is against the public policy nor it has been clarified as to which finding or findings made by the learned arbitrator are against public policy, save and except general allegations that award is against express terms of the contract, unjust, unfair and unsustainable and patently illegal. Apart from above, interference on the ground of “patent illegality” is permissible only if the same is going to the root of the matter. The public policy, violation should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the Court. 21. Hence, this court sees no reason to differ with the findings returned by the learned arbitral tribunal, while rejecting the claim as set up by the claimant. 22. Consequently in view of the detailed discussion made herein above, present petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.